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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the public politics of Empire at the fin de siècle. Taking as 
its focus the relationships between the Liberal Party, imperial rhetoric and the 
South African question in British politics from the Jameson Raid of 1895 through 
to the Transvaal Colony elections of 1907, it analyses key episodes such as the 
1899 outbreak of the South African War, the ‘methods of barbarism’ controversy 
of 1901 and the politics of ‘Chinese slavery’ in the run up to the general election 
of 1906. 
Eschewing a traditional focus on high politics, personal motivation and imperial 
thought, this thesis explores the public rhetoric of leading Liberal politicians, as 
evidenced in newspaper records and parliamentary proceedings. In doing so, 
this study identifies the key themes, languages and arguments which served as 
the framework through which Liberal speakers articulated both their specific 
responses to events in South Africa and advanced a wider Liberal approach to 
the politics of Empire. 
In focusing on Liberal politics as distinct from liberalism as political philosophy 
and avoiding a narrow factional focus, this thesis aims to further understandings 
of the role played by Empire within late-Victorian and Edwardian Liberal political 
culture. It argues that for all the internal divisions within the Liberal Party, Liberal 
speakers nonetheless maintained a largely consistent rhetoric of Empire in 
response to the South African question, emphasising the ideals of British 
imperial rule and the extent to which the Unionist government and the Boers 
respectively failed to meet such expectations. This thesis further suggests that 
the evidence explored provides a wider insight into the imperial factor in British 
political history, and challenges some of the assumptions of more minimalist 
accounts of the impact of the British Empire ‘at home’. 
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INTRODUCTION: SOUTH AFRICA, IMPERIAL POLITICS AND LIBERAL RHETORIC 
When in September 1899 the Liberals of Bristol East selected Charles 
Hobhouse to contest the seat at the next general election, the normally 
sympathetic Bristol Mercury was notably muted in its support for the new 
candidate. Although its editorial of 7 September declared that ‘the constituency 
is lucky in finding an earnest and vigorous and convinced candidate’ and noted 
in particular that there could be ‘no room for doubt as to his soundness about 
education’, on the tricky matter of South Africa the Bristol Mercury found itself at 
odds with the candidate’s views.1 The day before, in his first speech to his 
prospective constituents, Hobhouse had rubbished the prospect that Britain 
should go to war with the South African Republic, an outcome which looked 
increasingly likely throughout 1899 as Anglo-Boer relations in the region 
steadily worsened.2 Challenging Hobhouse’s position, the Bristol Mercury 
insisted that imperial interests demanded that Britain maintain ‘a practical and 
moral supremacy throughout South Africa’. Nonetheless, the editorial conceded, 
‘Liberal opinion is, as we know, not quite agreed on this subject, or shall we say 
that Liberals are not quite agreed as to which is the right way to apply Liberal 
principles’.3 Undoubtedly this remark reflected a somewhat optimistic desire to 
minimise the significance of the Liberal split on the issue, but in many ways it 
also struck right at the heart of the Liberal Party’s difficulties over the South 
African question and the politics of Empire: ‘Liberal principles’ could offer their 
adherents no single guide to action. 
This thesis analyses the rhetoric of Liberal Party speakers on Empire and the 
South African question in late-Victorian and early-Edwardian Britain. As well as 
looking at the period of the 1899-1902 South African War itself, this thesis also 
examines Liberal reactions to the Jameson Raid of 1895 and two of the key 
controversies of the war’s aftermath, namely Chinese labour and the grant of 
responsible government to the Transvaal Colony. By examining the public 
rhetoric of Liberal politicians, primarily through newspaper reports of key 
speeches and the records of parliamentary debates, this thesis identifies the 
                                            
1 Editorial, Bristol Mercury, 7 Sep. 1899. 
2 Charles Hobhouse, speech at Bristol, 6 Sep. 1899, reported in Bristol Mercury, 
7 Sep. 1899. 
3 Bristol Mercury, 7 Sep. 1899. 
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key tropes through which the politics of Empire were articulated in this period. In 
doing so, this thesis also explores the relationship between this public, 
contested politics of Empire and the internal divisions which wracked British 
Liberalism in the post-Gladstonian era. With such a focus in mind, this thesis is, 
at its core, a political and rhetorical history: the focus is not so much on the 
nature of British imperial rule in South Africa in and of itself, but instead upon 
how the South African question was constructed, expressed and debated within 
British political life. 
Naturally, the strong body of existing scholarship on the fin-de-siècle Liberal 
Party is of great assistance to a project such as this, biographers, political 
historians and scholars of imperial policy having extensively documented the 
intricacies of the party’s high politics over the years.4 In seeking to shift the 
focus from the private politics of Empire to that of the public sphere, this thesis 
aims not to reject this rich historiographical trend, but instead to complement it 
by identifying the public contexts within which these high political struggles 
occurred. Likewise, the many excellent studies of late-Victorian ideas of Empire 
and imperialism have greatly enriched our understandings of the intellectual and 
theoretical foundations by which liberalism and imperialism interacted. Through 
decoupling Liberal rhetoric from wider assumptions of liberalism, this thesis 
seeks to build upon this existing body of intellectual history by exploring how in 
relation to South Africa the conceptualisation of Empire existed and operated 
within the practical metropolitan politics of Empire. 
In examining the public rhetoric of Liberal speakers on the South African 
question, this thesis contributes to the field of British political and imperial 
                                            
4 The key accounts outlining the Liberal Party’s approach to South African 
affairs in this period include Jeffrey Butler, The Liberal Party and the Jameson 
Raid (Oxford: 1968); Peter Stansky, Ambitions and Strategies: The struggle for 
the leadership of the Liberal Party in the 1890s (Oxford: 1964); H.C.G. Matthew, 
The Liberal Imperialists: the ideas and politics of a post-Gladstonian élite 
(Oxford: 1973); G.B. Pyrah, Imperial Policy and South Africa, 1902-10 (Oxford: 
1955) and Ronald Hyam, Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office, 1905-1908: 
the watershed of the Empire-Commonwealth (London: 1968). 
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history by seeking to move beyond some of the limitations present in existing 
assessments of the politics of the South African question. First, by seeking to 
assess via a rhetorical focus the means by which the politics of the South 
African question were conducted, this thesis aims to complement and inform 
existing debates on the relative salience of ‘Empire’ or ‘imperialism’ within 
British politics by identifying the form such ideas took in political practice, 
unpacking the assumptions, approaches and ideals by which the British 
presence in South Africa was explained and justified. Second, by eschewing a 
traditional high politics emphasis on the private views and motivations of 
individual political actors, while at the same time adopting a focus on ‘Liberal 
politics’ rather than liberalism as a wider philosophy or ideology, this thesis aims 
to advance our understanding of the role played by Empire within Liberal 
political culture at the end of the Victorian era. Third, by examining the Liberal 
party as a whole, rather than focusing on a specific faction such as the pro-
Boers or the Liberal Imperialists, this thesis aims to contribute towards both the 
existing historiography of Liberal Party history and the political historiography of 
the South African War. By situating the splits over Empire within a wider contest 
over the nature of Liberal politics it emphasises the common politics of Empire 
within which the different Liberal factions positioned themselves. Additionally, 
the chapters that follow will demonstrate the potential for a party-focused study 
of political rhetoric to inform wider debates surrounding the role of Empire within 
British political history. Finally, while the focus of this thesis is directly 
concerned with Liberal rhetoric and the politics of Empire specifically in relation 
to the South African question, this thesis will seek to suggest ways in which 
analysis of this Liberal rhetoric of Empire might inform wider understandings of 
the relationship between liberalism and imperialism in the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries. 
The Road to 1895 
In one sense, the South African question as it existed in the politics of fin-de-
siècle Britain can be said to have been brought about by the Jameson Raid of 
1895, the abortive coup attempt by which the imperialist Cecil Rhodes 
attempted to displace the Boer leadership of the South African Republic (SAR) 
with a regime more amenable to British and Cape interests. Although the Raid 
proved a spectacular failure, it triggered a new period of crisis for South Africa, 
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sparking the war of 1899-1902 and ensuring South African questions dominated 
imperial affairs for over a decade. At the end of 1895, South Africa was a region 
dominated by four white settler states, of which two, the Cape Colony and 
Natal, were incorporated into the British Empire, while the remaining two, the 
SAR and the Orange Free State, were self-governing Boer republics. However, 
far from this state of affairs representing a blank canvas upon which the 
destabilising events of the Raid were painted, the region’s recent history already 
contained the seeds of many of the critical issues which were to determine the 
course of the South African question in the years that followed the Raid.  
Indeed, the basis for some aspects of the Anglo-Boer relationship trace as far 
back as the original British acquisition of the Cape. For our present purposes, 
though, the Boer settlement of the Transorangia and Transvaal regions in the 
first half of the nineteenth century represents the best starting point, the result of 
the Great Trek away from areas of British rule at the Cape and in the newly-
annexed Port Natal.5 This migration represented a specific rejection of British 
imperial authority, and was in no small part a response to the British position on 
the Black African populations of the region, particularly the legacies of the push 
against slavery, a point which later critics of Boer rule were keen to point out.6 
The years which followed the Great Trek were marked by what A.N. Porter has 
characterised as ‘the long history of recurrent British withdrawal and advance in 
South Africa’: following the pattern of the imperial acquisition of Natal, 
Transorangia was annexed to the Empire in 1848 as the Orange River 
Sovereignty in the name of countering disorder in the region, only to be 
retroceded just six years later in the face of Boer unrest.7 Driven by a concern 
for order and the security of Britain’s existing imperial possessions British 
authority was extended over new territories, only to be subsequently 
constrained by anxieties over accumulated responsibility and increased Anglo-
Boer tensions. This tidal pattern of British imperial expansion would 
                                            
5 For details see John S. Galbraith, Reluctant Empire: British policy on the 
South African frontier 1834-1854 (Berkeley, CA: 1963). 
6 Iain R. Smith, The origins of the South African War 1899-1902 (Harlow: 1996), 
p.17. 
7 Galbraith, Reluctant Empire; A.N. Porter, The origins of the South African War: 
Joseph Chamberlain and the diplomacy of imperialism, 1895-99 (Manchester: 
1980), p.37. 
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subsequently prove a useful basis for critics of the South African War and 
annexation. 
However, the single most significant event in shaping the South African 
question of the fin de siècle was the Transvaal War of 1880-1881, also known 
as the First Boer War. The Boers of the Transvaal had established the SAR in 
1856, but by 1877 the fledgling republic faced ruin and likely annihilation, 
prompting the Disraeli government to authorise its annexation to the Empire.8 
For William Gladstone this act represented just the latest element of Disraelian 
imperial acquisitiveness, prompting the Liberal stalwart to incorporate the issue 
into his Midlothian campaign ahead of the 1880 general election. Speaking in 
November 1879, Gladstone condemned the government’s subjugation of ‘a 
free, European, Christian and Republican community’ against its will.9 Despite 
this, however, upon returning to office Gladstone’s South African policy was not 
one of reversing the annexation, but of cementing it in order to ultimately 
facilitate a British-dominated federation in South Africa.10 This about-turn only 
increased resentment in the Transvaal, and after a poorly-handled dispute over 
taxation at the end of 1880 the Boers rose up against British rule, seemingly 
threatening an Afrikaner rising across South Africa.  
The conflict which followed was short and, in military terms, relatively 
insignificant: although the British defeat at Majuba Hill would in subsequent 
years come to be seen as a humiliation, it did not greatly determine the course 
of the conflict, Gladstone’s government having already determined to pursue a 
negotiated settlement.11 The key legacy of the events of 1880-1881 was not 
therefore so much the conflict itself, but the nature of the settlement which 
followed, in the form of the Pretoria and London conventions. The Pretoria 
Convention of 1881, which directly followed the end of the conflict, established 
                                            
8 Smith, Origins of the South African War, p.26. 
9 William Gladstone, speech at Edinburgh, 25 Nov. 1879, reported in The 
Times, 26 Nov. 1879. However, South Africa represented only a minor element 
of the Midlothian platform, which indeed was primarily concerned with the 
malign impact of imperialism upon Britain itself. See P.J. Durrans, ‘A Two-
Edged Sword: The Liberal Attack on Disraelian Imperialism’, Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History 10:3 (1982). 
10 Smith, Origins of the South African War, p.30; D.M. Schreuder, Gladstone 
and Kruger: Liberal Government and Colonial ‘Home Rule’ 1880-85 (London: 
1969), p.58. 
11 Smith, Origins of the South African War, p.31. 
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what was termed the Transvaal State as an associated entity of the Empire, a 
relationship ambiguously referred to in the convention’s preamble as suzerainty. 
Although notionally a grant of self-government, the convention greatly limited 
the state’s scope for independent action and maintained British oversight over a 
number of key areas.  
However, this state of affairs quickly proved unenforceable, generating 
resentment in the Transvaal and attracting criticism in British political circles. 
Significantly, when compelled to explain before Parliament why Britain was not 
seeking to enforce the convention, Gladstone fell back on a tactic which was to 
become a central element of ‘pro-Boer’ rhetoric: cautioning that ‘a strong feeling 
of sympathy passes from one end of the South African Settlements to the other 
among the entire Dutch population’, the Prime Minister warned that Britain 
risked calamity if it alienated its Dutch subjects at the Cape by implementing the 
convention through force.12 With Gladstone’s government having effectively 
admitted defeat over the Pretoria Convention, the road was soon paved for its 
replacement in the form of the London Convention of 1884. In contrast to its 
predecessor, the terms of the new convention imposed just two clear limitations 
on the state which the British now agreed to recognise under the name of the 
South African Republic: a prohibition against slavery, and a veto over any 
treaties the SAR might negotiate with foreign powers.13 Critically however, the 
new convention did not directly address the question of whether British 
suzerainty remained in place, an ambiguity which was to become a key 
flashpoint in the autumn of 1899. 
In the decade following the London Convention, dramatic developments in 
South Africa failed to be reflected in political life at the metropole. Arthur 
Davey’s assessment that ‘despite the upsurge of economic focus on South 
Africa […] the period 1886 to 1892 was marked by political inattention to it in 
Britain’ holds largely true for the whole period before the Jameson Raid.14 
Although reference to the post-Majuba settlement was to be made in the 
election of 1885, with Gladstone insisting that his policy had averted a general 
                                            
12 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons debate (hereafter HC Deb.), 16 
Mar. 1883, third series, Vol.277, c.722.  
13 Smith, Origins of the South African War, p.34. 
14 Arthur Davey, The British Pro-Boers 1877-1902 (Cape Town: 1978) p.36. 
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war in South Africa, it did not form a centre point of the campaign.15 In the years 
that followed, the discovery of gold on the Rand, the rapid industrialisation of 
the region around Johannesburg, and the interventions of Germany all had a 
profound impact on the regional balance of power.16 The setting up of the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate and the establishment of Chartered Company rule 
in Rhodesia brought about the further reshaping of South Africa in the late-
nineteenth century. While these developments hardly went unnoticed in Britain, 
at the same time they did not form the keystone of debates about Empire in 
British politics. Beyond these specific developments however, this period was 
also significant for the development of ideas of Boer nationhood. It was not until 
after the events of the South African War that the notion of an Afrikaner national 
identity fully materialised, yet nonetheless the political climate in the Transvaal 
following British retrocession proved fertile ground for the construction of a new 
and revitalised Afrikaner national identity. As Iain R. Smith notes, ‘the Transvaal 
became the rallying point for the vision of a united Afrikaner nation, with a 
shared sentiment and a common destiny’.17 If the end of the nineteenth century 
had not yet witnessed the definite foundation of Boer nationhood, it was 
nonetheless a growing political and cultural force in this period. 
Two further incidents in the run up to the Raid are worth noting, if not so much 
for their immediate political impact than for the underlying trends they 
embodied: the Malaboch War of 1894 and the Drifts Crisis of 1895. As Tlou 
John Makhura has argued, the Malaboch War, also known to history as the 
Boer-Bagananwa War, represented an important precursor to the events of the 
Raid; the SAR’s efforts to conscript the mining population of Johannesburg 
exacerbated tensions within the Republic as well as directly involving the 
imperial government in the affairs of the Uitlanders.18 Likewise the Drifts Crisis, 
                                            
15 Ibid, p.32. 
16 For details on the political and economic changes that took place in South 
Africa in this period, see. D. M. Schreuder, The Scramble for Southern Africa, 
1877-1895: the politics of partition reappraised (Cambridge, 1980).  
17 Smith, Origins of the South African War, p.34. 
18 Tlou John Makhura, ‘Another Road to the Raid: The Neglected Role of the 
Boer-Bagananwa War as a Factor in the Coming of the Jameson Raid, 1894-
1895’, Journal of Southern African Studies 21:2 (Jun. 1995). A revised version 
of this article was subsequently published as Tlou John Makhura, ‘The 
Neglected Role of the Boer-Bagananwa War in the Jameson Raid’, in The 
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at heart an economic dispute between the Cape and the SAR over the charges 
levied on goods traffic entering the Transvaal, again saw the intervention of the 
imperial government in a standoff between the regional powers.19 The situation 
at the close of 1895 was therefore not only one of increasing tension in the 
region, but also one of growing direct concern for London. 
Events in Britain meanwhile had seen the Liberal Party stumble from crisis to 
crisis, as disputes over foreign policy, imperial policy and Irish Home Rule 
crippled the effectiveness of both Gladstone’s final ministry and Lord 
Rosebery’s short-lived successor administration. Cast firmly into opposition 
following the cordite vote and the general election of 1895, the end of the year 
saw the party badly divided with increasingly fractious relations among its 
leadership. Joseph Chamberlain, the former Liberal turned Liberal Unionist, was 
by the same chain of events elevated to the position of Colonial Secretary in 
Lord Salisbury’s new Unionist ministry. Although traditionally something of a 
less overtly political post, the prominence Chamberlain brought to the position 
allowed him to increasingly push imperial issues to the fore of British politics.20 
In this manner, with imperial interests increasingly clashing in South Africa with 
the growing strength of the SAR, and with a renewed focus on imperial affairs 
emerging in domestic politics, the stage was set on the eve of the Raid for over 
a decade of political turbulence surrounding the South African question. 
Imperialism, Imperial History and the Politics of Empire 
The nature of British involvement in South Africa at the dawn of the twentieth 
century has long been a subject of intense historical interest. Quite apart from 
its significance for the history of the region itself, the events of the South African 
War and the subsequent settlement laying the foundations for the apartheid 
state that was to emerge in the aftermath of the Second World War, the decade 
of upheaval unleashed by the Jameson Raid of 1895 was to have enormous 
                                                                                                                                
Brenthurst Press, The Jameson Raid: a centennial retrospective (Houghton: 
1996). 
19 Smith, Origins of the South African War, p.66. See also discussion in Kenneth 
Wilburn, ‘The Drifts Crisis, the “missing telegrams” and the Jameson Raid: a 
centennial review’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 25:2 (1997). 
20 Porter, Origins of the South African War. 
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ramifications for Britain and the Empire at large.21 The situation of the South 
African question’s climax at the very end of the Victorian era, embodying the 
last major conflict for Britain prior to the cataclysmic events of 1914, has further 
served to emphasise for historians the significance of the crises and 
controversies which accompanied British intervention in the Transvaal, not only 
in understanding the course of late-Victorian and early-Edwardian British 
imperial policy but in seeking to assess the fundamental character and scope of 
British imperialism and British imperial rule in this period, as well as the impact 
of the Empire upon life at the metropole.  
In particular, historians have sought to use developments in the South African 
theatre as a case study for identifying the wider impulses behind British imperial 
expansion in the latter part of the nineteenth century. These debates 
surrounding the relationship between the South African War in particular and 
scholarly theories of imperialism are explored in more depth in chapter two, but 
for our current purposes it suffices to broadly characterise the key approaches 
as emphasising alternately economic determinism and strategic concerns as 
key drivers of British imperial expansion. In terms of the former, a variety of 
explanations have been proposed: for Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, 
intervention in South Africa represented only the latest in a series of reactive 
steps taken by the ‘official mind’ of the British government in order to address 
apparent threats to the Empire; in Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw’s analysis, 
British policy was driven by a need to counter the growing economic strength of 
the South African Republic; and for John Darwin imperial expansion in South 
Africa was concerned with reinforcing the interests of British ‘bridgehead’ 
groups in the region.22 In terms of the focus of this thesis, what is of most 
                                            
21 Writing in the aftermath of South Africa’s secession from the commonwealth, 
Nicholas Mansergh traced the roots of the new South African question back to 
the Liberal Party’s efforts to settle the previous one: see Nicholas Mansergh, 
South Africa 1906-1961: The Price of Magnanimity (London: 1962). For other 
accounts situating the conflict within the wider history of twentieth century South 
Africa, see for example: T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: a modern history, 
fourth edition (London: 1991); Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw, The Lion and 
the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War (Cambridge: 2003). 
22 Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, with Alice Denny, Africa and the 
Victorians: the official mind of imperialism (London: 1961), ch.14; Hyam and 
Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok, ch.2; John Darwin, ‘Imperialism and the 
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significance is not so much which theory best explains British expansion into 
South Africa, but more that the strategic assessment can be seen as reflecting 
an essentially defensive imperial outlook, which one might be expected to find 
in contemporary interpretations of events.  
To a degree, similar inferences might be drawn in relation to interpretations 
which explained the growth of empire from an economic determinist 
perspective, not least because many such assessments can be said to have 
had their origins in J.A. Hobson’s theories of imperialism, directly articulated in 
the context of South Africa.23 Ultimately, the question of which combination of 
forces actually brought about British action in South Africa is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. However, if the nature of British imperial expansion is to be 
understood, a key element of this understanding must be an appreciation of 
how contemporary political actors conceptualised, explained and justified British 
actions. With this goal in mind this thesis seeks to uncover the Liberal Party’s 
public response to the South African question. 
Given this focus, this study also engages with the debates surrounding the 
significance of the Empire at the metropole. The study of British imperial history 
has in recent decades seen a marked shift in scholarly attention towards the 
challenge of assessing the pervasiveness of imperialism and the impact of the 
Empire upon life in Britain. As an area of inquiry it is one which had produced 
starkly contrasting results, most notably in the form of the ongoing 
disagreement between John MacKenzie and Bernard Porter. While the specific 
contours of the debate have invariably shifted over time, the key area of dispute 
remains over the degree to which the Empire ‘mattered’ to the British: whereas 
in Propaganda and Empire MacKenzie depicts a Britain infused with imperial 
imagery and thinking, Porter in The Absent-Minded Imperialists presents the 
Empire as largely unimportant for all but those, mainly elites, directly connected 
with the enterprise.24  
                                                                                                                                
Victorians: the Dynamics of Territorial Expansion’, English Historical Review 
112:447 (1997). 
23 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: 1954) [first published 1902].  
24 John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: the Manipulation of British 
Public Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester: 1984); Bernard Porter, The Absent-
Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford: 2004). 
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These debates, subsequently explored through works such as Andrew S. 
Thompson’s The Empire Strikes Back? and Catherine Hall and Sonya O. 
Rose’s volume At Home with the Empire, have in many ways been neatly 
reflected by developments in the political history of fin-de-siècle Britain, 
particularly in relation to the significance of the South African War.25 For 
example, in An Imperial War and the British Working Class Richard Price 
sought to overturn the ‘khaki’ interpretation of the 1900 general election, the 
notion widely advanced by contemporary political actors that Unionist 
exploitation of patriotic and jingoistic narratives secured the Salisbury 
government’s re-election. However, Price’s efforts to downplay the impact of the 
war and imperial concerns upon voting behaviour have themselves come under 
challenge from more recent scholarship.26 In particular, the work of Paul 
Readman on the language of patriotism in Unionist election addresses has 
demonstrated the degree to which the South African question played a 
prominent role in late-Victorian party politics, while the contributions of M.D. 
Blanch and Ian Sharpe have also sought to challenge the notion that impact of 
imperial affairs on British politics was minimal.27   
A focus on language and rhetoric has also proved useful in examining the ways 
in which the nature of the British Empire and the meanings of imperialism more 
generally were understood by historical actors. In one sense, historians of the 
British Empire have long recognised the contested and evolving meanings of 
                                                                                                                                
Although not directly connected with the questions examined here, it is worth 
noting that more recently the question of the Empire’s centrality to life in Britain 
has been linked with wider debates over the ‘minimalist’ or ‘maximalist’ 
interpretation of the Empire’s impact on the world at large: see John M. 
MacKenzie, ‘The British Empire: Ramshackle or Rampaging? A 
Historiographical Reflection’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 
43:1 (2015). 
25 Andrew S. Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back? The Impact of Imperialism 
on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Harlow: 2005) ; Catherine Hall and 
Sonya O. Rose (eds), At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the 
Imperial World (Cambridge: 2006). 
26 Richard Price, An Imperial War and the British Working Class: Working-Class 
Attitudes and Reactions to the Boer War 1899-1902 (London: 1972). 
27 Paul Readman, ‘The Conservative Party, patriotism, and British politics: the 
case of the general election of 1900’, Journal of British Studies 40:1 (2001); 
M.D. Blanch, ‘British society and the war’, in Peter Warwick (ed.), The South 
African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902 (Harlow: 1980); Iain Sharpe, 
‘Empire, patriotism and the working-class electorate: the 1900 general election 
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the term. In their classic study Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a 
Political Word, Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt identified a turn-of-
the-century British imperialism caught between two understandings, one an 
earlier critical identification of imperialism with despotic rule and the other 
representing an outward-looking expression of national patriotism. Significantly, 
it is worth noting that for the authors the South African War represented ‘an 
essential turning point’ in the career of imperialism as a political word, bringing 
about a reversion to the earlier, pejorative understanding of the term.28 More 
recently, Thompson has made use of the South African question to chart the 
rise to dominance of different visions of imperialism within British political 
discourse. The contest for the language of imperialism, Thompson argues, saw 
first the dominance in the run up to the conflict of 1899-1902 of a Conservative 
vision of Empire which stressed settler kinship, then the emergence of a Liberal 
Imperialist-Fabian imperialism which sought to link patriotism with social reform, 
and finally the articulation of a Radical politics of empire which rejected 
imperialism and instead championed ideas of trusteeship.29 Along related lines, 
works such as Miles Taylor’s study of radical critiques of imperialism have also 
served to stress the changing and contested understandings of what 
imperialism meant to different groups and movements.30 Bernard Semmel, who 
situates their development within the wider international histories of liberal and 
racial thought, has additionally further documented the shifting theorisations of 
imperialism in this era.31 Quite apart from the insights such studies give as to 
                                            
28 Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt, Imperialism: The Story and 
Significance of a Political Word, 1840-1960 (Cambridge: 1965), p.248. 
29 Andrew S. Thompson, ‘The language of imperialism and the meanings of 
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Matikkala, Empire and Imperial Ambition: Liberty, Englishness and Anti-
Imperialism in Late Victorian Britain (London: 2011); Jon Wilson, ‘The Silence of 
Empire: Imperialism and India’ in David Craig and James Thompson (eds), 
Languages of Politics in Nineteenth-Century Britain (Basingstoke: 2013). 
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how ideas of imperialism evolved over time and were adapted to different 
circumstances, most critically the scholarship in this field has underlined the 
essentially contested nature of imperial language in British politics in this period. 
Yet to adopt a narrow focus on the specific understandings of the term 
imperialism advanced by key political and intellectual figures risks missing the 
wood for the trees. In a recent review article, MacKenzie criticises the tendency 
for minimalist accounts of the British Empire to exclude non-state action from 
their definitions of imperialism, speculating that the trend had arisen in part from 
an excessive focus on the term imperialism itself: some, he argues, ‘seem to 
imagine that if the word was not used the phenomenon somehow did not 
exist’.32 Although MacKenzie advances this point in relation to the informal 
imperialism of the frontier, such concerns are just as relevant for historians 
concerned with the political context at the metropole. While certainly the nature 
of British imperialism formed an important component of public political debate 
in this period, and indeed some of these debates from the time of the South 
African War are explored in depth in chapters two and three of this thesis, it 
would be wrong to imagine that such debates represented the totality or even 
the bulk of British political discourse on the character of the Empire. Instead, 
this thesis proceeds on the basis that political figures conveyed assumptions 
and beliefs about the nature of British imperial rule not primarily through 
explicitly defined visions of imperialism, but implicitly through their wider public 
statements on aspects of imperial politics. Faced with the need to respond to 
events in South Africa, Liberal speakers drew upon wider assumptions as to the 
nature of the British Empire and the ideals it supposedly represented. Further 
still, Liberal speakers also made use of the South African question to develop 
and advance new imperial ideals within British politics. 
In adopting this approach, the constraints of this study ultimately pose 
limitations as to the nature of the imperial politics it assesses. Given that this 
thesis focuses on the imperial dimensions of the South African question, rather 
than the more abstract use of imperialism in this period, it means that aspects of 
the debate over, for example, the Roseberyite notion of imperialism as the basis 
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for domestic social reform are not directly examined.33 Likewise, 
notwithstanding the fact that the settler population of South Africa represented 
only ever a small minority of the region’s total population, the notion of Empire 
articulated in relation to the South African question was primarily that of the 
Empire of white settlement. The politics of Empire as constructed in relation to 
South Africa might therefore have had only a partial resemblance to debates on 
India or the dependent Empire.   
Nonetheless, as will be examined in the following chapters, Liberal rhetoric on 
the South African question did indeed draw upon the rhetorical aspects of other 
episodes in the history of Empire. For example, the use of ideas of character to 
justify the imposition of imperial rule, as explored by P.J. Cain in his studies of 
the financial administration of Egypt and the idea of the ‘civilising mission’ in the 
dependent empire, formed a core component of Liberal rhetoric on the South 
African question, shaping British perceptions both of the Boers and of the 
nature of British rule.34 Similarly, while the debates over ‘domestic’ imperialism 
were not directly related to the politics of the South African question, as will be 
demonstrated much of the emphasis such debates placed, for example, on 
notions of constitutionalism and progress can be seen as reflected in debates 
on the governance of South Africa, alternately critiquing the nature of British 
and Boer rule in the region. As much, therefore, as the imperial politics 
examined in this thesis relates specifically to the context of the South African 
question, this politics did not exist in isolation but instead formed a part of a 
much broader politics of Empire. 
Liberal Politics and Liberal Rhetoric 
In adopting this approach, the rhetoric of Liberal politics becomes central to 
understanding the nature of the party’s response to the South African question. 
                                            
33 For studies exploring the use of imperialism as a basis for domestic social 
reform in Britain during this period, see in particular: Bernard Semmel, 
Imperialism and social reform: English social-imperial thought, 1895-1914 
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The study of rhetoric in British political history is one which has received 
increasing scholarly interest in recent years, as historians have sought to 
investigate not simply the operation but the culture of British politics. Gareth 
Stedman Jones’ seminal work Languages of Class, which emphasised that ‘the 
problematic character of language itself’ was not adequately addressed by 
existing social historical understandings of experience and consciousness, is 
often credited with heralding the advent of the linguistic turn in British political 
history.35 Likewise, the study of political languages has been heavily influenced 
by the ‘Cambridge school’ of intellectual history and the work of J.G.A. Pocock: 
Pocock’s characterisation of political language as ‘plural, flexible and non-final’ 
and his stress upon what he terms speech-acts as modifying user, audience 
and the language-structures in which they are performed have played an 
important role in shaping the approaches of historians concerned with political 
rhetoric.36   
Yet despite the increasing interest in the field, the question of what exactly is 
meant by rhetoric is one which continues to lack a simple answer. Depending 
on the nature of the inquiry at hand, rhetoric can be understood at the micro 
level, focusing on the specific semiotics or oratory deployed within a narrowly 
defined context, or alternatively rhetoric might be elevated to the level of the 
discourse and the overarching performative aspects of politics, in which sense it 
effectively becomes synonymous with the very practice of politics itself. A 
plurality of interpretations of rhetoric is of course no bad thing; however, the 
terms of reference must be appropriate to the subjects under investigation. 
With such considerations in mind, this thesis understands rhetoric to be both a 
process and a product of political activity. It was in one sense a toolkit for 
political actors, not simply enabling the effective communication of political 
ideas but serving as a means of reshaping the political reality of the situation. 
Richard Toye’s work on the ‘rhetorical premiership’ in twentieth-century Britain 
                                            
35 Gareth Steadman Jones, Languages of Class: Studies in English Working 
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serves as a useful illustration here, demonstrating the ways in which successive 
Prime Ministers augmented their formal political power through the use of 
rhetoric.37 Rhetoric in this sense takes into account not just the form of 
language used, but also takes into consideration performative factors such as 
context and the medium through which rhetorical acts were communicated. At 
the same time, however, the rhetorical expectations of the context in which 
political speakers operated fundamentally shaped not only the range of 
rhetorical tools available to them, but the very political reality in which they were 
acting. Rhetoric in this sense can be seen as broadly synonymous with the 
‘languages of politics’ outlined by David Craig and James Thompson, that is as 
a phenomenon comprised not so much as the expression of a coherent body of 
political thought, but instead rather as guided by the ‘loose clusters of beliefs 
and arguments […] that made up the world-view of political persons, that 
shaped what they did, and enabled them to evaluate the words and deeds of 
others’. Critically, Craig and Thompson’s interpretation emphasises the 
regulatory role of language on political conduct: ‘no one existed in a vacuum, 
and even the shifting and shuffling politician knew that wider norms and values 
limited what he or she might do’.38 In examining Liberal rhetoric on South Africa 
therefore, this thesis is seeking to identify both the methods by which the public 
politics of the South African question were conducted and the underlying 
assumptions and ideals which fundamentally shaped the rhetorical framework 
within which Liberal speakers acted. 
In seeking to understand British Liberal rhetoric on the South African question, it 
is necessary to draw a distinction between liberalism as philosophy or ideology 
and Liberal politics as a specific feature of British political history, or, as it is 
sometimes denoted, between ‘small l’ liberalism and ‘big L’ Liberalism.39 As far 
as the former is concerned, the term liberalism might charitably be 
                                            
37 Richard Toye, ‘The Rhetorical Premiership: A New Perspective on Prime 
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characterised as one which evades easy description. As Duncan Bell has 
argued in his recent essay ‘What is Liberalism?’ the concept is one which has 
produced not only myriad and often starkly conflicting definitions, but has also 
generated very different methods of scholarly engagement with the 
phenomenon. Where the term is critically engaged with at all, Bell notes, 
authors alternately seek to apply prescriptive accounts, demarcating an 
‘authentic’ branch of liberalism while relegating or discarding all rival forms, 
comprehensive approaches, concerned less with specific meaning and more 
with the usage of liberal discourse, and explanatory responses which focus on 
the development of liberalism(s). The diffusion of approaches is further 
multiplied by the division between stipulative and canonical interpretive 
protocols: that is, whether the liberal tradition is to be identified through 
engagement with a series of core concepts or constructed from a pantheon of 
great writings.40  
Yet while Bell is surely right to insist on the importance of historical context in 
seeking to understand liberalism, even if the scope of inquiry is narrowed to the 
liberalism of fin-de-siècle Britain, the task of definition remains a daunting 
challenge. Michael Freeden, for example, notes two clusters of liberal thought in 
this period, in the forms of classical liberalism and the new liberalism, quite 
apart from the ongoing processes which would see it continually contested and 
remoulded.41 The divergences between the two schools of thought and their 
manifestations in political life were substantial. Precise systems of classifying 
Liberal thought vary considerably but, for present purposes, it suffices to define 
classical liberalism as a doctrine that emphasised the rights and liberties of the 
individual, often in the context of the powers of the state. The new liberalism by 
contrast represented an evolution of these ideals into a philosophy that placed a 
much greater emphasis on the community and the capacity of state action to 
meet the new impulses of social reform. Despite a shared common tradition 
therefore, liberalism at the end of the nineteenth century represented a 
considerable range of different perspectives and purposes.  
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The introduction of the imperial element complicates the task of definition still 
further. Although public figures in Britain sought to frame the Empire as 
explicitly - and indeed exceptionally - liberal in nature, as Uday Singh Mehta, 
Martin J. Weiner and others have argued, the supposedly liberal instincts of 
imperial actors not only failed to soften the realities of imperial rule but also 
provided an intellectual framework and justification for imperialism. The civilising 
mission and the desire to uplift the subject populations of the Empire provided a 
rationale for their indefinite subjugation to British rule, just as the inherent 
contradictions between self-government and the rule of law became manifest in 
the colonised territories.42 As Jennifer Pitts has documented, this in itself 
represented a marked shift from the liberal scepticism of colonialism in the 
eighteenth century, as liberal thinkers abandoned earlier pluralistic 
conceptualisations of progress in favour of a dichotomy of civilization versus 
barbarism that justified the imposition of European rule over non-European 
populations.43 Furthermore, authors such as Mira Matikkala have identified 
liberal thought as concurrently central to the anti-imperialism of late-Victorian 
Britain.44 The problem of the ‘over-extension’ of liberalism as a concept 
identified by Bell thus remains a daunting challenge.45 
This thesis seeks to respond to these challenges by adopting as its focus what 
can be termed British Liberal politics: the characteristics and practices of Liberal 
Party politicians, structures and audiences, along with the characteristics and 
practices of those organisations and institutions closely affiliated with the party, 
for example the Liberal-supporting Press. Such a definition should not, 
however, be taken to imply that Liberal was somehow an empty term, a mere 
descriptor of party allegiance without greater significance. Indeed, the causes 
and ideals championed by Liberals, most notably for example support for Free 
Trade, lay at the very heart of what it meant to be Liberal. In this respect the key 
elements of Liberal politics reflected many of the core concepts associated with 
liberalism, and it would of course be fanciful to suggest that there was no 
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connection between British ideas of liberalism and the central tenets of British 
Liberal politics. Yet it is important nonetheless to decouple assumptions about 
the nature of British Liberal politics from the expectations of wider liberalism, 
however it might be defined. In spite of its name, the Liberal Party cannot simply 
be regarded as the manifestation of liberalism within the British parliamentary 
system: instead, British Liberal politics must be approached as a distinct 
historical phenomenon in its own right, the understanding of which was 
continually redefined as Liberal actors contested the meaning of the term.  
In this fashion, the divisions within the late-Victorian Liberal Party should not be 
seen as just a contest over the party’s leadership and organisation, but also 
fundamentally a contest over what it meant to be Liberal in the post-Gladstonian 
era. Indeed, for leading Liberals such as Rosebery or Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman to be successful in their efforts, it was vital that they could frame 
their own position as one which was indisputably Liberal. Jones’ observation in 
Languages of Class about the history of the post-war Labour Party is no less 
true of the Liberal Party of the late-Victorian era. The idea of the party having an 
essential definition, or being the product of a continuous evolutionary process, 
takes on an importance ‘not as its definition, but rather as an animating myth 
producing real effects upon the practices of many of the participants within that 
history’.46 The authority conferred by the Liberal name made the battle over 
Liberal ideas all the more significant. 
The 1886 schism over Irish Home Rule had after all spawned a pretender to the 
Liberal mantle in the form of the Liberal Unionist Party. Although often 
dismissed as a party that quickly lost its distinctiveness in alliance with the 
Conservatives, more recently the work of historians such as Ian Cawood has 
demonstrated the continuing claims to a Liberal identity advanced by the Liberal 
Unionists.  As much as the strength of this appeal was fading by the end of the 
century, the party nonetheless continued to challenge Liberal speakers’ claims 
to represent the ‘true’ Liberal position.47 The plurality of political positions within 
the Liberal Unionists, and particularly the personal prominence of Chamberlain, 
prevents any easy categorisation of the party’s appeal beyond the specific issue 
of opposition to Home Rule. In simple terms however, the Liberal Unionists at 
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the end of the nineteenth century might best be characterised as appealing to 
two specific audiences. First, there was a continuing concern to appeal to 
‘moderate’ Liberal support. The Liberal Unionist press often characterised the 
mainstream Liberal Party as the Radical Party, emphasising its sectional nature 
in contrast to the national position of the Unionist alliance, an appeal in some 
ways not all to dissimilar from that of the Roseberyites. Second, there also 
existed alongside this Chamberlain’s more radical pitch, combining popular 
imperial appeals with promises of social reform, advanced with the aim of 
attracting the support of the newly enfranchised working classes. Although as 
E.H.H. Greene notes Chamberlain’s own prominence in this cause risks 
eclipsing the fact that many of his party colleagues were strong opponents of 
social reform, this nonetheless represented another dimension of the Liberal 
Unionists’ efforts to contest the political territory of their former party.48 This 
continuing contest further manifested itself in the language of Liberal politics, 
with figures such as Chamberlain on occasion adopting many of the same 
rhetorical tropes as his former colleagues in opposition. 
The challenge for Liberal speakers in relation to divisions over South Africa was 
therefore that of seeking to present their own viewpoints as recognisably 
Liberal, while additionally reframing understandings of what a Liberal approach 
to the politics of Empire represented in order to undermine rival claims to a 
Liberal policy. By analysing the Liberal response to the South African question 
during this period of internal division, this thesis therefore aims to uncover not 
only the underlying assumptions as to what a Liberal approach to Empire 
constituted, but the ways in which Liberal speakers sought to reshape such 
expectations with a view to the wider struggle for control over British Liberal 
politics. 
As discussed above, this thesis focuses on the practice of fin-de-siècle Liberal 
politics as opposed to seeking to outline the major tenets of the British Liberal 
tradition. However, one aspect of this tradition worth specific consideration is 
that of constitutionalism. As the work of Jonathon Parry has explored, mid-
nineteenth century Liberal speakers placed great emphasis upon English 
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constitutionalism as part of a wider patriotic ideology underpinning the party’s 
domestic and foreign platforms. Pride in the allegedly open, disinterested 
governance of Britain in the national interest was contrasted against 
‘continental’ despotism, a rhetorical construction that not only allowed for the 
legitimisation of the British state to domestic audiences, but also enabled the 
pursuit of interventionist international policies for the cause of liberty against 
autocracy.49 In the imperial context, this in turn served to fuel the idea of the 
civilising mission, even as Liberals justified the imposition of British rule over 
other nations by making a unique virtue of the British capacity for self-
government. Although the mid-century confidence of this Liberal appeal had 
faded somewhat by the end of the century, not least in the face of a concerted 
Unionist effort to capture the language of patriotism, the framework of 
constitutionalism against despotism remained prominent in Liberal politics and 
thinking. For Liberal sceptics of imperialism and jingoism, such movements 
threatened to undermine the constitutional and democratic basis of the British 
state, both by enabling the extension of personalised autocratic rule in Britain 
and by damaging the essential bonds between democracy and morality.50 As 
this thesis explores however, Liberal imperialists also marshalled ideas of 
constitutionalism in support of imperialist appeals, emphasising the democratic 
and self-governing nature of the Empire as exceptional and uniquely British. 
The constitutional strand running through Liberal rhetoric on the character and 
the governance of Empire must therefore also be understood in the context of 
these wider trends in nineteenth-century Liberal thinking. 
In adopting a rhetorical approach, the historian of the nineteenth-century must 
add an important caveat as to the nature of the evidence available to them. 
Whereas a historian of twentieth-century politics might conceivably have access 
to a full audio or visual record of a given speech, the scholar of Victorian politics 
has no such luxury. Instead the core body of evidence available, and that with 
which this thesis is primarily concerned, is the written record of political 
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speeches as they were reported in newspapers. Such a state of affairs is by no 
means an insurmountable obstacle to examining Liberal rhetoric, but it does 
require an appreciation that the rhetoric under examination in this study has 
been mediated via the Press, rather than representing a direct line of 
communication between Liberal speakers and their audiences. The late-
Victorian period can be said to have been a golden age of political reporting, in 
the sense that political speeches were reported to a remarkable degree of detail 
within both the London and provincial Press: indeed, in the case of speeches by 
particularly high profile figures, whether locally or nationally, the bulk of the 
speech would often be reported in the form of a verbatim transcript rather than 
integrated into an article.51 However, while the product of this culture of political 
reporting provides a greater textual record of speechmaking that is available for 
earlier and indeed later periods, the mistake must not be made of assuming that 
the evidence provided by newspaper reports represents a complete 
reproduction of the speeches in question. 
Instead, even before the range of speeches examined is narrowed down to 
allow for a focused historical inquiry, it must be recognised that the process of 
political reporting in this period produced what was essentially a skewed 
reproduction of politicians’ speeches, both in terms of which speeches were 
reported in the first place and in terms of the nature of the transcripts included in 
the reports. As Joseph S. Meisel notes, while the top tier of prominent 
politicians might reasonably expect extensive coverage of their speeches, the 
same could not be said of their less high-profile colleagues, and the result was 
that the overall body of speech reporting inevitably did not directly reflect the full 
volume of speeches made.52 Furthermore, the Press were additionally 
mediators between political speakers and their newspaper-reading audiences in 
terms of the elements of the speech which were reported. While practices 
varied from newspaper to newspaper, and indeed from report to report, it was 
not uncommon for entire sections of a spoken speech not to be reproduced with 
little indication in the report itself as to the content of the excised sections. To 
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take an example from chapter three, a comparison of the reports in The Times 
and the Manchester Guardian covering Campbell-Bannerman’s infamous 
‘methods of barbarism’ speech of June 1901 reveal key differences between the 
two. While both covered the section condemning British policies on the grounds 
of morality, the subsequent part of the speech in which Campbell-Bannerman 
criticised the government’s tactics on the grounds of imperial governance was 
greatly conflated in The Times report, possibly indicating why the focus of many 
subsequent historical studies has been on the humanitarian dimensions of the 
speech.53 In respect to the latter issue, this thesis uses a range of different 
newspapers as its source material for Liberal speeches, generally selecting the 
newspaper reports which provided the fullest account as the sources to be 
examined with the aim of ensuring as far as possible that any relevant sections 
are not overlooked. More significantly, however, as this study is concerned not 
so much with the quantitative aspects of Liberal speeches so much as their 
qualitative aspects, the potential impact of this skewed reproduction is 
lessened. If as is argued Liberal speakers did indeed frame their stances on 
South Africa in relation to existing assumptions within British Liberal politics, 
then ultimately the mediating role of the Press in communicating and reinforcing 
these assumptions forms part of the wider phenomenon under investigation. 
In considering the wider audiences which newspaper reporting of speeches 
enabled politicians to address, it is worth also reflecting upon the role of public 
opinion in late-Victorian life. In an important contribution to the interpretation of 
fin-de-siècle British politics, James Thompson in British Political Culture and 
Public Opinion identifies the phenomenon as a ‘cardinal feature of late Victorian 
and Edwardian political culture’.54 Although there was considerable variance in 
the political and intellectual conceptualisations of public opinion, many of the 
key notions associated with the term are of direct relevance to the political 
dynamics this thesis examines. The perception of the public, as opposed to only 
the electorate, as a politically powerful group embodying the virtues of the 
national character and capable of acting as a guiding force upon the nation’s 
politics, and if necessary a restraint upon political elites, is key to understanding 
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the importance of the public dimensions of the South African question. Because 
public opinion could serve as a source of authority, especially for an opposition 
party lacking the prestige and machinery of government, the performative 
politics of being seen to represent public opinion proved of such use to Liberal 
speakers seeking to contest and reshape the nature of imperial political debate. 
At the same time, it was the recognition of this power for public opinion to direct 
the nation’s fortunes which provided Liberal speakers with a compelling need to 
advocate their own approaches to questions of imperial politics. Furthermore, 
as Thompson notes it was the Press, alongside other mediums such as the 
platform and the petition, which most frequently served as a barometer for 
public opinion.55 The relationship between political speakers, newspapers and 
readerships was not mono-directional therefore, but a dynamic in which 
newspapers at the very least notionally acted as arbiters of the public response 
to political developments.56 Not unrelated to this idea of public opinion, the 
Press can also be said to have served the function of representing party 
opinion: at a time of Liberal divisions at the elite level, in a party structure in 
which no organisation could be said to have ultimate authority over Liberal 
politics, the idea of representing a wider Liberal opinion present in the country at 
large could again serve to provide Liberal speakers with a degree of authority 
over their internal party rivals. 
The need for speakers to address audiences in the country at large via the 
newspaper industry did not render the speaker’s immediate audience and 
surroundings irrelevant. Indeed, the setting of the public meeting was itself a 
rhetorical act which provided both an opportunity and a challenge for speakers. 
As Jon Lawrence has noted, open public meetings represented a test of political 
legitimacy. If a speaker could be seen to carry the meeting, winning over their 
audience by force of argument, then they could demonstrate not merely the 
righteousness of their cause but crucially also present their self as a true 
representative of public opinion.57 Somewhat counterintuitively, a speaker who 
                                            
55 Ibid., ch.2. 
56 Whether newspapers accurately reflected the views of their readers and the 
public at large is in this instance of secondary importance to whether they were 
seen to do so. 
57 Jon Lawrence, Electing our masters: the hustings in British politics from 
Hogarth to Blair (Oxford: 2009), p.62. 
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faced severe hostility and even violence might also emerge from the encounter 
with their reputation strengthened, the theatrics of being seen to speak out in 
spite of intimidation reinforcing their apparent adherence to principle in the face 
of an unreasoning crowd.  
Even in circumstances where a meeting was not truly public in the sense of 
offering general admission, being seen to win over the audience could be of 
immense symbolic importance: for example, the infamous ‘war to the knife and 
fork’ of 1901, in which the battles of the Liberal civil war were fought out over a 
series of dinners hosted by different party factions, served to demonstrate the 
right of the speakers’ respective claims to speak for Liberal opinion.58 This 
dynamic was indeed only amplified further in the parliamentary arena, where 
the goal of being seen to speak for the Liberal Party carried with it the more 
immediate need to persuade reluctant colleagues to vote in the same division 
lobby, such parliamentary splits themselves further being reported extensively 
in the Press. Furthermore, both on the platform and in the parliamentary 
chamber the audience in the room mattered for the reason that they were not 
simply passive receptors of the speaker’s oratory, but active participants, 
challenging and heckling the speaker over controversial points. These 
interruptions, recorded by newspaper reports of speeches and by Hansard 
alike, provided yet still another context in which Liberal speakers were 
compelled to articulate their views for public consumption. The relationship 
between the speaker and their immediate audience thus remained of 
considerable importance, even if the audience in the country at large constituted 
a speaker’s primary target. 
In adopting a rhetorical focus, as opposed to examining private political views 
on Empire, and by focusing on Liberal politics, rather than a broader 
understanding of liberalism, this thesis is thus able to explore how the South 
African question operated as an issue within British political culture. By 
examining the speeches of Liberals at key moments in the history of the South 
African question, in which politicians were compelled to publicly state their 
views on the nature of British imperial power in the region and its operation, this 
thesis is able to explore the practical form which the politics of Empire assumed 
                                            
58 See chapter three. 
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within the dynamic of British party politics. While however the focus of this study 
concerns Liberal rhetoric on Empire, and indeed as noted above only the 
rhetoric of Empire in so far as it related to the South African question, it should 
not of course be assumed that such rhetoric existed as a closed system: 
instead, it was always articulated within a wider framework in which the 
meanings of imperialism were contested between political parties and indeed in 
relation to organisations and movements external to party politics. In examining 
the form taken by the politics of Empire within the confines of British Liberal 
politics therefore, it must be borne in mind that it existed not in isolation, but 
formed part of a wider rhetoric of Empire in British politics and society. 
Towards a Liberal Rhetoric of Empire 
Over the following chapters, this thesis explores the nature of Liberal rhetoric on 
Empire and the South African question in relation to four key episodes or 
periods between 1895 and 1907. Chapter one examines the Liberal response to 
the aftermath of the Jameson Raid of December 1895, the disastrous incursion 
of British South Africa Company forces into the South African Republic sparked 
by the abortive efforts of Cecil Rhodes to engineer regime change in the SAR to 
the advantage of the British Empire and Rhodes’ own administration in Cape 
Colony. Eschewing a traditional focus on the behind-the-scenes calculations 
that enabled Rhodes to escape the censure of the parliamentary inquiry into the 
episode, this chapter instead examines the ways in which Liberal speakers 
seized upon the events of the Raid in order to advance critiques of the nature of 
British imperial rule in the region. Looking in particular at how notions of 
character were deployed to critique the capital-driven imperialism perceived to 
have led to the unrest in the Transvaal, this chapter explores how Chartered 
Company rule in South Africa came to be criticised on the grounds of 
misgovernment, falling short of the governing ideals the Empire supposedly 
embodied. Furthermore, this chapter assesses how Liberal rhetoric on the 
Jameson Raid characterised Anglo-Dutch harmony within the settler community 
as the key requirement of successful British rule in South Africa, a narrative 
which at the same time served to erase the non-white populations of the region 
from political debate. While, therefore, out of all the aspects of the South African 
question examined in this thesis, the aftermath of the Jameson Raid produced 
the least public debate on the nature of Britain’s South African Empire, the 
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themes explored in this chapter are nonetheless critical in setting the stage for 
the Liberal Party’s response to the South African War and its aftermath. 
Chapter two takes this thesis up to the end of the century, examining the period 
spanning from the early summer of 1899, when renewed tensions over the 
Uitlander franchise further increased the salience of the South African question 
in British politics, through to the weeks following the outbreak of the war, in 
which the Liberal Imperialist faction made explicitly clear their breach not only 
with the pro-Boers but also their party leader. Although this represents the 
shortest period under examination in this thesis, it is nonetheless one of great 
significance. At a point in which the conflict remained largely hypothetical, and 
even after during the initial fighting, the focus of political debate was less on the 
practical situation within South Africa and more on the principles at stake. Again 
examining the theme of imperial governance, this chapter explores how Liberal 
speakers responded to the 1899 Transvaal crisis by articulating rival visions of 
imperial rule in South Africa, expressed both in terms of the supposed imperial 
suzerainty or paramountcy exercised over the Transvaal and in relation to the 
ideals of good government and self-government embodied in Britain’s colonies 
but allegedly denied to the Uitlanders. Likewise, this chapter explores how 
Liberal speakers exploited ideas about the character of the South African 
Republic and of the Boers as a race in support of their positions on South 
Africa, and the means by which both supporters and opponents of the Unionist 
government’s interventionist policy were able to cite the need for white racial 
harmony throughout South Africa in support of their stances. Critically, this 
chapter demonstrates how a broad level of agreement among Liberal speakers 
over the principles and ideals of British imperial rule nonetheless fractured 
against a political situation in South Africa in which the implementation of said 
ideals was to prove fundamentally contradictory. 
The progress and conduct of the conflict itself forms the subject of chapter 
three. Although there are many elements of the politics of the South African War 
which could be explored, such as the debates over the fitness of British military 
preparations and the expense of the conflict, the key controversies examined in 
this chapter are those which touched at the heart of the imperial nature of the 
conflict and which Liberal speakers used to advance wider critiques relating to 
the nature of British imperial rule and the future of South Africa. In particular, 
-36- 
 
this chapter re-examines the Liberal Party’s response to British 
counterinsurgency methods - most notably in the form of Campbell-
Bannerman’s famous ‘methods of barbarism’ speech - as not just a 
humanitarian critique but one framed in the same logics of white racial harmony 
and the importance of free self-government that had characterised earlier 
debates. Alongside debates over the consequences of martial law in Cape 
Colony and the implications of the government demand for ‘unconditional 
surrender’, this chapter also explores how Liberal speakers from across the 
party framed the questions of the Boer republics’ annexation in terms of what it 
meant for good government and self-government in the Transvaal and across 
South Africa as a whole. Critically, while the course of the war saw a substantial 
shift in the internal balance of power within the Liberal Party as the narrative 
shifted from the justice of the war’s origins to the conduct and proposed 
settlement of the conflict, there remained a strong element of consistency in the 
themes invoked by Liberal speakers in relation to the politics of Empire. 
Finally, in its fourth chapter this thesis explores the politics of the reconstruction 
era, specifically the Liberal response to the Chinese labour controversy and the 
debates over the mechanisms of self-government to be introduced in the newly-
established Transvaal and Orange River colonies. These two debates formed 
the core of Liberal objections to Unionist policy in South Africa in the years 
following the conflict, and were two of the highest-profile issues in South African 
affairs which Campbell-Bannerman’s incoming ministry would face after the fall 
of the Balfour government in 1905. While the question of Chinese labour was 
undoubtedly driven in part by working class concerns in Britain, as this chapter 
examines the question was also one directly linked to the task of governing 
South Africa, with Liberal speakers reworking earlier narratives on the 
importance of white racial harmony by framing the policy as one which would 
further exacerbate the racial obstacles to British rule. Likewise, the debates 
over the form of self-government to be granted to the former republics, whether 
a limited form of representative government or full responsible government, 
represented a continuation of many of the narratives of imperial governance 
from the time of the war, as well as serving to advance wider visions about the 
structure of the Empire of white settlement. Again, the fundamentals of the 
Liberal response to the South African question were largely unchanged: 
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Unionist policy was attacked as running contrary to the ideals of British imperial 
rule, and Liberal policy was presented as one which would resolve the problems 
of South Africa by embodying said ideals. However, as will be seen, the 
contradictions of race and governance at the heart of the Liberal outlook on 
Empire remained, setting the scene for new fractures within the Liberal Party 
over imperial policy. 
In studying these four episodes, what emerges is an understanding of how 
Liberal rhetoric on the South African question was framed with reference to 
what might be termed the idealised Liberal vision of Empire. This vision of 
imperial rule embodied the ideals which were not only presumed to exist within 
the Empire, but indeed were considered essential for its successful 
maintenance. Self-government, whether defined in terms of specific 
representative institutions or in terms of settler communities’ participation in 
government, was held to be the cornerstone of the good governance of the 
Empire, avoiding the pitfalls of direct rule and martial law. This idealised Empire 
was also one not, in theory at least, driven by race: rather than advocating the 
Anglicisation of its settler populations, the Empire embraced the plurality of 
white races which comprised it as its strength, an instinct which extended in 
very limited form to an aversion to explicit colour bars in the settler colonies. For 
the same reason, the character of the imperialism the Empire embodied was 
held to be of critical importance: an aggressive or capital-driven imperialism 
would, it was argued, undermine the bonds of imperial loyalty that held this 
idealised Liberal Empire together. Viewed in this light, the Liberal split becomes 
less a question of fundamental divisions over imperialism and more the result of 
a contest between competing positions each framed in the language of a Liberal 
approach to Empire. Critically, in arguing for an essential continuity within 
Liberal imperial rhetoric on the South African question, this interpretation also 
challenges existing interpretations that minimise the impact of the Empire on 
politics in fin-de-siècle Britain by demonstrating instead that the imperial 
debates associated with the South African War formed only the most visible 
element of an already existing Liberal imperial politics. 
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1. ‘PRIVATE ADVENTURERS IN DOMINION’: RESPONSES TO THE RAID, 1895-1898 
In late December 1895, Dr Leander Starr Jameson led British South African 
Company (BSAC) forces in an armed invasion of the South African Republic 
(SAR) from the neighbouring Bechuanaland protectorate. Ostensibly 
responding to a call of distress from the civilian Uitlander population of 
Johannesburg, the move was in fact a desperate attempt to force the Uitlanders 
into open revolt against the government of President Kruger and thus bring 
about the installation of a government in Pretoria more amenable to the 
interests of Cape Colony premier Cecil Rhodes. Although Jameson’s action did 
succeed in sparking an uprising on the Rand, his reformer allies failed to make 
much headway and Jameson found his men outmanoeuvred by the SAR’s 
forces, ultimately being forced to surrender on 2 January 1896. The failed 
invasion became known to history as the Jameson Raid. The subsequent 
exposure of the conspiracy behind it led to the downfall of Rhodes, elevated the 
Uitlander question to prominence, and ultimately paved the road to the outbreak 
of the South African War in 1899. 
While debates over South Africa were hardly a new feature of British politics at 
the beginning of 1896, the dramatic news of the Raid and the contentious 
developments which were to follow marked the beginning of a new chapter in 
the South African question as an issue within British party politics. At the time of 
the Raid itself however, its political impact in Britain was initially rather limited. 
This was no doubt partly down to timing: the Jameson Raid erupted against a 
backdrop of heightened tensions between Britain and the United States over 
Venezuela and renewed disputes over Britain’s Eastern policy in the wake of 
the Armenian massacres. The swiftness with which the Raid fizzled out and the 
relatively conciliatory positions initially adopted, in public at least, by Joseph 
Chamberlain and Kruger most likely also helped diffuse the sense of immediate 
crisis. Furthermore, there was at this point less direct potential for party conflict 
on the issue, and certainly less potential for public conflict within the Liberal 
Party: the breach between Lord Rosebery and Sir William Harcourt was not at 
the beginning of 1896 public knowledge.  
Nonetheless Liberal speakers did not prove quiet on the issue. Seeking a return 
to the House of Commons at the Montrose Burghs by-election early in 1896, 
-39- 
 
John Morley made extensive use of the Jameson Raid in his election 
speeches.1 At Westminster both Rosebery and Harcourt likewise devoted 
considerable attention to the South African question in their speeches on the 
opening of Parliament, and sections on the Transvaal were to be regularly 
included in their public speeches as leaders of the Liberal Party.2 The weeks 
and months after the Raid also saw a Radical Liberal critique emerge, most 
notably in the form of Henry Labouchere’s forceful attacks on the Chartered 
Company in his speeches and in his weekly periodical Truth. Such rhetoric from 
leading Liberal Party politicians was however the exception rather than the 
norm in the immediate aftermath of the Raid.3  
As the initial period of crisis faded, the political debate in Britain focused around 
the parliamentary inquiry into the Raid, later ingloriously dubbed the ‘committee 
of no inquiry’ for its reputation as a whitewash. Delayed by the trial of Jameson, 
the committee began its hearings in February 1897 and was significant for 
Liberal politics not only its content but for the reason that both Harcourt, then 
leader of the party, and Labouchere were some of the highest profile figures on 
the committee, along with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who was to lead the 
party through the South African War. The controversies surrounding the 
majority report’s lacklustre conclusions, which angered the Radical wing of the 
Liberal Party, and Chamberlain’s decision to come out fighting for Rhodes, 
which introduced a new partisan element into the debate as well as severely 
weakening Harcourt’s position, both provided for further high-profile 
opportunities for Liberal rhetoric on the South African question. 
This chapter explores the key imperial themes that emerged in Liberal rhetoric 
on the Raid and its repercussions. First, this chapter considers the condition of 
the Liberal Party in 1895, and outlines the ways in which historians have 
approached the subject of the Raid. It then goes on to assess the critiques of 
character advanced in response to the Raid, looking in particular at the ways in 
which Liberal speakers framed Jameson’s action as illegitimate. Next, it 
                                            
1 See for example John Morley, speech at Arbroath, 30 Jan. 1896, reported in 
Dundee Courier 31 Jan. 1896. 
2 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords debate (hereafter HL Deb.) 11 Feb. 
1896, fourth series, Vol.37 cc.36-39; HC Deb. 11 Feb. 1896, fourth series, Vol. 
37 cc.90-96. 
3 Arthur Davey, The British Pro-Boers 1877-1902 (Cape Town, 1978), p. 39. 
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considers the role played by race in Liberal rhetoric on the Raid, exploring the 
scope available to Liberal speakers in terms of framing the different national 
groups in South Africa, as well as examining ideas of white race harmony and 
the position of the Black African population. Finally, this chapter closes by 
considering the rhetoric of imperial governance, looking specifically at the 
debates surrounding the idea of suzerainty, the importance of white racial 
harmony to the British position in South Africa, and the idea of imperial 
misgovernment in the form of Chartered Company rule. In doing so, it will be 
shown that not only did Liberal speakers use the Raid to advance wider visions 
and critiques of British imperial rule in South Africa, but also that the Liberal 
Party’s response to the Raid demonstrated many of the key elements of 
imperial rhetoric which were to characterise subsequent debates on the South 
African question. 
The Liberal Party at the time of the Raid 
Although it had been Liberal governments which had played the greatest role in 
shaping the politics of the South African question before the Raid, the events of 
December 1895 found the party banished to opposition. Six months prior to the 
Raid the exhausted Rosebery government, face with an opposition motion of 
censure, had chosen to resign. The Conservative Lord Salisbury formed a 
government, significantly for the first time bringing the Liberal Unionists into the 
Cabinet, and went on to win the general election that autumn, making nearly a 
hundred gains from the Liberals and obtaining a clear majority in the House of 
Commons. By the end of 1895, therefore, the Liberal position was an 
unenviable one. Indeed, the situation was worsened by the traumatic 
experiences which had dogged the Liberals ever since their precarious return to 
power in 1892. The increasing clashes of personality within the parliamentary 
party had made the very act of forming a ministry difficult, while flagship 
measures over Irish Home Rule, local government reform and the Employer’s 
Liability Bill all met their demise at the hands of the House of Lords.4 The state 
of affairs deteriorated further following Rosebery’s ascendance to the 
premiership in the spring of 1894. Clashes with Cabinet colleagues and with the 
                                            
4 Roy Douglas, Liberals: The History of the Liberal and Liberal Democrat Parties 
(London: 2005), p.90. 
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radical section of the party, as well as divisions over Welsh disestablishment 
and imperial policy in Uganda, further exacerbated tensions within the party. 5 
Despite these divisions, the Liberal Party entered 1896 with a continuation of 
the notional partnership between Rosebery in the House of Lords and Harcourt 
in the House of Commons. Although largely concealed from the public, the 
already-strained relationship between the two leaders had spectacularly 
collapsed, with Rosebery having privately repudiated any notion of dual 
leadership following the election.6 The split had been as much driven by clashes 
of personality as it had been over questions of policy, although Uganda and the 
thorny issue of British authority over the Upper Nile had highlighted a clear 
divide between Rosebery’s policy of territorial acquisition in order to consolidate 
the Empire, and Harcourt’s more anti-expansionist attitude. Furthermore, it was 
divisions over foreign and imperial policy in the form of the Eastern question 
which were to form the notional basis for Rosebery’s resignation and Harcourt’s 
succession to the leadership, although as Peter Stansky documents this was 
only the end product of the long-running personal tensions between them.7 Yet 
in spite of imperialism representing a key divide between the two, it is notable 
how little public disagreement there was between Rosebery and Harcourt over 
the South African question, although as will be seen the two nonetheless 
adopted significantly different approaches to the issue. 
In his stance on the South African question, as in other matters, Harcourt found 
a close ally in Morley, the former Chief Secretary for Ireland under Gladstone 
and Rosebery. The story of Morley’s career after the fall of the Rosebery 
government is a fascinating one, of which his high-profile interventions over 
South Africa tell only a part. Although on good terms with Rosebery at the time 
of the latter’s ascension to the premiership, Morley found himself increasingly 
aligned with Harcourt over the increasingly factional disputes that split the 
Liberal leadership. More astonishing than any shift in his personal position 
however was his effective reinvention of himself in opposition as Gladstonian 
standard-bearer and a leading orator on the radical wing of the party. Building 
                                            
5 Leo McKinstry, Rosebery: Statesman in Turmoil (London: 2005), ch.11, 13. 
6 Ibid., pp.383-385. 
7 Peter Stansky, Ambitions and Strategies: The struggle for the leadership of 
the Liberal Party in the 1890s (Oxford: 1964), p.212. 
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on his steadfast commitment to Irish Home Rule, a policy which was to come 
under attack from Roseberyite circles in the post-Gladstonian era, Morley 
sought to place opposition to an immoral imperialism at the heart of his Liberal 
appeal, a position which by 1899 would place him at the vanguard of opposition 
to Chamberlain’s South African policy. Morley’s responses to the Jameson Raid 
must be considered with the wider trajectory of his career in mind, that is not as 
isolated expressions of opinion but as a central element to Morley’s political 
reinvention.  
In the case of other members of the Liberal frontbench the factors at play were 
less clear-cut.8 One individual from the Gladstone and Rosebery governments 
who was to go on to play a key role in the party’s future, particularly over the 
fraught question of Empire, was Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Campbell-
Bannerman, whose censure by Parliament in the 1895 cordite vote brought 
about the fall of the ailing Liberal ministry, would by the end of the decade find 
himself fending off a challenge to his own leadership of the Liberal Party from a 
resurgent Rosebery advancing a doctrine of Liberal imperialism. However, while 
his biographer John Wilson does indeed characterise Campbell-Bannerman at 
this point as having held essentially similar views to Harcourt, being ‘firmly 
opposed to the rising tide of Imperialist and Jingoist sentiment’, it would be a 
mistake to uncritically categorise him with the Radical reaction against 
imperialism within the Liberal Party.9 Instead, as events in 1899 would show, 
Campbell-Bannerman was more than prepared to adopt the language of Empire 
in order to advance his own political interests, which prior to the confrontation 
with Rosebery at least involved positioning himself at the centre of the party. 
Among more radical voices on the South African question, the role of 
Labouchere looms particularly large. From his combined position as the 
member for Northampton and editor-proprietor of the journal Truth, 
Labouchere’s political goals in this period underscore in many ways the 
inadequacy of viewing Liberalism through a Gladstonian-Roseberyite binary. A 
                                            
8 The interventions of Sir George Osborne Morgan, for example, might be seen 
as prompted more by an expectation for him to make known his views from his 
time as Colonial Under-Secretary of State rather than as part of a wider agenda 
for developing the Liberal position on Empire. 
9 John Wilson, CB: A Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (London: 1973), 
p.262. 
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divisive figure within the Liberal ranks, Labouchere had proven himself a thorn 
in the side of both Gladstone’s and Rosebery’s administrations, explicitly 
seeking to exclude Whig influence from the party and using Truth to advocate 
an anti-establishment and pro-Irish vision of Liberalism.10 Although a less 
controversial figure, if in part because his position within the parliamentary party 
was not of comparable influence, C.P. Scott might be considered as falling 
within the same editor-MP category. In their different ways, both might be said 
to have sought to use their positions to shape Liberal public opinion on Empire, 
and thereby shape the position of the Liberal Party as a whole.11 
If figures such as Labouchere represented a radical anti-imperialist effort to 
reshape the party, then we might also look to those who were to go on to form 
the ‘Liberal Imperialist’ group around Rosebery at the end of the century. 
However, while many of the seeds of later party division had already been 
planted by the time of the Raid, the situation was at this point far from the open 
schism that was to develop at the time of the South African War. Critically, 
‘imperialism’, however defined had not yet explicitly become the battleground 
for this open dispute within the party, that development instead springing more 
from the resignation of Harcourt in the aftermath of the Fashoda crisis. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to recognise a difference in response based along 
the lines of subsequent Roseberyite sectionalism: if figures such as R. B. 
Haldane and Sir Edward Grey receive little attention in this chapter, it is partly a 
reflection of the extent to which they avoided saying much on the Raid, a 
silence which indeed contrasts strongly with the radical response. One proto-
Liberal Imperialist whose behaviour did not fit with this characterisation however 
was H.H. Asquith, who made a number of high profile interventions in response 
to Jameson. H.C.G. Matthew’s assessment of Asquith as being ‘more closely 
identified with Rosebery’s cause than his policies or inclinations warranted’ and 
as ‘a man who moved on the periphery of groups’ holds particularly true for 
                                            
10 For more on Labouchere’s politics, see R.J. Hind, Henry Labouchere and the 
Empire, 1880-1905 (London: 1972), ch.1.  
11 For more on Scott and the South African question, see Mark Hampton, ‘The 
Press, Patriotism, and Public Discussion: C.P. Scott, The Manchester Guardian, 
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Asquith in this period.12 As will be seen however, while there were undoubtedly 
differences in approach to the Raid between Asquith’s approach and the radical 
approach as exemplified by Labouchere, this did not take the form of the open 
divisions which would be seen at the time of the South African War. If the roots 
of party division can be seen in Liberal responses to the Raid, they were not yet 
the driving factor in shaping Liberal rhetoric. 
Divisions within Liberal politics did not take place in a vacuum, but against a 
context of wider political struggle against the Unionist parties. In the simplest 
sense, as a party in opposition facing a newly installed government, it was in 
their interests to make immediate political capital out of the difficulties the 
government found itself in, with the aim of casting longer term doubts upon the 
competence of the government. In particular, the party faced a pressing need to 
respond to the rise of Joseph Chamberlain, whose return to office as part of a 
Unionist ministry not only further cemented the legacy of the 1886 schism but 
also brought with it a renewed imperial emphasis in British politics as 
Chamberlain sought to exploit the full potential of the platform the Colonial 
Office provided him. Liberal responses to the Jameson Raid were thus shaped 
from the very start by the two central struggles which gripped the party after 
1895: an internal struggle not just for the leadership but also for the essential 
character of the Liberal Party, and an external struggle against the Unionist 
government, with a view to returning to office at the next election. That is not to 
say that the Raid was always invoked deliberately as a device for fighting these 
battles; indeed, it was often more the case that there was an expectation for 
Liberal speakers to pronounce upon matters of public concern, and thus a need 
to articulate a position on the Raid for ready consumption by Liberal audiences. 
Indeed, the impression is often given that at times the Liberal leadership would 
have been very happy to have ignored the South African question and adopt a 
more favourable battleground: Harcourt’s exasperation in a private letter to 
Chamberlain from July 1896, declaring that ‘I wish with all my heart that Africa 
did not exist’, illustrates this point well.13 Yet, however much Liberal speakers 
may have wished otherwise, the South African question did take on these wider 
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political significances, dynamics which would fundamentally shape how the 
Liberal Party responded to the events of the Jameson Raid. 
Beyond Guilt and Gold: the Historiography of the Raid 
The historiography of the Raid can generally be said to have centred around 
two key controversies: the nature and degree of Joseph Chamberlain’s 
involvement, and by extension the involvement of the imperial government more 
generally; and the extent to which the events of the Raid were either triggered 
or enabled by the policies of the Kruger government towards the mining 
interests of Johannesburg. To a certain extent both these debates have now run 
their course: writing a century on from the Raid Christopher Saunders 
considered the two controversies to have been essentially resolved, and indeed 
was to speculate that there was likely to be little further scholarship on the 
subject.14 Although Saunders may have gone too far in effectively declaring the 
field closed, it is certainly fair to say that the Raid no longer remains heavily 
contested territory for historians, and indeed for the purposes of this chapter 
neither of the two central debates which once characterised the topic are of 
direct concern. At the same time however, much of the scholarship generated 
by these debates remains relevant, and indeed in some cases critical, to 
addressing the Raid’s politics and it is thus useful to briefly survey the field. 
In a sense, the debate among historians over the degree of Chamberlain’s 
complicity in the Raid followed directly on from contemporary allegations of his 
involvement. As will be explored later in this chapter, it did not take long for 
Chamberlain’s conciliatory and peace-making image of early 1896 to come 
under challenge. W. T. Stead’s fictionalised and infamously redacted account of 
the Raid, The History of the Mystery, was to appear the following December 
and implicating Chamberlain, under the guise of ‘Blastus’, in the plot.15 Yet 
given the somewhat sensationalist quarters from which such allegations 
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emerged, the reluctance of many of Chamberlain’s political opponents to 
directly accuse him of involvement, and, one assumes, a general desire among 
many British authors to avoid implicating the Imperial government in a 
discreditable action, Chamberlain was to a degree exonerated in early historical 
writing on the Raid. Writing in 1934, and undoubtedly influenced as much by his 
own personal relationship with his subject as he was by the relatively limited 
material at his disposal, J.L. Garvin’s biography of Chamberlain boldly declared 
that ‘he had not a shadow of complicity with the Raid’, although it is worth noting 
that even Garvin conceded that Chamberlain had considered how best Britain 
might respond to a revolution on the Rand.16  
Stead’s account was based in part upon his having access to what were to 
become the notorious ‘missing telegrams’, detailing the level of collaboration 
between the Colonial Office and Rhodes’ supporters at the Cape, and indeed it 
was the degree to which these and other sources were slowly made accessible 
to historians which was to drive much of the early scholarship on Chamberlain’s 
involvement. Writing a decade after Garvin, William L. Strauss was to suggest 
that upon a reinterpretation of the evidence Chamberlain might well have been 
a part of the conspiracy, a suggestion which Henry Winkler was to advance 
further in a 1949 article for The American Historical Review.17 It was not until 
the work of Jean van der Poel however that a powerful assault was launched on 
Garvin’s assessment of Chamberlain’s innocence: writing in 1951 and making 
use of the papers of Sir Graham Bower and Sir James Rose Innes, van der 
Poel charged Chamberlain with ‘aiding and abetting’ Rhodes in seeking to 
overthrow the government of the Transvaal.18 Van der Poel’s thesis was not 
wholly or immediately accepted by many historians: Elizabeth Pakenham’s own 
account of the Raid, though full of praise for van der Poel’s scholarship, stopped 
                                            
16 J. L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain (London: 1934), vol. III, p.125. 
17 William L. Strauss, Joseph Chamberlain and the Theory of Imperialism (New 
York: 1971) [first published 1942], pp.74-75; Henry R. Winkler, ‘Joseph 
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Historical Review 68:269 (1953); J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger’s Republic 
(Oxford: 1961). 
-47- 
 
far short of accepting the latter’s indictment of Chamberlain, while in his 
biography of the Colonial Secretary Peter Fraser criticised the ‘eagerness’ of 
South African historians to try and implicate Chamberlain in the conspiracy.19 In 
spite of resistance however, the tone for subsequent development of the debate 
had been set, and the arguments in favour of Chamberlain’s complicity 
continued to gain in strength as further documents became available.20  
In recent years, the consensus on the Imperial Government’s complicity tends 
to accept that Chamberlain desired regime change in the SAR and was happy 
to assist Rhodes in making preparations for a Chartered Company force to 
enter the Transvaal should an uprising occur, but that he did not expect 
Jameson to attempt to precipitate a revolution through a pre-emptive invasion.21 
Chamberlain is in this view considered as an accessory to the Raid and an 
accomplice in its cover up, rather than as an architect of the whole affair: the 
latter conclusion has not however always carried through into British political 
histories, Eugenio Biagini and Robert Ingham for example having recently 
sought to explain the Raid as ‘Chamberlain’s first attempt to seize the territories 
of the Boer Republics’.22 Ultimately it is more helpful for our current purposes to 
consider not the degree of Chamberlain’s guilt in the matter, which in the 
circumstances can only ultimately be considered a matter of personal 
interpretation, and instead reflect that the focus of the field on the question of 
imperial complicity touches upon the wider dynamics of imperial character and 
imperial control at play in this period. 
The second strain of scholarship, which might be termed the economic or 
‘mining’ debate, was sparked by the intervention of the Australian historian G. 
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Blainey in 1965. The search for economic explanations behind Anglo-Boer 
confrontations was hardly a new initiative, the Liberal economist J.A. Hobson 
having articulated his theory of a capital-driven imperialism against the 
backdrop of events in South Africa.23 Blainey however shifted the focus away 
from the metropole to events with the SAR itself: pouring scorn on the idea that 
the Raid could simply be explained as a ‘patriotic political adventure’, Blainey 
instead argued that the episode could only be understood in the context of 
Rhodes’ mining interests on the Rand, and the differential impacts of Kruger’s 
policies on outcrop and deep-level mining companies to the detriment of the 
latter.24 Blainey’s thesis proved controversial, and subsequently came under 
two waves of sustained assault.25 In his own assessment of the Randlords, 
Robert Kubicek found there to be no direct correlation between the political 
activity of the mining interests and the division of their holdings along outcrop 
and deep-level lines, while the very idea of a distinction between outcrop mine-
owners and deep-level mine-owners was to take a severe blow from A.A. 
Mawby’s rebuttal of D.J.N. Denoon’s efforts to extend the Blainey thesis into the 
1900s.26   
Blainey’s assessment was most fatally undermined by the work of Elaine Katz, 
which convincingly demonstrated that the outcrop and deep-level distinction 
was unsustainable not just at the level of ownership, but also at the level of 
production: that is, there was no specific economic difficulty for the deep-level 
mine-owners which would explain their willingness to participate in the 
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conspiracy, even if they had done so uniformly.27 Other aspects of the Blainey 
thesis have also come under question, with Ian Phimister having demonstrated 
that Rhodes’ private mining interests in the Rand were minor and largely 
unprofitable.28 Although the more general theory of a Raid driven by capitalist 
unrest on the Rand still has some adherents, with Richard Mendelsohn for 
example having argued that the long-term material investment in operations on 
the Rand created a potential profit motive for the conspirators, the debate over 
the Blainey thesis now appears to be largely concluded.29 
The search for economic motives for the Raid, whether at the broad level of 
Hobson’s capitalist plot or in the in-depth assessment of the workings of the 
mining industry, has undoubtedly done much to further our understanding of the 
Raid. At the same time however, the neat division of the field into ‘political’ and 
‘economic’ camps has understated the extent to which political and economic 
factors were interconnected, if not so much in determining the Raid’s origins 
then at least in so far as the Raid was subsequently discussed. While the focus 
of this chapter is on the political therefore, it will not be to the exclusion of the 
areas usually considered within the domain of the economic history of the Raid, 
and indeed questions of gold and capitalist impulses form a key part of this 
chapter’s assessment of the use of the tropes of character, race and 
governance in Liberal rhetoric on the Raid. 
While these two key debates concerning causation have proved central to the 
Raid’s historiography, it would be incorrect to assert that these controversies 
represented the entirety of historical scholarship on the Raid. Indeed, while 
understudied in comparison with other imperial episodes in this period, the 
political ramifications of the Raid have undergone a degree of assessment by 
historians of imperial politics, the works of some of which provide a valuable 
starting basis from which to pursue this inquiry. Although now somewhat dated, 
Jeffery Butler’s The Liberal Party and the Jameson Raid remains one of the 
best accounts written on the impact of the Raid as a political issue within Britain. 
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A deliberate attempt to advance the study of the Raid’s personal and political 
context beyond what he characterised as ‘hunt the villain’, Butler focused his 
efforts instead on trying to solve the question of why the Liberal response to the 
Raid, tied up as it was with the embarrassing episode of the committee of 
inquiry, should have proved so inadequate and seemingly weak.30 Butler 
attributed this assessment to the failure of historians to understand the 
behaviour of the Liberal leadership, and that of Harcourt in particular, within the 
context of the political and ideological constraints on their actions by their 
personal views on Empire and patriotic duty. Yet while Butler’s study of the 
Liberal response to the Jameson Raid has undoubtedly done much to further 
our understanding of the political impulses of its key actors, it was not as great a 
departure from the historiographical treatment of Chamberlain’s complicity as 
might be imagined: as with the wider field, Butler’s treatment of the politics of 
the Raid remained focused on personal motivation and private ideology, with 
the public dimensions of imperial politics consigned to a supporting role. While 
The Liberal Party and the Jameson Raid marks a useful starting point for our 
current purposes therefore, it only explores part of the picture. 
Dating from the same time, Stansky’s Ambitions and Strategies details how the 
aftermath of the Jameson Raid and particularly the drawn-out episode of the 
South Africa Committee formed the backdrop against which the continuing 
struggles over the Liberal leadership played out. Placing less emphasis on 
concern for the national honour than in Butler, Stansky identifies Harcourt’s 
singular goal during the inquiry as being to secure the condemnation of Rhodes, 
a task in which he ultimately entirely failed.31 Given the focus of Ambitions and 
Strategies on the personal dimensions of the Liberal leadership struggle, it only 
covers in passing the specific understandings and practices of imperial politics 
that shaped the South African question following the Raid. Nonetheless, 
Stansky’s account provides important context as to how the issues mapped on 
to the struggle over the Liberal leadership, as well as serving to illustrate the 
need to interpret the positions adopted by leading Liberals in the wider context 
of the leadership conflicts. 
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The failure of earlier histories to take into account the public dimension of the 
Raid’s politics, and particularly the role of public opinion, was one of the key 
drivers that prompted A.N. Porter’s re-examination of Chamberlain’s role in the 
run up to the South African War.32 Although in his focus on Chamberlain Porter 
was embarking on well-trodden territory his approach nonetheless represented 
a significant development in the field, emphasising the critical importance of 
ideas of public opinion in understanding the politics of the South African 
question between 1895 and 1899. It was with one eye towards the need to win 
over public opinion for the imperial cause that Chamberlain, in Porter’s analysis, 
sought to shift public debate towards questions of Uitlander grievances in both 
his political and diplomatic strategies. While not directly focused on the position 
of the Liberals therefore, this assessment does go some way towards 
examining the context and some of the key themes which were to drive not just 
political calculation in this period but political debate. Additionally, Porter’s 
assessment further recognises that the public politics of the Raid was not simply 
a reflection of private political action, but instead a central part of the processes 
of imperial policy, the public performances of the ‘new diplomacy’ representing 
a critical part of Chamberlain’s wider political strategy. 
This chapter seeks to build upon the existing scholarship on the high political 
and diplomatic elements of the episode by examining the operation of the South 
African question as a public issue within British Liberal politics after the events 
of the Raid. The aim of this exercise is as such not so much as to supersede 
the existing literature as it is to complement it, resituating an often narrowly 
defined episode of British imperial crisis within its wider party political context.  
Gold, BSAC and the Character of the Raid 
An emphasis on the importance of character, of nations and systems as well as 
individuals, forms one of the most distinctive elements of public life in this 
period. As Stephen Collini has argued, the Victorian era saw the ideal of 
character in public discourse enjoy a prominence not seen before or since.33 
For the ‘public moralists’ of Victorian Britain it was inadequacies of character 
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which served as the primary explanation for the failings of government and civic 
life.34 Recent scholarship in the field of imperial history has particularly 
emphasised the role of character in providing political justification and moral 
cover for the imposition of imperial control over subject populations and 
territories. Peter Cain has notably demonstrated the means by which critiques 
of character were deployed in support of the British occupation of Egypt in the 
latter portion of the nineteenth century, with British administrators adopting the 
view that the faults within the Egyptian national character rendered prospects 
for self-government impossible.35 Certainly, similar arguments were advanced in 
relation to the character of the Boers and the Uitlanders at the time of the 
Jameson Raid, as discussed later on in this chapter. Crucially however, this 
framework of character also provided a reference base against which the 
actions and motivations of imperial actors could be measured. This section 
explores therefore how Liberal criticisms of the key players in the Jameson Raid 
were couched in this language of character, and used to advance wider 
critiques of both the character of the Raid itself and the character of imperial 
policy. Furthermore, this section then goes on to explore the means by which 
these personal critiques were linked with the idea of the national character and 
the character of the British Empire.  
Although the British government acted quickly to denounce the Raid, that did 
not prevent some sections of society and the Press from lauding Jameson as a 
bold if somewhat tragic imperial hero. Infamously, the newly-appointed poet 
laureate, Alfred Austin, swiftly penned and published ‘Jameson’s Ride’ in The 
Times, characterising Jameson as a bold and dashing hero whose actions may 
have technically been incorrect but were worthy all the same.36 Such praise of 
Jameson’s character flew in the face of Liberal Party opinion, and it is notable 
that leading Liberals took the opportunity to condemn both the poem and the 
mood it represented. In a speech to the St Andrews University Liberal 
Association on 17 January 1896, the Liberal Member of Parliament Thomas 
Shaw concluded by ‘ridiculing the Jingo spirit as evinced in London newspapers 
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in what he termed the immortal ode of the poet laureate’.37 Shaw was a 
backbencher; however his line of ridicule was nonetheless taken up by the party 
leadership when Parliament returned to session that February. In his reply to 
the Queen’s speech, Rosebery remarked to laughter that he had ‘always 
considered the Laureateship to be an obsolete office; I am now inclined to 
consider that it is also a dangerous one’, while in the Commons Harcourt urged 
the Prime Minister to reflect the language and tone of the ‘sober-minded people 
of England’, continuing ‘I am not speaking of music-halls or of Poets 
Laureate.’38 Interestingly this contrast appears to have had some staying power 
in the debates on the Raid: in response to a speech he gave in Parliament in 
mid-May, Harcourt received a letter from one supporter praising him for his 
position and attacking Austin’s poem as being ‘deplorable as a work of art, 
execrable in its lack of taste’. By contrast, he argued, Harcourt was ‘standing up 
for the honour of old England’.39 Liberals then sought to position themselves in 
opposition to the jingoistic or laudatory accounts of Jameson’s behaviour and, 
as Harcourt’s reference to music halls suggests, the excesses of popular 
jingoism more widely. 
Indeed, Liberal criticisms of Jameson and the raiders were notable for their 
severity. Upon the meeting of Parliament Harcourt denounced the Raid as an 
‘outrageous and disastrous event’, while Rosebery characterised it as a 
‘filibustering excursion’.40 Notably in this instance both leaders were following in 
the line of Gladstone, who in a widely-reported public letter to the Cape Times 
had expressed himself ‘surprised and disgusted at the outrage committed on 
the Republic’, although compared with the rhetoric of Gladstone and Harcourt 
Rosebery’s language was considerably more restrained.41 From the radical 
wings of the party the criticism was even more pronounced: in an article for 
Truth shortly after the Raid took place, Labouchere provocatively declared that 
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‘if ever men died with their blood on their own heads, they are the men who fell 
in this raid; and if ever prisoners of war deserved scant mercy, Jameson and his 
comrades are those prisoners’.42  
Campaigning for his re-election to Parliament later in January, Morley similarly 
launched an aggressive assault on Jameson and his men, branding their 
actions as ‘criminality’ and ‘lawless mischief’.43 Significantly, such criticisms 
were not limited to being made during the immediate aftermath of the Raid. 
Asquith for example was thus able, in a speech made on 30 April 1897 in 
response to the inadequate conclusion of the committee of the inquiry, to 
denounce the Raid as ‘one of the most criminal acts of folly and one of the most 
foolish acts of criminality which history records’, a charge which Morley was to 
echo a few days later at Merthyr Tydvil, branding Jameson’s action ‘as silly and 
contemptible as it was criminal in design’.44 In both cases, the attack on 
character can clearly be seen, with the Raid not just described as unlawful but 
the intelligence and sense of the Raiders called into question. Although the 
salience of the issue may have been lesser in 1897 than it has been in 1896, 
such narratives clearly retained staying power within Liberal rhetoric on the 
South African question and indeed, as the next chapter will discuss, such 
criticisms of the character of the Raid were to continue through to the crisis 
atmosphere of late 1899. Therefore while the tone and the nature of the attacks 
may have varied, there was nonetheless a clear underlying critique of not just 
the consequences of the action but its very character, disclaiming the 
motivations of Jameson as well as the direct consequences of his actions. 
However, while Liberal speakers did criticise the act of the Raid, Jameson and 
his companions did not form the main target of censure: instead, from many 
more radical quarters in the party Liberal criticism fell upon the actions of 
Rhodes and the operation of BSAC. 
Criticisms of Rhodes and the directors of BSAC not only focused on the 
unacceptability of the Raid as an act of aggression, but also attacked its 
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perceived roots as a conspiracy for financial profit. As discussed above, the 
interrelationship between gold, capital and the Raid has long been recognised 
as a significant element within the politics of the South African question. 
However, while it is certainly the case that the events of the Jameson Raid, as 
with the subsequent war, lent themselves readily to Hobson’s thesis of a capital-
driven imperialism, it was not with respect to this wider theoretical critique of 
imperialism that Liberal speakers addressed the issue of the profit motive 
behind the Raid. Instead, the question was addressed through a rhetoric which 
cast the pursuit of profit through the Raid and the conspiracy surrounding it as a 
moral failing demonstrating a deficiency of character among those in positions 
of power and influence in South Africa. This can be seen in a rhetorical focus 
not just on the general financial and mining interests at play in the Rand, but on 
the specific charges of immediate financial gain and ‘stockjobbing’. The actual 
motivations and instincts behind the financial interests involved, it was implied, 
were what were to prove so dangerous about the character of the Raid. 
When Parliament first debated the Raid in February Harcourt’s remarks on 
character were limited, as discussed above, to criticisms of the event itself and 
to the danger it threatened. By the time of the Colonial Office vote in May 
however, Harcourt was advancing a powerful critique of the role played by 
Rhodes and the Chartered Company, and while much of this was focused on 
the principles of governance at stake, discussed later in this chapter, Harcourt’s 
rhetoric also advanced a sustained attack on the financial character of the Raid 
and its backers. Describing the conspiracy as a ‘sordid and squalid picture of 
stockjobbing Imperialism’, Harcourt cited the language of the communications 
exposed by the Transvaal government to attack the financial nature of the 
episode. Mocking the coded language of the telegrams, by which the uprising 
became a ‘flotation’ and the would-be revolutionaries the ‘new company’, 
Harcourt declared that ‘the very lingo is the language of the company promoter, 
and you might think you were reading the prospectus of a set of croupiers.’45 As 
Paul Johnson notes, the company promoter, and particularly the promoter with 
political ties, was a figure of public excoriation in the Victorian era.46 Harcourt’s 
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line of attack therefore represented a specific assault on the character of the 
company as well as highlighting the financial character of the Raid. In his 
allusion to croupiers, Harcourt may also have been further seeking to allude to 
traditional Liberal viewpoints on individual morality and responsibility, equating 
the idea of stockjobbing imperialism with the vice of gambling.47  
Certainly, Harcourt was keen to present this financial influence as harmful to the 
morality and character of the Empire. Referring to the possibility that Rhodes 
might be restored to power in the Cape, Harcourt asked what ‘lesson in public 
morals’ would be presented, 
if we are to tell our colonies, we are to tell the world, that the 
spirit by which we are accentuated is only this: ‘Put money in 
thy purse,’ and then call it the expansion of the Empire and the 
progress of civilisation – what effect is such a doctrine going to 
have in our Empire itself?48 
In Harcourt’s view, it was not just the events of the Raid but the financial forces 
behind the Raid which jeopardised the moral character of the Empire. In this 
sense, Harcourt’s rhetoric reflects the wider tradition within British political 
culture of frame financial matters as fundamentally questions of morality.49 
Indeed, parallels can be drawn with the controversy over Chamberlain’s Tariff 
Reform campaign which to was to erupt after the South African War, with 
proponents of Free Trade attacking the profit motive as dangerous to the 
integrity and morality of the Empire.50 
Such sentiments were echoed in Morley’s rhetoric. Although in his initial 
responses to the Raid Morley had held off from outright attacking the conduct of 
Rhodes and of BSAC, by the time of the committee of inquiry’s completion 
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Morley was likewise attacking the role of financial interests in driving the Raid. 
Responding to a description in The Times of the Raid as part of a wider process 
of empire-building, in a speech to his constituents on 28 September 1897 
declared that ‘all this empire building – why, the whole thing is tainted by a spirit 
of a hunt for gold.’51 Seeking to avoid the outright condemnation of Rhodes, 
Morley continued, 
I do not say of Mr Rhodes this Imperialism is a mere veil for 
stock operations and company operations, but this I do say, that 
he is surrounded by men with whom Imperialism is, and must 
be, nothing else but the end for operations of that ignoble 
kind.52 
Again, the focus of Morley’s rhetoric was not just that actions of the Raid were 
themselves wrong, but that the financial motivations of the Raid’s backers 
directly contributed to the ill character of the episode. Indeed, the description of 
empire-building as ‘tainted’ by the hunt for gold in particular is suggestive of a 
viewpoint in which the character of the Raid corrupted forces of Empire which 
otherwise may have been acceptable from the Liberal standpoint, even 
desirable; this idea of the Raid’s character as corrupting the character of the 
Empire is discussed in further detail below. 
Labouchere’s rhetoric, unsurprisingly, was the closest in tone to what was to 
become the Hobson thesis. The recent policy of the Chartered Company, he 
charged in early January 1896, was to ‘hire ruffians for filibustering raids and to 
manipulate the results for Stock Exchange purposes’, continuing that ‘to make 
money has been the one object of all, and all have doubtless succeeded. But 
every farthing that has been made has come out of the pocket of British 
investors, and has been stained with the blood of African natives.’53 Hobson’s 
direct assault on the ties between imperialism, jingoism and international capital 
was still at this point a few years away. However, the currents in progressive 
political thought that were to make such a synthesis possible were by the time 
of the Raid already well developed. As James Thompson has argued, the 
commentator William Clarke identified in this period the connections between 
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monopolist capitalism and imperialism as undermining the moral and 
democratic basis of the nation through appeals to jingoism and greed.54 Indeed, 
in ‘The Genesis of Jingoism’ Clarke explicitly invokes the jingo response to the 
Raid as an example of the capitalist influence: ‘the music-hall patriot is 
encouraged to howl for Jameson or any other hero of the hour, when, in reality, 
he is howling for the financiers who are making of Jameson their tool.’55  The 
Radical reaction against the Raid thus occurred in a wider intellectual 
environment that was increasingly critical of the links between finance and the 
new imperialism. 
Yet while such language undoubtedly formed a wider economic critique of 
imperialism as a force,  it was the moralistic critique that framed Labouchere’s 
rhetoric, with his focus resting primarily on the profiteering aspects of the 
company’s actions. Indeed, when in July 1897 Labouchere rose to speak in 
Philip Stanhope’s debate on the committee of inquiry’s report, he went as far to 
say that it was precisely because of Rhodes’ financial interests that the Raid 
was so unacceptable, stating: 
If Mr Rhodes had not been connected financially with the 
prospects of this company […] he would be quite ready to 
respect Mr Rhodes, as he respected Garibaldi, the late Mr 
Parnell, and many gentlemen who have been engaged in 
revolutionary objects. But what would have been said of 
Garibaldi if it had been found that he had established a 
company in Sicily before he went there, out of which he was 
making a profit of millions? Or what would have been said of Mr 
Parnell if it had been shown that his advocacy of Home Rule 
involved large financial advantage to himself?56 
The financial motivation of Rhodes and his co-conspirators, Labouchere 
continued, ‘lowered the standard of British public men’. Again therefore, it was 
specifically the financial aspects of the Raid that were the subject of criticism. 
In the same debate, Stanhope himself also advanced a critique along similar 
lines, casting the notion of finance-driven imperialism in direct opposition to the 
character-laded concept of patriotism. As Paul Readman has demonstrated in 
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his work on early twentieth-century politics, although the Unionist alliance 
‘owned’ the language of patriotism in the late Victorian and Edwardian period, 
this was not uncontested by Liberal speakers, who sought to couch their own 
political positions within the language of patriotism.57 Stanhope’s speech in 
response to the committee’s report represents an interesting example of this, 
demonstrating not only a radical attempt to make use of patriotic arguments in 
an explicitly imperial context, but also an implicit attempt to differentiate 
between ‘true’ and ‘false’ patriotism, along the lines of ‘true’ and ‘false’ 
imperialism which were to become a central part of Liberal imperial discourse at 
the time of the South African War. While claiming not to want to dispute 
Rhodes’ patriotism, Stanhope remarked that ‘one’s knowledge of patriots in 
history was not associated with the acquisition of millions by those patriots.’ 
Instead, he argued, they were witnessing what might be called ‘a fin de siècle 
patriotism, which had its nursery on the Stock Exchange.’58 As with 
Labouchere’s rhetoric therefore, the implication would seem to be that it was the 
prospects for financial gain which fundamentally made the Raid immoral, and 
indeed corrupted an idealised, true patriotism.  
Such attacks on character can also be said to demonstrate an underlying 
current of anti-Semitism within Radical anti-imperialist rhetoric. Hobson’s The 
War in South Africa was infamously anti-Semitic in tone, identifying the true 
beneficiaries of the war as ‘a small group of international financiers, chiefly 
German in origin and Jewish in race’.59  Hobson was writing several years after 
the speeches examined here, and we should not directly equate his theorisation 
of the South African question with the wider rhetorical political culture of Liberal 
pro-Boerism. Nonetheless, as Bernard Semmel argues critics of imperialism 
routinely drew upon the supposed demons of past society in their 
condemnations of Empire, of which the traditional reaction against Jewish usury 
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was among the most prominent. In addition to the racial dynamics of this anti-
Semitic rhetoric, such language also therefore acted as a signifier for the 
continuation of historic ills in the actions of the new international financiers.60 
This critique of irresponsible financial behaviour could sometimes be contrasted 
with a counter-narrative, likewise providing an implicit account of character and 
Empire. In his by-election campaign Morley drew a direct comparison between 
Britain’s financial standing and Britain’s moral standing, arguing that  
Our money credit in the money markets of the world is 
unbounded. You will see to-day what are called Consols 
(national stock) standing at 107 or 108. It is the highest of our 
interests, but just as our credit in the money markets of the 
world stands high, so our moral credit, our equity, our inflexible 
equity, our strict good faith, and rigorous observance of our 
word and our bond – these too, our moral Consols, shall stand 
at 108.61 
Morley’s rhetoric in this respect bears great resemblance to that deployed by 
David Lloyd George in his famous Queen’s Hall speech upon the outbreak of 
the First World War.62 This use of financial metaphor in discussions of the 
national honour can also be seen to support John S. Ellis’ thesis of a rhetorical 
continuity between Radical opposition to British aggression in South Africa and 
Radical support for the British war effort against Germany, albeit with a different 
focus to the one Ellis identifies.63 In any case, it is noteworthy that this notion of 
financial behaviour as indicative of moral character could be presented not just 
as an explicit criticism of the Raid itself, but also used as a means of discussing 
a positive ideal of Empire. 
These two narratives of the Raid’s character, that of the discussion of the Raid 
as a criminal enterprise and that of the criticism of the financial motives behind 
the Raid, did not exist in isolation from each other but instead formed part of a 
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combined moral critique of the Raid and the forces it represented. One area in 
which this was particularly apparent is in the occurrence of allusions to piracy in 
Liberal rhetoric on the Raid. Harcourt, in discussing the use of chartered 
companies as a means of imperial control during the May debate on the 
Colonial Office vote, advanced the argument that ‘these private adventurers in 
dominion have been very much like what was formally used in ancient warfare – 
privateers. Privateering has been abolished by the consent of most nations, 
because it has been found generally to degenerate into piracy.’64 Harcourt’s 
choice of language is interesting for a number of reasons. In the first instance, 
the image of the privateer or the pirate can be seen as an overwhelmingly 
pejorative one in terms of character, not only conjuring up the image of the 
violent criminal, but also referencing the idea of the privateer as motivated 
wholly by profit, as opposed to some greater, more meaningful cause. The 
reference to ancient warfare and the allusion to degeneration are also 
suggestive of a departure from the modern standards of civilisation.65 
Although critiques of the Raid’s character and particularly those centred on 
criticisms of stockjobbing imperialism tended to occur primarily in Radical 
responses to the Raid, the allusion to privateering can be found across the 
spectrum of Liberal opinion. Although Labouchere’s charge in Truth that the 
conspirators’ operations were ‘a mere adaptation of the methods and morals of 
Captain Kidd’ might be unsurprising given the ferocity of his criticism of the 
Raid, notably the charge of privateering was also deployed by Rosebery, who in 
his response to the Queens’ speech described the Raid as an episode ‘more 
worthy of the reign of Elizabeth […] than to the days of Her Gracious Majesty’.66 
The significance of such rhetoric should not, of course, be overstated: for one 
thing, Victorian views on the piracy of the Elizabethan era would have by no 
means been entirely negative. Nonetheless, it is worth bearing in mind that such 
allusions to piracy were to recur in later discussions of the South African 
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question, suggesting at the very least that the concepts of privateering and 
piracy made for useful shorthand in Liberal rhetoric on imperial issues.  
Liberal concern over the character of imperial actors was matched by a concern 
for the national character and the character of the Empire. To a degree, this 
represented a concern about the impact of the Raid upon the reputation of the 
imperial government: in the Colonial Office vote, Harcourt declared of the Raid 
that ‘it is transactions of this kind that enables our enemies to cast in our teeth 
the taunt of la perfide Albion’.67 This concern for Britain’s reputation abroad was 
echoed in the aftermath of the South Africa Committee’s report. In a speech at 
Wormit on 12 Oct. 1897, Asquith expressed regret that the inquiry had been 
unable to bring the missing telegrams to light, and that as such  
while they had implicit confidence in the honour and integrity of 
public men to whatever party they belonged, Great Britain was 
in that matter upon her trial at the bar of the civilised world. In 
every quarter and country they had censorious critics, to whom 
British pharisaism was a familiar and in many cases widespread 
charge, and who […] would naturally draw the most unfair 
inference to Britain.68 
Liberals then expressed a concern about the appearances of British imperialism 
not just with a view to the domestic audience, but also with a view to foreign 
powers.  
Indeed, it had been partly along such lines that Stanhope and Labouchere had 
sought to justify their motion condemning the outcome of the inquiry: moving his 
motion, Stanhope had declared it to be a matter of ‘supreme importance’ that 
Parliament act to bring about ‘the vindication of our national honour and the 
good name of Englishmen throughout the world’, while Labouchere charged 
that if Britain failed to punish Rhodes then ‘we should be regarded as the vilest 
hypocrites.’69 Labouchere had deployed similar notions in the immediate 
aftermath of the Raid, writing in Truth that the actions of the Raiders had been 
such that they were prepared to ‘drag the national honour though the mire’.70 
Again, the idea of damage to Britain’s reputation abroad was clearly 
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emphasised, implying a Liberal concern that the Empire was not only 
honourable but that it was seen to be honourable, as well as additionally serving 
as a means of attacking this version of imperialism without the risk of being 
seen as unpatriotic. Notably, while as with much of the rhetoric on the Raid in 
this period such allusions to this risk to the imperial character can be found 
mostly in the rhetoric of those who would go on to be labelled ‘pro-Boers’, they 
can also be found in the rhetoric of more markedly imperialist figures. Rosebery, 
for example, used a speech at Newton Abbot on 15 May 1896 to declare that on 
the question of the inquiry it was not only a case of reassuring opinion in Europe 
and in South Africa about Britain’s intentions, but that ‘we owe it also to 
ourselves to clear up our national character, for depend upon it any delay in this 
inquiry will be considered as suspicious by the vast majority of the population’.71 
However, Liberals did not only consider this a question of appearances. 
Instead, such rhetoric attacking the Raid for harming Britain’s reputation could 
also be accompanied by warnings that the national character had indeed been 
damaged. In the debate on Stanhope’s motion of censure Scott expressed his 
fear ‘that there had been a progressive demoralisation of public sentiment and 
opinion in this country’.72 This was, he argued 
a kind of depravation or degradation of public feeling in these 
matters which made it possible that the authors and abetters of 
public crimes of this kind should think that they had only to 
come to their fellow countrymen and show them just a little bit 
of success – a bit more territory won, huge possessions of this 
country made a bit huger – and they would at once have all 
their offenses condoned and themselves accepted as heroes by 
this country.73 
In these remarks Scott can be seen as taking the key components of the 
attacks on the character of the Raid, and of the character of jingoistic responses 
such as Austin’s ‘Jameson’s Ride’, and applying them to the nation as a whole. 
The language of ‘depravation’ and ‘degradation’ in particular is suggestive of a 
corruption having taken place in the otherwise good character representative of 
Britain and the Empire, implying a threat posed by the strand of imperialism 
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Jameson represented. While Scott’s rhetoric may have been unusual in so far 
as it alleged the damage to have taken place, we can see in this focus evidence 
of the wider expression by Liberals of the concerns about the potential 
degradation of imperial character. In the debate on supply the year prior to 
Scott’s speech, Harcourt had advanced similar points by attacking the 
degeneration of the character of the Press: ‘I have seen’, he claimed 
With the greatest regret what I must call the deterioration of the 
moral tone in the English press. To my mind, it is the most 
dangerous of all features of this transaction. I have seen 
palliations; I have seen apologies, even eulogies, upon 
transactions at which the mind of every honest man must revolt; 
I have seen appeals to the basest and most sordid motives to 
induce people to accept a condition of things which every man 
of honour ought to repudiate and condemn.74 
The use of the Press as a proxy target for attacks on jingoism in the public at 
large featured considerably in the run up to the South African War, explored in 
the next chapter, so it is interesting to see the tactic being deployed by Harcourt 
in the discussion of the Raid. Nonetheless, Harcourt was to go even further and 
hint at this wider degradation, declaring that ‘to my mind, one of the most 
serious matters for us to consider is to see how this accursed thirst for gold has 
eaten into the spirit of the English people’.75 This idea of the corrupting potential 
of the Raid’s character underscored much of Liberal speakers’ attacks on this 
issue. Harcourt’s attack on the doctrine of ‘put money in thy purse’, along with 
Morley’s allusions to Britain’s ‘moral credit’, can be seen as further evidence of 
this anxiety.  
Concerns over character thus formed a key basis for Liberal responses to the 
Raid. Although often focused on the narrow attack on the Raid as an action, 
and the personalities behind the Raid, Liberal rhetoric often built upon these 
ideas to advance wider critiques of the nature of British imperialism at work in 
the region and at home. Critically, implicit in these attacks on jingoism, 
‘stockjobbing imperialism’, and ‘privateering’, was an assumption that there had 
been a diversion from pre-existing British imperial practices, presumably free 
from such corrupting impulses. Yet this was combined in many cases with a 
concern for the potential harm caused by the Raid, both to the image of the 
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British Empire and, according to some speakers, the morality of the British 
themselves. Care must of course be taken to avoid overstating the significance 
of these lines of argument, particularly when as noted above it was those from 
the Radical wing of the party who typically, although as Rosebery’s rhetoric 
demonstrates not exclusively, made use of such rhetoric. Nonetheless, it would 
seem reasonable to conclude that concerns over character did not simply 
represent superficial froth on the surface of Liberal rhetoric on the Raid, but 
instead could form the core of wider critiques of the imperial situation in South 
Africa, as well as serving as a means for Liberal speakers to evade the charge 
of unpatriotic motives. 
Race and the Raid: Imagining South Africa 
A rhetorical emphasis on the character of the British Empire inevitably also 
touched upon questions of the character of the British as a people, drawing 
upon many of the racial assumptions which were used to justify imperial rule. 
The question of race was to represent an important element in Liberal rhetoric 
on the Raid. There was not, however, one single strand of racial rhetoric which 
ran through Liberal rhetoric on the South African question in this period. Rather, 
disparate elements were deployed alongside narratives of character and 
governance so as to frame race questions towards specific ends. 
Characterisations of the Boer and Uitlander populations of the Transvaal formed 
key areas of rhetorical focus, the relative novelty of the latter population in 
particular allowing for considerable scope in how they were presented. 
Alongside such characterisations, discussions of the Black African population 
by Liberal speakers also played a role in the rhetoric on the Raid, even if as is 
argued in this section such debates were notable more for their absence. 
Furthermore, the notion of white racial harmony also proved to be a recurring 
theme of Liberal rhetoric, again reflecting this idea of the damage caused by the 
Raid to an idealised pre-existing state of affairs. 
Despite the history of animosity between Britain and the Boers of the Transvaal, 
stemming from the Great Trek and earlier conflicts as well as from more recent 
confrontations such as the Drifts Crisis, many Liberal responses to the Raid 
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spoke of the Boers in favourable terms.76 For example, Robert Spence Watson, 
the president of the National Liberal Federation and a figure who would go on to 
become a prominent pro-Boer activist as the outlook in South Africa 
deteriorated, made favourable reference to the Boers in a speech at Blyth on 21 
January 1896, remarking that ‘We had had difficulties before with the Dutch in 
the Transvaal; difficulties in which they were proved to be right and we wrong.’77 
Similar sentiments had been expressed a few days previously by Sir G.O. 
Morgan, the Liberal member for East Denbighshire and a former Under-
Secretary of State for the Colonies, who in a public letter favourably contrasted 
at some length the characteristics of the Boers with those of the mining interests 
on the Rand. The Boers, he wrote, 
seemed to me very patriotic, honest, simple-minded, and in 
their way a very religious people, singularly free from that 
gambling, grasping, money-grabbing mania which is the curse 
of our age, and seems to have found a congenial habitat in the 
golden soil of South Africa.78 
Such language then framed the character of the Boers in opposition to some of 
the critiques of character which, as discussed above, would go on to form the 
core of much of the criticism of the motivations behind the Raid.  
Indeed, Morgan went even further on this point, mocking the claim of the mining 
interests to have developed the Transvaal: ‘the Boers would probably reply that 
they have no wish to be “developed” and that all they ask is to be allowed to live 
on their farms with their wives and their very large families without being 
molested.’79 Morgan’s rhetoric in this instance raises a number of interesting 
points. In one sense, it stands as an implicit criticism of the ‘civilising mission’ of 
Empire, questioning the merits of imposing the features of modern civilisation 
upon an unwilling population. Yet, although ostensibly in support of the Boers, 
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the depiction is essentially one of a backward, pastoral population at odds with, 
and hostile to the modern world, albeit in a supposedly admirable way; the 
significance of such double-edged praise of the Boers is discussed in further 
detail below. Morgan’s description of the Boers as a ‘very religious people’ is 
also significant. Although in the context of Morgan’s other statements it might be 
seen as further damning praise suggestive of the Boers’ backwardness, the 
essential status of the Boers as a Protestant people was to ultimately become a 
key contention of pro-Boer speakers by the end of the century: it might well be 
that in stressing this nature of the Boer character Morgan was also making 
reference to this wider point of Anglo-Boer similarity, although if so this did not 
form a major feature of rhetoric on the Raid. 
Certainly, when contrasted with the extensive discussions of the Boer character 
which accompanied the crisis of 1899, the relative absence of direct 
characterisations of the Boers in this period is quite striking. Yet while many 
Liberal speakers were unwilling to engage directly with questions as to the 
nature of the Boer population, in many cases the underlying rhetoric of race was 
nonetheless present in Liberal discussions of the Raid and its aftermath, most 
notably through reference to Kruger as essentially a proxy for the people he led. 
Significantly, in initial Liberal responses to the Raid references to Kruger almost 
always took the form of praise for his restraint in the face of Jameson’s action. 
Gladstone’s own brief intervention in response to the Raid demonstrates this: in 
his letter of 17 January, subsequently printed in the British Press, Gladstone 
stated he was ‘much pleased with what I see thus far of Kruger’s conduct’.80 
Likewise, A.J. Mundella, the Liberal member for Sheffield Brightside and the 
President of the Board of Trade under Gladstone and Rosebery, used a speech 
at Leicester on 16 January to praise the ‘magnanimity of President Kruger and 
of the Boers.’81  
Morley was also to advance a similar position at Arbroath, notably making 
reference to the German factor in the process. Referring to the Kaiser’s 
controversial telegram offering assistance to the SAR following the Raid, Morley 
cited Kruger’s response as evidence of his good character:  
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President Kruger, as he wrote with dry piety, said in answer that 
he relied upon the aid of God, and not upon foreign powers, 
and he showed that he knew very well how to take care of 
himself against his enemies, and with great magnanimity.82 
Harcourt was to likewise praise Kruger in his speech upon the opening of 
Parliament, declaring that  
we also applaud the magnanimity and the humanity which he 
has exhibited under circumstances of unparalleled difficulty. I 
think the page of history offers few examples of such 
moderation under such conditions. It is well that in the difficult 
questions that lie before us we should have to deal with a 
statesman of such moderation and of such wisdom.83 
Such descriptions were to some extent inevitable given the degree to which the 
circumstances of the Raid had strengthened the position of Kruger’s 
government relative to the British. Yet the significance of such positive 
descriptions can be said to truly come into focus when contrasted with Liberal 
rhetoric on subsequent iterations of the South African question, with even pro-
Boer rhetoric by 1899 regularly speaking of the Boers, and of Kruger personally, 
in far less positive terms. 
Liberal praise could, however, also mask less flattering assumptions about the 
nature of the Boers as a population. An emphasis on their supposed simplicity, 
stubbornness and religiosity, while presented as a contrast against the capital-
driven instincts of the mining interests, also served to fuel the popular 
stereotypes of the Boers which were to become commonplace in political 
debate by the time of the South African War.84 Indeed, to the extent that the 
nature of the Boers is mentioned at all in debates on the Raid after the initial 
period, it is usually with allusion to this idea of a backward nature. In a speech 
given to the Eighty Club on 3 March 1896, Rosebery remarked that they had 
increasing doubts about ‘the ability of our Heaven-born Ministers to counteract 
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the Dutch rural simplicity of our old friend President Kruger’.85 In similar fashion, 
Campbell-Bannerman was to comment somewhat ironically in speech at 
Cambridge on 6 June that they were ‘watching with some amusement at the 
game which was being played by our very astute Colonial Secretary and the 
simple minded Burgher.’86 Clearly in both cases the primary purpose of these 
comments was to mock the government’s record of the South African question 
and to cast aspersions on the Unionists’ ability to manage the Empire, itself 
evidence of the swift turnaround in Chamberlain’s reputation among Liberals in 
the months following his initial response to the Raid. Nonetheless, these 
comments can also be seen as making reference to and perpetuating some of 
these wider, negative characterisations of the Boers as simple and backward, 
again a characterisation which was to prove predominant in Liberal Imperialist 
rhetoric by the time of the South African War. 
If characterisations of the Boers at the time of the Raid are most significant only 
when contrasted with later rhetoric, then this is even more so the case with 
characterisations of the Uitlanders. As Smith notes, the Uitlander population of 
the Transvaal did not form a simple homogeneous group, instead being ‘a 
motley collection of individuals of diverse nationalities, divided by class and 
disunited’.87 Nonetheless, as will be discussed in the next chapter, this did not 
pose a barrier to attempts by British politicians to conflate the Uitlander 
population with the wider British population of South Africa. Nor indeed were 
such generalisations entirely absent from general debate around the time of the 
Raid. In the May 1896 debate on Colonial Office supply, Chamberlain for 
example spoke of ‘the grievances of British subjects, the majority of the 
Uitlanders’.88 Within Liberal speakers’ rhetoric on the Raid, however, discussion 
of the Uitlanders was a good deal more nuanced, as will now be explored. 
One feature of Liberal rhetoric on the Uitlanders which might seem anomalous 
when compared with later rhetoric is the relatively positive tone with which the 
migrant population was discussed. This situation can be seen as having come 
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about primarily due to the presence of two opposing narratives that shaped 
wider British political debate in the immediate aftermath of the Raid. The first of 
these took root among pro-Boer speakers and, as explored above, rested upon 
the notion that the Raid was the result of a conspiracy between BSAC and the 
mining interests, rather than an organic movement on the part of the Uitlanders. 
The second narrative, by contrast, arose from jingoistic responses to the failure 
of the Raid. Jameson, the explanation went, had failed in his action not because 
of any fault on his part, but because the courage of the revolutionaries at 
Johannesburg had failed and that the Uitlanders had failed to provide significant 
support. Indeed, as Stephen Gray points out, in the weeks and months following 
the Raid pamphlets began appearing both in Britain and on the continent 
attacking the cowardice of the Uitlanders.89 In seeking to develop a position in 
response to these two narratives, endorsing the first and challenging the implicit 
defence of the Raid contained within the second, Liberal speakers, and 
particularly those who later identified as pro-Boers, adopted a rhetorical position 
in defence of the Uitlanders. 
Morley, for example, sought to rebut the jingoistic charge of Uitlander 
responsibility for Jameson’s defeat in his by-election speech at Arbroath by 
making reference to the infamous ‘women and children’ letter which Jameson 
sought to use as a casus belli for intervention. ‘If’, he argued, 
the Raid is to be justified on the ground that it was destined to 
rescue the women and the children who were in great danger in 
Johannesburg, why was it expected and made an article of 
blame that it did not happen that some thousands of men did 
not march out of Johannesburg to meet this force of Dr 
Jameson’s, leaving their women and children exposed to all the 
suspected savagery of the Boers?90 
Such a statement was in part undoubtedly designed to keep the focus of 
attention upon the actions of Jameson and his backers, and indeed in his 
speech Morley proceeded directly into an attack upon the Raiders’ criminality. 
Nonetheless this can also be seen as a defence of the Uitlanders from a 
jingoistic political narrative in Britain which sought to cast aspersions upon their 
character.  
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We can see similar rhetoric adopted by Harcourt in the parliamentary set pieces 
of the spring of 1896, seemingly designed to establish distance between the 
Uitlander population and the conspiracy behind the Raid. In the debate on the 
loyal address, Harcourt called attention to Chamberlain’s dispatch in response 
to the Raid, asserting to cheers that ‘he [Chamberlain] stated, and stated truly, 
that this outrageous attempt to overthrow the Government of the Transvaal by 
force did not proceed from and had not the sympathy of the majority of the 
Uitlanders of the Rand.’91 Harcourt stressed this point further in the debate in 
May on Colonial Office supply: after quoting from the telegrams sent to 
Jameson by his co-conspirator Rutherfoord Harris at the Cape, which warned of 
the lack of support for the reform movements, Harcourt declared ‘No, they were 
not popular with the Uitlanders of Johannesburg. They were machinations, from 
first to last, of this syndicate, of the Chartered Company, connected with the 
gold speculators in Johannesburg and in the Cape Colony.’92 What can be seen 
in such rhetoric is not only an attempt to separate the Uitlanders from the actual 
conspiracy behind the Raid, but more critically also to distinguish between the 
Uitlander population and the interests of mining capital, in spite of the essential 
ties between the Uitlanders and the mining industry. Notably, Harcourt also 
used his speech in the debate on supply to combine this interpretation with a 
rebuttal of the jingoistic Uitlander guilt narrative, charging that 
there has been a great deal of, I think, very unjust abuse 
heaped upon these poor-spirited Uitlanders, and their treachery 
in not supporting the raid. The real charge against them is that 
they could not and would not be stimulated by bribery, and 
every other method, to enter upon an insurrection against the 
Government, which the great majority of them had no desire to 
overthrow.93 
Continuing, he declared that the Uitlanders were being treated ‘like the needy 
knifegrinder of Canning, as “wretches whom no sense of wrong could rouse to 
vengeance”’, and unfairly slandered in the Press because they refused to meet 
the wishes of BSAC.94 In contrast then to later turns of events in which the 
Uitlanders featured heavily in imperialist rhetoric on the South African question, 
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in early 1896 it was in fact Liberals such as Morley and Harcourt who sprang to 
their defence. 
While this narrative might be characterised as pro-Uitlander, it can also be seen 
as an effort to undermine the narrative of Uitlander rights which had notionally 
justified the Raid, and as such the position that Chamberlain was now 
advancing in his South African policy. This tactic can be seen in the rhetoric 
deployed by both Rosebery and Harcourt upon the opening of Parliament, with 
both speakers invoking the politics of the Irish question. The Liberal leadership 
were responding to a speech that the Unionist Prime Minister Lord Salisbury 
had made at the end of January attacking the policy of Irish home rule, in which 
he sought to portray the SAR as an example of extreme home rule.95 When 
Parliament met eleven days later, both Rosebery and Harcourt sought to turn 
this critique on its head and apply the Irish question to South Africa. While 
acknowledging that ‘Her Majesty’s Government cannot disregard the grievances 
with which it [the Raid] was intended to deal’, Rosebery mocked Salisbury for 
going so far ‘as to compare the Uitlanders to those cherished Ulstermen on 
whom they have been accustomed to heap so much eulogy in former days.’96 In 
the House of Commons, Harcourt attacked the government along similar lines. 
Commenting acidly that the Prime Minister ‘might have picked up stones 
enough to fling at Home Rule without seizing upon this delicate and dangerous 
topic as a missile to throw at his opponents’, Harcourt condemned Salisbury for 
having drawn a link between the two issues.97 ‘For what purpose’, he asked 
Were the bitterest memories of Irish strife brought up, which 
can only serve to inflame the quarrel which now unhappily 
exists between the races in South Africa whom it is our policy to 
reconcile? […] For what object was a vision of Scotch moss-
troopers invoked to come to the rescue of the Ulster of South 
Africa?98 
The primary purpose of such attacks was to discomfit the government. Yet in 
inviting this comparison to the Irish question, we can again see this process of 
deflection away from the question of Uitlander rights by invoking an established 
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Liberal rallying cry. Furthermore, in this direct comparison of the Uitlander to the 
Ulsterman, we might also see an inference that the complaints of the Uitlanders 
were equivalent to the agitation of Ulster Unionism against Irish Home Rule: 
that is, in the eyes of a Liberal audience, the cause of reaction rather than 
reform. 
The most significant aspect of Liberal discussion of the Uitlanders however was 
the reluctance on the part of Liberal statesmen to characterise them as British. 
Although Sir Edward Grey notably used a speech on 15 January 1896 to state 
that he hoped the Raid would at least have the consequence of concessions 
being granted ‘to British subjects and others’ living within the Transvaal, such 
comments, which stopped far short of characterising the Uitlander population as 
a whole as being intrinsically British, were exceptional for Liberal speakers.99 
Given that at the diplomatic level, Chamberlain moved very swiftly to make the 
question of the Uitlander franchise a central issue of Anglo-Boer relations, it is 
interesting to see this reluctance on the part of Liberal speakers to present the 
Uitlanders as an essentially British population. 
If Liberal silences over the question of Uitlander identity constitute one of the 
more distinctive elements of the party’s response to the Raid, they were as 
nothing compared to the party’s silences over the non-white populations of 
South Africa, and particularly Black African population.100 As noted above, the 
South African question prior to 1899 had long been framed, albeit generally 
from a governmental-diplomatic perspective rather than a political one, as a 
question of managing relations between imperial authorities, the British, the 
Dutch-speaking population, and, critically, the Black African population. Even as 
the relative power of the indigenous kingdoms declined, they were nonetheless 
presented as a key element underpinning British calculations in the region, as 
demonstrated by the continued prohibitions against slavery attached to both the 
Pretoria and London conventions. To the degree that the Black African 
population did feature in Liberal rhetoric in the aftermath of the Raid, it was 
however usually in the form of yet further evidence of the undesirable nature of 
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BSAC rule. As explored above, Labouchere had cited Rhodes’ conduct towards 
the Black African population of Rhodesia in his attack upon the character of 
Company rule. Writing in Truth in the immediate aftermath of the Raid, 
Labouchere declared that ‘the history of the company is disgraceful from 
beginning to end. It began by tricking Lobengula out of half his dominions; it 
went on to rob him by violence of the other half.’101 The fate of the Matabele, 
along with Labouchere’s attacks on profits ‘stained with the blood of African 
natives’, thus formed the backdrop of his attacks on the Chartered Company, 
rather than a current concern. In any case, the references to the 
dismemberment of the Matabele kingdom in Labouchere’s rhetoric did not 
represent a common feature of Liberal rhetoric on the Raid. 
The question of Chartered Company treatment of the Black African population 
was raised again in the summer of 1897, after the inconclusive conclusion of 
the committee of inquiry. Critically however, in this case the allegations centred 
on the charge of effective slavery. A critical report by the resident commissioner 
in Rhodesia, Sir Richard Martin, had attributed the unrest under BSAC rule to 
the policies of forced labour imposed by the chartered company. In Stanhope’s 
opening speech in the debate on his motion censuring the committee, he seized 
the report as further evidence of what the ‘scandalous maladministration’ which 
had gone on under company rule. Martin’s report, he charged, proved ‘that 
practically a system of slavery existed under the company, that cattle of the 
unfortunate natives were improperly confiscated, and that when they protested 
or resisted they were mown down by Maxim guns.’102 Of the three charges, the 
first allegation was undoubtedly the most toxic. As Esme Cleall has argued in 
her study of the indenturing of the Bechuana rebels by the Cape Government in 
this period, slavery ‘operated as a key signifier for imperial wrongs, racism and 
violence in British imperial discourse’.103 With a faith in the moral superiority of 
the British Empire, or at least a faith in an idealised vision of what the Empire 
should be, lying at the heart of assumptions regarding the supposed 
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uniqueness of the British imperial experiment in contrast to the empires of other 
powers, the charge of slavery carried particularly devastating weight, and it is 
unsurprising therefore that Stanhope should seek to maximise his attacks on 
BSAC by making use of such charges. 
Stanhope was not the only Liberal to draw a link between the criticisms of the 
Martin report and the Raid. In his October 1897 speech at Wormit, Asquith 
identified the problem of imperial administration in South Africa following the 
Raid as being not just one of restoring relations between the English and the 
Dutch in the region, but also of securing ‘for the natives, particularly in that part 
of the territory in South Africa called Rhodesia, adequate protection’.104 
Likewise, Morley had used a similar speech to his constituents to reference 
events in Rhodesia as part of his wider justification for the committee of 
inquiry’s conduct. Informing his Arbroath audience that he wished to address 
himself to ‘a certain chapter in the proceedings to which too little attention has 
been paid’, he proceeded to declare his disgust at Martin’s findings in Rhodesia. 
Stating to cheers from his audience that ‘compulsory labour is a long name for 
slavery’, Morley challenged the denials from Lord Grey, installed in the 
aftermath of the Raid as the administrator of Southern Rhodesia, by deliberately 
stressing his links to Rhodes.105 Remarking that, ‘as men of probity do 
sometimes, Lord Grey has fallen into questionable company’, Morley seized 
upon a remark that Rhodes had made upon Grey’s appointment, namely that 
Grey very kindly took his advice, to imply that Rhodes was behind the scandal 
of compulsory labour in the territory. In any case, he argued, Martin’s findings 
had not been disproven, and the result was 
that in the dominions of the Queen, whose sixtieth year’s reign 
we are celebrating this year, in the dominions of the queen at 
this moment there are men, under the Queen’s flag, who are 
administering what is neither more nor less than a system 
tending to slavery.106 
In invoking such patriotic tropes as the Queen’s jubilee and the flag, Morley can 
be seen as emphasising the contrast between an idealised Empire and actual 
imperial practice under BSAC rule. In this manner then, the Black African 
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population were invoked in support of a humanitarian, anti-slavery narrative 
which emphasised the supposedly alien nature of Rhodes’ operations to the 
standards expected of imperial servants. 
What makes this rhetoric in response to the Raid all the more intriguing is that 
there appears to have been very little discussion of the non-white subjects of 
the SAR, despite the great focus placed on the treatment of the Black Africans 
by the Boers during earlier iterations of the South African question. The Pretoria 
Convention had imposed a British Resident in the retroceded Transvaal state so 
as to continue to administer affairs relating to the Black African population, and 
it is notable that even the greatly watered-down London Convention retained a 
prohibition against slavery.107 Similarly, the British annexation of the fledgling 
trekker republics of Goshen and Stellaland had in part been a response to the 
tensions between the Tswana and the Boers in Bechuanaland while, as noted 
above, responses to the Malaboch War were also framed by humanitarian 
critiques of the Boers’ conduct.108 In the aftermath of the Raid however, the 
position of the indigenous population of the Transvaal barely featured at all in 
Liberal speechmaking: a significant development in the politics of the South 
African question. 
One further aspect of Morley’s account of the situation in Rhodesia worth 
considering is the direct link drawn between the actions of BSAC and the 
subsequent revolt. In consequence, Morley argued, ‘of this compulsory labour, 
and of this seizure of cattle, there was a war, and those wretched savages were 
mowed down like swathes of grass by Maxim guns – like swathes of grass 
before the scythe’.109 Again, this might be seen as evidence of an underlying 
humanitarian concern deployed so as to indict the reputation of BSAC. 
However, Morley went on to reinforce this charge by quoting from the writing of 
Sir Harry Johnston. Drawing a contrast between the philosophy of Johnston and 
that of Rhodes, he quoted Johnston as warning that 
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it must be borne in mind that the negro is a man with a man’s 
rights; above all, that he was the owner of the country before 
we came, and deserves, nay, is entitled to, a share in the land 
commensurate with his needs and wishes; that in numbers he 
will always exceed the white man, while he may some day 
come to rival him in intelligence; and that finally, if we do not 
use our power to govern him with absolute justice, the time will 
come, sooner or later, when he will rise against us and expel 
us, as the Egyptian officials were expelled from the Soudan.110 
Such a critique was essentially as much one of governance and security as it 
was one of humanitarianism. The implication was that a failure to govern with 
justice would jeopardise the Empire by increasing the likelihood of an uprising 
by the indigenous population, risking the entire imperial presence in the 
territory. Here then the Black African population is framed as a threat, or at least 
a hazard to imperial rule, as opposed to simply being the passive victims of 
colonial abuse. In linking this argument with the wider questions of the Raid’s 
aftermath, Morley’s speech was atypical for a high-profile Liberal. Nonetheless, 
it is worth noting that in the essential argument that British authority was 
contingent on the just administration of the Empire’s subject populations, 
Morley’s rhetoric echoed that which was to be deployed at the time of the crisis 
of 1899 with regards to the white settler populations. Ultimately however, such 
language in this context was rare, and to the degree that the non-white 
populations of South Africa were discussed by Liberal speakers at all, it was to 
present them not as political actors but as passive victims of a brand of British 
imperialism which Liberals sought to condemn. 
The portrayals of the Boer and Uitlander populations on the Transvaal 
examined in this section demonstrate the degree of rhetorical scope available to 
Liberal speakers in terms of framing the South African question in the aftermath 
of Jameson. Critically however such characterisations of the Boer and Uitlander 
populations were not presented in isolation, but instead were expressed 
alongside wider narratives of Anglo-Dutch race relations across the whole 
region. As with Morley’s discussion of the Black African populations of South 
Africa these ideas spoke fundamentally to questions of imperial governance, 
and this aspect of the rhetoric of white racial harmony is explored in the next 
section. More than this however, an examination of the ways by which Liberals 
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presented the state of relations between the British settler population and the 
Boers can reveal much about the wider dynamics of the South African question. 
These narratives of white race relations generally revolved around the premise 
that the Raid had disrupted a pre-existing state of white racial harmony across 
South Africa, with severe and potentially dangerous consequences. Just weeks 
after the Raid concerns for the damage done to relations between the British 
and the Boers formed a key aspect of Liberal responses to Jameson’s action. In 
his by-election campaign, Morley stressed how the Raid, if it had succeeded, 
would have resulted in ‘violent strife and passion kindled in the Cape Colony’.111 
Critically in this assessment, the warning is not just of damage done to Anglo-
Boer relations at the diplomatic level, but to harm being inflicted upon racial 
harmony within the Empire.  
Liberal rhetoric on the actual repercussions of the Raid rather than the 
theoretical impact also stressed that the question of race relations went beyond 
the borders of the SAR, and instead reflected wider dynamics throughout South 
Africa. Asquith was to adopt a similar line to Morley in a speech at Trowbridge 
on 9 May 1896, seeking to impress upon his audience the damage that had 
been done to the formerly good relations between the two settler populations in 
the region. The Raid, he argued ‘had opened a rift which it might take years, 
and possibly a generation, to close between the British and the Dutch 
populations in that part of the world, in whose close co-operation the victory of 
civilisation over barbarism depends.’112 Two elements are particularly notable in 
Harcourt and Asquith’s rhetoric on Anglo-Dutch relations within South Africa. 
First, as discussed above, the underlying implication of both speeches was that 
a state of division between the British and the Dutch was a new development in 
South Africa, an unwanted consequence of the Raid which had broken down an 
existing state of balance and harmony. In practice, as noted earlier there had 
been a long history of tensions between the British colonial authorities and the 
different Dutch-speaking groups in the region, from the events of the Great Trek 
through to the controversies surrounding the annexation and subsequent 
retrocession of both Transorangia and the Transvaal. The specific 
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circumstances of the Raid, it is true, might be seen as having polarised the 
division more sharply, but it is interesting nonetheless that its consequences 
were portrayed as an entirely new development.  
More significantly however, this assumption was accompanied by the 
suggestion that this development posed a serious risk to the Empire. Harcourt’s 
description of the situation as ‘perilous to our colonial empire’, and Asquith’s 
warning of the danger now posed to the ‘victory of civilisation over barbarism’ 
can be seen as evidence of an emphasis on the importance of Dutch sentiment 
to the security of Britain’s position in South Africa. As with Morley’s implicit 
warning about the risk posed by the Black African population, the Dutch-
speaking settler population was likewise presented as a group whose support 
would be essential to the continuity of imperial rule in the region, suggesting a 
fundamental insecurity about the fragility of Empire within Liberal rhetoric. 
An emphasis on the need to restore relations between the British and the Dutch 
was not just a feature of the immediate response to the Raid, but notably also 
framed Liberal responses to the committee of inquiry. In his intervention in the 
debate on Stanhope’s motion of censure, Campbell-Bannerman concluded his 
speech with the declaration that  
the only hope of peace and prosperity in South Africa was not in 
the aggravation, but in the extirpation of that miserable spirit of 
enmity and jealousy which had too much prevailed among the 
races, and in using the various gifts, qualities, and powers of 
those races for the common welfare of the country in which they 
resided.113 
Likewise, Asquith’s speech at Wormit on 12 October 1897 identified the 
problem as being one of ‘how to restore the relations broken for the time being 
– it would almost seem hopelessly broken by the criminal enterprise – between 
the English and the Dutch populations’ further underlines the continuity of this 
narrative.114 The persistence of the idea of race harmony might well be 
attributed to the realities of the diplomatic situation and political environment in 
South Africa after the Raid: by late 1897 any hope of a speedy reconciliation 
between the SAR and Britain looked increasingly distant, while the formation 
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and spread of the South African league underlined the degree to which politics 
in the Cape and Natal were increasingly operating along sectional lines.115 
However, we might also see in the emphasis on the restoration of Anglo-Dutch 
relations a wider focus on the role of local collaborators in the Liberal vision of 
Empire, crucially in the form of non-British populations as well as the imperial 
authorities ‘on the spot’. 
Yet alongside this narrative of cooperation must be added an important caveat: 
a restoration of good relations between the English and Dutch populations did 
not necessarily imply equality of position. In a speech at South Queensferry on 
20 January 1898, Campbell-Bannerman offered a significantly qualified version 
of this collaborative vision of imperial South Africa. Declaring that he believed 
British power would dominate south of the Zambesi river, he went on to state 
his hope that ‘the Dutch will not only be content to fall in with that 
predominance, but that they would form a most valuable part of that 
community.’116 There is then a hierarchy implied in such rhetoric, and while 
therefore there is evidence more generally of a semi-pluralist idea of empire, at 
least in regards to the empire of white settlement, there can be seen to be limits 
to this notion. The significance of Campbell-Bannerman’s rhetoric should not of 
course be overstated, and it is certainly the case that such explicit hierarchical 
discussions were not commonly occurring features of Liberal rhetoric on race. 
Nonetheless, Campbell-Bannerman’s rhetoric serves as a corollary to the 
narratives of white racial harmony and cooperation and, as will be seen in the 
next chapter, hints at some of the themes which were to become more 
prominent in the crisis atmosphere of 1899.  
Race rhetoric thus represented a complex component of the Liberal response to 
the Jameson Raid and was, in many ways, notable for the degree to which it did 
not represent a simple continuity of past narratives. Although in some of the 
more double-edged descriptions of the Boers we might identify the continuation 
of earlier critiques of Boer society, the characterisation of the Uitlanders was 
notably a far more novel development, if anything borrowing tropes more from 
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the history of the Irish question than from Britain’s past experiences in South 
Africa. Similarly, the role of the Black African population reflects something of a 
new development in Liberal rhetoric on the South African question, with an 
increased tendency to portray them in passive terms, so as to support other 
causes such as the critiques of BSAC rule, rather than as the regional actors 
they had been considered to be during earlier iterations of the South African 
question. Finally, while questions of cooperation were hardly a new feature of 
the South African question, the importance assigned to such factors by Liberal 
speakers suggests that a marked focus on idea of white racial harmony 
emerged out of the politics of the Raid. Given that these were all narratives 
which went on to frame later debates at the time of the 1899 crisis, we might 
therefore see the Liberal rhetoric on race and the Raid as laying many of the 
foundations for subsequent discussions of race and the South African question, 
even if in the immediate aftermath of the Raid this did not yet coalesce around 
one central narrative. Instead, such narratives served to reinforce the final 
element of Liberal rhetoric examined in this chapter: the rhetoric of governance.    
The Governance of South Africa and the Rhetoric of the Raid 
That questions of imperial governance loomed large in Liberal rhetoric on the 
Raid is unsurprising, given that questions over the character of British 
imperialism and the nature of the populations of South Africa invariably spoke to 
the processes and mechanisms by which British authority over the region was 
enforced. The Jameson Raid sparked considerable debate over the nature of, 
and basis for, British rule in South Africa, with the importance of good relations 
between the white settler populations and the role of BSAC in particular 
becoming subjects of discussion. Wider questions about the constitutional 
relationship between the British Empire and the South African Republic also 
played a role, as did debates on the political system within the Transvaal, a 
precursor to the franchise debates at the time of the crisis of 1899. All these 
issues represent what might be termed the rhetoric of imperial governance, 
which can be defined as political language used in the discussion of imperial 
questions which emphasises the structures and dynamics of British imperial 
rule, intertwined with a stress upon Liberal governing ideals such as self-
government and good government.  
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The latter in particular has in recent scholarship been identified as a key 
element of Victorian political rhetoric in the long nineteenth century. James 
Thompson identifies three strands of this language of good government: a 
Whiggish, moralistic language dominant in the early Victorian era; a focus on 
administrative competence in the mid-Victorian era; and finally a language of 
progressive good government and material improvement at the end of the 
century.117 Thompson touches on the subject of Empire only briefly, but notes 
nonetheless the persistence of the two more traditional narratives of good 
government in imperial administration and politics. In relation to the South 
African question, at least at the time of the Jameson Raid, this assessment 
appears to hold true, albeit with an important qualifier. In keeping with this idea 
of a language of good government defined by the effectiveness of government, 
Thompson’s definition places emphasis upon the ends of government rather 
than the process. This might well be the case for domestic questions, but in the 
imperial context it was important for Liberal audiences not only that good 
government be done, but also that good government be seen to be done: 
desirable ends, such as potentially the reform of the SAR, could not justify the 
means of misgovernment. To this it might also be added that the languages of 
moralistic good government and competent good government were not always 
necessarily stand-alone entities but, as discussed below, could form part of one 
and the same critique. 
The question of governance occurred in one sense at the regional level: who 
ruled in South Africa, and what was the nature of this rule? As explored above, 
a key part of this dynamic was founded upon the idea of white racial harmony, 
and particularly the idea that existing British rule depended on its maintenance. 
An emphasis on the risk posed to imperial rule at the Cape in particular formed 
a key part of this narrative. Morley’s warning at Arbroath during his by-election 
campaign, that had the Raid succeeded then there would have been ‘violent 
strife and passion kindled in the Cape Colony’, was to become a persistent 
refrain of the Liberal response to the Raid.118 Harcourt, for example, referenced 
this argument during the 8 May debate on supply. Not only, he noted, had 
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British relations with the SAR and the Orange Free State been damaged, but 
‘more serious still, a social animosity has been engendered at the Cape and 
throughout South Africa between the Dutch and the British races, most perilous 
to our colonial empire.’119   
Indeed, Harcourt went on to explicitly invoke the political situation of the Cape 
as evidence of the further damage being done to imperial authority in the 
region. ‘What chance’, he asked, 
Have you of restoring peace in the Cape Colony between the 
two races when you continue there the very men who have 
caused this animosity between them? I see it stated in the 
papers to-day that there is a chance of getting up a Rhodes 
Party in the Cape. Supposing you did, what would you 
accomplish?120 
An emphasis on the importance of race harmony as a foundation for imperial 
governance thus operated in one sense at a level internal to the formal empire, 
and concerned with the management of the relationship between different 
subject populations in a self-governing colony. This narrative of race harmony 
and imperial government was replicated at the regional level. The stress placed 
upon the specific need for co-operation at the Cape was accompanied by a 
wider characterisation of the imperial government as acting along the lines of an 
‘honest broker’ in the region. In his Newton Abbot speech, Rosebery advanced 
ideas along this line, declaring that ‘we owe it to South Africa to show that in this 
matter we mean to do impartial justice, that we mean to deal fairly between 
neighbour and neighbour.’121 In this vision of Britain’s role in South Africa then, 
impartiality and fairness became central to the task of governing South Africa. 
This idea of a British responsibility for managing relations between the different 
states and populations within South Africa touches upon the wider question of 
the exact nature of British authority over the region, and particularly over the 
Transvaal. The insistence of a right of suzerainty over the Transvaal was to 
prove a central factor in triggering the outbreak of the South African War, and 
the exact nature of British authority over the SAR was thus a major point of 
contention within political debate. These questions were by no means as central 
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to the debates on the Raid, but nonetheless formed key elements of some 
Liberal speeches on the topic. It is useful therefore to explore the ways in which 
Liberals sought to articulate the governing relationship between Britain and the 
SAR at the time of the Raid. Gladstone’s comments in his letter of 17 January 
1896, stating that he had ‘always thought the Transvaal had rather peculiar 
claims upon us’, illustrates well the degree to which the position of the SAR had 
been left ambiguous following the London convention. 
In his speech at Leicester on 16 January, Mundella characterised the SAR as ‘a 
neighbouring friendly state, which was under the protection, or at least the 
suzerainty, of the Queen’.122 Such a characterisation is notable for two reasons. 
First, Mundella implies a continuation of the suzerainty introduced in the 
Pretoria Convention, despite the absence of the word from the London 
Convention and Derby’s obfuscation over the term. Second, Mundella’s 
reference to the SAR as ‘under the Queen’s protection’ implies a rather different 
relationship between Britain and the SAR than that of a self-governing state 
subject to restraints on its actions, instead implying a relationship of British 
responsibility more akin to the idea of a protectorate. Morley implied a similar 
relationship to Mundella’s protection in his speech of 30 January, suggesting 
that the role of Britain was to act as the guarantor of the Transvaal’s 
independence: ‘Could we’, he asked his audience, ‘have sent a force to put 
down the Boers, who were defending their own independence which we had 
guaranteed to them?’123 Such rhetoric is suggestive of a relationship between 
Britain and the SAR in which the independence and self-government of the 
republic is the intended result of British imperial governance, rather than a 
complicating factor. 
This somewhat reimagined suzerainty in Liberal rhetoric also featured in 
Harcourt’s response to the Raid. In his speech during the May debate on 
Colonial Office supply, Harcourt questioned how there could possibly be a 
settlement between Britain and Kruger if a Rhodes party were to be set up at 
the Cape. ‘If this’, he asked,  
                                            
122 Leicester Chronicle and the Leicestershire Mercury, 18 Jan. 1896. 
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is the treatment that he has received from those who exercise 
the powers of that state which calls itself suzerain, how can you 
complain that he should look for support elsewhere? If he is to 
be attacked by his suzerain, and the people who attack him are 
to be continued in their authority, how can you expect to make a 
reasonable settlement?124 
Here then, the implication of Harcourt’s rhetoric is that Britain had failed in its 
duties as suzerain power: that by failing to act against the perpetrators of the 
Raid, Britain was failing to fairly govern South Africa as a region, and thereby 
failing in its responsibilities to the SAR. In contrast to Mundella, Harcourt’s 
rhetoric is also notably more equivocal in its discussion of suzerainty: referring 
to Britain as a state ‘which calls itself suzerain’ notably stops short of actually 
stating that a relationship of suzerainty exists. Nonetheless it is notable that, 
given the extent to which large sections of the Liberal leadership would reject 
the existence of suzerainty prior to the South African War, speakers such as 
Harcourt made reference to the concept in articulating their responses to the 
Raid. The key factor might therefore be that, in contrast to the suzerainty of 
1899, the Liberal understanding of suzerainty of 1896 was concerned with the 
obligations and responsibilities of Britain to defend the SAR, rather than an 
arrangement granting a right of intervention. 
Nonetheless, closely related to this question of suzerainty was the issue of how 
the Transvaal itself was governed, and by implication the scope for British 
action to correct misgovernment. As noted in the previous section, Liberal 
speakers often attacked the premise of the Raid by not only implying that the 
Raiders were motivated by gold, but by implying that the Uitlanders themselves 
did not wish for such an action. One way in which this was done was to 
downplay the question of the Uitlander franchise by dismissing the situation as 
akin to the limited franchise in Britain. In his public letter responding to the Raid, 
Morgan remarked that 
No doubt their electoral system is open to grave criticism, but 
the same thing might be said, and indeed is still said, of our 
own Parliamentary franchise. I know many ladies who complain 
bitterly that they have to pay taxes, without having any voice in 
their imposition. But I have not yet heard that any of them has 
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proposed to call in the aid of an armed foreign force to redress 
their grievances.125 
In his Arbroath by-election speech later that month Morley adopted a similar, if 
less entertaining line, combining the argument with an attack on the Unionist 
record on domestic political reform. ‘The plea for all this lawless mischief’ he 
declared, 
is that President Kruger will not confer political rights, and I 
notice that that plea is very much used by writers and 
gentlemen who were never very keen, so far as I recollect, to 
extend political rights to their own countrymen.126 
Given the cheers with which Morley’s line of attack was received, it may be that 
this simply represented an excuse to break out a more established party line, 
and thus win over the support of his audience with a topic more familiar to them 
than that of the South African question. Yet in both Morgan and Morley’s 
rhetoric on the Uitlanders we can also see an attempt to neutralise the franchise 
issue by deflecting it. 
The question of the Uitlander franchise invariably touched upon wider questions 
of how the SAR operated as a state. By the crisis of 1899 charges of Boer 
misgovernment and corruption were common recurring features of the political 
debate, yet in the immediate aftermath of the Raid they played little role in 
Liberal rhetoric on the questions of governance in the region. Indeed, in a 
speech at Rochdale on 28 April 1896, Rosebery explicitly condemned 
Chamberlain for having described Kruger’s administration as ‘eminently 
corrupt’, remarking that ‘if this is the method by which the new diplomacy 
conciliates the person with whom it is negotiating, it is a very new diplomacy 
indeed.’127 Rosebery’s criticism was not aimed at the actual allegation of 
corruption itself but at the somewhat contradictory impulses embodied in 
Chamberlain’s diplomatic methods, but nonetheless it is striking given that by 
the crisis of 1899 Rosebery had made the misgovernment of the Transvaal a 
central theme of his own rhetoric on the South African question. 
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Questions of misgovernment could also be advanced through an emphasis 
upon the ideal of self-government. Following on from Salisbury’s attack on the 
Transvaal as an example of ‘extreme home rule’, Morley used a speech at 
Forfar on 3 February 1896 to speak mockingly of the fact that  
while the Queen wrote a letter to the President of the Transvaal 
recognising his magnanimity and the wisdom with which he 
used his power, the Queen’s Prime Minister made a speech in 
which he implied that President Kruger ought never to have had 
any power to use or abuse.128 
Salisbury, it was implied, was wrong to criticise the actions of Kruger’s 
government, as to do so would be to attack the self-governing principle of the 
SAR. The notion that self-government might trump any criticisms of 
misgovernment can also be seen in Morgan’s comments on the Raid. In his 
letter responding to the Raid, Morgan remarked that  
To these people we, by the Treaty of London, gave absolute 
power to manage their own affairs. It is now said that they have 
not made the best use of their privileges, that their views on the 
distribution of political power are hopelessly antiquated and 
illiberal, and that they have failed to appreciate the merits of 
those gentlemen who, while putting some millions in their own 
politics, have ‘developed’ the country and made it the El Dorado 
which it is now reported to be.129 
Partly this served to further reinforce Morgan’s criticism of the mining interests 
in the Transvaal. However it might also be seen as an attack on the notion, 
generally applied to the indigenous populations of colonised territories rather 
than white settler populations, that the European assumption of control over the 
territories was justifiable on the basis that the indigenous populations were not 
in position to take advantage of the material resources of the land that they 
occupied. Again it must be stressed that Morgan’s comments in this regard 
were somewhat atypical, and not generally to be found in the rhetoric of leading 
Liberals in the aftermath of the Raid. Nonetheless, such language can be seen 
as part of a wider rhetorical effort to stress the self-governing nature of the SAR 
in response to critiques of misgovernment.  
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Ultimately however, while as examined there was initially a degree of discussion 
of Boer misgovernment, it was in criticisms of BSAC rule that critiques of 
government primarily emerged in Liberal rhetoric on the Raid. The critique of 
the character of the imperialism that Rhodes and BSAC represented, discussed 
above, occurred alongside direct attacks on BSAC, and chartered companies 
more generally, as instruments of governance. The device of the chartered 
company had long formed a feature of the British imperial system, most 
famously in the example of the British East India Company. However, the latest 
wave of imperial enterprise represented by BSAC had also taken place against 
the backdrop of a revolution in the role of financial corporations in British public 
life, fuelling anxieties about the relationship between commercial and political 
power, as well as the instability of these new ventures.130 It was thus in relation 
to these wider critiques of corporate immorality and recklessness as well as with 
appeals to the ideals of British imperial rule that Liberal critics of BSAC set 
about attacking the company’s fitness to govern. 
The conduct and critically also the competence of the Chartered Company’s 
directors came under specific attack in Liberal rhetoric. The directors of the 
Chartered Company, Harcourt charged appeared to be comprised of ‘two sets 
of men – one set of men who are capable and not honest, and another set of 
men who are honest but entirely incapable.’131 Such an attack presented BSAC 
as having fallen short of two of the standards of good government Thompson 
identifies, both questioning the morality of the Chartered Company and its 
governing capabilities. Stanhope was to deploy similar rhetoric in his motion of 
censure upon the South African committee. Criticising the report that had been 
produced, Stanhope asserted that the purpose of the Committee had not so 
much been to ‘inquire into the circumstances of the raid as to inquire into the 
circumstances of the Chartered Company and as to the fitness of that company 
to perform the great imperial duties which it was now fulfilling in South Africa’.132  
Stanhope thus presented the issue as not so much one of establishing guilt or 
responsibility for the Raid, but as one of investigating the governing structures 
of British rule in South Africa. Indeed, his subsequent description of the 
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Chartered Company’s holdings in Rhodesia as having been ‘one succession of 
scandalous maladministration’, and his criticisms of what he termed the 
‘ornamental’ directors of the company as men ‘who had proved to be grossly 
negligent or quite inefficient’, further underlines the extent to which narratives of 
competence were combined with those of culpability in Liberal attacks upon 
BSAC. Again, such criticisms also reflected many of the wider trends within 
Victorian commercial culture: as Johnson notes, the mid-century banking 
failures owed as much to the incompetence of managers as to outright 
dishonesty.133 
As with the discussions of the character of BSAC’s brand of imperialism, these 
criticisms of misgovernment attacked the principle of Charted Company rule, as 
well as the practice. In his speech at the opening of Parliament, Harcourt 
attacked the position of chartered companies as ‘a very anomalous one; it is 
one of limited liability for themselves, and unlimited liability for us’.134 Harcourt’s 
choice of language further demonstrates the influence of financial debates upon 
the Liberal critique of Chartered Company rule. As G.R. Searle has explored, 
the introduction of limited liability companies in Britain prompted concerns of a 
resultant lowering in commercial morality.135 By adopting the language of 
company liability, the suggestion of irregularity and misconduct was thus again 
emphasised in Harcourt’s rhetoric. 
Continuing, Harcourt further asserted that ‘the state which seeks to obtain 
power without responsibility obtains instead responsibility without power’.136 
Such language of responsibility and duty might be seen as an extension of the 
moral critique of the use of Chartered Companies. Significantly however, 
Harcourt went on to stress that ‘if we choose to delegate sovereign power we 
are answerable for the conduct of our delegates’ and that BSAC’s charter ‘must 
be revised under the superintendence and authority of Parliament.’ This was in 
essence a centralising demand, overturning the wisdom of the colonial ‘man on 
the spot’ by stressing instead the direct chain of authority, and indeed implicitly 
criticising the means by which it had been delegated. When Parliament debated 
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that Raid again in May, Harcourt again advanced a similar line. ‘The histories of 
chartered companies’, he argued 
when left to their own devices and without control have not 
been fortunate. They have been defined as a valuable 
instrument for the cheap extension of Empire. We have been 
told that they are a means of obtaining power without 
responsibility and wealth without expenditure, but we may find 
that we pay too dear a price for this.137 
Campbell-Bannerman was to deploy a similar critique on the principle of 
chartered company rule in his speech on the Stanhope debate of July 1897. 
Having outlined the circumstances of the evidence given to the committee of 
inquiry, Campbell-Bannerman went on to address the wider questions raised 
about the use of chartered companies. ‘The government’, he argued, 
must have learnt how dangerous it was to intrust the 
administration of a great territory to a trading company - or 
rather not to a trading company but to a speculative financial 
company – with administrative powers. They have learnt how 
readily such powers might be abused, and how necessary was 
the close supervision of the impartial imperial authority.138 
In many ways, Campbell-Bannerman’s language in this speech emphasises 
some of the most interesting features of this attack on the idea of imperial 
government through the use of mechanisms such as BSAC. First it can again 
be seen in Campbell-Bannerman’s rhetoric this fundamental wariness of the 
principle of Chartered Company rule, not simply its practice. This stress upon 
the ‘impartial’ also echoed Rosebery’s notion of the imperial government as 
mediator between the different populations and governments of South Africa. 
Furthermore, the emphasis upon ‘close supervision’ might also be seen as 
further evidence of a centralising instinct that further rejected the idea of 
chartered companies as instruments of arms-length imperial rule. Without 
therefore directly engaging with some of the wider questions of imperialism, the 
rhetoric of governance in Liberal attacks on the Chartered Company can 
nonetheless tell us much about the assumptions and impulses that shaped the 
political response of the Liberal leadership to the South African question in this 
period. 
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The rhetoric of governance ultimately played a key role in shaping Liberal 
responses to the Jameson Raid. Notably many Liberals, and particularly those 
on the Radical wing of the party, sought to use the Raid to articulate and 
critique the specific governing structures of British rule in South Africa. The 
politics of Chartered Company rule may have proved to be a short-lived 
controversy given that by the time of the South African War the position of 
BSAC had changed significantly, not least because the British government was 
now playing a direct role in the dispute with the SAR. Nonetheless, the means 
by which company rule was critiqued, suggesting a concern for imperial 
misgovernment occurring under the British flag, highlights what was to become 
an important feature throughout subsequent iterations of the South African 
question. The apparent centralising instinct embodied in Liberal criticisms of 
BSAC might also be seen as a precursor to the controversy over ‘Chinese 
Slavery’ in the reconstruction period following the war, and also serve to 
challenge assumptions about the supposed decentralisation of the Empire that 
Liberals notionally advocated. Finally, the understandings attached to 
suzerainty and the relationship between Britain and the SAR are significant, 
because such rhetoric demonstrates the degree to which the understanding of 
such terms could be shaped in different ways, making what would be an 
unhelpful term for pro-Boer Liberals in 1899 a useful rhetoric line in 1896. Even 
if therefore many of the specific ways in which the rhetoric of governance was 
deployed in response to the Raid were not to be subsequently replicated, the 
language and arguments used to advance such critiques played a key role in 
shaping the ways in which Liberals talked about the South African question, as 
one ultimately concerned with British authority and the means of Empire. 
Conclusion: the Rhetorical Foundations of 1899? 
The Jameson Raid was not the central issue driving British politics in this 
period, or indeed even the central imperial question. As this chapter has 
demonstrated however, the Liberal response to the Raid was nonetheless 
significant and, critically, was not simply concerned with the superficial 
narratives of personal culpability and political scandal. Rather, Liberals of all 
stripes seized the Raid as an opportunity to advance broader critiques of not 
only the South African question more generally, but also the more fundamental 
nature of the Empire and the impulses of British imperialism. Their reasons for 
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doing so varied: it might be remarked that among the Liberal leadership the 
primary concern was both the opportunity the crisis offered the party for 
critiquing the new government’s handling of imperial affairs and the genuine 
desire to minimise the harm the events of the Raid might do to the reputation of 
the Empire at large, whereas Radical speakers saw the Raid as an opportunity 
to expose the true nature of the capitalistic imperialism they opposed. Yet 
despite this difference, Liberal speakers from across the party nonetheless 
sought to advance these goals with reference to the ideals of Empire. An 
examination of the language and rhetorical techniques deployed by leading 
Liberals in response to the Raid thus offers a number of insights into the 
dynamics shaping the South African question as a political issue prior to the 
crisis of 1899. 
First, Liberal rhetoric on the Raid was essentially introspective, concerned more 
with what the episode revealed about the nature of Britain and its imperial 
position, than with events in the Transvaal. Although Liberals it is true did make 
use of racial characterisations of the Boers and the Uitlanders, and did engage 
with questions of the Uitlander franchise, such language is notable for its 
relative scarcity and lack of prominence. Instead, the highest profile Liberal 
interventions on the South African question after the Raid concerned the 
Empire: whether it was concern about the morality of the Raid, the character 
and competence of the Chartered Company, or the damage done to the 
foundations of imperial authority by white racial harmony, the primary focus of 
Liberal rhetoric was on Britain’s existing imperial position. This focus is 
suggestive of a wider concern, or even anxiety, among Liberals as to the 
direction of imperial policy. Indeed, as this chapter has explored the notion that 
British imperialism had with the Raid diverged from a previously correct and 
ideal course of development was an assumption which underscored many 
Liberal responses to the Raid. 
Second, an examination of Liberal responses to Jameson’s action suggests that 
there was a degree of departure from earlier iterations of the South African 
question. Liberal rhetoric on the Black African populations was framed so as to 
present them as largely passive or secondary to considerations about the 
imperial situation in South Africa, useful for illustrative purposes but not the 
subject of discussion in their own right, a substantial development in the politics 
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of the South African question. The positive characterisation of the Boers and of 
the Kruger administration in particular likewise represented a break from prior 
narratives in the history of the South African question, though in this case this 
development was more partial and ultimately a temporary divergence from 
established trend. It is of course important not to overstress this point, and it is 
certainly the case that some elements such as the rhetoric of slavery continued 
narratives from earlier instances of the South African question. Nonetheless, the 
notable degree of departure from previous themes and arguments serves to 
emphasise the extent to which the South African question, at the time of the 
Jameson Raid, was as a political issue a relatively novel one, granting Liberal 
speakers considerable scope as to how the situation was to be framed. 
Finally, an analysis of the rhetoric used by Liberals to discuss the South African 
question in the aftermath of the Raid, although disparate, can be seen to 
contain within it many of the elements which would go on to form key narratives 
at the time of the South African War, and in subsequent debates. The focus on 
the idea of white racial harmony, for example, would become central to pro-
Boer campaigns, as well as featuring in the language of some Liberal 
Imperialists, at the time of the crisis of 1899. Likewise, many of the critiques of 
character and competence surrounding BSAC would be replicated in 
subsequent years, albeit with the criticisms transferred directly to the imperial 
authorities after the Chartered Company’s eclipse as a major regional power. 
The invocation of the charge of slavery against the use of indentured labour in 
Rhodesia might likewise be seen as a precursor to the Chinese slavery 
controversy following the end of the war. Ultimately then, while the politics of the 
Raid did not by any means simply represent a dry run for the controversies to 
come, an analysis of Liberal rhetoric on the Raid nonetheless serves to illustrate 
the background to many of the themes and narratives which were to emerge 
during the crisis of 1899, the rhetoric of which the next chapter will now explore. 
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2. ‘A POSITION OF MENACE’: IMPERIALISM AND THE TRANSVAAL CRISIS OF 1899 
In and of itself, the Jameson Raid did not directly lead to the outbreak of war. 
Yet in increasing the salience of the Uitlander question in imperial politics, as 
well as crystallising the dispute as one between the South African Republic and 
the Imperial government directly, the repercussions of the Raid had laid the 
foundations for further conflict, and by the end of the decade the storm clouds of 
war were gathering over South Africa. With the option of an uprising against the 
Kruger government no longer viable, the opponents of the SAR’s government 
within the Transvaal and across South Africa at large instead organised a series 
of petitions from the Uitlanders at the end of 1898 and again in the spring of 
1899 directly appealing to the Imperial government for redress.1 This appeal 
was controversial, both in the claim of the petitions to truly represent Uitlander 
opinion and in the characterisation of the Uitlanders as British subjects. 
Nonetheless, the effect was to push the South African question to the forefront 
of British politics, with the imperial government taking up the cause of Uitlander 
grievances and particularly the question of franchise rights. With the failure of 
the Bloemfontein Conference in June to settle the issue, the situation became 
one of crisis, although a revised franchise proposal from Pretoria and the 
parliamentary recess served to calm excitement over the issue to a degree up 
until the end of August. Nonetheless, autumn saw the situation deteriorate 
rapidly as the question of the franchise became entangled with that of a British 
right of intervention in the affairs of the SAR. For the backers of the Unionist 
government’s policy, the struggle was increasingly becoming one for British 
predominance in South Africa, while on the Liberal side those most opposed to 
the threat of war increasingly began to agitate against the policy of 
confrontation. The situation rapidly deteriorated, and with the Boer ultimatum of 
10 October 1899, the South African War began.   
As is well known, the conflict which erupted in the autumn of 1899 swiftly 
became first a war of annexation, and then a protracted exercise in imperial 
counter-insurgency. The political repercussions of the latter development in 
particular, which sparked the row over British ‘methods of barbarism’ in South 
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Africa and pushed tensions within the Liberal Party to breaking point, are 
explored in depth in the next chapter. The focus of this chapter however is on 
what can be termed the immediate crisis period surrounding the outbreak of the 
war, spanning broadly from the ratcheting up of tensions between Britain and 
the SAR in the summer of 1899 to the first few weeks immediately following the 
formal outbreak of the conflict. Although this represents a relatively small 
window of inquiry in a strictly chronological sense in comparison with the 
periods examined in the other chapters of this thesis, the specific political 
dynamics of the Transvaal Crisis nonetheless provide critical insight into how 
the South African question was conceptualised by Liberal speakers. Critically, 
the political focus on the position of the Uitlanders and the right of British 
intervention, both questions which were to become largely eclipsed once the 
war was fully under way, required Liberal speakers to articulate competing 
visions as to the nature and extent of the British imperial presence in South 
Africa. This thesis now explores the rhetorical frameworks that underpinned this 
process. 
This chapter begins by surveying the wider historical debates on the origins of 
the South African War and briefly reflecting on the nature of the Liberal Party’s 
divisions on the eve of the conflict, before going on to explore how the nature 
and position of British imperial rule was presented in Liberal responses to the 
crisis. Looking both at Liberal efforts to use the crisis to provide a commentary 
on the nature of the Empire or imperialism at large and at the more detailed 
arguments as to the basis for British intervention in the affairs of the SAR, it will 
be demonstrated that far from the debates over intervention simply revolving 
around the justice of British policy, Liberal rhetoric on such questions rested on 
far more significant assumptions about the nature of imperial responsibility and 
the obligations of imperial rule. This chapter also uses the rhetoric of the 
Transvaal Crisis period as a case study through which to examine the role of 
ideas of patriotism, jingoism and emotional restraint in the politics of the South 
African question, looking in particular at how ideas about the role of the Press in 
driving jingoistic sentiment were reflected in the struggle to represent a Liberal 
approach to Empire. This chapter then proceeds to examine the role played by 
race in Liberal rhetoric on the Transvaal Crisis, looking both at how the South 
African question was conceptualised as a problem of Anglo-Boer relations and 
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at the ways in which ideas of the British and Boer character were deployed in 
Liberal rhetoric. Finally, this chapter explores the tension between the Liberal 
imperial ideals of good government and self-government in their application to 
the politics of the South African questions, as Liberal speakers alternately 
framed their support for and opposition to a confrontationist approach in terms 
of the implications of such an action for the future governance of South Africa. 
In doing so, this chapter will demonstrate how common Liberal ideals and 
assumptions of Empire produced a fragmented rhetorical response to the 
Transvaal Crisis, but a response which nonetheless serves to highlight the key 
narratives and conflicts at the heart of the fin-de-siècle Liberal Party’s imperial 
politics. 
The Causes of the War 
In seeking to assess the nature of the Transvaal Crisis as an issue within British 
Liberal politics, it is first necessary to situate the developments of 1899 within 
their wider imperial and political contexts. In particular, the rhetorical responses 
of Liberal speakers to events in South Africa in the run up to the outbreak of war 
need to be understood as occurring against the backdrop of the various 
influences and factors which drove the Empire and the SAR along the road to 
conflict. The exact reasons behind the outbreak of the South African War have 
of course formed the subject of extensive scholarly debate. Quite apart from the 
questions of individual motive and war guilt which have long fascinated 
biographers and historians of the war’s high politics, the position of the war as a 
high-profile imperial conflict at the turn of the century has naturally led many 
historians to examine its origins in an effort to divine the wider impulses of fin-
de-siècle British imperialism. While the task of evaluating the exact combination 
of factors which triggered the conflict lies beyond the scope of thesis, the 
broader themes identified by many scholars of the war’s origins can 
nonetheless serve to illuminate some of the key assumptions upon which 
Liberal speakers constructed their rhetorical responses. 
The scope of historical debate on the origins of the war is vast, not least 
because of the legacy of the contrasting narratives of blame advanced by the 
British and Afrikaner historiographical schools which, as with the history of the 
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Jameson Raid, shaped much of the earlier work on the subject.2 Moving beyond 
the question of establishing the guilty parties, the efforts of historians to explain 
what ultimately proved to be the violent expansion of British imperial rule within 
South Africa can be loosely sorted into the two categories of political and 
economic explanations. Considering the former category first, the 
historiographical focus on what can be termed the broader political causes of 
the war has generally served to emphasise what were essentially defensive 
British concerns over the imperial position in the region. In Ronald Robinson 
and John Gallagher’s Africa and the Victorians the conflict represented part of a 
wider process by which the Empire was expanded through the perceived need 
to respond to growing nationalist pressures and international rivalry: the South 
African War was a result of the ‘official mind’ of Victorian imperialism reacting 
against a threat to existing British supremacy, rather than consciously acting to 
expand it.3  
Along similar lines, Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw have characterised the 
war as the product of a British determination to secure the Empire’s power and 
prestige.4 On this reading, ‘power’ is identified in terms of the Empire’s military 
and economic strength, while ‘prestige’ is considered as the extent to which 
British power, and Britain’s willingness to make use of it, was perceived.5 Hyam 
and Henshaw argue that the decision-makers in London believed the economic 
growth provided by the Rand mining industry was supplying the Transvaal with 
the means to break free of, and to ultimately supplant, British influence in 
southern Africa. As this would have amounted to an unacceptable loss of power 
and prestige, again this represented an essentially defensive understanding of 
British imperial actions. Critically however, it is important to consider that while 
                                            
2 In this respect, J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic (Oxford: 1961) can 
be seen as serving a roughly analogous role to that of Jean van der Poel’s 
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survey on the causes of the war, see Smith, Origins of the South African War, 
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4 Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and 
South Africa since the Boer War (Cambridge: 2003), p.43. 
5 These definitions are discussed in greater depth in Ronald Hyam, ‘The 
primacy of geopolitics: The dynamics of British imperial policy, 1763–1963’, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 27:2 (1999). 
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the focus of such political accounts has generally been on the view of 
governments and administrators, such concerns over imperial power and 
position, particularly the perception of vulnerability, might also be expected to 
be found in the public politics of imperialism at the metropole.  
The position presented by economic explanations for the causes of the South 
African War is somewhat more complicated. If British expansion in South Africa 
is to be understood primarily within the framework of the demands created by 
British monopoly capitalism, then in one sense the economic explanations for 
the war’s origins become of less relevance to the task of this thesis.6 The 
historiographical focus on the conflict’s economic causes is nonetheless 
significant for understanding the contexts in which the politics of the war 
occurred, not least because of the near-contemporary economic theories of 
imperialism which were to emerge in Britain in response to the conflict. Indeed, 
the contemporary critiques of the war by J.A. Hobson, the unorthodox liberal 
economist, are generally regarded as marking the beginnings of this economic 
interpretation of empire, with his 1902 work Imperialism having broken new 
ground with its direct identification of capital pressures as fuelling imperial 
conflict.7 Yet while certainly the underlying Radical suspicion of the influence of 
the role of capital in South Africa influenced the rhetorical responses of the pro-
Boers in particular, it is important not to allow the subsequent significance of 
Hobson’s theories of imperialism to overstate their contemporary importance 
within British politics: the open anti-imperialism of Hobson’s arguments won little 
support among Liberal parliamentarians at the time.8 
In reflecting on the significance of the economic drivers of British imperialism, it 
is useful also to consider the gentlemanly capitalism thesis advanced by Peter 
Cain and Tony Hopkins. Under this model, the economic penetration of the 
colonial sphere by British elites, the traditionally landed gentlemanly capitalists 
who required new incomes to sustain their social position, sparked development 
crises which invariably necessitated British intervention. Applying this thesis to 
                                            
6 The applicability of this model of economic imperialism to the South African 
war is discussed at length in Shula Marks, ‘Scrambling for South Africa’, Journal 
of African History 23:1 (1982). 
7 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: 1954 [first published 1902]). 
8 P.J. Cain, Hobson and Imperialism: Radicalism, New Liberalism, and Finance 
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the events of 1899, Cain and Hopkins argue that the occupation of Southern 
Africa was ‘a result of Britain’s growing stake in the region, where her 
investments had risen substantially following the discovery of minerals’.9 
Although careful not to endorse the idea that the war was triggered on behalf of 
the mining interests, the threat posed by Kruger’s republic to the future of 
Britain’s economic interests was a key factor in bringing about the conflict. One 
does not have to necessarily accept the specific thesis of a gentlemanly 
capitalist class as characterised by Cain and Hopkins to appreciate the wider 
relevance of this explanation for the outbreak of the South African War. Indeed, 
while the conflict is explained as the product of the economic framework of 
British imperialism, this account nonetheless echoes the defence of British 
interests model advocated by political accounts of the war’s origins. 
Significantly, Cain and Hopkins also consider events in the Transvaal to have 
closely mirrored those in Egypt in the early 1880s, suggesting that in the 
process of the annexation, ‘the image of the Boers, like that of the Egyptians, 
was downgraded to provide moral justification for aggression’.10 Not only does 
this relate to many of the questions of character surrounding the justification of 
British ideals, explored later on in this chapter, but it also highlights the 
connections between economic interests and the need for British intervention, 
financial considerations and moral imperative forming two sides of the same 
coin.   
Given that both political and economic interpretations of the war’s origins place 
significant emphasis on the Rand and its Uitlander population, the former in 
terms of the region’s significance for future British power in the region and the 
latter as the centre of capital within the Transvaal, it is worth also examining 
further the nature of the Uitlander factor in terms of bringing about the events of 
1899. One of the key contentions of J.S. Marais’ challenge to the traditional 
British and Hobsonian interpretations of the war’s origins was that the 
significance of the Uitlanders and the mine-owners in bringing about the war 
                                            
9 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: 1688-2000, second edition 
(Harlow: 2002) [first published 1993], p.337. The point was previously outlined 
in P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British expansion 
overseas II: new imperialism, 1850-1945’, Economic History Review 40:1 
(1987). 
10 Cain and Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism’,13. 
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had been overstated.11 Yet while ideas of a Rand-led conspiracy have largely 
fallen out of favour in historical explanations of the war, it does not follow that 
the role of the Uitlander population has been considered as ultimately marginal. 
Notably, the Uitlanders feature prominently in the assessment of imperial 
expansion proposed by John Darwin in his 1997 article ‘Imperialism and the 
Victorians’. The critical factor in determining the expansion of formal imperial 
control, Darwin argues, was the ability of imperial bridgeheads to develop at the 
periphery and the metropole. In the South African context, this meant that the 
British willingness for intervention sprung as much from a desire to reinforce the 
position of the existing imperial bridgehead groups, such as the Uitlanders, as it 
did from wider strategic and commercial concerns.12 The Uitlanders in this 
sense took on a greater significance in bringing about the events of the war, not 
so much for their own actions but because they came to represent, in the view 
of the imperial authorities, a group upon whose position Britain’s wider imperial 
position came to depend. Indeed, this can be broadly seen as being in line with 
Iain Smith’s analysis of the build-up to the war: the imperial focus on the 
Uitlander question owed less to a genuine desire to alleviate Uitlander 
complaints, but instead reflected the issues’ status as representing the wider 
struggle for British authority in the region, as well as a means to an end through 
which concerns over the challenge posed by the SAR could be addressed.13 
Uitlander concerns thus became critically linked to the wider need to reinforce 
the British position in South Africa. 
In considering the rhetorical responses of Liberal speakers to the events of 
1899, the perceptions of Kruger’s government as a threat to British authority, 
the strategic-economic repercussions of the Rand’s development, and the need 
to defend or be seen to defend the Uitlanders matter less as potential factors in 
bringing about the war, but instead take on a greater significance in terms of 
what they reveal about perceptions of why the crisis was emerging. As will be 
explored in the debates on British paramountcy and the militaristic 
misgovernment of the SAR, the crisis in South Africa was continually framed by 
Liberal speakers as one relating to questions of maintaining British power in the 
                                            
11 Marais, Fall of Kruger’s Republic, pp.323-25. 
12 John Darwin, ‘Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial 
Expansion’, English Historical Review 112:447 (1997). 
13 Smith, The Origins of the South African War, pp.417-23. 
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region, including by Liberal opponents of the conflict who pointed to the harm 
that would be inflicted upon Britain’s existing position in South Africa by a resort 
to war. Likewise, debates over the extent to which the Uitlander question 
necessitated British intervention and risked destabilising not just the Transvaal 
but the balance of power in South Africa as a whole formed a core component 
of how the politics of the South African question were framed. In proceeding to 
examine Liberal rhetoric on the Transvaal Crisis, it is important therefore to take 
into consideration the ways in which contemporary political actors understood 
and portrayed the nature of the confrontation between Britain and the SAR, not 
only with a view to the parallels that might be drawn between such arguments 
and historical explanations for the war’s outbreak, but critically also for what 
such arguments implicitly reveal about the wider assumptions of imperial politics 
which the events of the Transvaal Crisis brought to the fore.  
The Transvaal Crisis and the Liberal Split 
In addition to the wider forces at work in bringing about tensions in South Africa, 
Liberal responses to the Transvaal crisis were also fundamentally shaped by 
the growing factional splits within Liberal politics in Britain, divisions which the 
crisis of 1899 both exacerbated and brought clearly into public view. Yet while 
the events of 1899 were undoubtedly crucial in bringing about the open three-
way split within the Liberal Party which lasted through to the infamous ‘war to 
the knife and fork’ of 1901, the nuanced nature of the divisions within the party 
must be taken into account in seeking to understand the nature of the party’s 
rhetorical response to the developing crisis. This section thus briefly surveys the 
literature on the party’s divisions over the outbreak of the war, with a view to 
illuminating the wider context in which often competing understandings of British 
imperial politics were articulated by Liberal speakers from opposing wings of the 
party. Although divisions within the leadership of the Liberal Party, most notably 
the breach between Lord Rosebery and Sir William Harcourt, had been a 
standing feature of Liberal parliamentary politics for some time, the resignation 
of Harcourt from the leadership in 1898 in response to Rosebery’s intervention 
over the Fashoda Crisis brought the extent of Liberal disarray to the very 
forefront of public attention. Critically, Harcourt’s resignation along with John 
Morley’s concurrent withdrawal from the Liberal front bench was framed in part 
as a campaign against the influence of jingoism and imperialism on Liberal 
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politics, setting the stage for imperial questions to form the most visible fault 
lines within the party under the leadership of Harcourt’s successor, Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman.  
Ultimately, when the spark came in the form of the Transvaal Crisis, the party 
split three ways, an anti-war block led by Morley and Harcourt countered by the 
Roseberyite Liberal Imperialist group, with an uneasy centre position occupied 
by Campbell-Bannerman, a division most clearly illustrated by the divisions 
within the Liberal contingent of the House of Commons in the emergency 
session following the outbreak of war. However, while the idea of a straight split 
over imperialism into neat categories makes for useful shorthand in terms of 
understanding Liberal disunity, the nature of the Liberal divisions should not go 
unquestioned. For one thing, in an echo of the debates over the wider influence 
of imperialism on fin-de-siècle British politics, historians have disagreed as to 
extent to which the split really concerned questions of Empire, as opposed to 
wider complaints about the style of post-Gladstonian Liberal politics: George 
Bernstein for example has characterised the divisions as fundamentally a 
process brought about by the need to reconcile the principles of liberalism and 
imperialism, whereas by contrast Ian Packer stresses that the split owed more 
to debates about the expected behaviour of a democratic opposition in wartime 
in relation to the national interest.14  
The question is further complicated by the focus of historical interest on the 
factional battles over the Liberal leadership, particularly in relation to the 
Roseberyite challenges to Campbell-Bannerman in the aftermath of the 
‘methods of barbarism’ controversy and in the form of the Chesterfield platform, 
as well as on the performance of the various Liberal groupings in the general 
election of 1900. While such a focus is not without its uses for the purposes of 
this thesis, and indeed is discussed in more depth in the next chapter, it is 
nonetheless important not to risk reading the battle lines of these subsequent 
struggles backwards into the divisions of 1899. This section thus briefly surveys 
the nature of the Liberal divisions over the Transvaal Crisis, and suggests a 
need to avoid taking the factional splits within the party at face value. 
                                            
14 George L. Bernstein, Liberalism and Liberal politics in Edwardian England 
(Boston, MA: 1986), p.167; Ian Packer, Liberal Government and Politics, 1905-
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Although the Liberal pro-Boers have sometimes been characterised as an 
explicitly anti-imperialist movement, John Auld suggesting that the movement 
represented ‘the tempering strain of faith in self-government and humanitarian 
concern […] which enabled the British eventually to renounce the imperial 
enterprise’, there is a need for caution in equating the anti-war agitations of 
1899 with a wider reaction against Empire.15 Indeed as the evidence explored in 
this chapter reflects, many of the anti-war arguments advanced by Liberal 
opponents of the war were explicitly presented as necessary for the defence of 
Empire. Furthermore, as Bernard Porter notes, the label ‘pro-Boer’ in itself was 
assigned to anti-war speakers by their political opponents, rather than a self-
adopted mantle advanced by a homogeneous group: with very few exceptions 
within the party, the majority of pro-Boer Liberals certainly wanted to see a 
British victory in South Africa, and were keen to express their disapproval of the 
governance of the SAR.16 The situation is also complicated by the leadership 
given to the anti-war movement by Morley and Harcourt during at the time of 
Transvaal Crisis. Having been in private agreement with Harcourt for some time 
that the government’s South African policy would have to be firmly opposed, 
Morley dramatically challenged the government in a major speech to his 
constituents on 5 September 1899, giving national prominence to a cause which 
had largely beforehand attracted only modest attention through the activities of 
Radical groups such as the Liberal Forwards.17 The Liberal anti-war campaign 
thus had less in common with the Radical reaction to the events of the Jameson 
Raid than might be assumed, although Morley in particular shared platforms 
alongside some of the more established pro-Boer speakers. The Liberal anti-
war movement in 1899 should therefore not be seen as simply part of a wider 
anti-imperial tradition within the party, but also in many respects a specific 
product of the Transvaal Crisis. 
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In opposition to the pro-Boers stood the Liberal Imperialists, supporters of 
Rosebery among whose numbers included H.H. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey and 
R.B. Haldane. As with the Liberal pro-Boers, the extent to which the Liberal 
Imperialist revolt against Campbell-Bannerman’s leadership of the party was 
driven by imperial questions has been the subject of some debate. In his 
seminal work on the movement, H.C.G. Matthew characterised the Liberal 
Imperialists as primarily a reaction against the direction of the Liberal Party after 
Gladstone, in terms of both the ‘sectional’ causes it championed and its political 
style which increasingly marginalised the scope of movement for traditional 
party elites. Imperialism, under this thesis, was seized upon as a convenient 
basis upon which to oppose the Radical elements of the party, with the 
Transvaal Crisis a prominent opportunity in which an alternative patriotic and 
‘national’ appeal could be advanced.18 Bernard Semmel by contrast has 
identified imperialism as the key cause of the Roseberyites’ breach with their 
colleagues, although the Liberal Imperialists were also eager to distance their 
own brand of imperial politics from that of the government’s, even while granting 
unconditional support to Unionist policy in South Africa.19 Along similar lines, 
Andrew Thompson has identified strong links between the imperial language of 
the Fabians and the Liberal Imperialist movement, representing a key if 
ultimately unsuccessful effort to contest the Unionists’ dominance of the 
language of imperialism.20 If the question as to whether imperial questions 
formed the heart of the movement’s ideology is up for debate, there is 
nonetheless wide recognition that imperial concerns at least served as the 
premise for the open breach, with the prospect of war in South Africa a key test 
for the Liberal Party’s capacity to act in the imperial interest.  
However, what is striking about the Liberal Imperialist reaction to the events of 
the Transvaal Crisis is the patchiness of the response: as Matthew notes, a 
belief in the patriotic need to refrain from criticising the government’s conduct of 
the negotiations ensured that Liberal Imperialist speakers generally said little of 
                                            
18 H.C.G. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists: The ideas and politics of a post-
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substance on the question until the actual outbreak of war, at which point they 
embarked on a swift rhetorical campaign aimed at capturing Liberal opinion in 
the country by seeking to isolate the party’s ‘little Englanders’.21 In contrast to 
the later struggles between Rosebery and Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal 
Imperialist reaction to the outbreak of war should as such be seen as more 
concerned with changing the attitude and perception of Liberals in respect to 
the South African question. 
In considering the pro-Boer and Liberal Imperialist positions on the eve of the 
South African War, it is worth reflecting on why the events of the Transvaal 
Crisis served as an opportunity for both factions to engage in a struggle over 
the direction of the Liberal Party. The responses of both groups, while naturally 
concerned with the genuine dilemmas posed by the South African question, 
nonetheless were also undoubtedly conducted with a view to the wider balance 
of power within the Liberal Party. For the Liberal Imperialists, the crisis not only 
represented a moment of national urgency which might conceivably have seen 
Rosebery answer a popular summons out of retirement, but also served as a 
favourable basis on which the final breach with the more radical elements of the 
party might be undertaken. This situation did not constitute a concerted effort to 
split the party, but nonetheless necessitated that the Imperialist position not be 
overridden by the Little Englanders.22 In turn, the Liberal pro-Boers saw the 
‘patriotic silence’ of the Liberal Imperialists as a worrying impediment to the 
party being used an effective vehicle for opposing the march to war.23  
Significantly, these calculations also took place in a context in which Campbell-
Bannerman was for much of the time absent from the scene: although the 
Liberal leader led the party’s response to the early stages of the crisis, when 
Parliament rose in the summer of 1899 he left the country for Marienbad, only 
returning to London at the beginning of October.24 Campbell-Bannerman’s 
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absence caused considerable anxiety to Liberals from across the party: Asquith 
emphasised that joint action within the party would be impossible until the 
Liberal leader returned, while Morley complained to Herbert Gladstone that 
Harcourt and himself had been left ‘like sheep without a shepherd’.25 In such 
circumstances, it is therefore unsurprising that the responses of Liberal 
politicians to the crisis should also have taken on further significance as 
attempts to be seen as representing the true voice of the Liberal Party as a 
whole. 
The divisions within the Liberal Party over the events of 1899 were not a simple 
split over events in South Africa, but related more fundamentally both to the 
internal factional struggle over the direction of Liberal politics in Britain and to 
wider questions about the role of imperial appeals within British politics. 
However, the division of the party into these groupings was not in any sense 
strictly defined, even at a parliamentary level. As will be explored in this chapter, 
there were significant variations in the arguments adopted by both Liberal 
supporters and opponents of the war, as well as important common rhetorical 
tropes that were similarly shared by both Liberal Imperialists and the Liberal 
pro-Boers. Considering the pro-Boer and Liberal Imperialist labels as broadly 
opposing positions on a continuous spectrum of Liberal responses to the crisis, 
rather than as separate factions operating within a narrowly defined scope for 
political action, is instead a more useful approach. Indeed, the existence of a 
continuous broad spectrum of Liberal responses to the conflict ensured that the 
South African question could serve as a proxy for the wider divisions between 
British Liberal politics in this period, as all sides sought to present themselves 
as speaking on behalf of majorities within Liberal opinion. In exploring the 
differing Liberal rhetorical responses to the events of the Transvaal Crisis 
therefore, this chapter proceeds by seeking not simply to compare the language 
deployed by the different factions within the party, but also to uncover the wider 
assumptions of imperial politics which shaped the nature of the divisions which 
were ultimately brought about by the outbreak of the war. 
Finally, in considering the responses of Liberal speakers to the outbreak of the 
South African War we must also take into account their immediate audiences. 
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Liberal speakers did not have the luxury of striking out different claims to 
represent the Liberal position on the crisis and advancing different 
understandings of imperialism in the abstract, but instead had to shape their 
interventions to the circumstances in which they were speaking. Most obviously, 
for the Liberal pro-Boers this could necessitate actively combatting a hostile 
audience, as was the case for Morley in his speech at Manchester. Beyond 
such immediate pressures however, considerations such as whether an 
audience was comprised of Liberal supporters or was notionally cross-party, or 
whether the speech was given at a meeting held for the purpose of discussing 
the crisis or had been scheduled for some other occasion, certainly would have 
shaped the form of argument and focus adopted. In comparing and contrasting 
the rhetoric of Liberals on the Transvaal Crisis, as this chapter now proceeds to 
do, we must also keep in mind the practical circumstances that framed Liberal 
speeches as well as the language deployed. 
Imperialism, Liberal Politics and the Crisis 
The bulk of Liberal responses to the events of 1899 tended to focus on the 
specifics of the Transvaal Crisis, rather than more abstract questions about the 
nature of imperialism or the Empire at large. In particular, the focus tended to be 
over issues such as the nature of the Empire in South Africa, its specific 
capacity for expansion or its vulnerability to threat, and the contrast in values 
between the situation in South Africa then existing and the likely future for South 
Africa whether under British or Boer rule. Nonetheless, the crisis did serve as 
an opportunity for Liberal speakers to directly outline a wider vision of imperial 
politics. While such explicit addresses on the wider nature of the Empire were 
relatively rare, this section briefly examines three such approaches which did 
indeed adopt this wider viewpoint, looking alternately at the visions of Empire 
and imperialism contained within the rhetoric of Campbell-Bannerman, 
Rosebery and Grey. In doing so, this chapter not only explores the nature of the 
wider imperial outlooks advanced by the three speakers, but also considers how 
each reflected the complex role played by ideas of imperialism in the political 
environment of fin-de-siècle Britain, and the rhetorical pressures placed upon 
each speaker in engaging with the language of imperialism. 
In his responses to the crisis, Campbell-Bannerman characterised imperialism 
as a somewhat suspect doctrine that Liberals would do well to avoid, reflecting 
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Gladstone’s pejorative use of the term in the Midlothian campaign.26 Speaking 
at the City Liberal Club on 30 June, Campbell-Bannerman made use of the 
Transvaal crisis to explicitly reject the idea that he was an ‘imperialist’, or that 
his policy was one of ‘imperialism’. Commenting that certain Liberal politicians 
has recently engaged in ‘an amiable by-play about the meaning of the word 
imperialism’, in reference to the open divisions over imperialism that had 
erupted over Harcourt’s resignation the previous year, the Liberal leader stated 
that, 
I declare I dislike the word Imperialism, and I dislike it for this 
plain reason, that, define it as you may, it covers, according to 
the man who utters it, either the plainest duty or the wildest 
folly.27 
The ‘plainest duty’ which Campbell-Bannerman identified was that embodied in 
the view taken of Empire by the ‘sensible men’ who held ‘that we ought quietly 
to meet the responsibilities which we have undertaken’ and ‘when necessity 
arises to accept the smaller responsibilities to which our greater responsibilities 
have an acquired faculty of giving birth.’28 Significantly, this definition of 
imperialism as one framed in relation to the obligation and ability for British 
action would prove a key foundation for the Liberal leader’s understanding of 
British paramountcy in South Africa. As an approach to Empire, it was also an 
essentially conservative and reactive one in which inherited existing obligations 
were maintained while new responsibilities were to be taken on only if the 
situation developed to the point in which such involvement was necessary. 
By contrast, the ‘wildest folly’ strain of imperialism that Campbell-Bannerman 
identified was a far more active approach to Empire. Returning to his ‘sensible 
men’, Campbell-Bannerman argued that they were uninterested in ‘new 
enterprises, which are for the most past visionary enterprises, distant in time as 
well as in space, and which, although they may bring down some empty glory 
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1960 (London: 1964), ch.6; P.J. Durrans, ‘A Two-Edged Sword: The Liberal 
Attack on Disraelian Imperialism’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 10:3 (1982). 
27 Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, speech of 30 Jun. 1899, City Liberal Club, 
reported in Glasgow Herald, 1 Jul. 1899. 
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for the time, yet are not demanded by any immediate necessity’.29 The imperial 
policy Campbell-Bannerman advocated was thus one of scepticism at the idea 
of imperial expansion and development. In particular, it was one of disapproval 
of any attempt to deliberately expand or reshape the Empire by Imperial 
statesmen. Campbell-Bannerman thus carefully positioned himself so that he 
was neither ‘imperialist’, in the sense that he did not wish to pursue a grand 
vision of Empire, nor ‘anti-imperialist’, in the sense that he did not consider 
Britain’s empire to be beneficial or have wider responsibilities. In this fashion, 
the Liberal leader can be seen as operating in the rhetorical climate identified by 
Richard Koebner and Helmut Schmidt, in which positive and pejorative 
understandings of imperialism existed in tension with each other within the 
same rhetorical space.30 Erring on the side of caution, Campbell-Bannerman 
therefore presented both attitudes as running counter to his own ideals of 
Empire. Although this may seem somewhat paradoxical, given the seemingly 
antithetical nature of these definitions of imperialism and anti-imperialism, there 
was nonetheless something of a basis for contrast against both. Campbell-
Bannerman stressed in his rhetoric that the Empire was extant, inherently 
determined by past and continuing responsibilities, some of which inevitably 
resulted in the further expansion of Empire. What the Liberal leader seems to 
have opposed, then, is what might be termed any artificial change to the 
Empire, whether that be a refutation and dismissal of existing obligations or 
whether that be a grand scheme for expanding or recasting the Empire.  
In stark contrast to Campbell-Bannerman, Rosebery willingly embraced the 
imperialist label in his response to the crisis. In a major speech at a notionally 
non-party function in Bath several weeks after the outbreak of war, Rosebery 
declared to his audience his belief that ‘the party of Liberal Imperialism is 
destined to control the destinies of this country.’31 Rosebery’s choice of 
language here is significant given the general instability of the party system in 
this point. The divisions within the Liberal Party, the precedent of 1886 and 
Rosebery’s estrangement from many of his former colleagues combined to 
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ensure that Rosebery was spoken of as someone who might return to office at 
the head of a new ministry in a reconstructed national politics.32 Certainly, 
Rosebery himself appears to have envisaged any return to power as one that 
would be in answer to the call of the nation and ‘untrammelled by the despised 
party system’.33 The call for a party of liberal imperialism thus not only 
represented a pitch for Rosebery’s programme, but also contained within it the 
implicit suggestion of political realignment. In this sense, Rosebery’s speech 
possibly had a wider audience than might be anticipated for an explicitly Liberal 
appeal, although the very limited nature of the steps Rosebery took in pursuit of 
this goal suggests against weighting this aspect of its appeal too greatly.  
Characteristically, Rosebery provided little detail as to what this Liberal 
Imperialism actually represented, and indeed failed to even clarify whether it 
was a movement that had any great relation to imperial affairs at all. 
Nonetheless, Rosebery’s expression of affinity with Pitt the Elder as ‘the first 
Liberal Imperialist’ represented a stark focus on the Empire as the core 
component of his Liberal Imperialist doctrine. Pitt’s administration, he argued, 
had added ‘the largest share to that Empire which we are mainly entrusted with 
the duty of maintaining’.34 Rosebery’s first Liberal Imperialist then was one who 
had actively expanded and reshaped the Empire, suggesting that in outlook his 
Liberal Imperialism was one in which the Empire was developed through the 
actions of Imperial statesmen, rather than the passive, organic maintenance of 
the status quo espoused by Campbell-Bannerman. In the same speech 
however, Rosebery also challenged this expansionist vision of Britain’s imperial 
destiny. Expressing bewilderment at the ill-feeling of the other powers towards 
Britain, Rosebery argued that Britain was the only empire in the world which 
‘should only be too glad at this moment to strike a bargain with the rest of the 
world that every frontier in the world should remain as it is at present’.35 The 
vision of Empire expressed by Rosebery in this sense was therefore one more 
in accord with that advocated by Campbell-Bannerman: an Empire to be 
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maintained and conserved rather than to be deliberately expanded. At its heart 
therefore, the politics of Empire espoused by Rosebery might therefore be said 
to have rested upon a willingness for Britain to actively intervene in order to 
maintain the Empire’s world position: a rhetoric of maintenance, but one far 
more forcible than that advocated by the Liberal mainstream. 
Rosebery was far from the only Liberal Imperialist to use the Transvaal Crisis as 
a means of discussing Empire more generally. Grey also used the conflict as a 
means of addressing the wider nature of the Empire. A key supporter of 
Rosebery, Grey gave a speech at Glasgow on 25 October in support of the 
former’s candidature for the Lord Rectorship of Glasgow University, taking the 
opportunity to also make known his views on the war. Notably, he prefaced his 
discussion of events in the Transvaal with a section declaring that the British 
Empire ‘was not only the greatest empire the world had ever seen – it was the 
only Liberal empire which the world had ever known’.36 In this manner, Grey 
was in accord with Rosebery’s rhetoric on British exceptionalism. However, 
Grey’s vision of Empire differed from both Rosebery’s and Campbell-
Bannerman’s. Specifically, it was one framed not in terms of the Empire’s place 
in the world and its maintenance against external threats, as was the case with 
both Rosebery and Campbell-Bannerman, but with its internal structure and 
governance. Liberalism, according to Grey, was premised above all things upon 
a ‘fairness of mind’, both in domestic and imperial matters, and it was because 
of such fairness of mind that Grey was able to declare that 
The great pride of our Empire was that though we had our race 
living in many lands, separated by great distances, and living all 
under the same imperial supremacy, yet wherever our race 
ruled there was a free democratic Government and not a 
centralised Government, and our pride was that the Empire was 
held together, not by conquest, not by force, but by the bond of 
affection between free communities.37 
Grey’s rhetoric is striking not just because of the conceptualisation of 
centralised government as antithetical to democracy and the notion of an 
Empire bound by sentimental ties, a recurring theme in rhetoric emphasising the 
self-governing nature of the settler empire, but critically also because Grey 
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sought to present such ideas as representing an exceptionally British and 
indeed an explicitly Liberal approach to imperial rule.  
Ultimately, the extensive discussion of the wider characteristics of British 
imperialism and the Empire at large represented only a small element of the 
Liberal Party’s rhetoric on the Transvaal Crisis. The speeches examined in this 
section additionally also represent the views of those who are elite figures 
prominent within the party at this point. There is no reason to assume that the 
conceptualisations of Empire advanced by the party’s leaders did not find 
reflection at the backbench and grassroots level. The Sheffield Liberal Arthur 
Markham, for example, adopted similar language to Grey in a public meeting on 
the outbreak of the war, stressing that the Empire was exceptional because 
unlike past Empires, it was founded ‘on the principles of freedom, justice and 
equality.’38 However, it is possible that opinion and language within the wider 
party was more reflective of the more critical ideas of Empire advanced by 
liberal and progressive thinkers in the country at large.39 
Nonetheless, the approaches examined in this section are highly revealing in 
terms of demonstrating the varying methods by which Liberals sought to outline 
and justify their approaches to imperial questions in a period in which Unionist 
speakers were taking full advantage of their dominance of the language of 
imperialism, while older pejorative conceptualisations of imperialism also 
retained considerable weight with Liberal audiences. For Campbell-Bannerman, 
the solution was to seek to position himself outside of the framework which 
emphasised a struggle between imperialism and anti-imperialism, instead 
espousing a defensive and responsible approach to the maintenance of the 
Empire. Rosebery and Grey, by contrast, challenged both the anti-imperial 
elements within British Liberal politics and the Unionists’ control over the 
language of imperialism by stressing the inherently Liberal nature of the Empire, 
deploying an exceptionalism narrative designed to counter the negative 
associations of imperialism as an alien doctrine to British rule. Furthermore, 
many of the same underlying tropes were also to be found in Liberal 
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conceptualisations of the nature of Imperial rule specifically in South Africa. 
Indeed, the visions of Empire put forward by Campbell-Bannerman and 
Rosebery, and even the more inward-facing vision of Grey are best seen not so 
much as the isolated ideals of individual Liberal figures, but instead the most 
immediately visible elements of the much broader set of assumptions about the 
ideals of imperial rule which lay at the heart of the Liberal response to the 
Transvaal Crisis. This chapter now proceeds to further explore some of these 
underlying ideals by examining Liberal rhetoric on the nature of British imperial 
authority in South Africa. 
Suzerainty, Paramountcy and the Limits of Empire 
Although the key elements of the Transvaal Crisis initially related to how the 
grievances of the Uitlanders might be redressed, by the autumn of 1899 both 
the dispute with the SAR and the political debate in Britain had crystallised 
around questions over the scale and nature of the British right of intervention in 
the republic’s affairs. Pointing to the terminology used in the Pretoria 
Convention of 1881 Chamberlain insisted that Britain retained a formal 
suzerainty over the Transvaal. While the term was absent from the subsequent 
London Convention of 1884, Chamberlain argued that the continued existence 
of restrictions on the republic’s sovereignty, such as the ban on negotiating 
treaties with foreign powers, demonstrated that the SAR remained effectively 
subject to imperial authority, and thereby had to submit to imperial intervention 
in its internal affairs. Yet beyond the technical idea of a formal suzerainty, the 
Imperial government’s right of intervention was also declared to be founded on 
the more fundamental idea of British paramountcy or supremacy over South 
Africa, an authority granted by the Empire’s status as the predominant power in 
the region. Debate over the nature of this paramountcy and the potential 
consequences of the crisis for its retention constituted a key aspect of Liberal 
debates over the rapidly developing crisis. Critically, such debates were not 
limited to the narrow question of whether or not British intervention and conflict 
could be justified, but fundamentally related to the nature and limits of British 
imperial authority in South Africa, drawing upon many of the same notions of 
imperial responsibility, ties of affection and the need to defend the existing 
position of the Empire as examined above. 
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Campbell-Bannerman’s public position on Britain’s role in South Africa and the 
question of its relationship to the two Republics was a complex one. Like the 
pro-Boers, Campbell-Bannerman came out strongly against the idea that Britain 
exercised a formal suzerainty over the South African Republic. Speaking at 
Maidstone, the Liberal Leader asserted that with regards to the idea that Britain 
had a legal right to a degree of intervention in the internal affairs of the 
Transvaal stemming from the Pretoria Convention, ‘this claim has been 
exploded once and for all by Sir William Harcourt and Sir Edward Clarke’.40 In 
doing so, Campbell-Bannerman apparently ranged himself alongside pro-Boer 
opinion even on the eve of war. However, in referencing the position of Clarke, 
the Conservative MP and former Solicitor-General, as well as the position of 
Harcourt, Campbell-Bannerman may have been trying to avoid full association 
with radical pro-Boerism. Indeed, in positioning his response in this manner, 
Campbell-Bannerman was likely seeking to exploit the genuine cross-party 
currents running against Chamberlain’s policy prior to the outbreak of the war. 
Although minor in comparison with the Liberal split, a number of Unionist 
parliamentarians also adopted a strongly anti-war position during the crisis of 
1899, strengthening the force of Campbell-Bannerman’s criticisms of the 
government. 
Nonetheless, in contrast to Harcourt’s more explicitly pro-Boer position 
Campbell-Bannerman made clear that his rejection of suzerainty did not 
constitute a rejection of a general British authority over the Transvaal, or indeed 
South Africa at large. Speaking at Maidstone, the Liberal leader expressed his 
concern that many of his fellow countrymen had committed 
the error of confounding the technical word suzerainty, which is 
valueless, with a great fact, which is cardinal and essential, of 
the supremacy, the predominance, the preponderance, the 
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paramountcy, choose which name you like, of the British power 
in South Africa.41 
In complete contrast to suzerainty, British paramountcy in South Africa was 
thus, for Campbell-Bannerman, both extant and desirable. This was in essence 
a distinction without any real difference, made for opportunistic reasons: by 
defining suzerainty narrowly the Leader of the Opposition was able to in effect 
attack the government’s handling of the crisis while at the same time allowing 
for a right of intervention, meeting to a degree both of the conflicting 
requirements expected of his position. Notwithstanding the immediate political 
advantages of such a position however, within the specific context of the 
Transvaal crisis a distinction between suzerainty and paramountcy could have 
specific implications: the suzerainty question was closely associated with the 
Pretoria and London Conventions, whereas ideas of paramountcy and 
supremacy were not. Indeed, the assignation of a circumstance-specific notion 
of suzerainty during the crisis was widespread enough for The Times to criticise 
Campbell-Bannerman on the grounds that he was stating what the British 
people already knew to be the case.42 Yet by drawing a distinction between the 
two, Campbell-Bannerman was able to shift the focus of his rhetoric away from 
the technical specifics of treaty interpretation, and to discuss the nature of 
British Imperial power far more broadly. 
Campbell-Bannerman presented paramountcy as giving Britain both the right 
and the obligation to intervene throughout the entirety of South Africa. At Ilford 
on 17 June, the Liberal leader asserted that the inherent danger present within 
the continuing Uitlander dispute ‘not only justifies us, but compels us’ to bring 
about a resolution to the issue.43 In his speech at the City Liberal Club, 
Campbell-Bannerman described the Transvaal situation as ‘only one of the 
incidents we must expect to arise from our world position – a position which 
imposes on us obligations and raises problems we are bound to deal with’.44 At 
Maidstone, he made this point more explicitly, arguing that if Britain was to 
claim the right to redress the Uitlander grievances, 
                                            
41 Ibid. 
42 The Times, 7 Oct. 1899. 
43 Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, speech of 17 Jun. 1899, Ilford, reported in 
Daily News, 19 Jun. 1899. 
44 Glasgow Herald, 1 Jul. 1899. 
-116- 
 
we do so not the least in virtue of this so-called suzerainty, but 
on the grounds of international obligations and with the 
additional authority which is given to us by the fact that we act 
in the interests of the whole South African communities at large 
for whose wellbeing we are in the main responsible, and to 
whom the prolongation of the present evil relations between the 
Government of the Transvaal and those of the Outlanders must 
be a constant source of disturbance and danger.45  
Britain, the implication was, had a responsibility for the wellbeing of the 
inhabitants of all South Africa and, necessarily following from this obligation, a 
responsibility for the maintenance of order in this region. Such obligations might 
further involve a specific obligation to British citizens across the world or indeed 
to world order more generally, although such notions were not central to 
Campbell-Bannerman’s rhetoric. The outlook of Empire that emerged then was 
one in which British power and British obligations were not solely internal to the 
formal Empire, but instead spread beyond its technical borders.  
Indeed, in a telling comment during his speech on the loyal address, Campbell-
Bannerman remarked that, in having asserted British responsibility for the 
region, ‘I do not stand upon any technical ground whatsoever; our natural 
position in South Africa makes us principally responsible for this quiet and 
contentment, and places upon us the duty of seeing that any impediment is 
removed.’46 This rejection of not just a singular technical, or legalistic, 
interpretation of the situation but of the very idea that the right course of British 
action in South Africa could be determined on technical grounds was key to 
Campbell-Bannerman’s framing of Britain’s imperial position in the region. For 
the Liberal leader, it would seem, the responsibilities of the Empire did not end 
at its borders, but rather extended into all areas where the British position could 
be utilised for the common good. Given the emphasis often placed upon 
constitutionalism and the rule of law as a means of ensuring good governance 
in Liberal thinking on the Empire, an emphasis indeed very much present in 
Campbell-Bannerman’s rhetoric throughout the period of the crisis and the war, 
this apparent substitution of a legalistic basis for intervention with a moral basis 
is somewhat striking. However, as the work of Jonathon Parry has 
demonstrated, mid-century British Liberalism paired a stress on English 
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constitutionalism with an ethical emphasis, enabling and indeed necessitating 
interventionism in pursuit of a moral good such a liberty, and to a degree 
Campbell-Bannerman’s understanding of paramountcy follows such a pattern.47 
For the Liberal Imperialists, the question was one of defending British 
paramountcy rather than defining it. Rosebery warned his audience at Bath that 
the aggression of the Transvaal government risked bringing about a situation in 
which the British were ‘to become a subject nation in our turn in South Africa’, 
presenting paramountcy and subservient status in oppositional terms, with no 
in-between status for British power.48 Similarly, Grey warned his audience at 
Glasgow that ‘the Boers have been taking advantage of every opportunity to 
build up their position, build up their strength, not only with the object of 
maintaining their independence, but also with the object of undermining our 
authority in South Africa.’49 Again, the focus was not so much on elucidating the 
nature of this authority, but instead emphasising an urgent need to defend the 
status of the Empire in the region. Additionally, while Rosebery and Grey were 
supportive of the Salisbury government’s handling of the crisis, neither made 
mention of the suzerainty argument. This may simply have been because the 
course of events had moved on to the degree that it was no longer considered 
relevant, but nonetheless it serves to reinforce the idea of an inherent British 
authority over South African affairs, rather than a specific right of intervention in 
the Transvaal. 
Certainly, this was the position reflected in Asquith’s rhetoric. Speaking at 
Dundee on the first night of the war, Asquith devoted considerable attention to 
both the suzerainty question and to British paramountcy. He characterised the 
Transvaal’s objections to British intervention as being premised upon the idea 
that the Convention of 1884 represented a ‘complete and exhaustive 
embodiment’ of the Transvaal’s relations with Britain, and that as such British 
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pressure for the Uitlander franchise constituted having ‘tampered, without legal 
or moral title, with their internal autonomy’.50 Importantly, Asquith conceded that 
if the Boer interpretation of the situation was correct, ‘then no doubt we are out 
of court’, seemingly agreeing that there was nothing in the conventions 
themselves which allowed for British intervention.51 On the specific notion of 
whether the conventions granted Britain suzerainty over the Transvaal, he 
argued that it was ‘a controversy of a scholastic character, for it cannot be too 
clearly understood that the word suzerainty conveys no definite rights and 
imposes no definite obligations’.52 Asquith’s rhetoric on the question of 
suzerainty was this in this respect strikingly similar to that that of his party 
leader. 
Indeed, on the broader point of paramountcy he explicitly backed Campbell-
Bannerman’s interpretation, declaring to his audience that  
we have, as Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman asserted in the 
clearest terms the other day, the right of intervention in the 
circumstances that have arisen based, not upon parchment 
treaties or arrangements, but upon the general principles of 
international law and equity and upon our special 
responsibilities as a paramount power which in the last resort 
has to preserve peace and order throughout South Africa.53 
Asquith’s staunch backing of Campbell-Bannerman’s position stands in stark 
contrast with that of other Liberal Imperialists, Haldane for example on the very 
same evening overtly endorsing Rosebery’s lead on the crisis at a meeting in 
North Berwick.54 Yet beyond the factional manoeuvring over the Liberal 
leadership, what is most significant about Asquith’s comments is the degree to 
which they reinforced this idea of an obligation-driven basis for imperial 
authority in South Africa, with not just a right but a duty of intervention derived 
from a British responsibility for the maintenance of order throughout the region. 
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The pro-Boer approach to these matters was somewhat different from both of 
the above positions, particularly on the question of a British paramountcy. 
Superficially, however, there was a great deal of similarity between the rhetoric 
of the pro-Boers on the specific issue of suzerainty and that of Campbell-
Bannerman and Asquith. For Harcourt, the claim to suzerainty was ‘a 
pretension wholly unfounded’. Speaking to an audience at New Tredegar, the 
former Liberal leader argued that the use of the term had led to ‘misconception 
and misunderstanding’, as the Transvaal had in effect ‘home rule’ with Britain 
merely retaining a veto over the Republic’s external relations.55 Morley similarly 
criticised the claim to suzerainty. Speaking at Arbroath on 5 September, Morley 
declared the question of suzerainty to be one of etymology, although he warned 
that this made the word no less dangerous as ‘most of the bloodiest and most 
obstinate struggles in the history of mankind have been struggles about 
words’.56 Further still, the word suzerainty had he claimed ‘a flavour of 
sovereignty in it’, making it still less desirable a descriptor as ‘from a lawyer’s 
point of view the citizens of the South African Republic are not Queen’s 
subjects’.57 On the question of suzerainty then, there was at least something of 
a collective Liberal opposition to the use of the issue to justify intervention within 
the Transvaal.  
However, on the question of British paramountcy in South Africa, the Liberal 
Party’s statesmen were fiercely divided: while Campbell-Bannerman and 
Asquith limited their criticisms to suzerainty, as a particular form of British 
authority over the Transvaal, the pro-Boers attacked the notion of British 
authority over the Transvaal in general. British supremacy and paramountcy, 
Morley informed his audience at Arbroath, ‘is derived from the facts of the case, 
from the enormous wealth, from the ideas and institutions which great Britain 
carries with her’. Crucially however, Morley argued that this position did not 
grant Britain the right to dictate to the Transvaal, and indeed that on the 
question of the SAR’s internal affairs Britain’s ‘only claim is the right of friendly 
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counsel in the state of South Africa’.58 Similarly, at New Tredegar Harcourt 
argued that ‘of course we are supreme in South Africa […] we have the 
command of force’, but with the caveat that ‘it is not what we can do, but what it 
is right we should do, and what we ought to do. That is the only supremacy 
which I claim for the English nation’.59 For the pro-Boers then, British 
supremacy meant an existing advantage in the region, but not one that granted 
Britain any overarching governance of the region, or rights of intervention in the 
affairs of the two republics. 
Indeed, in the run up to the conflict pro-Boers sought to ridicule these claims of 
any general rights of intervention by hypothetically applying them to the Orange 
Free State. The position of the OFS had proved a tricky one for the Unionist 
Press to square with the government’s claims of a British supremacy in South 
Africa, The Times for example insisting that ‘the English people do not and 
cannot acknowledge” any sovereign international state in South Africa apart 
from the British Empire, ‘with the single exception of the Orange Free State’.60 
Sharing a peace platform with Morley at Manchester on 15 September, the 
renegade Liberal Unionist MP Leonard Courtney expressed his astonishment at 
‘the argument that we must in the interests of Empire insist upon the supremacy 
of Great Britain throughout South Africa, except the Orange Free State. Why 
that exception if supremacy was so urgently wanted elsewhere?’61 This line of 
attack was likewise adopted by Harcourt in his New Tredegar speech a few 
days later: ‘is this word “paramountcy”’, he asked his audience, 
intended to tell the Orange Free State that you intend to 
interfere with their affairs, too, in all particulars? Is that a wise 
and statesmanlike thing to flaunt at the moment in the face of 
the Orange Free State in South Africa?62 
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By extending the arguments from the specific circumstances of the Transvaal 
crisis to the wider principle involved, Courtney and Harcourt hoped to 
demonstrate in their rhetoric that a right to intervention derived from 
paramountcy was incompatible with a Liberal interpretation of Empire.  
Morley adopted a similar tactic, extending the principle of paramountcy to 
Britain’s own imperial possessions: at Arbroath he argued that Britain in fact ‘is 
not paramount in a single one of her self-governing Colonies’, as in none of 
Britain’s colonies would British statesmen attempt to dictate internal matters 
such as the nature of their franchise or legal system. If they did, Morley argued, 
‘you would have the Empire shattered in a month’.63 This represented in 
essence an appeal to the ideal of a self-governing Empire. What is striking 
about this comparison however is that Morley was essentially deploying the 
principles of British imperial rule to a state which he insisted lay beyond the 
lawful reach of imperial authority. This was therefore a rhetoric which attacked 
interventionist notions of paramountcy for the principal reason that the 
underlying assumptions behind such a justification for action were not only 
being misapplied to the Transvaal, but fundamentally represented a departure 
from established British imperial practice. 
The pro-Boer attacks on supremacy and paramountcy were in part a product of 
necessity. A British right to intervene and a British responsibility to intervene 
were perceived as being inherently linked; if the Liberal opponents of the 
conflict were to oppose British intervention, they would also need to address the 
question of whether Britain had a right to intervene, which meant challenging 
the notion of paramountcy. Yet they also underlined a more fundamental 
division over where the limits of empire lay in South Africa. Across the party 
there was a rejection of Unionist rhetoric on suzerainty, with even Liberal 
speakers supportive of British intervention declining to frame the question in 
legalistic or technical terms. Yet whereas the Liberal pro-Boers presented 
British imperial authority as ending at the borders of its formal empire, the 
assumptions underlying the rhetoric of both the Liberal Imperialists and 
Campbell-Bannerman characterised Britain’s position of strength as naturally 
furnishing the Empire with wider rights and responsibilities in the region, 
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including over the governance of the two Boer republics. However even this 
division was not as simple as it initially appears, with pro-Boer speakers using 
the ideals of a decentralised self-governing settler Empire to attack the very 
notion of paramountcy within the bounds of the formal Empire, let alone outside 
it. Liberal rhetoric on the claim to paramountcy thus not only served as a basis 
for expressing the wider ideals of Empire, but also represented the wider need 
for Liberal speakers to advance understandings of the nature of Britain’s 
existing imperial rule in South Africa and the basis for its continuation. 
‘Perverted patriotism’ and Political Temperament 
In framing their responses to the crisis of 1899, Liberal speakers from across 
the party critiqued not simply the basis by which it was argued Britain had a 
right to intervene in the SAR, but also more fundamentally the manner in which 
the most enthusiastic advocates of war in Britain advanced their cause. In a 
political climate in which Liberal opponents of the war were readily attacked for 
supporting the Empire’s enemies, and in which Rosebery’s Liberal Imperialist 
project was seeking to shake off the sectional legacies of the Gladstonian era 
by emphasising the idea of the national interest, the language of patriotism 
became one of the key rhetorical battlefields upon which Liberal speakers 
defended their positions. Along related lines, the charge that it was a jingo 
campaign that was pushing Britain toward a war with the SAR proved a steady 
refrain of the Liberal pro-Boers, although the spirit of jingoism also came in for 
intense criticism from Liberal supporters of the conflict. Indeed, Liberals actively 
framed their positions in opposition to the jingo impulses present within the 
Transvaal debate. To an extent, the debates over patriotism and jingoism 
reflected the inevitable political dilemmas facing an opposition party at a time of 
international crisis. Yet these debates also went to the heart of the politics of 
Empire that characterised Liberal rhetoric on the Transvaal Crisis. As seen in 
the debates on the Jameson Raid, the ideals of imperial rule invoked by Liberal 
speakers related not just to how the practices of Empire were done, but how 
they were seen to be done, the manner with which political actors in Britain 
addressed imperial affairs forming an important part of this dynamic. The efforts 
of Liberal speakers to triangulate their own positions between the nebulous 
concepts of patriotism and jingoism, reinforced with specific attacks on the 
supposedly excessive emotional political behaviour of their opponents, served 
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not just an immediate political purpose but also emphasised an idealised form 
of imperial statesmanship founded upon assumptions about the character of 
Britain and its Empire.      
Liberal appeals to patriotism at the time of the Transvaal Crisis were 
complicated, as Liberal speakers sought to navigate a rhetorical landscape 
largely favourable to the party’s opponents. As Readman has argued, despite 
the Unionist dominance of patriotic languages in this period, particularly over 
the issue of the South African War, Liberal speakers from across the party 
sought to contest the government’s ownership of patriotic appeals, framing their 
own positions in similar language.64 However, the success with which the 
Unionists exploited patriotic appeals also served to disrupt this process, with 
Liberal appeals to patriotism often sitting uneasily alongside direct attacks on 
the language of patriotism. For example, at Ilford Campbell-Bannerman 
mockingly referred to the un-Britishing of the Uitlanders through the grant of 
Transvaal citizenship as a policy to be carried out in the ‘name of British 
patriotism’.65 Yet by the time of his Maidstone speech, the Liberal leader found 
himself defending his relative silence on the Transvaal over the parliamentary 
recess on the grounds that Liberal speakers had ‘been forced, from patriotic 
motives, to keep silent’. Continuing, he declared that appeal to prevent the 
outbreak of a war was one ‘in which every thoughtful man and every really 
patriotic man must join.66 This change is tone was likely in no small part due to 
the increased seriousness of the Transvaal Crisis in the beginning of October 
relative to the summer, but the two very different engagements with the idea of 
patriotism nonetheless serve to demonstrate the Liberal dilemma in how to 
respond to the government’s appeals.  
The uneasy integration of patriotism within wider Liberal anti-war rhetoric in 
particular can be seen in the contrasting rhetoric of Harcourt and Morley. 
Speaking at Carnarvon in early October, Morley assured his audience that he 
repudiated ‘entirely the notion of disloyalty or treachery, or want of patriotism, or 
want of love of my country, or sympathy for those who suffer wrongs in foreign 
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lands’.67 By contrast, in a letter published in The Times a few days beforehand, 
Harcourt derided ‘what is called the “patriotic spirit”’, which he charged was the 
‘true spirit of the party who are endeavouring to manoeuvre the country into 
war’.68 Again, patriotism was both utilised in pro-Boer Liberal appeals, but also 
characterised and attacked as essentially synonymous with jingoism. 
Both these tactics served a Liberal need to refute the charges of unpatriotic 
behaviour levied against them, yet both risked reinforcing the political narratives 
of their opponents. The need to dispel accusations of unpatriotic behaviour 
while also challenging at the very least the more explicit war party efforts to 
advance an exclusive claim to patriotism can be seen as lying at the heart of 
Asquith’s use of patriotism in his speech at Newburgh. Responding to the 
suggestion that it was the ‘duty of the patriot’ to remain silent during 
negotiations and afterwards acquiesce in the outcome, Asquith declared that 
this was ‘a perverted patriotism’ which he entirely repudiated.69 Asquith’s 
characterisation of his opponents’ arguments as representing a ‘perverted 
patriotism’ parallels the distinction between true and false imperialisms 
deployed by Liberal and Radical political actors in an effort to contest the 
expansionist, Anglo-centric visions of Empire embodied by the New 
Imperialism.  
Indeed, Asquith’s counter-attack against ‘perverted patriotism’ echoes the 
Radical attacks on the patriotism of the stock exchange at the time of the 
Jameson Raid: although couched in different terms and deployed in sharply 
contrasting contexts, both served the essential purpose of qualifying, and 
thereby denigrating the patriotism of their political opponents, which in turn 
served to strengthen the speaker’s own claim to represent at the very least a 
version of imperialism. Yet as much as the crisis of 1899 was to bring into the 
open the divisions within the Liberal Party, in which ideas of patriotism and 
representing the national interest were to play no small part, the overall usage 
of patriotic themes by the Liberal leadership in this period was relatively limited, 
suggesting an unease with the ideas of patriotism being propagated by Unionist 
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rhetoric, but an unease which nonetheless had not yet fully aligned itself to 
existing Liberal rhetorical tropes in an effort to advance alternative forms of 
imperial politics. 
If the rhetorical minefield of patriotism posed difficulties for Liberal speakers in 
articulating their responses to the Transvaal Crisis, Liberal attacks upon 
jingoism represented a clearer line of approach. In his speech at Manchester, 
Morley declared that he was not answerable to ‘those people who by 
temperament are inclined to vote for feeding the fire and flame – who are never 
so happy as when they are in opposition to some other nation’.70 Morley’s 
association of support for a possible conflict with jingoism led on this occasion 
to the Liberal Sheffield Independent coldly commenting that ‘Mr. Morley’s 
rebuke to Jingoism was excellent; but ordinary level-headed Englishmen are not 
Jingoes’.71 In this fashion the Liberal pro-Boer attack on jingoism could also 
serve to call into question the position of Liberal politicians and newspapers 
which supported the government’s stance on South Africa, casting ostensibly 
more imperial positions as failing to live up to the idealised standards of imperial 
politics.  
Such attacks on jingoism did not necessarily represent a direct attack on the 
supporters of the government however. Indeed, following on from Morley’s 
speech Courtney sought to characterise Chamberlain’s ‘penultimatum’ of 
September 1899 as a ‘rebuke to the fire-eaters’, enabling him to narrow the 
charge of jingoism to include only those more pro-war than the government.72 
Courtney’s position as a Liberal Unionist, for the time being at least, 
undoubtedly shaped in part his reluctance to publicly accuse Chamberlain of 
jingoism, although notably Morley also shied away from directly making such a 
claim of the government, rather than the government’s supporters. Indeed, in 
this sense Morley and Courtney’s attacks on jingoism had less to do with 
casting aspersions on specific political opponents, but rather instead on 
emphasising jingoism as an immoral and unrespectable form of imperial politics, 
in contrast to the enlightened approach their own anti-war stance represented. 
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Critically however, attacks on jingo behaviour were not limited to pro-Boer 
demonstrations. At Dundee, on the day of the war’s outbreak, Asquith launched 
into a forceful attack on ‘the irresponsible fire-eaters, the professional breeders 
of mischief between nation and nation, the bubblers and the bullies who at 
times like this always make themselves heard in the back slums of British 
journalism’.73 Likewise, a critique of jingoism was to be readily found in the 
rhetoric of the Liberal leader. By the time of the debate on the loyal address, 
Campbell-Bannerman had adopted a position of qualified support for the war, 
even if he reserved judgement on the government’s actions in the run up to the 
conflict. Yet even from the position of begrudging support for the conflict, 
Campbell-Bannerman nonetheless felt compelled to condemn in his speech the 
‘the noisiest applauders and acclaimers of the war amongst certain classes of 
the community’.74 Like Asquith, the Liberal leader significantly did not elaborate 
on who actually formed the ‘noisiest applauders’ of conflict. Indeed, the most 
noticeable aspect of these attacks on jingoism is their apparent failure, 
deliberate or otherwise, to specifically identify who the jingoes actually were. 
Again, this rhetoric suggests that the primary function of such attacks on 
jingoism was less to do with vilifying the actions of individual political actors, but 
rather instead to denigrate the practice of jingoistic imperial politics. Indeed, for 
Liberals who adopted positions to a greater or lesser extent supportive of the 
conflict, being seen by Liberal audiences to attack jingoism enabled Liberal 
speakers to convey that they still supported and embodied Liberal ideal of 
imperial politics in their approaches, as well as forestalling Radical criticism. 
While Liberal speakers may have been reluctant to directly accuse their 
opponents of endorsing jingoism, one group which did regularly come in for 
intense criticism was that of the newspaper industry. In the run up to the 
Transvaal Crisis attacks on the ‘jingo Press’ increasingly became a common 
feature of Liberal rhetoric on South Africa. Asquith’s scathing attack on those 
who lurked in ‘the back slums of British journalism’ found itself echoed, albeit in 
a more moderate tone, by his party leader.75 Speaking in Parliament in July, 
Campbell-Bannerman drew a comparison between the ‘violence of tone’ 
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engaged in by the South African Press and the tone adopted by the British 
Press, referring  
not only to the modern sensation journals which live in and by 
excitement, but to certain old, staid, long established 
newspapers [interruption] the writers in which would almost 
induce me to believe that they regard reason and moderation 
as crime, and that they look upon an appeal to force as 
something in itself as actually and specifically desirable.76  
The character of the British Press was likewise attacked by Campbell-
Bannerman’s predecessor. At Rhymney, Harcourt heavily criticised ‘the war 
Press – I was going to call it the Rhodes Press – in England and at the Cape to 
aggravate the position of affairs’, accusing such newspapers of perverting the 
facts in order prevent any peaceful settlement of the conflict.77 Along these 
lines, the politics of the 1899 crisis echoed Liberal criticisms of the jingoistic 
response by elements of the Press, as well as the poet laureate, to the events 
of the Jameson Raid. This language might also be said to reflect Simon Potter’s 
findings on contemporary understandings of the role of newspapers in the new 
imperialism. Critics of the South African War, Potter argues, condemned the 
jingo Press not simply for misrepresenting events in order to exacerbate 
tensions, but actively whipping up the passions of the wider public rather than 
appealing to reason.78 This tendency to see the Press as a corrupting force, and 
indeed the primary means by which jingoes could achieve their goals, explains 
why anti-war Liberals were keen to pinpoint the jingo Press specifically as a 
target for censure. 
As with the broader charge of jingoism, there was likewise a complaint from 
those supportive of the conflict at the association of all pro-war Press with the 
charge of jingoism, not least because as Kenneth O. Morgan notes the 
overwhelming majority of British newspapers held a pro-war stance.79 In 
response to an attack by Morley on the ‘jingos of the press’, the Glasgow Herald 
retorted that ‘he is so maddened by the war party that he apparently no longer 
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sees clearly or thinks honestly’, and that ‘the fiercest writer in the Jingo press 
has got closer to the facts than Mr Morley’.80 Similarly, a heated dispute arose 
between the avowedly Liberal Sheffield Independent and Benjamin Pickard, the 
Lib-Lab member for Normanton. Pickard was not a high-profile Liberal, and the 
incident did not receive national attention. Nonetheless, its unusual nature as a 
direct confrontation between two wings of Liberal politics makes it worthy of 
examination. The dispute erupted into the open with a heavily critical letter from 
Pickard to the Sheffield Independent, which the newspaper opted to publish in 
full in early October. Addressing his remarks to the editor, Pickard accused the 
newspaper of running ‘leading articles […] of the most advanced Jingo type’, 
and declared that  
if the Liberal Press in Sheffield and some other parts of the 
country consider for the time being themselves entitled to go 
the whole hog in jingoism and in goading this country into war 
with a peaceful set of farmers, let them take the full 
responsibility.81 
Pickard went on to assert that the Sheffield Independent, along with other pro-
war Liberal newspapers and politicians, ‘are now claimed as supporters of the 
Tory party’, and that it ill-fared the Liberal party when ‘Liberals can throw off 
their cardinal principles as they throw off their clothes’.  
Pickard’s intervention is significant because of his direct contrast of Liberal 
credentials with jingoistic behaviour, and it was this provocative comparison that 
prompted an equally withering counterattack from the newspaper. The Sheffield 
Independent chose to respond to Pickard’s letter by devoting a substantial 
section of its leading article to its response. Protesting against the assumptions 
that ‘he is honest and we are not; that he is Liberal and we are not; that he 
hates war, and we do not’, the newspaper attacked Pickard’s ‘intolerant and 
illiberal anger’. ‘Is Mr Pickard’, the newspaper asked, ‘speaking the language of 
truth and soberness, or the language of wild passion and utterly unjust 
imputation?’82  
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This exchange, though relatively untypical in its openness and ferocity, 
highlights the role jingoism played in the rhetoric of Liberal politics and Empire. 
Both in Pickard’s letter and in the Sheffield Independent’s response, jingoism is 
recognised as being antithetical to Liberalism; the two pieces differ only in their 
interpretation of what constituted jingoism. The response of the Sheffield 
Independent to the Pickard letter is also notable for its criticism of his attitude, 
not just in terms of denying the newspaper’s Liberalism but also in terms of the 
public emotionality of his and other pro-Boer arguments. The newspaper 
branded Pickard’s letter as being typical of the attitude of the ‘passionate 
people’ who made up the pro-Boer cause and misrepresented the Liberal 
position, and attacked the ‘passionate haste’ with which Pickard had made his 
attack.83 This denigrating use of the word ‘passionate’, combined with the 
newspaper’s insinuation that Pickard had abandoned the ‘language of truth and 
soberness’ for the ‘language of wild passion and utterly unjust imputation’, 
reveals the importance placed upon emotion in Liberal rhetoric on the Transvaal 
Crisis, and as such the extent to which charges of emotionality could be levied 
by supporters of the war on their pro-Boer opponents, countering charges of 
jingoism. 
Indeed, such debates over the relationship between emotion and the charge of 
jingoism can be said to touch upon the wider significance of public displays of 
emotion in the practice of late-nineteenth century Liberal politics, relating in 
particular to ideas of temperament and character. In his analysis of the 
‘emotional economy’ of post-war Conservatism in Britain, Martin Francis has 
argued that an important dimension in 1950s British political culture was that of 
a tension between self-expression and self-control, with the latter, a ‘coda of 
restraint’, being seen as desirable. Critically, Francis identified such values of 
political presentation as part of a longer, though not unchanging, trend in British 
political culture, based upon ‘nineteenth-century constructions of the restrained 
middle-class persona’.84 Along similar lines, John Belchem and James Epstein 
have identified the Gladstonian tradition of public politics as founded in no small 
part upon ideas of respectability, demonstrated through the ‘ability to rise above 
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sensual instincts and passions through sobriety, self-help, frugality, duty, effort, 
industry and “temperance in all things”’.85 Such ideas surrounding the 
temperament of the political speaker can further be seen as closely linked to 
broader ideas on the importance of character in the politics of late-Victorian 
imperialism. Cain has argued that the era saw the language of character 
deployed by ‘ultra-imperialists’ to justify the possession of Empire, character in 
Cain’s conceptualisation representing the virtues of ‘energy, industry (in its 
broad meaning), thrift, prudence, perseverance, [and] honesty’.86 While the 
Liberal speakers examined here are by contrast those whom Cain would term 
the ‘more pragmatic supporters of empire’, the question of character, and 
particularly the aspects of character attached to prudence and honesty, can 
nonetheless be seen as evident in Liberal rhetoric on the Transvaal crisis, in the 
sense that they bound not just how a Liberal statesman was to behave on the 
platform, but also how a Liberal statesman was to conduct the business of 
Empire.  
Such criticism of displays of excessive emotion can be found in the rhetoric of 
both pro-Boer and pro-conflict Liberal speakers. Much of this took the form of 
allusions to what might be termed as unrespectable platform behaviour, in 
particular the idea of excessive clamour. In attacking jingoism, Campbell-
Bannerman explicitly criticised the ‘the noisiest applauders and acclaimers of 
the war’, the implication being that it was not their support for the conflict which 
ran contrary to the ideals of Liberal Empire, but the vocal means by which they 
expressed their support for the war.87 Similarly, speaking at the beginning of 
September at Leven, Asquith attacked those who favoured annexation as ‘noisy 
but insignificant shouters’, while two days later at Arbroath Morley spoke 
dismissively of how ‘the clamours and vociferations of fire-eaters’ would never 
persuade him that the country as a whole supported the government’s policy.88 
This focus of Liberal speakers on the tone of those eager for conflict suggests 
that it was not just their enthusiasm for the war but their apparent disregard for 
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emotional restraint that rendered their approach to Empire incompatible with 
Liberal values. 
Such emotionality was presented in contrast to the restraint which Liberal 
speakers considered to be embodied in the Liberal approach to Empire, 
appeals to calmness and moderation being prominent in speeches running up 
to the crisis. In his speech at the City Liberal Club, Campbell-Bannerman spoke 
of their need to deal with the crisis ‘with courage, but with prudence, and above 
all things to keep our heads’; indeed, in the same speech it is worth noting the 
emphasis he placed on the need for Britain to ‘quietly’ meet its obligations.89 
This was a line of argument he repeated during the debate on supply later that 
month: appealing ‘for moderation and for guarded language’, Campbell-
Bannerman declared that, in contrast to the attitude of the Press, ‘it behoves on 
us at least in this House to maintain a calm tone’.90 Significantly, the Liberal 
leader remarked that, in order to maintain this calm tone, he would endeavour 
‘not to make polemical advantage’ out of the situation, an apparent suggestion 
that the pro-Boers could likewise stray from this Liberal framework of restraint. 
The pro-Boers for their part likewise sought to clothe themselves in the mantle 
of emotional restraint: Morley, ironically one of the more fiery Liberal orators on 
the subject of the Transvaal, promised his audience at Carnarvon that he would 
not make, ‘even if I were competent to make, a speech of rhetorical fireworks’. 
Instead, he argued that in contrast to the ‘Bedlamite’ war party, he had 
promised himself that he would ‘observe the language of good temper and 
moderation’.91 At the very least, Morley’s remarks suggest an awareness of the 
vulnerability of his own position to the charge of excessive emotionality and the 
importance of respectability to the anti-war cause, even if in relation to other 
aspects of his autumn campaign Morley rhetoric echoed that of the traditional 
Radical platform speaker. 
This idea of respectability and soundness of character was not simply confined 
to public behaviour however: instead, as Morley’s ‘Bedlamite’ label suggests, 
Liberal rhetoric on temperament and Imperial policy also drew upon notions of 
sound and rational thinking. Attacks on jingos and jingoistic behaviour were 
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accompanied by a suggestion of unsoundness of mind and character in those 
who opposed the Liberal approach to Empire. By contrast Liberals presented 
their own ideas as representing sanity and thoughtfulness. Harcourt for example 
spoke at Rhymney of how ‘in the arrogance of irresistible might and lust of 
insatiable dominion the minds of men are inflamed’.92 A few weeks later, he 
would go on to characterise the debate as being one which pitted the 
‘unthinking masses’ in opposition to the ‘sober masses’, a framing of the debate 
which notably alludes to the Liberal cause of temperance and with it pre-existing 
associations of drunkenness as a failing of character.93 At Arbroath Morley 
likewise sought to contrast ‘the humour of the rabid dog’, encouraged in his 
view by the pro-war Press, with an attitude befitting ‘responsible and rational 
citizens of the most powerful State in the world.’94 Similar language was also to 
be found in the speeches of Campbell-Bannerman. As examined above, 
Campbell-Bannerman praised the imperial attitude of the ‘sensible men’ who 
were uninterested in grand schemes of Empire, a theme he was to echo at 
Maidstone in his assertion that ‘right-thinking men’ would repudiate any designs 
on the Transvaal’s independence.95 The suggestion inherent in such rhetoric 
was then that the Liberal policies advocated by the speakers were 
fundamentally based on reason and sense, while the character of their 
opponents was such that they could not help but advocate such irrational 
positions.  
Liberal rhetoric on the conduct of political actors in responding to the Transvaal 
Crisis demonstrates the ways in which the politics of the South African question 
and indeed the politics of Empire as a whole were shaped by tropes of 
character and temperament. In this sense, the rhetoric examined in this section 
related not simply to the Liberal ideals of imperial rule, but to the Liberal ideals 
of imperial politics: how a statesman should conduct himself, and how public 
opinion should seek to be guided. Liberal speakers had to articulate their 
positions with care in a context in which accusations of jingoism or want of 
patriotism needed to be evaded. Yet these concepts also afforded political 
actors with the rhetorical tools needed to demonstrate their own commitment to 
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Liberal ideals of imperial politics, defined in opposition to a jingo Press. Further 
still, the space afforded to emotion within the performance of Liberal imperial 
politics, ideas of emotional restraint being equated to respectability and 
soundness of character, served to emphasise not simply the fitness for 
individual speakers to pronounce upon imperial questions, but also ideas about 
the character of the Empire itself. Rather than viewing the performative aspects 
of the Liberal response to the Transvaal Crisis as concerned with the processes 
of imperial politics rather than the principles, it is better to understand Liberal 
rhetoric on patriotism, jingoism and emotional politics as part of a wider 
rhetorical framework of imperial politics in which governing ideals and political 
practices were viewed as fundamentally interconnected. 
Fusion or Hatred? Race and the Transvaal Crisis 
If ideas of emotion and temperament formed rather abstract bases on which to 
found a Liberal approach to Empire, the questions surrounding race 
represented a strand of debate with more solid grounding in the specifics of the 
Transvaal Crisis. From the outset, Liberal rhetoric, and indeed British political 
rhetoric on the crisis in general, cast the potential conflict as being not just 
between the South African Republic and the British Empire, but being between 
the Boer and British, or Dutch-speaking and English-speaking settler 
populations both within the Transvaal and across South Africa as a whole. This 
framework provided a basis for Liberals to discuss the relationship between 
race and British authority in South Africa, constructing a Liberal rhetoric of 
Empire premised in part upon the supposed welcoming position afforded to the 
non-British ‘civilised’ subject races under British rule. However, as will be 
examined, this same rhetorical framework which enabled Liberal speakers to 
conceptualise the Transvaal crisis as one of potential conflict between the Boer 
and British communities, somewhat anomalously assigning the Uitlanders to the 
latter category, also served to reinforce assumptions about the superior 
character of the British race and the extent to which the Boer character was 
capable of meeting such expectations. 
In the crisis atmosphere of 1899 the question of race was almost exclusively 
one which referred to the white races of the British and the Boers. The position 
of the not-inconsiderable Indian population of South Africa, for example, 
received no attention from major Liberal speakers; it was Chamberlain who was 
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left to condemn the ‘brutal outrages which are constantly being committed on 
the Indian subjects of the Queen, and on the coloured men, who are also British 
subjects’.96 Likewise, the Black African majority of the region was often 
excluded from Liberal rhetoric on the crisis altogether, and even when 
mentioned it was generally only in support of other narratives. Outlined briefly, 
Liberal rhetoric on the Black African population fell broadly into two key strands. 
On the one hand, there emerged from some Liberal speakers a humanitarian 
narrative concerning the treatment of the Black African population under Boer 
rule and British rule respectively. Grey expressed the hope that from the conflict 
would emerge, among other things, ‘that humane treatment for the native 
coloured population which is the pride and the glory of every other part of the 
Queen’s dominions’.97  
However, this narrative sat uneasily alongside a sense that the native 
population posed a threat to the British. Morley and Rosebery, in spite of their 
otherwise opposing positions in the crisis, both made reference to the Black 
African population as a potential source of danger. Speaking at Arbroath, 
Morley warned that by sparking a conflict the British will have 
stirred up a spirit of restlessness among the native population of 
South Africa. And, considering their vast superiority in numbers 
and the horrors of a war between the white races and these 
Kaffirs, you cannot exaggerate the mischief of such a 
proceeding as that.98 
Similarly, Rosebery at Bath cautioned his audience that the British settlers ‘were 
losing face […] in the eyes of the natives’ and that in the forthcoming struggle 
between the white races of South Africa, ‘people, including that vast native 
population, are all watching which is to be the predominant race’.99 This rhetoric 
thus further underlined the risk posed by white racial conflict to the future of 
colonial South Africa, and in Morley’s case also served to minimise the 
differences between the British and the Boers by framing the dynamic as one of 
white settlers threatened by native unrest. This narrative of threat was also not 
necessarily inconsistent with Grey’s emphasis upon humane treatment, the 
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successful management of subject populations in theory at least representing 
one of the key elements of the British model of imperial rule. Yet this in itself 
served to highlight the point that, to the limited extent to which the ‘native 
question’ was raised at all by Liberal in response to the crisis of 1899, it was 
almost exclusively in terms of its relevance to the governing ability, the security, 
and the position of the British settlers. At least as far as the Transvaal crisis was 
concerned, the Empire in Liberal rhetoric was very much the Empire of white 
settlement.  
Liberal speakers thus approached the racial dynamics of South Africa with the 
white races in mind, invariably presented as a binary division between the 
British and the Boers. Driven no doubt in part by the notional focus of the 
Transvaal Crisis upon the specific rights denied to the Uitlanders, Liberal 
speakers from across the party framed the issue as one of equality between the 
white races of South Africa. In his letter of 11 October, Rosebery asserted that 
the British aims in the Transvaal were to redress Uitlander grievances and 
secure ‘equal rights for the white races in South Africa’.100 Speaking that same 
evening at Dundee, Asquith similarly argued that under the Majuba Hill 
settlement the Boers had already promised that ‘the British minority would have 
equal rights and privileges with the burgher citizens’.101 Equal rights, it must be 
stressed, in this context effectively meant specific improvements in the position 
of the Uitlanders rather than any wider-reaching changes: indeed, it was the 
failure of the SAR to adopt a regime of equal rights similar to that existing in the 
two British colonies which in this narrative necessitated intervention in the 
Republic’s internal affairs, emphasising an approach to equality enshrined in 
ideals of pluralism and the rule of law as a Liberal ideal of British imperial rule. 
Notably, this ideal of white racial equality was also invoked by Liberal 
opponents of the war: Morley, for example, attacked the programme of the war 
party on the grounds that conflict would not produce ‘not equality, but the 
superiority of the English’.102 Precisely because an armed conflict with Kruger’s 
government would not bring about equality, such an action was incompatible 
with a Liberal approach to Empire.  
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Yet this emphasis on racial equality as an ideal of Empire should not be 
overstated, and indeed there appears to have been reluctance outside of the 
Liberal Imperialist wing to embrace a narrative of equal rights in relation to the 
white races of South Africa. Campbell-Bannerman notably steered well clear of 
the argument in his speeches on the crisis. This may have been down to 
pragmatic considerations: Chamberlain had stated that the government’s stated 
rationale in pushing for the Uitlander franchise was precisely that it would 
remove the need to agitate for the Uitlanders’ other rights, thus lowering the 
risks of confrontation.103 Wanting to prevent a conflict, it is unsurprising that 
anti-war elements in the party may have balked at the idea of demanding full 
equality, which would largely serve to further the narratives of their political 
opponents. Furthermore, while Rosebery and Asquith may have called for equal 
rights for the two races, it does not necessarily follow that equal rights meant full 
racial equality in terms of status, or even participation in government, rather 
than simply a technical equality before the law. Indeed, Rosebery’s subsequent 
remark in his speech at Bath, that the native population were waiting to see 
which race would become ‘predominant’, suggests that full white racial equality 
was not what he had in mind.104 An interesting parallel might well be drawn here 
with the debates on the colour bar in South Africa which were to emerge later 
on in Edwardian politics, a technical equality and opposition to an explicit racial 
barrier under British colonial rule nonetheless stopping far short of undermining 
British primacy within the settler states. 
Instead, Liberal rhetoric on race in South Africa crystallised around the ideal of 
racial harmony. Liberal speakers from across the spectrum of opinion in the 
party placed characterised racial harmony between the British and the Boers as 
both a critical object of British policy in South Africa, and indeed a state of 
affairs which had existed in the region prior to the collapse in relations between 
Britain and the SAR. In the debate on the vote of supply, Campbell-Bannerman 
expressed his belief that it was the duty of Britain to bring about a situation so 
that they will find ‘the Dutchmen and the Britishers more and more contented, 
more and more friendly, and co-operating in building up the prosperity of that 
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great community of which in their different States they are a part’.105 In his 
speech at Arbroath, Morley referenced a similar line of argument, commenting 
approvingly that ‘great progress has been made’ in uniting the two sections of 
the South African population, progress which he considered the conflict put at 
risk.106 Likewise, at Dundee Asquith further praised the spirit of racial harmony, 
claiming to his audience that it was ‘that unanimity of feeling, that loyalty of 
sentiment, that harmony of co-operation upon which our Imperial position in 
South Africa depends’.107 The importance of good relations between the British 
and other white subject races was then a key assumption underpinning Liberal 
ideals of imperial rule. 
This point is further underscored by the general condemnation of racial hatred 
or ill feeling by Liberal speakers. In his characterisation of the conflict as a race 
war, Rosebery was atypical. From the outset Campbell-Bannerman had 
cautioned against casting the conflict as such, warning in July against any 
public figure saying anything which could ‘intensify or embitter race and 
sectional and party feeling in South Africa’.108 Asquith by contrast presented the 
Transvaal’s actions as harmful to British interests precisely because they would 
cause such tensions, arguing that ‘you cannot isolate the causes of hatred, 
resentment, and estrangement which have developed. They spread insensibly, 
gradually, inevitably, till they poison the whole life of the great South African 
dominion.’109 In invoking this idea of race hatred as a contagion, Asquith was 
actually adopting a line deployed by Chamberlain earlier on in the crisis, the 
latter having spoken in July of race inequality as a ‘source of poison’ which 
‘cannot be prevented from spreading’.110 For the pro-Boers, it was the war itself 
that would produce racial strife. At New Tredegar Harcourt argued that the war 
would produce ‘an inheritance of undying hatred in the hearts of people 
amongst whom you will still have to live’.111 In this manner, both Liberal 
supporters and opponents of a confrontationist approach in the Transvaal 
positioned themselves as defending South Africa from the risks of race hatred. 
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Instead, Liberal speakers championed the elimination of racial divisions in 
South Africa through a process of fusion. At Arbroath, Morley declared to his 
audience that ‘the British and the Dutch have got to live together in South Africa 
– fuse them’.112 Drawing an example from elsewhere in the Empire, the 
following month Morley argued that in Canada fusion and good race relations 
had been achieved between the British and French settlers, declaring that ‘what 
I want to do is apply to South Africa […] the same principles as were so 
successful in Canada, and made Canada one of the most united portions of the 
Queen’s realm’.113 The Canadian comparison had also been deployed by 
Campbell-Bannerman earlier on in the crisis: in the supply vote, he remarked 
that in Canada ‘two races not nearly so akin as those in South Africa’ had 
‘obliterated the difficulties and differences that separated them’.114 Why, he 
asked, should there be so little faith that such a process could be repeated in 
South Africa?  
There also appears to have been support for this idea of fusion from the Liberal 
Imperialist wing of the party, although such support was more muted. At 
Dundee Asquith expressed regret at the interruption of the process by which the 
British and the Dutch at the Cape were ‘becoming every year more and more 
fused into one community of loyal subjects of the British Empire’, implying 
support for the process of fusion throughout post-conflict South Africa, but not 
explicitly calling for its introduction in the Transvaal.115 Again, this may have 
been in part due to the context in which the Liberal Imperialists’ interventions 
were taking place: acknowledging the need for fusion to take place in the 
Transvaal would create a need to address the pro-Boer charge that such fusion 
would be difficult, if not impossible, following a conflict in the region. 
Nonetheless, Asquith’s usage of ideas of fusion served to further underline the 
idea of the Uitlander crisis acting as a destabilising influence upon the essential 
processes which supported existing British imperial rule in South Africa. While 
both Liberal supporters and opponents of the government’s stance towards 
South Africa were able to advocate the idea of fusion therefore, it was again 
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presented as a question of managing threats to the status quo of Anglo-Boer 
relations in South Africa. 
As Morley’s attack on a war which would bring about English ‘superiority’ in the 
Transvaal demonstrates, Liberal rhetoric on the ideas of white racial equality 
and fusion in South Africa was matched by an explicit disavowal of any prospect 
of establishing an explicit ascendancy of the British over the Boers. Indeed, 
even for those Liberal speakers who wished to see what would in effect have 
been a new Uitlander-backed administration in Pretoria, such an outcome would 
have been the product of what was to ultimately prove an illusory Uitlander 
majority in the territory, rather than the result of the legal elevation of the 
Uitlanders over the Boers. Yet as much as Liberal speakers espoused an ideal 
of imperial rule which emphasised the essential unity of the white races, and to 
a lesser degree an even broader pluralistic ideal which sought to minimise race 
as an explicit factor within British imperial rule, Liberal rhetoric on the racial 
dynamics of the Transvaal Crisis was nonetheless steeped in assumptions 
about the respective character of the British and Boer settler populations of 
South Africa. As the work of Cain has demonstrated, assumptions over 
character were not only important to the conduct of political actors in late-
Victorian Britain, but were also key to the conceptualisation and justification of 
imperial rule, the virtues of the British continually characterised as essentially 
superior to the attributes of the Empire’s subject races.116 Certainly, as will be 
examined Liberal speakers framed the racial dimensions of the South African 
question in a manner which emphasised the supposed strengths of the British 
character. Yet while Cain and Hopkins identify a wider trend within British 
imperial rhetoric founded in part on the debasing of the Boer race, such tactics 
saw relatively limited usage within Liberal rhetoric on the crisis of 1899.117 
Instead rather, the dynamic was more one of contesting the degree of similarity 
between the British and Boer races, and in particular the claims of the latter to 
possessing the virtues of the former. 
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Both Liberal supporters and Liberal opponents of the conflict sought in their 
public interventions to convey to their audiences ideas of the Boer character. 
Although some elements of Liberal Imperialist rhetoric sought to create distance 
and emphasise difference between their British audiences and their Boer 
subjects of debate, if anything Liberal rhetoric on the Boer character tended to 
focus on emphasising the lack of difference between the British and the Boers. 
In the debate on the loyal address Campbell-Bannerman commented that the 
Boers had ‘some good qualities and a good many bad ones’, suggesting that he 
wished to avoid praising or condemning the Boers, or promoting or denying 
their similarities as a race to the British.118 Despite this disclaimer however, 
Campbell-Bannerman had begun his speech by declaring that ‘we are entering 
a war directed against a European people, a Christian people, a Protestant 
people’, clearly drawing links of association even as he later sought to present 
himself as doing no such thing. This line of association had similarly been 
expressed by Asquith: speaking at the outbreak of the conflict, Asquith likewise 
described the Boers as men of the ‘same blood, the same colour, the same 
religion as ourselves’.119 Grey likewise shied away from the rhetoric of racial 
conflict, casting ‘the Boer oligarchy and the Hollander clique’ as the enemy, 
rather than the Dutch settler population at large.120 Even among those Liberal 
speakers ultimately supportive of the conflict therefore, far from participating in 
an active process of framing the Dutch of South Africa or even the Boers of the 
Transvaal as inferior on the grounds of racial character there was instead an 
emphasis upon their essential similarities to the British. 
Anti-war Liberal rhetoric on the character of the Boers in particular sought to 
emphasise the shared protestant heritage of the British and the Boers with a 
view to asserting the common values of freedom and independence which such 
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a Whiggish account of history supposedly demonstrated. For example, at 
Manchester Morley cast the Boers as being a race whose forefathers  
drove out the Spanish tyrant from the Netherlands and set up in 
Holland there that Government from which the cause of 
freedom – freedom of life, freedom of thought, freedom of belief 
– which all Europe and England especially included, has 
derived priceless blessings.121 
Harcourt similarly drew attention to the Boer’s Dutch ancestry, declaring that 
‘the men who won the independence of Holland from the oppressive rule of 
Philip II. of Spain – they [the Boers] inherit from them their unconquerable love 
of freedom and liberty.’122 Given that Liberal rhetoric emphasised not only the 
unique character of the British Empire as one founded upon and governed 
according to ideals of freedom and liberty, but also fundamentally the 
independent spirit of the British race, imagined here as an extension of the 
English, this was then essentially a narrative which served to impress upon their 
audiences the essential Britishness of the Boer character. Indeed, the 
invocation of the struggle against Philip of Spain is particularly significant in light 
of Morley and Harcourt’s primarily Liberal audiences because, framed as the 
conflict was against the backdrop of the Reformation in Europe, it was as much 
a religious struggle of Protestantism against the established Catholic faith as it 
was a war of independence. Given this, the emphasis placed on the Boers’ 
history served to invite comparisons with Nonconformist struggles and the anti-
Ritualism campaigns of late-Victorian Liberal politics, serving to highlight still 
further the Liberal credentials of the pro-Boer position. 
Significantly, Liberal opponents of the conflict did not just stress similarities 
between the Boers and the British, but also between the Boers and the Celtic 
races. Harcourt in his New Tredegar speech attempted to elicit sympathy from a 
Welsh audience for the Boers, arguing that the British ‘drove them from the 
place of their birth and made them abandon the land of their fathers – words 
musical to the ears of Welshmen’.123 Yet such a comparison was likely not just 
a rhetorical device for casting the Boers as victims of injustice, but also a means 
by which Harcourt could present the Boers as a race as being not so different 
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from those he was trying to persuade against conflict. Morley deployed similar 
tactics at Arbroath: discussing the questions of suzerainty and paramountcy, 
Morley remarked to his Scottish audience that ‘suzerainty and paramountcy 
were what Edward I. alleged – and I think you did not much approve of it, if I 
remember’.124 Such remarks are interesting as they suggest that the Welsh and 
the Scots might be to some degree more receptive of their argument that 
conflict was unjust than the British public at large, or that at least Morley and 
Harcourt believed that this might be so. These comments also lend some 
credence to John S. Ellis’ argument that pro-Boerism in Britain helped foster 
ideas of British pluralism at home, with the themes of the subordination of small 
nations having ‘held particular relevance for Irish and Welsh opponents who 
saw echoes of their own history’, although Ellis’ thesis curiously excludes the 
Scots from the process.125 In any case, such remarks can be seen as further 
evidence of the rhetorical efforts by Liberal pro-Boer speakers to stress degrees 
of association between the Boers and the British, and by extension the Celtic 
home nations. 
Liberal speakers thus articulated the crisis of 1899 as one fundamentally 
concerned with the relationship between the British and the Boer populations of 
South Africa. Confrontation with the SAR was presented as either risking the 
processes of increasing racial harmony by alienating the Empire’s Dutch 
subjects or alternatively as necessary to prevent the increasing tensions arising 
out of the Uitlanders’ grievances in the Transvaal. In this fashion Liberal 
speakers essentially articulated an approach to South African affairs which 
stressed the pluralist ideal of Empire, rather than one which established a 
British ascendancy. Yet in framing the racial dynamics of the Transvaal crisis in 
this manner, Liberal speakers also served to reinforce wider narratives which 
emphasised the virtuous character of the British race, even as they sought to 
minimise Anglo-Boer differences by emphasising a common heritage, religion 
and values. This narrative ultimately stressed the capacity of the Boers to match 
up to the exacting standards of the British character, the fusion of races in effect 
representing the integration of the Boers within British imperial norms. 
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Furthermore, the tendency to view the Transvaal Crisis as inherently related to 
the question of Anglo-Boer relations throughout South Africa would also have 
important consequences for how Liberals addressed questions of the 
Transvaal’s governance, which this chapter now explores. 
Good Government and Self-government 
As seen in the debates on the role of BSAC at the time of the Jameson Raid, a 
faith in the traditional governing structures of Empire and a hostility towards the 
idea of misgovernment represented a key element of the idealised Empire. This 
was a pattern which was to be repeated in relation to the Transvaal Crisis, with 
Liberal speakers again stressing the importance of ensuring the ideals of good 
governance and self-governance in British rule in South Africa. Critically 
however, the range of questions raised by the Transvaal Crisis saw Liberal 
speakers apply the language of governance to the conflict in starkly contrasting 
ways. An emphasis on the need for racial harmony in South Africa as a 
fundamental basis for good government in Britain’s existing colonies was 
contrasted with the alleged misgovernment of the South African Republic by the 
Boers. Similarly, the ideal of self-government was invoked both in support of the 
Boers’ right to govern their own lands free of imperial authority and in support of 
the Uitlanders’ demands for the franchise and a stake in the running of the 
country, in which it was assumed they were in a majority. The question of 
imperial governance in South Africa was thus another challenge for Liberal 
speakers to navigate during the crisis, providing an excellent basis from which 
to explore their underlying assumptions. 
In his speeches on the crisis, Campbell-Bannerman stressed that a British 
mishandling of the situation, in the form of provoking an armed conflict, risked 
jeopardising the prospects for good governance in the region. Speaking in the 
debate on supply, he drew upon his prior warnings about racial tensions to 
caution that a conflict would produce a ‘race feud extending through the whole 
of our colonies and possessions, which would make the good government of 
that continent impossible’.126 Presented in this manner, Campbell-Bannerman 
advanced by this statement two key lines of argument. In the first instance, by 
equating the outcome of conflict with the impossibility of good government, the 
                                            
126 HC Deb., 28 Jul. 1899, fourth series, Vol.75, cc.690-91. 
-144- 
 
Liberal leader could effectively counter the argument deployed by those 
supporters of the war, discussed in depth below, that the war could be 
considered a remedy for the state of misgovernment within the South African 
Republic.  
Yet, as with his rhetoric regarding the questions of supremacy and suzerainty, it 
is Campbell-Bannerman’s emphasis on not just the Transvaal itself but ‘the 
whole of our colonies and possessions’ and the ‘continent’ that speaks volumes. 
On the basis of Campbell-Bannerman’s phrasing, it was not just in a post-
annexation Transvaal that good governance would be impossible, but also in 
the pre-existing British colonies, where from a Liberal perspective good 
governance may be presumed to have been extant. The Liberal leader was not 
then just cautioning of future difficulties for the good governance of empire, but 
by implication warning that the conflict posed a threat to the already existing 
good governance of the Empire. Again we see from Campbell-Bannerman an 
outlook on Empire that was conservative, fundamentally concerned with the 
preservation of the Empire’s existing Liberal elements, and reactive against 
those threats such as armed conflict which stood to disrupt such elements. 
Campbell-Bannerman was to return to this theme later on in the crisis. Speaking 
at Maidstone, he once again drew a direct link between the risk of racial enmity 
and the prospects for the region’s governance. Cautioning again that the results 
of war would be racial tension ‘not only in the territories of the Republics, but 
throughout the whole of South Africa’, Campbell-Bannerman declared to his 
Kentish audience that  
every wise and prudent statesman who has had any 
responsibility in South African affairs, has found the cardinal 
principle of good government to lie in the maintenance of the 
best feeling between the Dutch and English elements in the 
population.127 
The stress on maintaining racial harmony as a basis for good government within 
the existing British colonies of South Africa is again evident, underscoring the 
inherently conservative nature of Campbell-Bannerman’s rhetorical line. On this 
particular aspect of the debate the Liberal leader found himself aligned 
alongside Morley, who, speaking at Carnarvon that same evening, likewise 
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sought to justify his opposition to the conflict on the grounds that it stood in 
opposition to the existing good governance of the Empire. ‘The cause of peace’, 
Morley stated to his audience, was ‘also the cause of good government and of 
wise policy’.128 Yet the basis for Morley’s good governance of Empire differed 
from that of his party leader. Although it might be inferred from his other 
remarks on race that Morley would most likely have indeed regarded racial 
harmony as a key component of good imperial governance, that was not the 
line of argument which he chose to deploy.  
Instead, Morley linked the question of imperial governance squarely with that of 
the centralisation of Empire. Criticising the British government for its apparent 
desire for broad intervention with regards to the Transvaal’s internal affairs, 
Morley declared that 
I do not believe any clever man sitting down at a desk in 
Whitehall and writing out on a piece of paper the administration 
that the Transvaal requires, I do not believe in it. Talk of 
paradox! Why, what incongruity could be greater, what more 
absolute departure could there be from all the teachings of our 
own rich and fruitful experience, and all the principles that have 
made the steady and self-developed growth of good 
government in our own dominions the envy of the world.129 
The government’s Transvaal policy, Morley charged, thus stood in marked 
contrast to prior British imperial practice. Notwithstanding the wider questions 
about the extent to which the ‘new imperialism’ really represented a departure in 
British policy, Morley sought to frame the government’s actions as novel, in that 
they represented a centralisation of imperial decision-making. As, in Morley’s 
view, statesmen and administrators at the metropole would inevitably be inferior 
to the task of imperial governance when contrasted with those at the periphery, 
the resulting governance of a post-conflict South Africa would ultimately fall 
short of Britain’s established record for good imperial governance. Morley’s 
assertion that good government in the dominions was ‘self-developed’ is also 
particularly interesting, as the implication that it would develop of its own accord 
within the wider British imperial framework would appear to chime with ideas of 
the development of the Empire as an organic, evolutionary process.   
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As with the prospects of imperial expansion, both Campbell-Bannerman and 
Morley regarded the question of good governance as one essentially 
conservative and reactive in nature. Good government was something already 
extant, achieved through the inherent superiority of the British approach to 
Empire. The prospect of war with the SAR represented both a departure from 
this allegedly tried-and-tested approach to Empire, a policy which would not 
reproduce good government in the Transvaal, and a direct threat to the existing 
good governance of British South Africa, through its violation of the principles of 
good race relations and administration by those on the periphery. 
The question of good governance was also a key trope of those Liberals who 
supported the conflict. However, in stark contrast with the position adopted by 
Campbell-Bannerman and Morley it was not the prospects for British good 
governance that proved central to the rhetoric of the Liberal Imperialists, but the 
extent of Transvaal misgovernment. In his speech at Bath, Rosebery made the 
character of the Kruger regime a key foundation for his views on the crisis. 
Charging that the discovery of gold had ‘produced great corruption in the 
Transvaal’, Rosebery condemned the ‘appalling record of the way in which the 
Government of the Transvaal was carried on’.130 Indeed, so bad was the 
misgovernment from Rosebery’s point of view that it had brought about the 
Jameson Raid: a ‘symptom of a deplorable state of things’, Rosebery declared 
that ‘no English gentleman would have engaged in what may be called a 
filibustering raid had it not been for the strong cry of distress that proceeded 
from within the Transvaal’.131 Intriguingly then in Rosebery’s rhetoric on the 
crisis, we have Boer misgovernment not only forming a basis for the conflict’s 
justification, but also serving as a force that might provoke British colonisers into 
abandoning their higher imperial principles out of desperation, echoing while at 
the same time countering Campbell-Bannerman’s warning of a threat to existing 
good British imperial governance. 
Rosebery’s attack on the misgovernment of the Transvaal followed on from the 
use of similar rhetoric by his leading followers. In his speech at Dundee on 11 
October, Asquith had slammed Pretoria for having responded to the Jameson 
Raid by ‘legislation more reactionary, administration more oppressive, [and] 
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military expenditure more profuse’.132 The inclusion of the charge of excessive 
spending alongside the more explicit claims of misgovernment is notable: while 
this no doubt in part represented a desire on Asquith’s part to stress to his 
audience the idea of the Transvaal as a military threat, it might also be seen as 
symptomatic of a wider Liberal wariness towards military power, implying a 
degree of synonymy between misgovernment and militarism. Indeed, in this 
sense the Liberal Imperialist critique of Boer misgovernment bore a striking 
similarity to the traditional radical critique of imperialism as representing the 
triumph of despotic power over the rule of law.   
Grey likewise invoked the notion of oppression in his speech at Glasgow. As 
noted in the previous section, Grey shied away from the rhetoric of racial 
conflict in his address to the students of Glasgow University, with the result that 
the object of his attack became the record of the Kruger regime specifically. 
‘The blame for the war’, Grey charged, ‘rests upon the Boer oligarchy and the 
Hollander clique […] which has misled their country and their countrymen’; the 
war was, in his view, fundamentally ‘a war against an oligarchical and 
oppressive Government’.133 By framing the question as one of Boer 
misgovernment, rather than potential British misgovernment, supporters of the 
conflict were thus able to appeal to a key Liberal touchstone in their efforts to 
rally Liberal opinion to their cause, while at the same time avoiding having to 
directly engage with the narrative of potential British misgovernment. Attacks on 
Boer misgovernment were of course not limited to Liberal circles: Chamberlain 
for example, in seeking to set out the government’s line on Uitlander 
oppression, launched an attack on the ‘corrupt, inefficient officials’ of the 
Transvaal.134 Even if such rhetoric was however being deployed in government 
circles as well, themes of misgovernment nonetheless formed an important 
feature of Liberal rhetoric on South Africa, and it is worth noting that 
Chamberlain’s own account came in an address to a pseudo-Liberal audience 
in the form of the Birmingham Liberal Unionist Association. 
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A central feature of this attack on Boer misgovernment was a critique of the 
alleged injustice perpetrated by the Kruger regime. Writing in a public letter on 
the day of the war’s outbreak, Rosebery declared his support for the ‘simple and 
reasonable objective of rescuing our fellow countrymen in the Transvaal from 
intolerable conditions of subjugation and injustice’.135 Haldane similarly charged 
that the Boers had ‘refused to grant the most elementary justice’ to the 
Uitlanders.136 This sentiment was also reflected by more centrist opinion in the 
Liberal Party: the Daily News declared as early as June that the position of the 
Uitlanders was a ‘crying injustice’, the removal of which should be of ‘special 
concern’ to Liberals.137 Indeed, even while urging caution and patience from the 
British position, Campbell-Bannerman nonetheless acknowledged at Ilford that 
the Uitlander complaints were well-founded.138 There was thus among Liberal 
speakers from the centre and imperialist components of the party a clear 
narrative of justice, or rather injustice, with regards to the Uitlander position in 
the Transvaal. Significantly, this appears to have been a narrative which Liberal 
opponents of the war felt required to engage with. At Carnarvon, Morley 
declared that ‘there is no man known to me who denies our obligation to protect 
our British fellow subjects from injustice’ and at Manchester even going as far 
as to say that ‘the cause we are here advocating, is the cause of Justice and 
peace, because we are not advocating the Boer cause’, although notably in 
neither case did he actually concede that injustice was actually taking place.139 
The pro-Boers were thus compelled to cast their rhetoric within this notion of 
injustice in the Transvaal, even as they rejected the suggestion that this 
injustice was for the British to correct by whatever means necessary.  
The misgovernment identified by the Liberal Imperialists also included a 
financial dimension. Speaking at Gullane, Haldane expressed his outrage that 
not only had the Uitlanders been denied their elementary rights, but also that 
they had ‘at the same time [been] taxed for the purpose of placing the South 
African Republic in a position of menace to the peace and good government of 
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the whole of South Africa’.140 Rosebery likewise denounced the taxation of the 
Uitlanders in his speech at Bath, alleging that ‘almost all the taxation of the 
country was drawn from our fellow-countrymen’.141 On a related theme, 
Rosebery also attacked the financial corruption of the Transvaal more generally, 
condemning the Pretoria regime for its excessive public salaries. This focus 
upon financial governance is interesting as it suggests to us that for as much as 
the Liberal Imperialists represented a reaction against Gladstonian Liberalism 
they were nonetheless prepared to draw upon a Gladstonian rhetoric of 
retrenchment, or indeed earlier radical critiques of the link between taxation and 
representation, in order to advance their claims on Liberal opinion. 
On the pro-Boer side, there was generally little direct engagement with the 
Liberal Imperialists’ line of attack. As with the questions of race and Uitlander 
rights, there was often a cursory recognition that the situation in the Transvaal 
was unacceptable, but otherwise there was minimal discussion of or challenge 
to the Liberal Imperialists’ rhetoric of misgovernment. Indeed, the brief 
discussion of the nature of the Transvaal government in Morley’s speech at 
Arbroath can be seen as the exception that proves the rule. To laughter, Morley 
declared that ‘we are told that the Boers of the Transvaal are a set of pig-
headed oligarchs’, before launching into a section attacking the Conservative 
Party for its history of resisting political reforms within Britain itself.142 Morley 
was thus then attempting to ridicule the language deployed by the Liberal 
Imperialists rather than trying to directly engage with their arguments, a tactic 
that prompted the Liberal Unionist Glasgow Herald to accuse him of discounting 
the role of ‘Boer misgovernment and corruption’ in bringing about the crisis.143  
Criticism of Morley’s reluctance to address the issue was also to be found in the 
non-schismatic Liberal Press. The Daily News, which was ultimately to adopt a 
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pro-conflict position but in September could be still regarded as holding a 
broadly centrist position within British Liberal politics, welcomed Morley’s 
speech but nonetheless commented that 
in the present condition of the Transvaal, which prompted his 
wise counsels to Mr Kruger, no doubt he [Morley] had a thought 
of Ireland too. No doubt he thought of experiences which 
enable him to trace the troubles of the Transvaal to 
misgovernment.144 
In making this analogy, the Daily News turned on its head Morley’s attempts to 
draw a favourable parallel between the Boer population and the Irish, instead 
encouraging its readers to associate the Kruger administration with the 
discredited governing practices of the landlord classes in Ireland. This can be 
seen then as further evidence of the attempts by both sides of the debate to 
frame the crisis and the questions of empire it raised in terms of existing Liberal 
political issues. The raising of the Irish comparison in relation to misgovernment 
also touches upon a wider question of imperial governance however. 
The ideal of good governance was clearly evident in the rhetoric both of those 
Liberals who supported the conflict and those who opposed it. However, such 
rhetoric existed in tension with that of a rival ideal of imperial governance: the 
ideal of self-governance. The assumption that the British Empire was a self-
governing Empire was one shared by both the radical and Liberal Imperialist 
wings of the party, although as with the principle of racial equality this was not 
an ideal extended to the non-white population. A striking degree of similarity 
exists between Morley’s warning against the administration of the Empire from 
London and Grey’s boast that ‘wherever our race ruled there was a free 
democratic Government and not a centralised Government’.145 However, with 
regards to the specific question of the governance of the Transvaal, the cause 
of self-government was very much the domain of the pro-Boer Liberals. 
For opponents of the conflict, self-government was not simply an effective and 
just means for the administration of the Empire: it was also an ideal form of 
governance which Liberals should support on principle, which necessarily 
translated into opposition towards any action in South Africa which would rob 
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the Transvaal Boers of their right to govern themselves. This idea of British 
intervention jeopardising self-government was discussed at length by Morley at 
Carnarvon. In a stance notably more critical than in his earlier interventions, 
Morley criticised not just the potential conflict but the broader negotiations 
themselves for their attack on the self-government of the Transvaal. Having 
stressed that franchise reform was the only policy capable of ‘reconciling reform 
with independence and self-government’, Morley condemned the suggestion 
that if the franchise could not be negotiated Britain should press for other 
reforms, arguing that said reforms ‘were to affect the judiciary, the constitution, 
the Civil Service, the jury system, the system of Municipal Government. How 
much self-government, I wonder, is left when you reckon all that up.’146 On the 
prospects of any self-government remaining after an actual conflict, Morley was 
similarly dismissive. Mocking the programme of the ‘war party’ for the 
reconstruction of South Africa following the conflict, he joked that  
having got them [the Boers] into good humour and into the 
frame of mind for proper self-government by this soothing and 
agreeable process then, in the words of the ‘Times’ newspaper, 
you are to establish some form of independent government at 
the earliest opportunity. Yes, not long before the day of 
judgement I think.147 
Self-government, it was implied, was not just a desirable object of policy but 
instead a fundamental good which was not to be interfered with. 
In casting doubt upon the likelihood that supporters of the conflict would 
ultimately introduce self-government, the pro-Boers also made reference to 
previous imperial episodes relating to the Boers in which a lack of self-
government had become a Liberal concern. Morley addressed British failure to 
translate a wish for Boer self-government into reality before, noting in his 
address at Arbroath that following the first annexation of the Transvaal Britain 
had promised to grant self-government, but had been unable to deliver on it.148 
In his New Tredegar speech, Harcourt reached back even further for an 
example of this. The former Liberal leader declared to his audience that the very 
reason for the emigration of the Boers from Cape Colony and the establishment 
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of the Transvaal state stemmed from the desire for self-government: ‘all the 
grievances of the emigrants arose from one cause – they desired self-
government, and under British administration this was denied to them.’149 In 
presenting his audience with this information, Harcourt was able to cast the 
question of self-governance as the original basis for tension in South Africa, 
presenting the Boers as a people whose desire for self-governance could be 
sympathised with while at the same time insinuating that a return to British 
administration might mean a revocation of self-government.  
Pro-Boer exploration of the self-governance issue also drew upon analogies 
with the Irish question. The Irish question was of great significance to questions 
of imperial self-government. Harcourt’s comparison of the Transvaal’s status 
under the conventions as ‘Home Rule’ was as much about his own form of 
Liberal politics as it was an aid for comparison: given that the Sheffield 
Independent reported that his audience cheered the reference to home rule, it 
would seem likely that this was a clear attempt to generate opposition to the 
conflict through appealing to a radical Liberal issue.150 Likewise Morley’s 
description of the likely outcome of conflict as being ‘Ireland all over again’ was 
founded upon the question of governance, with Morley justifying his comparison 
on the grounds that, as in Ireland, a post-conflict Transvaal would be made up 
of a ‘sort of loyalist Ulster’, in that it would have ‘a loyalist district, and outside of 
that an enormous territory, as I say, saturated with sullen disaffection’.151 In this 
manner, the framework of the Home Rule debate was almost grafted onto the 
Transvaal question, with the unreformed situation in Ireland held up as a 
counter-example demonstrating a failure to apply Liberal values of imperial 
governance. Additionally, the use of the Irish analogy also served to highlight 
parallels between the white racial divisions in Ireland and in South Africa, and 
as with other imperial questions provided supporters of Home Rule and Irish 
nationalism with the additional means of drawing attention to Irish grievances.152  
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Again, there was little by way of direct engagement with these arguments from 
the Liberal Imperialist wing of the party. While Asquith did indeed disavow the 
annexation of the Transvaal, and Grey stressed that the war would bring 
‘democratic government’, neither suggested that the outcome of the war would 
be a return to self-government by the Transvaal Dutch.153 Indeed, it might be 
speculated that the focus many pro-conflict speakers placed upon the granting 
of franchise rights to the Uitlanders was not just a reflection of the crisis’ 
development but also a way of acknowledging, even if not engaging with, the 
Liberal ideal of self-government, as they may well have expected a democratic 
election to produce a British majority. Nonetheless, even if this was an 
underlying implication, it was not one that was explicitly made, or indeed could 
be made within the framework of Liberal debate on Empire. The ideal of self-
government, was thus a Liberal touchstone ‘owned’ by the conflict’s opponents, 
and one which posed a severe challenge to the Liberal Imperialists’ use of the 
ideal of good governance in order to cast the Transvaal government as contrary 
to Liberal ideals of Empire. 
An examination of the rhetoric of leading Liberals thus reveals an inherent 
tension surrounding the question of imperial governance. In seeking to frame a 
Liberal approach to Empire prominent Liberals sought to draw upon established 
ideals of good government and self-government, ideals which would be 
recognisably ‘Liberal’ to their audiences. However, while there was an 
underlying Liberal assumption these two ideals could theoretically coexist, the 
attempt to apply these ideals of governance to the questions of Empire raised 
by the Transvaal Crisis brought about a divergence between them that Liberal 
speakers struggled to reconcile. The issue of self-government naturally lent 
itself to the pro-Boer cause, with supporters of the conflict unable to effectively 
use the ideal as a touchstone in their own rhetoric, instead simply opting to 
avoid discussion of it. The issue of good government was more contested, 
being deployed by both sides of the debate, but even in this regard there was 
little direct confrontation over the issue: the pro-Boers had no answer to the 
charge of misgovernment in the Transvaal, while the Liberal Imperialists did not 
respond to suggestions that the conflict would bring about misgovernment 
under British rule. From this lack of explicit counter-argument from either side, it 
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can be seen that there were indeed underlying assumptions that a Liberal 
approach to Empire would necessarily be dependent upon both good 
governance and self-government. The interplay between these two ideals of 
imperial governance will be explored in more depth in later chapters; in the 
context of the Transvaal Crisis, however, the internal fault lines of the Liberal 
rhetoric of governance ultimately proved irreconcilable. 
Conclusion: Rhetoric and the Legacy of the Transvaal Crisis 
Ultimately, the Liberal response to the Transvaal Crisis can best be 
characterised as that of a politics of Empire severely disrupted by events, the 
deteriorating relations between Britain and the South African Republic creating 
a perfect storm within which the growing factional tensions within the Liberal 
Party could openly fracture over questions of Empire. Yet just as there was not 
a clear-cut divide within the party between the Roseberyites and the pro-Boers, 
but instead rather a spectrum of positions within which individual Liberal actors 
were free to move, neither can the Liberal splits over the outbreak of the South 
African War be understood a simple division between imperialism and anti-
imperialism, or between support and opposition for the expansion of Empire. 
The divisions which emerged in Liberal rhetoric on the crisis instead 
represented a far more nuanced and multifaceted debate over how the politics 
of Empire should be conducted, both in relation to the ideals which were said to 
be critical to the strength of British imperial rule and with regards to the 
expectations placed upon the behaviour and character of political actors in 
Britain.  
Significantly, despite the diverse and often opposing narratives advanced by 
Liberal speakers from across the party in response to the crisis, these ideals 
and assumptions represented a common rhetorical framework for Liberal 
speakers which was if anything further reinforced by the debates on the crisis. 
Both supporters and opponents of British intervention in the Transvaal put 
forward a rhetoric which emphasised the strengths of the British character, the 
idea of imperial responsibility and the ideals of a well-governed, self-governing 
settler Empire, even as they deployed these themes in starkly contrasting 
arguments. Yet despite these shared Liberal assumptions of Empire and 
imperial politics, the complex problems raised by the Transvaal Crisis in terms 
of Transvaal misgovernment, Anglo-Boer relations, the grievances of the 
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Uitlanders and the nature of British authority over the SAR all served to produce 
a situation in which the competing ideals of Empire could not all be effectively 
applied, resulting in the articulation of a fractured and contradictory rhetoric of 
Empire. 
Critically, Liberal speakers were not simply engaged in trying to persuade their 
audiences of the legitimacy of the emerging conflict or indeed how best to 
redress the problems of the Transvaal, but more fundamentally were engaged 
in a process of conceptualising the essential nature of the South African 
question itself. In characterising the problems of South Africa as relating 
fundamentally to the relationship between the British and Boer populations of 
the region, Liberal speakers adopted a rhetorical framework which was to 
emphasise ideas of white racial harmony as a key goal of British policy in the 
years that would follow, marginalising the position of South Africa’s non-white 
populations in the process. Likewise, while the twin ideals of imperial 
governance, good government and self-government, were to prove an unstable 
and contradictory basis for Liberal rhetoric in response to the Transvaal Crisis, 
in emphasising these ideals Liberal speakers established the question of 
governance as a key consideration of subsequent South African policy, which 
as the next chapter will explore could more readily be expressed in relation to 
the conduct of the war and the debates on the eventual peace.  
Further still, as the debates over the nature of the Empire and the role of 
jingoism and character examined in this chapter have shown, the rhetoric of 
Liberal speakers on the outbreak of war established the methods by which the 
struggle of politicians to appear ‘Liberal’ over questions of Empire was to be 
conducted, a pattern which was to be continued through to the Roseberyite 
challenges following the election of 1900. While the politics of the Transvaal 
Crisis represented a brief and turbulent episode in the Liberal Party’s history, it 
was nonetheless one which brought into sharp focus the competing narratives 
and instincts at the heart of the party’s imperial politics. 
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3. ‘METHODS OF BARBARISM’: LIBERALS AND THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR, 1899-
1902 
The outbreak of the South African War left the Liberal Party badly divided, with 
the Liberal Imperialists presenting the conflict as necessary for the security of 
the Empire and the Liberal pro-Boers railing against a war which they claimed 
risked doing permanent damage to the political and social fabric of South Africa. 
Yet the war which broke out in October 1899 soon defied many of the initial 
expectations of both its supporters and opponents: as early as Lord Rosebery’s 
speech at Bath, it was becoming clear that the military strength of the two Boer 
republics had been severely underestimated, and that the war was unlikely to 
result in a quick victory. If John Morley’s predictions that the war would result in 
annexation did indeed prove prescient when the regular governments of the 
South African Republic and the Orange Free State fell in mid-1900, the 
subsequent descent into guerrilla warfare and the brutal counter-insurgency 
tactics adopted by the British added still further unforeseen new developments 
to the politics of the war. Against the backdrop of the general election of 1900 
and the leadership struggles of 1901, the period of the South African War thus 
represented a critical period for the relationship between the Liberal Party and 
the politics of Empire. 
This chapter focuses on three key aspects of the war’s conduct which made up 
key elements of the Liberal rhetorical response to the conflict. The first 
examines the annexation of the two republics: given that the case for war had 
been framed as one of defence rather than territorial expansion, the 
annexations represented a critical shift in rhetoric on the war, as well as 
exacerbating divisions between the centrist and pro-Boer elements of the 
Liberal Party. The second focus of this chapter is on the connected issues of 
the British tactic of farm-burning and the setting up of concentration camps, 
policies which would be famously denounced by Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman as the ‘methods of barbarism’. The agitation against British war 
tactics has often been interpreted as a humanitarian critique of British 
imperialism and the ideals of Empire: yet as this chapter will explore, Liberal 
speakers who advanced such a critique also explicitly invoked the rhetoric of 
imperial governance and notions of race harmony, as well as drawing links 
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between the tactics and the imposition of martial law at the Cape. Finally, this 
chapter considers Liberal rhetoric on the settlement of the conflict and the 
nature of British imperial rule over the conquered Boers. As the subsequent 
chapter will explore, the restoration of self-government in South Africa 
represented a key point of political contention in the reconstruction of the region 
after 1902. However, this was not a situation which simply arose following the 
final cessation of hostilities, but as will be demonstrated was one which Liberals 
discussed at great length throughout the conflict, casting considerable light on 
the Liberal Party’s approach to the politics of Empire. 
Additionally, one of the most notable consequences of the war for British politics 
was that it brought about an open but very public split within British Liberalism, 
particularly following the disappointing Liberal performance at the 1900 general 
election. If the embryonic ideas of Liberal Imperialism had started to become 
apparent in the autumn of 1899, the progress of the war itself saw the 
movement crystallise into a specific sectional identity within Liberal politics, 
albeit one which was still not clearly demarcated either in terms of policy or 
personnel. The increasingly public nature of the division coincided with the 
Roseberyite faction’s increasing challenges to the leadership of Campbell-
Bannerman, most notably expressed in the so-called ‘war to the knife and fork’ 
and the most high profile of Rosebery’s many re-entries into public life with the 
1902 Chesterfield speech. This chapter examines the rhetoric used to frame the 
public debates about the relationship between Liberalism and Empire that the 
Liberal split prompted, in order to build further upon the existing scholarship of 
the party’s wartime high politics. Regardless of the extent to which imperialism 
actually formed the core of Liberal Imperialist politics, the prominence given to 
the imperialist label encouraged speakers from across the party to articulate 
explicitly Liberal principles of Empire in relation to the South African question to 
a greater degree than in 1899. Additionally, the climate of the general election 
of 1900 also saw an increased tendency of Liberal speakers to contrast their 
party’s approaches with jingoism and Tory imperialism. This chapter therefore 
examines these broader debates alongside the specific issues raised by the 
war, in order to assess the South African question as an imperial political issue 
in these years. 
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The politics of the war were complex, and naturally the rapidly changing 
situation in South Africa brought about in its turn substantial changes in debates 
over Empire in Britain, reshaping the key rhetorical tropes which Liberals 
deployed in their rhetoric on South Africa. Nonetheless, as will be 
demonstrated, the changing foci of Liberal debates on the war, against a 
backdrop of high political divisions within the party, actually masks a degree of 
rhetorical continuity on the South African question. On the key points of good 
imperial governance, race harmony, self-government and the national honour, 
as well as with the recurring tropes of character and the idea of a Liberal 
approach to Empire, the key elements of Liberal rhetoric ultimately stood 
essentially unchanged from the debates of 1899 and earlier. 
Debating Significance: the Political History of the War  
The subtitle of Andrew Porter’s centenary essay charting the South African 
War’s impact on the metropole, ‘A Question of Significance?’, aptly highlights 
the central debate within historical writing on Britain’s wartime politics.1 With the 
years 1899 to 1902 witnessing an open split within Liberalism and a heated 
election campaign seemingly focused on questions of patriotism and 
imperialism, one of the key concerns of much historical writing on the period 
has to been to try and assess the extent to which the South African question 
represented the key driver of political events, or simply the backdrop against 
which they took place. 
In part, this reflects the wider use of the South African War as a case study for 
many historians of British imperial society. Alongside the First World War, the 
Boer War emerges as a key influence in John Mackenzie’s analysis of imperial 
propaganda, providing a basis for the dissemination of imperial ideas 
throughout British society.2 By contrast, the British experience of the South 
African War features heavily in Bernard Porter’s thesis of ‘absent-minded 
imperialism’. Challenging the notion of a Britain enthused with imperialism, 
Porter considers the production of imperial propaganda for young readerships 
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and the prevalence of patriotic songs among the working classes during the 
South African War as evidence for the limitations of imperial pervasiveness 
within British culture.3 The period of the war has also been seized upon in terms 
of explaining the shifting meanings of imperialism in this period. Koebner and 
Schmidt held that the war was primarily responsible for imperialism’s ‘reversion 
to the status of partisan abuse’ within politics, not just in Britain but also 
internationally.4 While few today would entirely back such an analysis, many 
would still consider the war a key moment in shaping British imperial sentiment. 
Andrew Thompson, for example, argues that the one of the most significant 
effects of the war was to dampen enthusiasm for the ‘new imperialism’ of the 
late nineteenth century.5 With such considerations in mind, it is therefore 
worthwhile examining how Liberal articulations of Empire and imperialism 
changed, or indeed remained consistent, over the course of the war. 
In assessments of the politics of the war, debates over the nature of the ‘khaki’ 
election of autumn 1900 loom particularly large. Held less than a year after the 
outbreak of hostilities and framed by the Unionist government in strongly 
imperial terms, the election result swiftly became to be identified as dramatic 
proof of jingoism and popular imperialism which gripped the political life of fin-
de-siècle Britain. Indeed, the narrative of a government seeking to exploit the 
war for political gain was one that was advanced before polling had even 
begun, the Daily News of 22 September attacking Tory electioneers for 
advocating the ‘confinement of the election controversies to the single issue of 
the war’.6 Following the government’s success, both Liberals and Unionists 
interpreted the result as primarily driven by popular imperialism, not least 
because it represented the first clear re-election of a government since the 
Second Reform Act.7 This conventional wisdom is reflected in early 
historiography on the topic, J. A. Spender’s biography of Campbell-Bannerman 
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attributing the Liberal defeat to the average voter’s ‘practical instinct […] that the 
defeat of the Government would be construed by the Boers and by foreign 
Powers as a censure of its entire South African policy’.8 Likewise Elizabeth 
Enstam, while placing stress on the organisational weaknesses of the Liberal 
Party in determining the election result, similarly identified the war as a key 
factor in bringing about the Unionist victory.9 
This interpretation came under significant challenge however in the 1970s with 
Richard Price’s An Imperial War and the British Working Class. As part of a 
wider thesis questioning the narrative of popular working class support for 
imperialism during the South African War, Price conducted an analysis of 
constituency results by demographic composition and the position of the Liberal 
candidates on the war, suggesting that only in pro-Boer constituencies was the 
conflict a ‘live issue’.10 Arguing instead for a greater understanding of Unionist 
appeals to social reform as a central element of the election, Price concluded 
that ‘imperialism as an electoral issue was of very little force in working-class 
constituencies’.11 Price’s analysis of the election is echoed in Andrew Porter’s 
assessment of the war’s impact on political life. Considering South African 
questions to have been ‘a source of such embarrassment that party leaders 
wished to be rid of them as quickly as possible’, Porter paints an account of the 
1900 general election which consigns the war to a background role.12 The 
faltering course of the war, by this analysis, drained Chamberlain’s imperial 
politics ‘of any moral and political capital’, with the result that ‘there was 
widespread avoidance of war issues by Unionist candidates’ during the 
election.13 Porter goes further than most in this assessment, but nonetheless 
the argument that attitudes to the war imperialism cannot explain the election’s 
outcome have been broadly accepted until relatively recently.  
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-161- 
 
The main challenge to this assessment emerged from the work of Paul 
Readman. In a quantitative study of the election addresses of both Unionist and 
Liberal candidates at the election, Readman argues that the South African War 
did play a significant role in the election, most significantly in providing a 
framework within which Unionist candidates could launch patriotic appeals to 
the electorate.14 The nature of the political language of patriotism as identified 
by Readman has already been discussed in the previous chapter, so will not be 
further discussed here, except to note again that Readman’s understanding of 
patriotism is by no means synonymous with ideas of imperialism or jingoism. 
The need to differentiate between the two is a point recently also stressed by 
Luke Blaxill, who argues nonetheless that the 1900 election was indeed 
characterised by imperialist appeals, albeit in the hands of the Unionist an 
appeal that was deliberately conflated with patriotism.15 The Price interpretation 
of the election of 1900 has also come under fire from other quarters.16 Although 
it will be difficult to ever fully establish the degree to which different issues 
shaped the nature of a general election, a point which indeed Price himself 
recognised and stressed, there has certainly been a growing trend in recent 
years of recognising the impact of the South African question on the politics of 
the election.  
The connections between the politics of the conflict and divisions within the 
Liberal Party have also been the subject of much historical inquiry. Although it 
remains the case that the impact of the war upon Liberal politics is often passed 
over astonishingly swiftly in many general histories of the Liberal Party, there 
remains nonetheless a solid body of literature on the fracturing of the party 
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between 1899 and 1902, particularly concerning the high politics of the struggle 
over the party leadership.17 Peter Jacobson, David Gutzke, and George 
Bernstein all provide informative surveys of the relationship between the official 
leadership of Campbell-Bannerman and the Roseberyite wing. All three 
consider the very public emergence of the Liberal Imperialist section during the 
war as part of cumulative process with its roots in earlier divisions, although 
there is a less of a consensus on the extent to which it was a question of policy 
or ideology. For Jacobson, the term Liberal Imperialist is best considered as the 
‘rhetoric of party infighting during the Boer War’.18 Gutzke and Bernstein, in 
contrast, identify a more genuine split along the questions of imperialism and 
war policy, Gutzke in particular noting a degree of continuity with earlier 
divisions over Ireland.19  
In H.C.G. Matthew’s assessment, the politics of the war play only a small part, 
in line with Matthew’s characterisation of the group as an elite formation within 
Liberalism that sought to articulate a wide-range of post-Gladstonian positions. 
Nonetheless, Matthew’s work is useful in that identifies the questions of 
annexation, the peace settlement, and the relationship with Alfred Milner as key 
flash points which divided the faction from the bulk of party opinion.20 The latter 
question was more of a war issue than an imperial one, although it was certainly 
related to questions over the ‘methods of barbarism’. The annexations and the 
ultimate settlement of the conflict in any case represent two of the central 
elements of imperial Liberal rhetoric during the course of the war, making 
Matthew’s work an invaluable basis for further inquiry. 
There has also been a considerable body of scholarship on the relationship 
between the Liberal Party and the pro-Boers. In his assessment of Liberals and 
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the war, Bernard Porter characterises the pro-Boer wing of the party as 
primarily concerned with demonstrating the injustice of the conflict and rejecting 
the idea of a casus belli.21 While this is a fair description of some of the more 
radical elements within the pro-Boer wing of the party, it ignores the extent to 
which an assessment of the war’s origins was combined with imperial questions 
arising from the conduct of the war. Porter’s assessment of the neglect of the 
black African population in pro-Boer rhetoric certainly rings true however, and 
represents one of the more interesting silences in anti-imperialist rhetoric on the 
war.22 John W. Auld provides a more in-depth assessment of the pro-Boer 
position in this period, identifying a traditional concern for humanitarianism and 
(white) self-government as the main drivers behind pro-Boer Liberal sentiment 
during the war.23 Even this however reflects only part of the pro-Boer appeal, 
and as recent scholarship on the humanitarian response to British war methods 
has shown, Liberal pro-Boer politics can be considered to have embodied a 
more complex relationship with Empire. 
One aspect of the conflict that has attracted considerable attention from both 
historians of the Liberal Party and of the politics of the war more generally is 
that of the British war methods of farm-burning and the implementation of 
concentration camps, controversially characterised by Campbell-Bannerman as 
the ‘methods of barbarism’. More than any other two elements, the twin policies 
have come to represent the height of the controversies within Britain over the 
South African War.24 For Bill Nasson, the reaction to the system of 
concentration camps represented the ‘most single-minded political issue of the 
war’, and certainly it looms large in political histories of the years following the 
election of 1900. The reaction to the camps took on two related but distinct 
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forms: the first a specific controversy relating to Campbell-Bannerman’s political 
charge that the war was being waged by ‘methods of barbarism’, and the 
second a wider humanitarian reaction within British society upon which the 
Liberal charge was based. Partly due to the uproar generated by the specific cry 
of ‘methods of barbarism’, historians of British Liberal politics have tended to 
focus on the role of Campbell-Bannerman in bringing the issue to the political 
foreground. Assessments about the impact of Campbell-Bannerman’s 
intervention have varied considerably. For A. J. P. Taylor, the new line of attack 
was nothing less than ‘a stroke of genius’ which brought about the reunification 
of Liberals and Radicals, characterising the new Liberal approach as ‘moral 
fervour revived free from any awkward moral problems’.25 In Spender’s 
interpretation however, the charge alienated the ‘faithful’ centre rather than 
binding it with the Liberals, while John Wilson has questioned whether there 
was any ‘political purpose’ to the intervention.26 In his analysis of the Liberal 
Imperialist response, Matthew considered that significance of the speech had 
more to do with the appearance that Campbell-Bannerman was vacating the 
centre of the party than ultimately with any real differences over imperial 
policy.27 
Yet moving away from questions of high politics, others have seen a distinctly 
imperial element to the Liberal critique of British war tactics. John S. Ellis has 
argued that the rhetoric of ‘methods of barbarism’ served to advance a 
pluralistic Liberal vision of Empire and Britishness against the new imperialism 
of the Conservatives. Liberal pro-Boers, Ellis argues, presented the policies of 
farm burning and the concentration camps as an attack by the strong on the 
weak and a parallel to the Empire’s assault on the rights of the Boer nations; by 
contrast, the Liberal alternative presented a Gladstonian vision of a 
multinational Empire.28 Ellis’ thesis of a narrative of barbarism underpinning a 
pluralistic Liberalism is echoed by Kenneth O. Morgan in his examination of 
Lloyd George’s pro-Boer activities. Morgan characterises Lloyd George’s 
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imperialism as that of a belief in imperial partnership, although he considers this 
a secondary factor to Lloyd George’s repulsion towards the corrupting effect of 
jingoism and a profiteering imperialism on Britain itself.29 Given the race 
dynamics already identified in the politics of the South African question, it is 
worth exploring the extent to which pro-Boer narratives, and indeed other 
aspects of Liberal rhetoric, implicitly or explicitly linked the vision of a pluralistic 
Empire with the humanitarian response to the farm burnings. 
Additionally, a rich body of scholarship has in recent years explored the 
gendered dimensions of the concentration camps controversy. Paula Krebs’ 
cultural study of the conflict and British imperial culture, Gender, Race and the 
Writing of Empire, rightly identifies the significance of gender ideology both in 
the newspaper reporting of the scandal, and in shaping the government and the 
military’s official responses to the episode.30 On the figure of Hobhouse in 
particular, Marouf Hasian Jr.’s rhetorical analysis provides a useful account of 
the efforts by British administrators to frame Hobhouse’s campaign as evidence 
of ‘hysteria’ and a failing of national character, even as Hobhouse’s revelations 
were seized upon by the pro-Boers who found the humanitarian critique a more 
effective narrative than previous agitation over annexation and reconciliation.31 
In a similar vein, Zoë Denness’ recent article on the camps controversy 
highlights the extent to which both critics and defenders of the camp system 
invoked gendered tropes in their descriptions of Boer women, which in turn 
were linked to ideals of civilisation and Empire.32 Denness’ work is also notable 
for her assessment that the concentration camp controversy was closely linked 
to discourses on Boer whiteness and Anglo-Boer similarity, which as seen in the 
previous chapter represented a key element of pro-Boer rhetoric prior to the 
outbreak of the war. Additionally Morgan’s work on the Boer War and the British 
press has stressed the importance of the female readerships in the reporting of 
                                            
29 Kenneth O. Morgan, ‘Lloyd George, Keir Hardie and the Importance of the 
“Pro-Boers”’, South African Historical Journal 41:1 (1999). 
30 Paula M. Krebs, Gender, Race and the Writing of Empire: Public Discourse 
and the Boer War (Cambridge: 1999). 
31 Marouf Hasian Jr., ‘The “hysterical” Emily Hobhouse and Boer War 
concentration camp controversy’, Western Journal of Communication 67:2 
(2003). 
32 Zoë Denness, ‘Women and warfare at the start of the twentieth century: the 
racialization of the “enemy” during the South African War (1899–1902)’, 
Patterns of Prejudice 46:3-4 (2012). 
-166- 
 
the concentration camp atrocities and the subsequent shift in the public 
opinion.33 These debates have largely not engaged directly with the party 
political element of the controversy; nonetheless, in considering the rhetoric of 
‘methods of barbarism’ the wider rhetorical framework of the camps controversy 
serves to provide important context for Liberal rhetorical strategies. 
In seeking to trace the evolution of the South African question in Liberal rhetoric 
through the years of the South African War, there is then a substantial body of 
existing research which serves to act as a foundation for further inquiry. In 
particular, the large body of literature surrounding the high political struggles 
over the Liberal leadership and the nature of Liberal factionalism in this period 
serves to provide political context to many of the speeches examined in this 
chapter, as well as highlighting the key points of contention. However, the focus 
on personalities rather than the principles of the issue, as well as the focus in 
the studies of the 1900 election on the relative importance of imperial issues 
rather than way in which it was discussed renders much of the existing 
historiography of only limited use for our purposes. Only really on the issue of 
‘methods of barbarism’ itself have the rhetorical nature of the campaigns been 
studied in significant depth. While taking into account the themes raised by the 
existing literature therefore, this chapter largely steers clear of the high political 
conflict comprising the ‘war to the knife and fork’ and similar episodes, except 
so as far as the rhetoric deployed casts light on wider imperial attitudes and 
assumptions. Similarly, the purpose of this chapter is not ultimately to assess 
the importance of the South African question to either the general election of 
1900 or to the politics of wartime more generally. Rather, it is with the aim of 
mind of establishing how, when the question was raised by Liberal speakers, 
the imperial questions at the heart of the conflict were articulated and framed. 
The Liberal Party and the Wartime Politics of Empire 
As examined in the previous chapter, the descent into warfare in the autumn of 
1899 served as a catalyst for discussions about the relationship between Liberal 
Party politics and the Empire. This was a process not just driven by the nature 
of the South African War as an imperial conflict, but also by the dynamics of 
British party political culture at the end of the nineteenth century. The legacy of 
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imperial concerns as the chosen basis for Harcourt’s resignation, and the 
adoption of the ‘imperialist’ label to describe the anti-Radical faction that 
developed around Rosebery, helped ensure that much of the public discourse 
surrounding the Liberal split was framed in terms of questions of imperialism as 
well as the divisions over the war. While as noted above the degree to which 
genuine divisions over the Empire lay at the root of divisions within the party 
has been seriously questioned by historians, the very fact that imperialism 
formed the notional battleground within the party created rhetorical spaces for 
the articulation of Liberal visions of empire and Liberal expressions of imperial 
politics. Additionally, the need to set out the relationship between Liberal politics 
and imperial questions was also created by the necessity of countering an 
ascendant Unionist politics which sought to claim ownership over imperial 
languages, not only at the election of 1900 but throughout the course of the war. 
This section therefore examines the ways in which Liberal speakers drew links 
between the politics of the war and the wider role of the Empire and imperialism 
within British Liberal politics. 
Liberal speakers sought to rebut Unionist claims that the party could not be 
trusted with the responsibilities of managing the Empire by drawing upon British 
Liberalism’s record of imperial management. For example, James Bryce, 
President of the Board of Trade under the Rosebery government and a critic of 
the war, used a speech at Aberdeen in the summer of 1900 to declare that the 
Empire had ‘expanded enormously under Liberal Governments’, which had 
protected its interests and vindicated its rights as well as any Tory 
administration.34 Given the degree to which a suspicion of expansionist 
imperialism ran through sections of the Liberal Party supporter base in this 
period, such efforts could sometimes backfire on speakers. For example, in a 
speech at Stoke Newington on 17 November 1899 Lord Tweedmouth attempted 
to rebut the charge that Liberals did not care for the interests of the Empire by 
asserting that ‘it had been during Liberal administrations that the largest 
annexations had been made’, only to be greeted with laughter and heckled with 
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cries of ‘shame’ from his audience.35 Confronted with this, Tweedmouth could 
only reply that perhaps it was a shame, but it was nonetheless a fact, which he 
swiftly contrasted with ‘the biggest loss the Empire ever sustained – namely, the 
loss of the American colonies’ under the Tory administration of Lord North. 
Although it is difficult to judge from newspaper reports the extent to which the 
hecklers were representative of the mood at large, the incident serves to 
highlight nonetheless the challenge that faced Liberal critics of the conflict in 
seeking to defend their imperial credentials without alienating radical sentiment. 
The charge that it was under Tory rule that the United States was lost to the 
Empire was a regular staple of Liberal speeches during the South African War. 
Campbell-Bannerman had himself adopted this line early on in the war. In a 
speech at Manchester on 14 November 1899, the Liberal leader invited his 
audience to imagine a contest between two men, one a Liberal and one a Tory, 
in which each sought to argue that their party had done the most for the Empire. 
The contest would not go on for long, he said, because the Liberal would argue 
that ‘to add to empire was something, but to prevent a great loss to it was surely 
better, and he would put down this, that it was the Tory policy that cost the 
North American colonies.’36 The Liberal Chief Whip Herbert Gladstone made a 
similar charge at the time of the general election the following year. Speaking at 
Leeds on 18 September 1900, Gladstone declared that: 
The development of our colonies has been chiefly due to the 
Liberal party. It was the Tories who lost us the United States of 
America; it was the Tories who would have lost us Canada but 
for the action of the Liberal Party; and it was Lord Beaconsfield, 
the great Tory Imperialist, who spoke of the colonies as “those 
wretched colonies”.37  
This represented an audacious bid for the mantle of imperialism from 
Gladstone, not least given the degree to which his father’s assault upon 
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Disraelian imperialism had become an article of faith for many within the party.38 
The invited contrast between the United States and Canada is also significant: 
as will be examined, Liberals presented the development of responsible self-
government in Canada as demonstrating the effectiveness of the Liberal 
approach to Empire, as well as citing Canada as an idealised model for the 
settlement of South Africa, combining race harmony and self-governing 
federation.  
Similar efforts were made to distinguish between the imperialism of the Liberal 
Party and that of the Unionist government. In a speech at St Andrews University 
on 10 January 1900, R. B. Haldane asserted that ‘there was a great deal which 
marked Liberals off from the Jingo Imperialism which was associated with some 
prominent members of the Ministry.’39 The latter, he charged, lay behind the 
mishandled diplomacy and planning in the run up to the war, and failed to 
appreciate that the government of South Africa could only be carried out with 
respect to the prejudices and feelings of their neighbours in the region. Later 
that month Gladstone was to advance a similar case to his constituents at 
Holbeck, explicitly contrasting the new imperialism represented by 
Chamberlain’s tenure at the Colonial Office with the Liberal Imperialist platform. 
Rejecting what he characterised as the imperialism of ‘the critical events, the 
anxieties, and the wars and alarms of the past five years’, Gladstone instead 
endorsed the ‘true and sound Imperialism which had been expounded by Mr 
Asquith and Lord Rosebery’ which, he argued, ‘had extended freedom and self-
government in our colonies, and which had, without brag or bluster, devoted 
itself beneficially to the development of our vast colonies and territories’.40 The 
positioning of Liberals as representing a ‘true’ imperialism was also to be 
reiterated in the heated context of the election, with Grey arguing at Berwick-on-
Tweed that ‘the Opposition must be Imperialist, but it ought not to be an 
aggressive Imperialism’, charging the government with the latter and urging 
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instead to embrace the ‘true imperialist feeling’ of a ‘Liberal Empire’.41 In this 
way, criticisms of the government’s imperialism tended to focus on questions of 
character, competence and statesmanship, a dynamic which also served to 
further stress Liberal efforts to present their South African policies as following a 
traditional, successful pattern. 
Grey’s rhetoric at Berwick-on-Tweed closely reflected the language of his 
Glasgow speech at the time of the initial moment of crisis, and might likewise be 
seen as an effort to expound the Roseberyite position on Empire.42 Similarly, 
Gladstone’s endorsement of the imperialism of Asquith and Rosebery, although 
framed in opposition to Chamberlainite imperialism, could not help but also 
serve to highlight the Liberal Imperialist platform. Throughout this period, 
however, both the Liberal Imperialists and their opponents within the party were 
inconsistent in their efforts to frame questions of imperialism as the basis for the 
Liberal split. From the Liberal Imperialist camp, Grey adopted at different times 
a variety of rhetorical efforts to articulate his personal position in relation to 
imperialism and internal Liberal politics. In his speech to the City Liberal Club on 
20 March 1900, Grey attacked the notion of ‘pruning’ the Liberal Imperialists 
from the party specifically in relation to imperialism, asserting that the party 
must instead extend its roots into ‘the soil of imperial sentiment’.43 Addressing 
his constituents in May 1901 however, Grey was instead to insist that, while the 
Liberal Party was currently split between those who looked on the war as a war 
of aggression and those who saw it as a war of defence, ‘this difference, 
however, need not constitute a difference on Imperialism.’44 Like Asquith, Grey 
also notably did not raise the question of imperialism at the Reform Club 
meeting of the parliamentary Liberal Party, convened on 9 July 1901 to consider 
a confidence motion in the leadership of Campbell-Bannerman. Instead, Grey 
simply asserted his right to express his own views on the specifics of the South 
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African question.45 Even allowing for the careful stage-management of the 
Reform Club Meeting, it is striking nonetheless that Grey did not even notionally 
seek to characterise his difference in opinion as an imperialist one.  
In contrast to his supporters in the House of Commons, Rosebery did seek to 
frame the leadership crisis of summer 1901 as an imperial question, albeit 
indirectly. Speaking at the City Liberal Club ten days after the Reform Club 
meeting, Rosebery outlined the view that the latest divisions within the Liberal 
Party formed a part of longer-running schism within Liberalism over foreign and 
imperial questions predating the secession of the Liberal Unionists. The 
paralysis of Liberalism and the party’s defeat at the general election, he 
charged, arose from doubts over the ‘competency of the Opposition to deal with 
the imperial crisis which lay outside domestic affairs’.46 Yet even this 
assessment fell considerably short of the explicit ‘Liberal Imperialist’ programme 
he had outlined at Bath at the beginning of the war, and while Rosebery’s 
much-heralded Chesterfield speech in December 1901 did advise his Liberal 
colleagues not to dissociate themselves from the ‘new sentiment of the empire’, 
it is notable that the essence of his platform for Liberalism revolved instead 
around the specific debate over ‘methods of barbarism’ and the rejection of Irish 
home rule.47   
If Liberal Imperialists did not always seek to frame imperialism as the cause of 
Liberal divisions, neither did their opponents. Although in a speech at Forfar on 
24 January 1900 Morley declared his dislike for the word ‘empire’ and famously 
likened Liberal Imperialism to ‘Chamberlain wine with a Rosebery label’, such 
direct attacks upon the Liberal Imperialist platform should not necessarily be 
taken as typical of the pro-Boer position, either in terms of presenting 
imperialism as the cause of the breach or in the explicit rejection of the 
imperialist label.48 Indeed, many Liberal opponents of the war and its conduct 
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sought to deliberately cast themselves in the imperialist mould. Bryce, in his 
speech at Aberdeen on 4 June 1900 was to insist that: 
there is no man in the Liberal party holding any responsible 
position […] who desires to circumscribe the influence of Britain 
abroad, or who is indifferent to the maintenance of our power 
and the discharge of our Imperial duties. There is no difference 
of opinion in the Liberal Party as to the dignity of the mission 
entrusted to us, as to the energy with which we should fulfil it.49 
Critically, this insistence coming from a Liberal critic of the conflict, that the party 
was united on imperial questions, was accompanied by a direct invocation of 
Liberal Imperialist programme, with Bryce declaring that ‘if their Imperialism was 
to be truly Liberal it must, as Lord Rosebery has well said, be a “sane and 
unaggressive imperialism.”’50 Bryce would advance similar rhetoric later on in 
the conflict. Speaking again at Aberdeen on 9 January 1902, Bryce again 
sought to stress that there was no difference in opinion within the Liberal party 
‘as to what is called the sentiment of empire’, instead insisting that it ‘is as 
Imperialists that we condemn this war. We condemn it because we want to save 
South Africa for the Empire’.51 Again, we can see in Bryce’s rhetoric the effort 
both to play down imperial matters as the cause of the divisions within the party, 
and to claim the ‘imperialist’ label for the opponents of the conflict.  
Similarly, in a speech at Conway on 24 January 1900 William Jones, the Welsh 
nationalist and pro-Boer Liberal MP for Arfon, declared himself to be ‘a firm 
believer in imperialism and in empire’, asserting that ‘the principles of Welsh 
Nationalism were in harmony with the principles of enlightened imperialism’.52 
Like Bryce, Jones then was also seeking to characterise his opposition to the 
conflict as an imperialist position, challenging both Unionist efforts to own the 
language of imperialism in this period and the Roseberyite wing’s claim to 
represent imperialism within the party. Jones’ efforts to link his imperialism to 
his Welsh nationalism are also notable, commenting that ‘as a Welsh Nationalist 
he was proud of the great empire of which Wales formed a part. It was Wales 
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which had commenced the creation of the British Empire when it placed the 
Welsh Tudors on the British throne.’53 Jones’ comments in this regard are 
suggestive of a pluralistic vision of Empire, at least in relation to the nationalities 
of the United Kingdom, along the lines suggested by Ellis and Morgan. 
Certainly, they in any case serve to illustrate one way in which the imperialist 
label could be co-opted to Radical causes. 
With respect to doctrines of imperialism and their relation to Liberalism, 
Campbell-Bannerman for his part largely continued with the strategy he adopted 
in the autumn of 1899, namely questioning the multitude of meanings 
associated with imperialism while seeking to stress Liberal support for the 
Empire and minimising differences within Liberalism. In a speech at Birmingham 
on 24 November 1899, Campbell-Bannerman observed that ‘everyone 
nowadays appears to cultivate some peculiar species of his own of what is 
called Imperialism, and try to fit some qualifying adjective of his own before the 
word.’ His own brand, he declared, would be ‘commonsense Imperialism’, which 
encouraged the development of imperial sentiment and loyalty coming from ‘a 
well-governed, and if possible, a self-governed people.’54 The references to 
good government, self-government and imperial loyalty echo the language 
deployed by Campbell-Bannerman and others within the Liberal Party prior to 
the outbreak of the war. Similarly, speaking at Bath on 20 November 1901, 
Campbell-Bannerman characterised his imperialism as a readiness ‘to defend 
our imperial interests, and to add to the Empire if it is necessary’, but not in the 
form of a ‘swaggering, hectoring, blustering, and filibustering Empire’, reflecting 
a focus on the character and practice of imperialism as seen in earlier debates 
on the South African question.55 Notably, the Liberal Leader’s position at Bath 
allowed for the expansion of the Empire in order to defend imperial interests. 
Campbell-Bannerman’s definition of imperialism accommodated the annexation 
of the two republics, by this point generally accepted as irreversible by the bulk 
of the party.  
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One further aspect of Campbell-Bannerman’s rhetoric on imperialism worth 
analysing is the language he deployed in his speech at Leicester on 19 
February 1902, during the final stages of the conflict. Both for contemporaries 
and for later historians, the Leicester speech was primarily notable as an explicit 
rejection of the ‘clean slate’ proposed by Rosebery at Chesterfield, anticipating 
the shift in focus to Irish Home Rule as the battleground upon which Liberal 
divisions were to be fought. However, the speech also contained a lengthy 
exposition on the notion of imperialism, which Campbell-Bannerman 
demarcated into ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ imperialism. The former represented 
very much the vision of empire he had previously articulated, characterising it 
as the ‘desire and endeavour to defend and promote the interests of and 
strengthen in every way our Empire’. Characteristically, the Liberal leader also 
poured scorn on ‘ridiculous’ jingo behaviour and presented his own brand of 
imperialism as not ‘some novel doctrine’, but a ‘doctrine as old as the Empire 
itself’. More unusual however, was his description of domestic imperialism, 
‘which we know under the name of Caesarism’.56 Domestic imperialism, he 
charged 
magnifies the executive power, it acts upon the passions of the 
people, it conciliates them in classes and in localities by lavish 
expenditure, it occupies men’s minds with display and 
amusement, it inspires a thirst for military glory, it captures the 
electorate by false assertions and illusory promises, and then, 
having by these means a plebiscite, in the servile Parliament 
thus created it crushes opposition and extinguishes liberty.57 
This explicit characterisation of imperialism as Caesarism was not a regular 
feature of Campbell-Bannerman’s discussions of imperialism, and appears in 
this case to have been prompted by the political row surrounding the 
Government’s proposals to amend the standing orders of the House of 
Commons. Nonetheless, in his references to the passions of the people, the 
thirst for military glory and the capturing of the electorate, Campbell-Bannerman 
can be seen to at least implicitly reference the South African War and the 
politics of the general election. 
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The invocation of Caesarism thus serves to highlight a number of aspects about 
the wider rhetoric on imperialism within Liberal circles in this period. First, the 
invocation of Caesarism as a definition of imperialism would appear to support 
the assessment of Koebner and Schmidt, that the course of the South African 
War witnessed a transition in the meaning of imperialism back towards its 
earlier pejorative associations, or at the very least that the language of 
Caesarism remained a part of the Liberal rhetorical arsenal. Campbell-
Bannerman’s speech also reflects wider Liberal and Radical concerns about the 
risk of a detrimental domestic impact on Britain from an undesirable 
imperialism. As Porter notes in Critics of Empire, anti-imperialist Liberals were 
aghast at the domestic implications of imperialism.58 Not only did imperialism in 
their view enable reactionary forces in Britain to stay the demand for social 
reform, but also the despotic nature of imperial rule was actively harmful to the 
British constitution due to its corrupting influences on public sentiment and 
political character. Indeed, in Miles Taylor’s analysis the prevalence of such 
arguments serves as an explanation for the strength of the backlash against the 
‘new imperialism’ in the time of the South African question, the negative critique 
of empire revived ‘only when the resilience of democracy at home seemed in 
doubt’.59 For all the specific contexts of Campbell-Bannerman’s intervention 
therefore, his rhetoric was drawing upon significant pre-existing anxieties in 
Radical and progressive circles. Additionally, the rhetorical link drawn between 
imperialism, liberty and governing structures serves to underline the focus on 
governing structures within Liberal party debates on imperialism and, as will be 
examined later on, many Liberal critiques of the methods of the war, particularly 
in relation to the imposition of martial law at the Cape and discussions relating 
to self-government following the war’s conclusion, would deploy rhetoric on 
these lines. 
The relationship between British Liberalism and the language of imperialism 
during the period of the South African War was a complex one. Liberal speakers 
did not consistently advance comprehensive definitions of imperialism, which 
could be taken to refer respectively to the objects, methods or character of 
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British imperial policy. Neither was the question of differences over imperialism 
consistently linked to the differences that existed over the South African War 
either between the Liberal opposition and the Unionist government, or within the 
Liberal Party. Nonetheless, there are a number of insights which can be drawn 
from the characterisations of imperialism found within Liberal speeches. First, in 
spite of their name the Liberal Imperialist faction did not consistently emphasise 
imperialism as the basis for their breach with the radical wing of the party and, 
from 1901, the leadership of Campbell-Bannerman. As will be examined later in 
this chapter, it was primarily on specific questions of South African policy that 
the Liberal Imperialists sought to demarcate their position.60 Second, while the 
Radical critique of the war advanced anti-imperialist arguments in the general 
sense, and certainly figures such as Morley continued to express their 
unhappiness with the language of empire, many Liberal critics of the war 
nonetheless sought to frame their positions as imperialist. This relates to a third 
observation that might be made, namely that in articulating visions of 
imperialism, Liberal speakers often presented a contrast between their own 
version of imperialism and an undesirable ‘other’ imperialism, which might be 
variously labelled Tory, jingoistic or Caesarist imperialism, which stood to harm 
the Empire. In this respect, many of the elements of Liberal rhetoric on 
imperialism during the course of the war reflected a pre-war focus, suggesting a 
degree of continuity despite the outbreak of hostilities.  
As with the crisis of 1899, explicit Liberal debates on ideas of imperialism 
represented only the most visible element of Liberal rhetoric on the Empire. As 
will be examined, the issues raised in relation to the course of the war in South 
Africa provided Liberals with further opportunities to frame imperial policies both 
implicitly and explicitly in Liberal terms. The nature of the debates over the 
relationship between Liberal politics and the Empire should as such be seen as 
the wider context within which the specific controversies of the South African 
war were articulated, and it is these controversies which this thesis now 
examines. 
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Annexation and its Consequences 
The early phases of the South African War had not gone at all well for the 
British: the swift Boer offensive into Natal and the Cape Colony took many by 
surprise, and the military defeats of ‘Black Week’ in December 1899 proved a 
serious shock to both British policy makers and the general public. By the spring 
of 1900 however, the tide had been reversed, and British forces were now 
advancing steadily into Boer territory. The Orange Free State (OFS) capital of 
Bloemfontein was captured in March, prompting the government of President 
Marthinus Steyn to hastily relocate to Kroonstad, which itself fell in early May. 
On 24 May, less than a fortnight later, Lord Roberts proclaimed the annexation 
of the OFS, which was now to become the Orange River Colony. Pretoria fell on 
5 June, and likewise the SAR was annexed as the Transvaal Colony soon 
after.61 As events would soon demonstrate, the annexations would prove to be 
far from the end of the conflict, which swiftly entered a protracted guerrilla 
phase. In terms of the political situation however, the annexations were highly 
significant. 
The way in which Liberals discussed the annexations of the SAR and the OFS 
reveals much about the party’s response to the rapidly shifting aims of the war. 
Crucially, to its critics the prospect of annexation was condemned not just as a 
breach of Liberal principles but as a dangerous development for the Empire. 
Once annexation had been accomplished, and was presented by the Unionists 
as a key point of contention at the general election, the Liberal leadership swiftly 
articulated a new position, recognising the incorporation of the Boer republics 
as irreversible. However, this position was not merely defended as the 
recognition of ‘an accomplished fact’. Instead, the rhetoric of necessity was 
deployed and combined with pre-war rhetoric on race disharmony and imperial 
governance to advance a new critique of government policy, insisting on the 
swift implementation of a settlement along self-governing lines. 
The question of annexation was addressed head-on by Campbell-Bannerman 
early on in the course of the war, in his speech at Birmingham of 24 November 
1899. Noting with approval the earlier declaration by the Prime Minister that 
Britain sought neither gold fields nor territory from the war, the Liberal leader 
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cautioned that there were nonetheless those in the country and in the Press 
‘who would repudiate this disclaimer’ and were arguing for the complete 
absorption of the republics into the Empire.62 Questioning whether the 
annexationists had really considered what their plans amounted to, Campbell-
Bannerman declared that 
We are to conquer the two States, and then we are to annex 
their territory without much ado. But they are each of them – 
each in its own fashion – in the enjoyment of representative 
government. […] But when these two Republics are 
vanquished, does anyone think that their population will be in 
such a frame of mind that it will be possible to administer them 
by free representative institutions? No, sir; they will have to be 
governed directly, autocratically, without free institutions at all in 
the manner of our Crown colonies.63 
This was essentially an extension of the argument along the lines of that 
advocated by Morley and Harcourt prior to the conflict, namely that Britain 
would find itself in the undesirable position of administering a hostile settler 
population which could not be safely granted self-government.64 Furthermore, in 
bringing about an ‘autocratic’ system of government in the Transvaal, Britain 
would be placing itself directly at odds with its stated policy aims prior to the 
outbreak of war. ‘Look at the position we should then find ourselves in’, 
Campbell-Bannerman continued, 
before the astonished eyes of the world. Having gone to war as 
the champions of constitutional government in order to procure 
the franchise for the outlanders, and ending it by refusing that 
franchise ourselves and by taking it away from the natives.65 
It was disingenuous of Campbell-Bannerman to present the franchise as the 
cause for war, given that even prior to the Boer ultimatum the main point of 
contention in Anglo-Boer relations had already switched to questions over 
suzerainty and British paramountcy. The characterisation of Boers as ‘the 
natives’ is also unusual, serving to reinforce the idea that the Boers had a right 
to Transvaal territory. Nonetheless, it can be seen that Campbell-Bannerman 
sought to stress the importance of constitutional government and the franchise 
                                            
62 Aberdeen Journal 25 Nov. 1899 
63 Ibid. 
64 See previous chapter. 
65 Aberdeen Journal 25 Nov. 1899. 
-179- 
 
in speaking of a post-conflict settlement, with the result that annexation was 
presented in opposition terms to the Liberal ideal of a self-governing settler 
empire. 
Campbell-Bannerman’s focus on the consequences of annexation for the future 
government of South Africa was to be echoed by other Liberal speakers in the 
new year as the prospect of annexation grew ever more likely. In his speech at 
Conway, Jones attacked the ‘Jingoes’ who declared that ‘the British flag must 
fly over Pretoria and Bloemfontein’. Such an outcome, he charged, meant a 
stationing of a garrison in the two Republics, followed by martial law, noting to 
laughter that ’they do not call it martial law, but a firm administration – a sugar-
coated pill, the same as the garrison in Ireland.’ 66 Again, annexation is attacked 
not primarily in terms of acquisition of the territory, but in terms of its 
consequences for the government of South Africa. The focus on martial law in 
particular can be seen as tapping into Liberal anxieties over the subversion of 
constitutional rule, while once again the comparison of South Africa with Ireland 
serves as an example of imperial failure and race ascendancy. On the point of 
race in particular, Jones likewise contrasted the supposed aims of the war with 
the consequences of annexation, asking his audience ‘Who would come under 
this martial law? The Dutch in Cape Colony or the British? The Dutch of 
necessity. Where, then, would be the equal rights for which they were 
contending?’67 Invoking the Dutch of the Cape Colony in this warning served to 
further highlight the risk annexation posed to the constitutional rule of the 
existing Empire, and in this sense Jones’ comments might be considered an 
early precursor of the controversy which was to subsequently develop over the 
practices of martial law in the Cape later on in the war. 
More surprisingly, a similar line of argument was also advanced by Sir Edward 
Grey, despite his general support for the government’s war policies since the 
outbreak of hostilities. Unlike Campbell-Bannerman and Jones Grey did not 
condemn a policy of annexation outright, but nonetheless in his speech on 20 
March 1900 he cautioned about its consequences for the Empire. Stating that a 
friend had remarked to him that ‘any fool can annex’, Grey warned his audience 
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that ‘annexation does not take you a step further out of difficulty’.68 Continuing, 
Grey suggested that annexation would invariably require crown colony rule, 
which was certain to alienate the Empire’s new Boer subjects.69 In this sense, 
Grey was returning to his earlier theme of the need to take into account settler 
opinion when formulating South African policy, however with the crucial 
difference that in this case it was the position of the Boers under British rule that 
risked causing concern. This critique of annexation does however need to be 
seen in light of other comments by Grey on Boer independence during the early 
stages of the war. In a speech at Peebles on 4 November 1899, Grey asserted 
that Boer independence ‘had come to mean race ascendancy and 
misgovernment’, a statement which, while not going so far as to advocate 
annexation, is certainly suggestive of a hostility to any post-conflict restoration 
of independence. 70 Nonetheless, Grey’s speech at the City Liberal Club is at 
least illustrative of the unease and apprehension within Liberal circles at the 
prospect of imposing imperial rule by force over a white settler population. 
Contrasts between annexation and an idealised vision of Empire were also 
deployed by Liberal speakers opposed to the Republics’ incorporation into the 
Empire. At an anti-war meeting in Bangor on 11 April 1900, Lloyd George 
attacked the suggestion of annexation by branding it ‘a fatal policy to the 
Empire’, declaring that, 
the last annexation of an independent State after a war was that 
of Poland. Russia, just emerging from barbarism in the 18th 
century, had done this. No; Britain, now in the 20th century, 
going to emulate barbarous Russia in the 18th century? [sic]71 
In light of the later rallying cry of ‘methods of barbarism’, the comparison to 
‘barbarous Russia’ by Lloyd George early on in the course of the war is a 
fascinating one, and serves to highlight the point that barbarism was not simply 
a humanitarian charge, but could also be applied to the methods of imperial 
government.   
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This moralistic critique, essentially asserting that Britain had abandoned the 
modern standards of civilisation in mimicry of the savagery of earlier centuries, 
was to be echoed in the Radical assault upon annexation during the debate on 
the motion of censure against Chamberlain on 25 July. By this point the OFS 
had already been annexed some weeks previously, although the debate 
represented the first opportunity to substantially address the issue in the House 
of Commons. Opening for the Radicals, Sir Wilfred Lawson, the MP for 
Cockermouth, condemned the annexation for how it reflected on Britain’s 
national character and world image. ‘We have lost our character’, he declared. 
‘Never again can England pose as the friend of freedom, the protector of the 
weak, the guardian of the oppressed.’72 In similar fashion, Lloyd George 
attacked the consequences for British Empire’s image of the shifting aims of the 
war which the annexation represented, accusing the government of having 
entered into these two Republics for philanthropic purposes, 
and remained to commit burglary. In changing the purpose of 
the war you have made a bad change. That is the impression 
you are creating abroad. Our critics say you are not going to 
war for equal rights and to establish fair play, but to get hold of 
the goldfields; and you have justified that criticism of our 
enemies by that change.73 
In this respect, the Radical critique of annexation was in many ways similar to 
the reaction against the Jameson Raid, in the sense that the actions of the 
government were seen to be causing both apparent and actual damage to the 
nation’s character, and betraying the principles which had previously been held 
to govern imperial policy. 
Along similar lines, both Lawson and Lloyd George echoed Campbell-
Bannerman’s earlier rhetoric in seeking to present annexation as contrary to the 
stated ideals over which Britain was supposed to have gone to war. Lawson 
sought to undermine the claim that the war was primarily a war for freedom and 
against Transvaal misgovernment, attacking ‘the crushing out of two 
independent Republics’ and noting that ‘one was the Orange Free State; but 
you have blotted out the “free” now’. That it had been the OFS which was 
annexed first provided particular ammunition to the Radicals, as it allowed them 
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to further contrast the stated aims of the war with its consequences. Describing 
the government of the republic as ‘the very best as regarded freedom and 
comfort the world had ever seen’, Lawson charged that Britain ‘was fighting at 
this moment to prevent the government being carried on’.74 Lloyd George 
similarly sought to challenge the idea that annexation would bring about self-
government and white racial equality in a reconstructed South Africa. ‘We 
started the war’, he stated, ‘to obtain the franchise for everybody, and we end it 
with franchise for nobody. It is true that you establish a kind of equality between 
the white races there, but it is not equal rights, but equal wrongs.’75 In this 
fashion, the Liberal pro-Boers were able to deploy the rhetoric used in support 
of a confrontational policy prior to the outbreak of war in order to challenge the 
policy of annexation. 
By the time of the Radical protest against annexation in the House of Commons 
however, the public position of the Liberal leadership had already shifted in 
favour of the two Republics’ incorporation. In a speech at Glasgow on 7 June, 
Campbell-Bannerman criticised the government for having acted so quickly in 
annexing the OFS, before remarking that the act ‘having been done, we have, 
of course, to treat that as an accomplished fact’.76 Campbell-Bannerman’s 
position might be seen as yet another attempt to steer a middle course on a 
South African question between the pro-Boers and the Liberal Imperialists, and 
indeed his positioning in this regard were criticised by the Daily News, which 
following his abstention on the annexation debate declared that ‘what we cannot 
understand, and what we fear the country will fail to understand, is the 
indeterminate position […] which finds two lobbies not enough, and which halts 
between two opinions’.77 However, whatever the tactical consideration behind 
the ‘accomplished fact’ line, this was not the limit of Campbell-Bannerman’s 
remarks on annexation in his Glasgow speech.  
Instead, the Liberal leader went on to advance a case for why annexation was a 
desirable option, or at the very least the least undesirable outcome of the war. 
Referring to the opponents of annexation, Campbell-Bannerman remarked that 
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he sympathised with those who desired that ‘some kind of national 
independence should be restored to the Boers’.78 Again, the Liberal leader’s 
choice of phrasing here raises interesting questions about notions of Boer 
nationhood. As has already been seen, the distinctive cultural and historical 
attributes of the Boers were often conflated with ideas of the wider South 
African Dutch-speaking community in British Liberal rhetoric, including in the 
language of Campbell-Bannerman. The national independence referred to by 
Campbell-Bannerman thus appears to refer more to ideas of statehood. Yet 
even then, this was a reflection of cultural and racial attitudes to Boer 
nationhood, British rhetoric on Boer independence having traditionally 
emphasised their own structures of governance, as distinct from British imperial 
methods, and their capacity as a population for genuine self-government. 
Invocation of Boer nationhood, in this context at least, thus again drew upon the 
wider conceptualisations of race and self-governance that characterised Liberal 
rhetoric on South Africa. 
In any case, in his Glasgow speech Campbell-Bannerman however went on to 
question the value of a form of independence where:  
the State is not to have any relations whatever with foreign 
Powers, the State is to be prohibited from acquiring or using 
arms and to be subjugated to constant supervision and 
interference which that prohibition would entail. The franchise to 
be used is to be dictated from outside. […] The language to be 
spoken in their Parliament is to be prescribed from the outside, 
the languages to be taught in their schools are to be prescribed. 
Why, what is left of the reality and dignity of independence?79 
In many ways, this section echoed Morley’s speeches in the autumn of 1899; 
but whereas then Morley was seeking to persuade his audience of the 
intolerable nature of British intervention in the Transvaal’s internal affairs, at 
Glasgow Campbell-Bannerman deployed these arguments in support of 
annexation. Significantly, the arguments of the Liberal Imperialists at the time of 
the Colonial Office vote followed along parallel lines. In a shift from his earlier 
position, Grey used his speech opposing the motion of censure against 
Chamberlain to state his support for annexation, arguing that ‘If you do not have 
annexation […] you will have again Conventions, and you will have again that 
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weary treadmill of which we have had experience, and the whole country kept in 
a state of unrest’.80 Grey’s position was framed in the language of necessity and 
security, rather than Campbell-Bannerman’s appeals to considerations of the 
Boer position. Ultimately however, the underlying position was the same: a 
return to imperial management by convention, presumably along the lines of the 
1881 convention, was less desirable than formal annexation.  
The annexation of OFS was soon followed by that of the SAR, and the resulting 
general election was framed in part by the Unionists as a ratification of the 
annexations. Chamberlain in particular sought to cast the contest as revolving 
around the question of whether British gains in the war were to be secured or 
discarded.81 In response, Liberals again sought to stress that they accepted the 
moves as accomplished fact. Gladstone attacked the notion that disagreements 
over annexation justified the dissolution of Parliament, given that ‘there is no 
wide divergence of opinion in the Liberal Party on the question of annexation as 
a result of the war, as an already accomplished fact’.82 Indeed, Liberal speakers 
sought to place particular stress on the unity of the party on this issue. For 
example, Hugh Hoare, the Liberal candidate and former MP for Chesterton, 
declared in an address at Mepal on 24 September that ‘There is only one 
settlement possible, and that course is recommended by Sir William Harcourt, 
Lord Rosebery, Mr Morley, Mr Asquith, and other leaders of the Liberal party, 
and it is annexation.’83 Hoare was somewhat disingenuous in his suggestion 
that Morley actively advocated annexation: in his election address, the former 
Chief Secretary for Ireland remarked that if he might be said to approve of 
annexation, it was in ‘much the same cheerful sense in which a man who had 
lost his money in a mismanaged company approved of liquidation and had no 
fault to find with winding-up’.84 Such criticism aside however, a key concern for 
many Liberals at the election was to rebut the charge that the party as a whole 
supported independence. 
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Again however, Liberal support for annexation was also explicitly linked to idea 
of self-government. Speaking at Ladybank on 15 September, Asquith asked his 
audience to consider the alternatives to annexation, given that whatever the 
settlement Britain would need to ensure its position in South Africa could not be 
threatened again. ‘Any measures actually effected for this purpose’, he argued, 
‘would require at least as much interference with the sovereignty or 
independence in any real sense of these two Republics, as their incorporation 
into the British Empire’. Continuing, he warned against ‘a little grant of protected 
or vassaled States, with their privileges and obligations, defined or sought to be 
defined, by written conventions, possessing neither the reality of independence, 
nor the full status of partners in the empire’.85 In this manner, annexation was 
portrayed as the option best able to deliver self-government following the 
conclusion of the conflict. This line of argument was echoed in the Press 
reaction to the speech, the editorial of the Sheffield and Rotherham 
Independent praising Asquith’s assessment and stating that ‘only by annexation 
can the central object of wise, equal, free government be obtained’.86  
Asquith was to return to this theme during his re-election campaign in East Fife, 
declaring in a speech to his constituents that: 
The annexation of the two Republics was the first step towards 
a free, contented, and loyal South Africa, and it was only as a 
first step in laying the foundation of the edifice which was 
ultimately to be built up that the Liberal Party acquiesced in 
building up the structure which was to be raised upon that 
foundation.87 
In a speech at Stirling on 26 September, Campbell-Bannerman likewise 
stressed that ‘annexation is not the end. It is the beginning. Annexation is not 
settlement: it is the thing on which settlement is to be built.’88 The debates 
surrounding the question of self-government and the eventual settlement of the 
conflict are considered later in this chapter. Nonetheless, for our present 
purposes it is important to note the ways in which Campbell-Bannerman and 
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Asquith sought to reframe the question of annexation so as to detach the action 
from a Unionist narrative which presented the new colonies as the hard-won 
results of British sacrifice, instead contextualising the annexations within a new 
narrative focused on the incorporation of the new colonies within the self-
governing British Empire. 
The link between annexation and eventual self-government was reinforced by 
an emphasis on the prior misgovernment of the SAR, drawing upon similar 
rhetoric used during the initial crisis of 1899. In its editorial in response to the 
annexation of the Transvaal, the Daily News asserted that the action would 
‘give to its inhabitants that true independence, that real enjoyment of the 
blessings of self-government, which they have so long been denied’, posing the 
question: ‘is the independence enjoyed by the communities under the British 
flag less or greater than that which has been experienced under a Republic 
which has only been a Republic in name?’.89 This was a line of argument readily 
adopted by Liberal speakers in their autumn campaigns. In his Ladybank 
speech, Asquith stated that he regretted  
the necessity of the extinction of small States with a history and 
a patriotism of their own and the enlargement of the areas of 
the burdening of British responsibilities. But no lover of freedom 
need shed any tears for the disappearance of the South African 
Republic – an unhappy specimen of one of the worst kinds of 
political imposture, a caricature or mockery of liberty under a 
democratic form.90  
Such attacks made use of earlier narratives of Boer misgovernment to frame 
the anticipated grant of self-government following annexation as a new 
development, rather than as a restoration of existing rights, as well as providing 
justification for the act of annexation itself. Arguments along such lines built 
upon earlier narratives of the SAR’s conditional independence, with the Kruger 
regime’s record of misgovernment invalidating any right to free self-
government.91 It is also possible to draw parallels in this respect with the wider 
justification of imperial rule in mid-century liberal thought that stressed the 
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acceptability of removing the freedom of a people judged incapable of 
exercising it.92  
The question of annexation within Liberal politics was then one which evolved 
significantly over the course of the first year of the war, moving from general 
opposition to the incorporation of the two republics into the Empire to a position 
in which the bulk of the party accepted and indeed sought to justify the move. 
Critically however, while the narrative of ‘accomplished fact’ did indeed form 
part of the basis by which Liberal speakers sought to defend the annexations, 
the action was also justified by Liberal speakers from across the party as a 
move in the interests of the governance of South Africa, precisely the basis on 
which the prospect of annexation had been previously opposed. The prospect 
of a return to an intensified form of suzerainty was in this manner now 
presented as denying self-government to the Boers, who instead would enjoy 
free self-government within the British imperial system as a result of the 
settlement of the war. This imperial-constitutional rhetorical framework thus 
served as a means by which Liberals could defend a resulting post-war order in 
South Africa. As will be seen however, the focus placed by this argument on the 
Boer as citizens and beneficiaries of a reconstituted British rule in South Africa 
would present other complications in relation to British war tactics and debates 
over self-government in the new colonies.  
Ultimately, after 1900 the issue of annexation increasingly became eclipsed by 
other questions over South Africa. Some speakers on the Radical wing of the 
Liberal Party continued to attack the acts of annexation as unwise or immoral: 
at a demonstration in Exeter in May 1901, James Bryce for example 
condemned the deprivation of self-government and the annexation of the 
‘goldfields’ of the Transvaal.93 Critically however, such interventions rarely 
called for a restoration of the Republics’ independence. Debate instead shifted 
to the conduct of the war, and the nature of the settlement which was to follow. 
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Farm Burning, the Concentration Camps and Martial Law 
Campbell-Bannerman’s charge, made in a speech at the Holborn Restaurant in 
London on 14 June 1901, that war in South Africa was being waged with 
‘methods of barbarism’, triggered one of the most prominent controversies of 
the war. It was in many senses one of the first substantial points of South 
African policy which the Liberal Party leadership had directly opposed the 
government on, and in terms of the Liberal Party’s internal struggles the claim 
triggered an open breach with the Liberal Imperialists, dubbed the ‘war to the 
knife and fork’. Although certainly the reaction against farm burning and the 
concentration camp system was not just a political campaign but formed part of 
a wider humanitarian movement, the Liberal Party’s rhetorical response to the 
British army’s tactics was not simply concerned with the morality of such tactics, 
but with their viability as imperial policy. In addition, while Campbell-
Bannerman’s speech might have helped bring the debates over British tactics to 
political prominence, this intervention had not taken placed in a vacuum, but 
against a backdrop in which Liberal speakers from the Radical wing of the party 
had already been campaigning on this issue for some time. Neither did the 
Holborn Restaurant speech definitively establish the rhetorical framework within 
which the question would be discussed. Instead, in the months following 
‘methods of barbarism’ the Liberal critique of the government also increasingly 
incorporated attacks on the imposition of martial law at the Cape Colony. This 
section therefore examines the role played by the tactics of farm burning, the 
humanitarian crisis of the concentration camps, and the imposition of martial 
law at the Cape within British Liberal politics, suggesting that all three formed 
part of an overarching Liberal critique of the conduct of the war as imperial 
mismanagement. 
Although the policy of farm burning had been initiated relatively early in the war, 
it was primarily during the later guerrilla phase of the conflict that figures on the 
Radical wing of the Liberal Party began to raise objections to the policy in late 
1900. In a letter printed in The Times on 17 November, Morley detailed an 
account provided to him by a correspondent at the Cape, describing the story of 
how the women of a Boer family had suffered the destruction of their farm and 
were now due to be sent to a concentration camp. Significantly, Morley added 
his own comments to the end of the account, remarking that ‘I will not give 
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offense to-day by intruding any unfashionable reflections about humanity, pity, 
and the like.’ Instead, he urged, ‘consider the unwisdom of these fireraisings 
and all their attendant abominations. Consider the resentment that is being 
accumulated in the mind of every Dutch-speaking man and woman in South 
Africa.’94 This then represented a critique of farm burnings not in relation to the 
humanitarian consequences of the policy, although Morley makes his views 
here very clearly known, but in terms of its consequences for the Dutch-
speaking population’s attitude to Britain throughout South Africa. A similar 
stance was adopted by the Liberal MP for Flintshire, Samuel Smith, who raised 
the issue in Parliament during a debate on War Office supply on 11 December. 
Comparing British tactics in South Africa with those used in the American War 
of Independence, Smith charged that through farm burning they ‘were storing 
up for ourselves a heritage of hatred which would last for generations.’95 In this 
focus on a heritage of hatred and concern for Dutch sentiment, Morley and 
Smith were continuing many of the anti-war narratives expressed prior to the 
outbreak of the conflict, and this was to set the pattern which would be 
increasingly followed by radical speakers in the first half of 1901. 
Campbell-Bannerman’s assault on the government’s war tactics at the National 
Reform Union dinner at the Holborn Restaurant was comprised of two main 
elements. The first of these was undoubtedly a moral and humanitarian critique. 
The policy being urged on the government by the Unionist Press, he charged, 
was that: 
now we have got the men that we have been fighting against 
down, we should punish them as severely as possible. It is that 
we should devastate their country, that we should burn their 
homes, that we should break up their instruments of agriculture 
and destroy the machinery by which food was produced. It was 
that we should sweep, as the Spaniards did in Cuba - and how 
we denounced the Spaniards! – sweep the women and children 
into camps in which they are destitute of all the decencies and 
comforts and of many of the necessaries of life, and in some of 
which the death-rate rose so high as 430 in the thousand.96 
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Although he was careful to state that he did think this was an outcome 
deliberately sought by the government, he nonetheless attacked the fact that 
this was being done in the name ‘of this most humane and Christian nation.’ 
Taking advantage of the government’s difficulties with a situation in which a 
state of war existed in South Africa well after they had presented the war as 
practically finished, Campbell-Bannerman mockingly asked, ‘When is a war not 
a war? When it is carried on by methods of barbarism in South Africa.’97 Quite 
apart from the shocking details of the policies’ impacts themselves, the contrast 
the Liberal leader drew between the idea of a ‘humane and Christian nation’ 
and the policy of barbarism struck at the heart of the notion of a moral imperial 
policy. Similarly, the equation of British tactics with that of the Spanish Empire in 
the Cuban War of Independence represented an assault on the notion of the 
exceptionalism of British imperialism, an idea firmly grounded in hierarchical 
ideas of world civilisation and supposedly demonstrated by the exceptional 
humanity of British policy.98 There is no reason to suppose that this outrage at 
the results of British imperial policy was not genuine: both Spender and Wilson 
consider Campbell-Bannerman to have been genuinely moved by Hobhouse’s 
account of the conditions in the camps.99 Critically however, in converting 
personal indignation into political argument, Campbell-Bannerman did not just 
rely on a moralistic appeal. 
Instead, the Liberal leader declared that ‘this is not a question of humanity 
alone’, but that ‘it has come to be condemned on grounds of policy’. The 
policies of farm burning and the concentration camp system, Campbell-
Bannerman argued, would only build up further problems for imperial 
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government in South Africa: ‘this insane policy of subjugation and obliteration’, 
he charged, ‘will perpetuate the very evils and danger from which the war was 
designed to deliver us – if, indeed, there was any design in it.’100 This 
represented a clear revival of his rhetorical strategy prior to the outbreak of the 
war, in which Campbell-Bannerman had warned of the dangers posed by a 
conflict to white racial harmony and the future of South Africa.101 The Republics 
had become British colonies, he reminded his audience, and British colonies 
were only held without difficulty ‘because we treat them as equals, because we 
leave their identity untouched, because we don’t interfere with their customs 
and laws, because we respect their perfect legal independence’. When the true 
scope of suffering was known after the conflict, he declared, the result would 
not only be the racial and political enmity of those who as a result of the 
annexation ‘are our fellow-citizens already’, but also a ‘personal hatred, an 
ineradicable sense of personal wrong’. Even if, he conceded, there was a 
military advantage to be gained from farm burning, it was one which came at 
the price of a ‘heavy, overwhelming, irredeemable mortgage on the peace and 
contentment of South Africa.’ Given this, he declared himself to be confident 
that when they realised these facts, his fellow countrymen and countrywomen 
would instantly demand the cessation of these activities.102 This second part of 
his speech thus squarely placed his critique of British tactics within the context 
of its material consequences for the Empire, rather than relying on what might 
be considered the emotional appeal to humanity and morality. 
Despite the controversy of the speech, initial Press reaction was initially 
relatively muted. Although the editorial of The Times the following day attacked 
the suggestion of ‘methods of barbarism’ on the grounds that there was little 
proof to support such accusations, the bulk of its critique was focused along 
existing Unionist lines, namely that the war was just and that Liberal criticisms 
risked encouraging the Boers and delaying the end of the war.103 Subsequently 
however, the speech swiftly gained notoriety, with Campbell-Bannerman’s 
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political opponents accusing him of having attacked the British Army as 
barbaric, an interpretation of the phrase ‘methods of barbarism’ which the 
Liberal Imperialists would also seize upon in their rebuttals of the leadership’s 
platform.104 Amidst the tumult the speech created, less attention seems to have 
been focused on the argument that the ‘methods of barbarism’ were unwise 
imperial policy. No doubt this was in part due to the sensationalism of the 
charge of barbarism, both as originally intended and as it was construed by the 
Liberal leader’s opponents, but this process may also have been exacerbated 
by the way in which the speech was reported: The Times, for example, 
significantly conflated the latter portion of Campbell-Bannerman’s speech, 
serving to further impede the Liberal leader’s attempts to frame his critique of 
the war’s conduct within an imperial-governmental framework as well as a 
moralistic one.105  
Nonetheless, in the weeks and months that followed Campbell-Bannerman and 
his supporters within the Liberal Party continued to critique the government’s 
war methods as bad imperial policy due to the impact the measures were 
having on the attitude of the Dutch population. Opening an adjournment debate 
in the House of Commons the Monday after the Holborn Restaurant speech, 
Lloyd George focused primarily on the specific details of the humanitarian 
situation in the camps, and indeed was prevented by the ruling of the Speaker 
from discussing the degree to which the policy risked extending the war. 
Nonetheless, he concluded his speech by warning that ‘when children are being 
treated in this way and dying, we are simply ranging the deepest passions of 
the human heart against British rule in Africa.’ Continuing, he cautioned that ‘it 
will always be remembered that this is the way British rule started there, and 
that this is the method by which it was brought about’, suggesting as well that 
the legacy such actions might be uprisings in the future.106 Similarly, at the 
Reform Club meeting called in July to discuss his leadership, Campbell-
Bannerman urged his colleagues to 
avoid, as a matter of policy, if from no higher motive, any action 
in military operations which is likely to leave behind it a sense of 
unnecessary harshness, and to give fresh substance and point 
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to those racial and political animosities which we know to exist 
today.107 
Given the political calculations behind the Reform Club meeting, it is 
unsurprising that the direct charge of ‘methods of barbarism’ was not repeated 
here, although Campbell-Bannerman had repeated the charge a week 
previously in a speech at Southampton.108 Again, the persistence of this 
narrative of concern for Dutch sentiment in South Africa can be seen in 
evidence, with Lloyd George and Campbell-Bannerman effectively framing their 
critique of British tactics on the grounds of imperial mismanagement. 
While the tactics of farm burning and the concentration camps formed the 
mainstay of this race-alienation argument, they were by no means the only 
‘methods of barbarism’ to form part of this critique. The practice of compelling 
the neighbours and family members of captured Boer fighters to witness their 
executions was similarly condemned by Liberal critics of the war. In a speech at 
Arbroath on 31 October 1901, Morley was to attack the policy, stating that he 
‘did not believe such a proceeding as that has been adopted by any civilised 
community or Government for many a long generation.’109 Mockingly referring to 
Unionist newspapers which boasted that the effect of the action was that the 
restive Boer population would never forget the fate of those who defied the 
British, Morley declared that 
No, it never will be forgotten. The things that were done in the 
new Ireland which you are building up in South Africa are more 
like what was done in the old Ireland on the repression of the 
rebellion of 1798.110 
Again, with the comparison to Ireland we can see Morley continuing with one of 
his earlier rhetorical strategies, invoking the unhappy precedent of British rule in 
Ireland as an example of imperial mismanagement producing long-lasting and 
insurmountable resentment from the subjugated population. Continuing, Morley 
went on to stress the race element in this dynamic, warning of ‘civil war, with its 
ingredient of race feud, race jealousy, race animosity’ and charging that ‘all this 
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has aggravated the essential mischief of the situation and that for days that will 
pass beyond the time of any of us here these transactions will not be 
forgotten.’111 In this manner, the anti-war arguments deployed prior to the 
conflict which warned of a generic risk posed by war to Anglo-Dutch relations in 
South Africa were reiterated as specific criticisms of the methods by which the 
war was being waged, whether in relation to farm burning, the concentration 
camps or to the system of executions. 
The policy of farm burning in particular was also slammed for the material 
damage it was inflicting upon the two annexed republics. In his letter to The 
Times in late 1900, Morley cited his South African correspondent as writing to 
him that ‘you [Morley] compared annexation to compulsory liquidation in 
bankruptcy, but what liquidator ever destroyed the assets in the estate by way 
of settlement?’112 Similarly, rising in reply to Campbell-Bannerman’s speech at 
the Holborn Restaurant, Harcourt drew upon the facts of annexation to attack 
the policy of farm burning, declaring that ‘we are exhorted every morning in 
some telegram to rejoice that we are slowly devastating a country which is our 
own, that we are killing and wounding a people whom we have recently made 
our subjects.’113 The moral critique of the policy was in this manner again 
framed in the context of the changing constitutional situation in South Africa.  
In a speech at Stirling on 25 October 1901, Campbell-Bannerman sought to 
combine this element with his warning of the obstacle being created for South 
Africa’s future governance. Attacking Unionist optimism that the new colonies 
could be easily pacified following the end of the war, the Liberal leader insisted 
that South Africa could only be ruled through self-governing institutions. ‘And 
where’, he asked,  
are the elements to be found for a settlement in the condition to 
which you have reduced South Africa? The whole country in the 
two belligerent States, outside the mining towns, is a howling 
wilderness; the farms are burned; the country is wasted; the 
flocks and herds are either butchered or driven off; the mills are 
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destroyed; the furniture and implements of agriculture are 
smashed.114 
Following the war, he continued, ‘the 50,000 prisoners of war will of course 
return to what by some sort of irony we may perhaps be permitted to call their 
homes; these are the materials for your new self-government.’115 The 
consequences of the government’s methods were presented therefore not just 
as ‘barbarous’, but as further undermining the practical basis for the 
incorporation of the annexed republics into the self-governing empire of 
settlement.  
Liberal speakers also sought to undermine the legitimacy of the government’s 
tactics by presenting them as lying beyond the pale of Britain’s imperial 
traditions. Echoing the comparisons made between British policy and the 
actions of the Spanish Empire in Cuba, at Arbroath Morley attacked the 
government for citing precedent for the methods used in South Africa, 
characterising the precedent as being ‘Russia in Poland or the Caucasus, 
Austria in Bosnia, and so on. Was there ever such a sinister parallel drawn in 
the history of this country?’116 In making this charge, Morley presented the 
government’s methods as more akin to continental despotism than to British 
imperialism. A similar tactic was deployed by Campbell-Bannerman in his 
Stirling speech a few days earlier, in which he mockingly referred to the 
government’s policy as being one of ‘up-to-date twentieth century methods’, 
prompting laughter from his audience. ‘Oh, but they are the twentieth century 
methods’, he continued, ‘because we are told on the highest authority that the 
old Victorian methods […] are out of date altogether, either in politics or in 
morals.’117 In this fashion, we can again see the Liberal leader seeking to cast 
the tactics in South Africa as a departure from the traditional practices of 
Victorian imperialism, as well as implicitly seeking to cast his own position along 
traditional lines. 
As noted above, the charge of ‘methods of barbarism’ served to crystallise the 
divisions between Campbell-Bannerman and the Liberal Imperialists, most 
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notably placing Asquith in direct opposition to him and triggering the ‘war to the 
knife and fork’. Indeed, it was over the question of British tactics that Asquith 
most clearly signalled his heterodoxy, stressing that he rejected the view of 
those who ‘think that to this initial crime [of the war] we have added, day by day, 
month by month, year by year, countless further crimes against the code of 
humanity’, declaring instead that ‘there is no ground for any general charge of 
inhumanity against either side.’ Continuing, he specifically rejected any charge 
of cruelty against Milner, asserting that ‘there is no man throughout the length 
and breadth of the British Empire more penetrated with the spirit of humanity 
than Lord Milner.’ 118 This response to Campbell-Bannerman’s rhetoric at the 
Holborn Restaurant was to become something of a standard formula for the 
Liberal Imperialist response: conflating the critique of war methods with wider 
opposition to the justice of the war, denying a charge of general inhumanity on 
the part of Britain, and defending in particular the conduct of Milner. In this 
respect, Rosebery was as ever more outspoken: in his speech at the City 
Liberal Club, the former Prime Minister characterised the party as being split 
between those who thought the war just, and those ‘who think it utterly wrong 
and carried on by methods of barbarism’, conflating the criticism of war methods 
with the pro-Boer position out outright opposition.119 
Liberal Imperialist speakers also indirectly echoed some of the direct attacks 
upon Campbell-Bannerman by drawing a link between the charge of barbarism 
and the character of British soldiers. At Chesterfield, Rosebery condemned 
what he described as the language of ‘papers abroad’, stating that he felt it very 
strongly when he heard the British army ‘spoken of as mercenaries and held up 
to execration for their barbarous methods’, before declaring that he acquitted 
‘our government, or anyone of British birth, of any barbarity in this matter.’120 
Speaking at Liverpool on 13 November 1901, Grey similarly condemned as ‘a 
foul and filthy lie the charges made against us in the Continental press of having 
established the camps in order to exterminate the Boers’, while at a meeting of 
his Leith constituents on 5 December, R. C. Munro Ferguson defended his 
membership of the Liberal Imperialist League by stressing that it gave its 
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members the opportunity ‘to more effectively repel charges as to the barbarous 
methods which had been repeated in the country with the effect of creating 
divisions’.121 Notably, these criticisms were not directly framed as an attack on 
Campbell-Bannerman, the foreign Press providing the target of choice. 
However, given that such remarks were made in the context of a sustained 
Unionist effort to characterise Campbell-Bannerman as an enemy of the British 
soldier, it is reasonable to assume that at the very least such remarks would 
have been interpreted as implicit rebuttals of the pro-Boer position. 
The Liberal Imperialist response also defended the British tactics from a 
position of military necessity. In a speech at Leeds on 2 November, Asquith 
echoed the official reasoning for the establishment of the concentration camps, 
stressing that they ‘became an absolute necessity in the conditions prevailing at 
the time, unless women and children were to be left to starve on the veldt.’122 
Similarly, at Chesterfield Rosebery characterised the ‘refugee camps’ as the 
necessary result of farm burning.123 This was a position which came under 
heavy attack from Liberal critics of the war, although again the focus of such 
attacks was on their jingo opponents and the Press, rather than the Liberal 
Imperialists directly. In his speech at Bath, Campbell-Bannerman attacked the 
Methodist Times for having praised the policy of camps as an act of British 
generosity: ‘is our hypocrisy so great’, he asked, ‘as that we actually flatter 
ourselves upon our great humanity because we have saved from starvation 
those whose danger of starvation we have caused?’124 Henry Labouchere was 
to adopt a similar line at Northampton on 27 November, commenting on the 
death rate in the camps that he had ‘seen in a Jingo paper the statement that it 
was kind of us to relieve the Boers of their domestic duties. At this rate Herod 
was a philanthropist.’125 Nonetheless, the Liberal Imperialist rejection of the 
‘methods of barbarism’ narrative served as a rebuttal to the notion that policies 
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pursued by Milner in the two annexed republics were either unnecessary or 
immoral on Britain’s part: indeed, it was because they were necessary that they 
were justified. 
If Liberal Imperialists felt able to condone farm-burning and the concentration 
camp system from a position of necessity however, Milner’s policies in the Cape 
Colony, particularly relating to the expansion of martial law, were to prove an 
additional challenge for Liberal speakers. Struggles between the Cape 
government, the military and imperial authorities on the spot, and the imperial 
government in Britain had been ongoing since the very start of the war, and the 
steady advance of martial law over much of the colony became one of the key 
exacerbating factors in Cape politics. Within British politics however, the 
debates over martial law took on a life of their own, as Liberal speakers sought 
to present Unionist policy as not merely damaging the prospects of a lasting 
settlement in the two former republics, but also jeopardising British rule over the 
Cape. In order to understand why this came to form such a central element of 
the Liberal response, we need to first take into account the role which had been 
assigned to the Cape Colony within British political rhetoric in order to justify the 
conflict in the first place.   
As noted in the previous chapter, prior to the outbreak of the conflict both 
supporters and opponents of Unionist policy sought to present the Cape as 
representing an idealised form of imperial rule in South Africa: depending on the 
speaker, the Cape came to represent the model of white racial harmony and 
inclusive self-government which was either lacking in the Transvaal, justifying 
intervention, or was threatened by a resort to war which would irrevocably 
divide the British and the Dutch settler communities. Liberal speakers continued 
to advance such narratives during the early stages of the conflict. For example, 
in a speech at Wolverhampton on 9 November 1899, the Liberal Imperialist and 
former Indian Secretary Sir H. H. Fowler described the war as not just being 
one for the defence of British territory, but also ‘one for the defence of the white 
races of South Africa, and the placing them upon that equality which was at 
present enjoyed in Cape Colony’.126 Speaking at Manchester a few days later, 
Campbell-Bannerman likewise stressed that the war risked damaging the Cape 
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system, declaring that ‘for good and stable government in Cape Colony, the first 
essential condition is that we should have the best feeling between the two 
races’ and warning that the war against the republics would give ‘fresh 
bitterness to old jealousies and revive hatreds which ought to have expired’ 
among the Dutch at the Cape.127  
The existence of collaborative constitutional rule at the Cape also served as a 
tool for rebutting the charge that the goal of the war was to establish British 
ascendancy: at Peebles, Grey attacked criticism of the war from foreign 
quarters, asking ‘how many of them would have permitted freely and frankly 
their own colony to be ruled by the Dutch as we had done Cape Colony?’128 In 
this manner the constitutional settlement at the Cape played a significant role in 
framing British political rhetoric on the conflict. As such, as the system of 
government at the Cape became increasingly displaced by martial law, and 
Dutch participation in the colony’s governance was minimised, this provided 
Liberal critics of the government’s war methods with a powerful basis for 
challenging British policy in South Africa. 
Liberal critics of the war presented martial law as an attack on the constitutional 
structure of the Empire. Speaking at Stirling in October 1901, Campbell-
Bannerman dedicated a lengthy section of his speech to attacking the state of 
affairs at the Cape, declaring that ‘the suspension of the Constitution with the 
consent of the Imperial Government is a very grave and serious fact’ as well as 
noting that the Cape Parliament had not been summoned despite Chamberlain 
having previously stated that a failure to summon it would be a breach of the 
law. Charging that martial law was ‘nothing but the arbitrary rule of soldiers’, the 
Liberal leader declared that ‘no man is safe in property, in liberty, or in life’.129 In 
this critique then, martial law was presented as an attack on the rights of the 
citizen and the rule of law, as well as on the ordinary institutions of 
representative government. Critically, the use of martial law was also implicitly 
characterised as going against British traditions, Campbell-Bannerman 
remarking ‘why, gentlemen, with what indignation should we denounce such 
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proceedings in other countries.’130 Morley was to deploy a similar line of 
argument a few days later at Arbroath: citing legal opinion stating that the 
government could not use martial law to bypass the civil legal system while 
such courts continued to exist, Morley insisted that a civil administration should 
be set up so ‘that the law of the sword shall cease’.131 Unlike with the methods 
of barbarism controversy this was also a point echoed by some on the Liberal 
Imperialist wing of the party: in his speech at Liverpool, Grey stated that while 
martial law might be necessary ‘to stop the importation of Boer arms’, it might 
nonetheless be possible to incorporate a civil element into the Cape’s 
administration.132 In this manner, Liberals from across the spectrum of opinion 
in the party publically expressed their discomfort with the imposition of military 
rule in South Africa.  
Liberal criticisms of the practice of martial law also focused on the lack of 
transparency by the authorities in South Africa. In a speech at Dunfermline on 
10 December 1901, Campbell-Bannerman declared that:  
it is an intolerable thing, and in my judgement it is grossly 
unconstitutional, that the British people should have so little 
official information as we have as to the extent to which and the 
numbers to which martial law is applied.133 
On an issue which concerned the ‘civil rights of our fellow-citizens’, he argued, 
‘it is our duty to inquire into it, and surely someone in this constitutional Empire 
– and after all, we still profess to be a constitutional Empire – must be 
responsible.’134 The secrecy surrounding the implementation of martial law, and 
the restrictions on the flow of information from the Cape to Britain thus served to 
further reinforce the unconstitutionality of the policy in Liberal rhetoric.  
As with the tactics of farm burning and the concentration camps, Liberal 
speakers likewise presented the imposition of martial law in the Cape as 
undermining the support of the Dutch-speaking population for the Empire, 
damaging British rule in South Africa in the longer term. As early as November 
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1899 Asquith had sought to stress that Britain ought to ‘assure our Dutch fellow 
subjects in the Cape Colony and the Natal that they had no reason to fear the 
destruction or curtailment of their constitutional rights and liberties.’135 While not 
exactly a direct criticism of martial law, Asquith’s comments do demonstrate an 
early concern voiced within Liberal circles that Dutch sentiment in Britain’s 
existing colonies risked being alienated not just from the war against their 
kinsfolk, but through the direct impact of the war on existing imperial structures 
in South Africa.  
Following the rise of the ‘methods of barbarism’ narrative, Campbell-Bannerman 
and his supporters in the party sought to further stress the harm that military 
rule in the Cape was doing. Speaking at Stirling, Campbell-Bannerman stated 
that they had ‘reason to fear that martial law is but a form of undeclared war 
upon the Dutch population.’136 Critically, the Liberal leader condemned this as a 
matter of imperial policy: 
Have these ministers of ours not learned that it is not by 
suppression of civil liberties, not by harshness, not by coercion 
and force in any form, that a free people can be kept quiet and 
contented? How has their policy worked in the colony? It has 
alienated thousands of both races, it has sapped loyalty, it has 
turned friends into rebels, and it has filled the ranks of the men 
in the field against us, and yet they wonder why it is that the war 
is not concluded.137 
This represented a direct echo of his rhetoric on farm burning and the 
concentration camps, branding martial law as a policy which actively harmed 
British rule in the region by alienating the Empire’s Dutch subjects through 
coercion. Campbell-Bannerman’s critique of martial law also warned of the 
alienation of ‘both races’, suggesting that the abandonment of constitutional rule 
additionally risked undermining the support of the British settler population at 
the Cape.  
The charge that martial law was destroying the previous loyalty of the Cape 
Dutch to the British Empire was similarly stressed by Morley, who at Arbroath 
quoted a young Winston Churchill, at this point still a Conservative, describing 
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the situation as ‘a festering wound, eating into the flesh in the Cape Colony and 
into South Africa, and it is eating into ourselves also’.138 Morley was being 
disingenuous here, as Churchill’s actual comments, made in a speech at 
Leicester a few days previously, appear to have had little to do with the question 
of martial law.139 Nonetheless, Morley directly linked this metaphor to the 
position in the Cape, charging that as a result of martial law, ‘one war has 
grown into two wars. A war against the enemy outside our border has added to 
itself a civil war within our own borders in the Cape Colony’.140 Similarly, at the 
start of 1902 Bryce attacked the effective suspension of the Cape Constitution, 
charging that as a result there was in the Cape:  
intense bitterness between Englishmen and Dutchmen, who 
before had lived in harmony, and intense irritation on the part of 
Englishmen as well as Dutchmen at the oppressions of martial 
law; the great bulk of the Dutch embittered against British rule, 
and most of the younger Dutch in arms against us.141 
The crux of the Liberal argument was essentially an inversion of the logic with 
which the government sought to justify the suspension of civil rule in the first 
place. Rather than the policy being necessitated by the threat of rebellion and 
the disloyalty of the Dutch population, Liberal critics of the war charged that it 
was creating the very problems it supposedly addressed. In this manner, as 
with earlier narratives on white racial sentiment underpinning Britain’s position 
in South Africa, the Liberal critique of martial law could be characterised as a 
rhetoric of imperial maintenance in the face of the threat posed by the 
government’s tactics. 
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Although the Liberal attack on martial law resembled in many ways the politics 
of ‘methods of barbarism’, in practice the issue appears to have neither 
generated the same level of prominence or controversy. This in part may have 
been due to questions of coverage: although Campbell-Bannerman in particular 
began to devote substantial sections of his speeches on the war to the question 
of martial law from the summer of 1901 onwards, these were not always 
reflected in newspaper reports. Writing to Harcourt in December 1901, the 
Liberal leader commented that his speech at Dunfermline ‘was miserably 
reported in the London papers’, complaining in particular that the Daily News 
left out long sections on martial law and the situation at the Cape Colony.142 The 
rhetoric on martial law was also not as provocative as that accompanying the 
attacks on farm burning: while the underlying arguments shared many key 
elements, there was no equivalent charge of ‘methods of barbarism’. For this 
reason, unlike with British tactics in the Transvaal, there was no sustained 
Liberal Imperialist rejection of Campbell-Bannerman’s position. Although at 
Chesterfield Rosebery, in characteristic fashion, attacked the government for 
having not introduced martial law sooner, the issue was one generally avoided 
by Rosebery’s supporters in the party.143 Nonetheless, as demonstrated in this 
section, the question of martial law occupied a key place in Liberal rhetoric on 
the conduct of the conflict, and followed many of the same tropes and patterns 
as the debates on the ‘methods of barbarism’ in the two former republics.  
The responses of Liberal speakers to the conduct of the war serve therefore to 
highlight the extent to which questions of policy were discussed in relation to a 
framework of imperial governance, rather than simply representing a moral 
critique. Given the degree to which, as Hasian identifies in his study of the 
Hobhouse campaign, the government and its allies sought to counter the wider 
humanitarian critique of the war by characterising the debate as hysterical and 
framing it in emotional, gendered terms, the stress placed by Liberal critics of 
the government’s policies in particular on the ‘methods of barbarism’ as unwise 
imperial policy might be seen as an attempt to evade capture in this particular 
rhetorical trap. Indeed, Morley’s remarks that he would avoid any ‘unfashionable 
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reflections about humanity, pity, and the like’ would appear to suggest at the 
very least some awareness that adopting the rhetoric of imperial governance 
offered a more successful route for opposition.144 Likewise, concerns over the 
need to avoid charges of unpatriotic behaviour in drawing attention to the 
suffering of ‘the enemy’ may have played a role.145 However, the mainstream 
Liberal critique of ‘methods of barbarism’, and that of martial law at the Cape, 
did not occur in a vacuum but represented in many ways a continuation of 
Liberal rhetoric on the South African question from prior to the outbreak of war. 
Likewise, the rhetoric of necessity in the Liberal Imperialist defence of farm-
burning and the concentration camps can be seen as a continuation of pre-war 
narratives justifying the need for British action. Most importantly however, unlike 
the debates over the justice or otherwise of the war, these debates over the 
government’s tactics were fundamentally linked to the question of the war’s 
settlement, which this chapter now considers. 
‘Unconditional surrender’ and the Return to Self-government 
Both as a result of the South African War’s casus belli in the form of the 
Uitlander question and as a result of the premature expectations of victory from 
1900 onwards, the question of the war’s settlement formed a key component of 
Liberal speeches on the conflict. As discussed above, a central part of the 
‘methods of barbarism’ narrative was not simply that it was damaging Britain’s 
long-term position in South Africa, but also that in a practical sense the policies 
were not bringing about an end to the conflict. This formed part of a wider 
Liberal critique of what became known government’s policy of ‘unconditional 
surrender’, although again this formed the basis of a split between the Liberal 
Imperialists and the bulk of the party. For critics of the government, the policy of 
seeking a complete and total victory over the Boers was both jeopardising the 
chances for peace and further alienating Dutch sentiment. Alongside the 
debates over how and when the settlement was to be achieved, Liberal 
speakers also focused on the specifics of the political-constitutional situation in 
South Africa following the conflict, particularly in relation to the eventual grant of 
self-government. Significantly, while superficially Liberals from across the party 
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championed a swift return of the conquered republics to self-government, the 
ways in which such positions were framed and justified differed considerably. 
The characterisation of the government’s position as that of unconditional 
surrender began to be advanced relatively early in the conflict. In a wide-
ranging speech during a House of Commons debate on War Office Supply on 
12 December 1900, Bryce declared that ‘the greatest of all mistakes made is 
the demand for unconditional surrender’, stating that the government’s position 
had lengthened the conflict, whereas a more conciliatory approach might have 
swiftly secured the surrender of the bulk of the Boer forces.146 Campbell-
Bannerman was to raise a similar point in the House of Commons debate on 
the loyal address the following February, criticising the insistence on 
unconditional surrender and instead calling for a settlement for the Boers which 
‘may assuage their fears, save their dignity, restore their personal rights, and 
thus induce them to lay down their arms’.147 In this form, the rhetoric of 
unconditional surrender was essentially more a feature of war politics than a 
question of imperial settlement, although the calls for a conciliatory approach 
might be said to have embodied an implicit suggestion of a liberal settlement for 
the Dutch-speaking population following the conflict. Critically however, as the 
war dragged on the charge that the government was seeking a total victory over 
the Boers came increasingly to be presented as a policy of annihilation. 
Given the degree to which the conflict had been framed by supporters of the 
Unionist government as a war for white racial equality, the implication that the 
war was being continued indefinitely to introduce British ascendancy in the 
conquered territories served as a powerful rhetorical tool for Liberal critics of the 
war. In his speech at Arbroath in October 1901, Morley was to make precisely 
this point. Attacking the war for having ‘completely changed in character’, 
Morley charged that ‘the policy or unconditional surrender, of unconditional 
subjugation, which is the present policy of the Government […] means the 
policy of extermination and annihilation.’148 Strikingly, when heckled by an 
audience member that a policy of extermination was justified ‘if necessary’, 
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Morley invited his Scottish audience to consider how they would react in the 
face of an English policy of extermination: 
Supposing you had got into a war with England, and that we 
had come down and laid your lands waste and stuck your 
women and children into concentration camps and hanged men 
whom we called rebels and flogged lads and then said: “Now 
we are going to have you down on your knees. Unconditional 
surrender and unconditional submission! If you do not agree we 
will exterminate you.” If I know anything about Scotland you 
would say, “Exterminate us if you can!”149 
Morley’s rhetorical efforts to invoke Scottish sympathy for the Boers echoes the 
language he deployed prior to the outbreak of the conflict and might be seen as 
further evidence of the pluralistic vision of Empire that Ellis identifies in Welsh 
pro-Boer rhetoric, although it must be recognised as well that Morley’s rhetoric 
also served a more immediate purpose in keeping his audience in the room 
onside. In any case, Morley’s tactic of conflating the continuation of the war with 
a policy of extermination served to stress the argument that the policy of 
unconditional surrender was not just ineffective but contrary to British imperial 
tradition.  
Campbell-Bannerman was to deploy similar language at Leicester the following 
February, again identifying the Unionist government and particularly Milner’s 
policy as one of insisting upon unconditional surrender: regardless, he stated, 
whether the policy had the aim of ‘the ruin and practical annihilation of the Boer 
race’ or merely represented the desire ‘to beat the Boers to their knees and 
place them at our mercy’, it was a policy ‘which is mischievous and, if 
persevered in, fatal’.150 Again, the narrative of annihilation can be seen as being 
presented not only as unpalatable, but one which would ultimately damage 
British interests in South Africa. 
Indeed, the policy of unconditional surrender was explicitly presented as 
antithetical to any settlement which would lead to the former republics’ 
incorporation into the Empire as self-governing colonies. In a speech at 
Inverness on 19 November 1901, Tweedmouth argued that if they followed the 
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line the government urged, deploying ever more vigorous methods against the 
Boers,  
no doubt they would drive the Boer to the ground. They should 
nearly have exterminated him. They should make his country a 
waste without any male population. Was that a very fruitful 
ground on which to sow the seeds of a self-governing 
colony?151 
Any British effort to crush the Boers, he continued, would only make it less likely 
that they would accept British rule, increasing the risk of a future war for 
independence. Similarly Lord Crewe, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland under 
Gladstone and Rosebery, used a speech at Manchester on 23 January 1902 to 
attack the government’s policy on the grounds of the need for a future 
settlement. ‘A conditional surrender’, Crewe argued, ‘is a much more valuable 
asset in the countries you are going to annex than unconditional surrender’, as 
those who surrendered unconditionally would have ‘no obligation to accept our 
rule’.152 In presenting a negotiated settlement as securing an ideal imperial 
settlement in South Africa, such rhetoric allowed Liberals to critique imperial 
policy without appearing unsupportive of Britain’s position in South Africa. 
The Liberal Imperialists’ position on unconditional surrender was a complex 
one, and was shaped by the varying tides of disunity within the Liberal ranks at 
the conflict went on. Liberal Imperialist efforts to counter the leadership’s attack 
on the indefinite continuation of the war in many ways resembled aspects of the 
Unionist government’s own response. In rebutting the charge of unconditional 
surrender in the February 1901 debate on the loyal address, Chamberlain 
insisted that the government’s policy was for the ‘unconditional surrender of the 
Governments’ of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, rather 
that the unconditional surrender of the Boer peoples: the war was continuing, he 
argued, only because the Boers was still holding out for independence.153 This 
was a line readily adopted by the Liberal Imperialists who sought to justify the 
continuation of the conflict, particularly in the heightened atmosphere of the ‘war 
to the knife and fork’. In his speech at the Liverpool Street Station Hotel, Asquith 
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declared that neither Liberals nor the Unionist government were seriously 
insisting upon unconditional surrender, stressing instead that ‘it is impossible to 
restore the previous political situation of those two Republics’, echoing the 
Unionist line that the alternative to continued fighting could only be 
independence.  
Provocatively, Asquith also sought to invert the rhetoric of unconditional 
surrender by characterising the policy of the Liberal pro-Boers as one of 
‘unconditional surrender to the Boers’, a remark which can be taken as a direct 
rebuttal to Campbell-Bannerman and which, if the Aberdeen Journal is to be 
believed, triggered considerable dissension within his audience.154 Asquith was 
to echo this argument, albeit in less provocative terms, in his speech at Leeds 
at the start of November: rejecting the charge that on the war, he and his 
colleagues ‘were opposed to its conclusion by an offer of reasonable terms’, 
Asquith insisted that the war was continuing because ‘the Boers now in the field 
still professed to be fighting for independence.’155 Such a defence essentially 
drew upon the same narratives of necessity by which the charge of ‘methods of 
barbarism’ was rejected, insisting that the only alternative to the continuation of 
the war was a state of affairs which would harm British control over the region. 
Liberal Imperialist justifications for the continuation of the conflict could also 
draw upon the race question as a barrier to an early settlement. In his speech at 
Leith, Munro Ferguson declared that if anything had been learned from the war, 
it was plain that: 
it was not by proclamations or terms of peace any more than by 
farm burnings or by military executions that we should bring the 
war to an end, but solely by the defeat and capture of the 
remaining Boer forces in the field.156 
Significantly, Munro Ferguson asserted that it was not just Boer demands for 
their independence which prevented a settlement, but also their opposition to 
white racial equality. Peace could not be declared, he insisted, until the Boers 
recognised that ‘there would have to be absolute equality for the white races in 
South Africa and they would no more get a Boer to admit that voluntarily than 
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they would get a Hungarian to relax his domination over the Slavs.’157 If the 
critics of the war sought to present unconditional surrender as the basis for 
British ascendancy, Liberal Imperialists such as Munro Ferguson attempted to 
counter this argument with the notion of Boer ascendancy.  
Speaking the following week at Bristol, Grey similarly invoked the position of the 
British settler population in South Africa in seeking to defend the continuation of 
the conflict. Rebutting in particular the notion that Milner should be recalled from 
South Africa to increase the chances of a settlement, Grey called his audience’s 
attention to the ‘some 30,000 British colonists’ fighting for the Empire, warning 
against any act which ‘alienated the sympathy and cost us the confidence of the 
British race there’. Echoing Rosebery’s rhetoric from the early stages of the war, 
Grey warned that a failure to retain the support of the British in South Africa 
‘would lose us South Africa altogether’.158 This was essentially a continuity of 
the rhetoric that the conflict was necessary in order to defend the position of the 
British settlers in South Africa, and that a failure to secure a clear victory over 
the Boers risked a return to Boer ascendancy and the alienation of British settler 
opinion. 
Significantly however, at Chesterfield Rosebery adopted a somewhat different 
stance from his followers on the question of the war’s conclusion. While echoing 
his supporters’ arguments that the war must be energetically fought to the 
finish, he asserted that it needed to end precisely because its continuation 
‘adjourns and embitters the ultimate settlement of South Africa’. Similarly, 
although Rosebery echoed Grey’s comments that the recall of Milner would 
alienate British sentiment, he also stressed the need for an amnesty in order to 
facilitate the pacification of South Africa, and urged his audience to remember 
‘that you do not wish to do anything to humiliate the Boers unnecessarily or to 
crush the Boers unnecessarily, for they are hereafter to be your fellow-subjects, 
and, I trust, loyal and important elements in your Empire.’159 This rhetorical 
casting of the Boer as imperial citizen in many ways resembled the language of 
the Liberal critics of the war’s conduct, although it was not inconsistent with 
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Liberal Imperialist rhetoric during the crisis of 1899, or indeed in relation to the 
debates over annexation. Nonetheless, it is noticeable that following the 
Chesterfield speech, his followers were generally less critical of the idea of a 
negotiated settlement, and more positive towards the prospect of amnesties for 
the defeated Boer leaders. 
In discussing the settlement following the conflict, the importance of self-
government being granted to the new colonies formed a prominent feature of 
Liberal rhetoric. As examined in the previous chapter, the notion of good 
imperial government founded upon representative self-governing institutions 
played a central role in both pro-Boer criticisms of government policy and 
Liberal Imperialist justifications for supporting the government. The stress upon 
self-government continued to form a central element of Liberal rhetoric as the 
war developed. Speaking at Alnwick on 27 November 1899, Grey stressed that 
while it was premature to discuss the exact details of the settlement, following 
the conflict there had to be: 
such a franchise throughout South Africa that it shall be certain 
that, whatever be their constitutions of Governments, the 
Governments shall be such as correspond to the numbers, the 
desires, and the needs of the population inhabiting the country, 
of whatever race it might be.160 
In stressing the point of the franchise, Grey clearly had the position of the 
Uitlanders primarily in mind: he would go on to insist that never again must it be 
possible for an ‘enlightened majority’ to be oppressed by a ‘backward and 
inexperienced minority’, clearly referencing the situation in the Transvaal.161 
Nonetheless, in stressing the franchise as a question for the settlement 
throughout South Africa alongside race equality, Grey’s speech can 
nonetheless be seen as furthering his earlier characterisation of the conflict as a 
war for democratic government. As discussed above, the principle of self-
government was also deployed in relation to annexation, first by its opponents 
so as to demonstrate the incompatibility of territorial acquisition with the stated 
aims of the war, and then by Liberals from across the party in order to justify 
their acquiescence with annexation by framing it as part of a wider settlement in 
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South Africa. In terms of the settlement therefore, the call for a speedy 
restoration of self-government to the conquered territories became a key 
characteristic of Liberal debate. 
Campbell-Bannerman in particular placed the question of the self-government 
at the centre of his rhetoric on the settlement of South Africa at the time of the 
annexations, attacking the suggestion that the former republics should be 
governed as Crown Colonies without representative institutions. In his speech 
at Glasgow in June 1900, Campbell-Bannerman attacked the recent statements 
from Chamberlain and Salisbury suggesting a substantial period of Crown 
Colony rule awaited the belligerent states, condemning in particular the Prime 
Minister’s statement that the Boers should be stripped of ‘every shred of 
independent government’.162 Challenging the idea that following the cessation 
of hostilities the Boers can be easily integrated into the Empire, the Liberal 
leader declared: 
How can you expect them to be hearty members if you take 
from them every shred of independent government, if you 
govern them as Crown Colonies, if you rule them from Downing 
Street, if you Anglicise them, if you impose upon them your 
laws instead of their laws, and your customs and ways instead 
of the ways and customs which they and their fathers before 
them have followed?163 
A Crown Colony system, which was presented as direct, centralised rule from 
London, would under this analysis only serve to prolong Boer opposition to 
British rule in South Africa. The conflation of Crown Colony rule with a policy of 
Anglicisation is also notable, and can be seen as a precursor to later Liberal 
attacks on ‘unconditional surrender’ as a policy of annihilation. Significantly, 
Campbell-Bannerman also went on to present such a system as a barrier to 
eventual federation in South Africa: asserting that for federation to work it must 
be initiated by the member states themselves rather than being imposed top-
down, he declared that as such ‘there can be no federation whatever if you 
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have Crown Colonies among your constitutional Governments.’164 In linking 
self-government to the long-running dream of a British-led federation of South 
Africa, Campbell-Bannerman can in this way be seen to have explicitly framed 
his position as one supportive of British imperial power.  
Speaking at Stirling during the election campaign, Campbell-Bannerman again 
stressed his opposition to Crown Colony rule, declaring to cheers that he was 
‘proud to remember that I promptly and publicly protested against the idea’, 
calling instead for the government to make clear how the new colonies will be 
governed once military rule is ended.165 Significantly, the question of Crown 
Colony rule does not appear to have been one which generated much division 
in the party. In his speech to the City Liberal Club in March 1900 Grey 
cautioned against Crown Colony government, which he speculated would be 
the result of annexation, as being likely to cause unease throughout the Empire 
of settlement. Describing Crown Colony rule as an unpopular term, Grey stated 
that he did not ‘think any self-governing British colony liked the idea of any large 
white community being governed by a Crown colony Government. A Crown 
colony must be as provincial a system for any large community of white men as 
military occupation.’166 While others on the imperialist wing of the party did on 
occasion express support for Crown Colony control, the Liberal MP for Ilkeston 
Sir Walter Foster for example using a speech at Langley Mill in July 1900 to call 
for a ‘necessary interval of government under the Crown colony system’, such 
interventions were relatively rare and did not envisage an extended or indefinite 
period without self-government.167 Instead, Liberal speakers from across the 
party not only emphasised the self-governing future of South Africa within the 
Empire, but also generally stressed that such a measure could not be longer 
delayed. 
In particular, Liberals sought to present the ideal settlement in South Africa as 
one which replicated the self-governing dominion model deployed in Canada 
and Australia, often combining this with a call for federation. Asquith for 
example used his speech at Tayport to declare that ‘liberty was the best 
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antidote or medicine for discontent and disloyalty’, and that, while any 
settlement would inevitably take time, they would be able to: 
work out a future for South Africa as worthy of the great 
traditions of our Empire, and of the great principles of 
Liberalism as that experience which we had seen so 
successfully carried out under the analogous, if not identical 
conditions in Canada.168 
Asquith was to echo this point the following summer in his speech at the 
Liverpool Street Station Hotel, again asserting that while there would invariably 
be a pause before self-government could be granted, the new colonies should 
be endowed with ‘the full machinery and apparatus of autonomous 
government’, so that after a short interval, ‘they will be put on the footing of 
Canada and Australia.’169 In Asquith’s rhetoric, then, the two former republics 
were to be integrated into the Empire through the same self-governing methods 
of imperialism that applied to Britain’s ‘successful’ dominions.  
A similar position was advocated by Campbell-Bannerman at the Reform Club 
meeting of the Liberal Party: while acknowledging that a ‘short interval of 
irregular government’ would have to take place following the end of the war, he 
called on the country to promise the Boers that ‘the free independent system of 
colonial self-government so familiar to us shall be set up, leading ultimately, if 
the several States so desire, to a federal constitution in South Africa.’170 Rising 
in reply, the veteran Liberal MP Sir Joseph Pease put the point simply by 
declaring that ‘nothing will satisfy us that does not ultimately produce in South 
Africa a Canada, if I may so call it, of free institutions loyal to the mother 
country.’171 In this manner Liberals sought once again to frame the self-
governing federations of the settler-Empire as idealised models to be applied to 
the settlement in South Africa, presenting the grant of free institutions as not 
just consistent with British imperial policy but an essential part of it. If this was a 
position advocated across the party however, the underlying justifications varied 
significantly. 
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As examined above, many Liberal speakers presented the primacy of self-
government to any settlement in South Africa primarily both as justifying 
annexation and as a principle of British imperial tradition. The grant of self-
governing institutions, it was implied, served to redeem British rule in South 
Africa and would assist in the pacification and integration of the Boers. Such 
rhetoric was reinforced by narratives stressing the whiteness of the Boers, and 
hence the need to afford them with representative institutions. Such rhetoric 
might be identified as countering many of the decivilising narratives by which 
conflict with the Boers could be justified and the horrors of the ‘methods of 
barbarism’ explained way. Speaking at Plymouth on 19 November 1901, 
Campbell-Bannerman reminded his audience that the South African Dutch: 
are not like some tribe of Pathans on the Indian frontier, or a 
herd of dervishes in the Soudan, whom it had become 
necessary to punish on account of some offense or misconduct 
on their part, and who, being barbarians or semi-barbarians, 
and recognising nothing but brute force, had to be punished in 
the only way they understood, and in the end must remain 
outside of our domination altogether or in acknowledged 
subjugation to us.172 
Instead, he declared, they were ‘Europeans, like ourselves, capable of the 
highest European civilisation’, and that as such Britain ‘cannot in the face of the 
world and in the face of our own conscience keep a European race under 
military subjugation.’173 Campbell-Bannerman’s rhetoric at Plymouth is 
fascinating, not least because of what it reveals about Liberal rhetoric on the 
treatment of the non-white subjects of the Empire, framed as his comments with 
reference to discipline and brute force. In relation to the settlement of South 
Africa, the main crux of his argument was that as the Boers were a white, 
European race, they could not be governed through the barbarian-tailored 
methods of ‘acknowledged subjugation’ or military rule. In this respect, the 
question of the settlement was one of the governance of the Dutch speaking 
population.  
This was a line of argument which was also readily elevated into a point of 
principle as a key element of British imperial policy. In his speech at 
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Southampton the previous July, Campbell-Bannerman had declared that ‘British 
power could not be maintained by force over the a community of men of 
European blood except with the consent of that community’, because 
fundamentally the rule of force was ‘contrary to the principles upon which our 
Empire was founded, and alien from the noblest traditions of our race.’174 As 
well as serving to reinforce a ‘Liberal’ vision of British imperialism, this again 
represents an effort by Campbell-Bannerman to frame the question of 
governing the new territories in terms of the position of the Dutch population. 
Inclusionist narratives were by no means limited to Liberal supporters of 
Campbell-Bannerman: as noted above, Asquith repeatedly stressed the notion 
of self-government for the Boers at the time of the debates over annexation. 
Some speakers on the Liberal Imperialist wing of the party, however, articulated 
the case for self-government as distinct and separate from that of the task of 
pacifying the Boer population. Instead, arguments in favour of the swift grant of 
representative institutions rested upon the widely-repeated claim that, in the 
Transvaal at least, the Boers had formed only a minority of the white population 
prior to the outbreak of the war, and the assumption that this state of affairs 
would resume following the conflict. As his attack on rule by the ‘backward and 
inexperienced minority’ in his speech at Alnwick might suggest, Grey in 
particular sought to stress the need for self-governing institutions following the 
conflict as required by the British settlers rather than the Dutch.175 In a speech 
at Newcastle on 28 September 1900, Grey told his audience to ‘remember that 
when the war is over the British will outnumber the Boers two to one as they did 
before. Are you going to keep the British in the Transvaal without self-
government?’176  
Grey was to repeat this point the following February, in a speech to the Eighty 
Club, asserting that following the conflict ‘a large white population – a very great 
proportion of it British – would flow back into the Transvaal. It was not possible 
that that population should be indefinitely kept without self-government.’ 
Continuing, Grey suggested that any self-government was in effect conditional 
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on this British population, arguing that ‘the guarantee that within a measurable 
distance of time self-government must be the rule in South Africa was the inflow 
of the British […] and what was given to them must be given at the same time to 
the Dutch race’.177 While Grey did indeed present self-government as also 
requiring extension to the Dutch population, it was with a view to a British 
majority in the Transvaal that Grey anchored his argument.178 Similar rhetoric 
was deployed by Munro Ferguson, who in his speech at Leith in December 
1901 declared that: 
as soon as the normal population returned to the Transvaal 
there would be a British majority, and the British would no more 
submit to a policy of military or Downing Street rule in the 
Transvaal than they would anywhere else.179 
Again, we can see a Liberal Imperialist rhetoric of self-government, in the 
Transvaal at least, which was premised upon the idea of government by the 
British race: a system in which the Boers participated and were represented, but 
not one of Boer self-government. Fundamentally then, even if the swift 
introduction of self-government represented a consistent theme of Liberal 
speakers from across the spectrum of opinion in the party, there was a division 
in terms of the rhetorical strategy by which the advocacy of self-government 
was justified. 
Yet if this proved a point of difference between the Liberal leadership and the 
Liberal Imperialists, what is striking is the degree to which the rhetoric of equal 
rights between the races, and of fair treatment for the defeated Boers, was 
consistent throughout Liberal speeches dealing with the settlement from 
speakers across the party. Not only was there a repeated insistence from 
figures across the party that there could be no formal British ascendancy 
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established in South Africa, but there was also a sustained defence of the 
Boers’ right to their own identity and cultural institutions within the new South 
Africa that was to be created. Campbell-Bannerman’s attack at Glasgow on any 
attempt to ‘Anglicise’ the Boers, which he was to repeat in various forms in later 
speeches, was also echoed by those on the Liberal Imperialist wing.180 In a 
speech at Newcastle at the beginning of 1902, Grey attacked any suggestion 
that the Boer language should be proscribed: language, he stated, ‘has in it the 
spirit of a people. Short of trying to suppress men’s religion, the nearest thing to 
trampling upon their soul is to try and suppress their language.’ The Boer may 
differ from the British in many things, he continued, ‘but the British Empire is a 
big thing, and there was room and must be room for him to breathe freely inside 
of the British Empire, even though all these differences exist.’181 Undoubtedly 
Grey was seeking to follow Rosebery’s lead into adopting a more conciliatory 
stance towards the Boers following Chesterfield, but nonetheless this can be 
seen as reflecting a wider pluralistic vision of Empire and a rejection of 
Milnerism in South Africa. Rosebery’s own call, in a speech at Leeds on 30 May 
1902, stressing the need to ‘convert those who have been brave foes into brave 
friends and faithful fellow-citizens and subjects with us in a new and brighter 
South Africa’, might likewise be seen as deploying similar language as that 
used by Liberal critics of the war’s conduct earlier in the conflict, stressing the 
need to incorporate the Boers as citizens into the Empire.182  
In this sense, the debates on the policy of unconditional surrender and the 
restoration of self-government which characterised Liberal rhetoric on the 
settlement of the war might be said to have been framed largely in the rhetoric 
of earlier narratives on the nature of imperial governance in South Africa, both 
in relation to the politics of the crisis of 1899 and those which emerged from the 
critique of the war’s conduct. In particular, the key dynamic of the need to 
manage relations between the British and Dutch populations in South Africa 
was central to both debates. Most significant of all however is that, despite the 
difference in framing the justification for such a position, Liberal speakers from 
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across the party emphasised the need for a swift restoration of self-government 
to the two former republics. The eventual grant of responsible government to 
the new colonies was to become a critical imperial question following the Liberal 
return to power in 1905, one which became mythologised as that of the 
‘magnanimous gesture’, and has subsequently been judged as driven by the 
need to find a solution to the controversy surrounding indentured Asiatic labour. 
Yet as this section has demonstrated, the question of the grant of self-
government formed a central element of Liberal speakers’ rhetoric on the South 
African War, itself drawing upon the earlier debates in connection with 
annexation and the origins of the conflict. As the next chapter will examine, 
many key elements of the rhetorical framework which informed the politics of 
the ‘magnanimous gesture’ had already been formed by the war’s end. 
Conclusion: a Continuity of Rhetoric 
Lasting two and a half years and dominating the attention of Britain’s political 
class, the South African War ultimately had a wide-ranging impact on British 
political life, of which the elements studied in this chapter represent only a part. 
The fast-changing nature of events and the unforeseen consequences of British 
policy created new and unanticipated debates and rhetorical spaces through 
which British Liberals engaged with the politics of Empire. In many respects it is 
easy to see the politics of the war as bringing about considerable shifts relating 
to British Liberal politics and the South African question. The acquiescence of 
the bulk of the Liberal Party in the annexation of the two Republics represented 
a major break both from pro-Boer opposition to a provocative policy in South 
Africa prior to the outbreak of war and the justifications for the conflict provided 
by the Liberal Imperialists during the initial moment of crisis. Likewise, while the 
imagery of the destruction of war had certainly featured in Liberal rhetoric prior 
to the conflict, the descent of South Africa into guerrilla warfare and the 
resultant ‘methods of barbarism’ they prompted can be said to have opened up 
a new dimension in the politics of the South African question, in addition to 
shifting the factional tectonics of the Liberal Party by firmly aligning Campbell-
Bannerman in opposition to the Liberal Imperialists. With a shift of debates over 
how to resolve the problems of South Africa in 1899 to debates over the 
conduct of the war and its consequences, it is relatively easy to consider the 
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war as permanently and drastically changing the role of the South African in the 
Liberal Party’s approach to imperial politics. 
Yet as this chapter has demonstrated, what is most striking is the degree of 
continuity present in Liberal rhetoric on South Africa throughout the war, even 
as the political background shifted. The key debates over the nature of 
imperialism and its relationship with the Liberal programme, although as 
fragmentary as ever, repeated the key themes which Liberals had raised in 
relation to South Africa since the time of the Jameson Raid. Whether on the 
questions of annexation, farm-burning, the concentration camps or the 
imposition of martial law at the Cape, Liberal speakers consistently framed 
these in relation to the long-running themes of imperial governance and the 
necessary equality of the white races in South Africa. The disputes over the 
policy of ‘unconditional surrender’, self-government and the eventual settlement 
of the conflict similarly adopted the elements of a constitutional-governmental 
framework for imperial politics, remarkably unchanged from those which were 
readily applied to pre-war South Africa, even if the events of the conflict had 
effectively superseded considerations of British supremacy or paramountcy in 
the region. Ultimately then, despite the trauma and disputes of the South 
African War, and in spite of the changing power dynamics within the party, the 
core elements of the Liberal Party’s approach to the politics of the South African 
question emerged relatively unchanged and, as the following chapter examines, 
these were to go inform the politics of reconstruction in South Africa after 1902.
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4. ‘A WITCHES’ CAULDRON’: CHINESE LABOUR AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 
1902-1907 
The years following the conclusion of the South African War were complex ones 
for Liberal politics in Britain. In one sense, many of the divisions within the 
Liberal Party over the South African question faded out of significance, as 
questions regarding the conduct of the conflict and the terms of settlement were 
largely superseded by events, and the political focus in Britain shifted on to 
other, more salient topics. Joseph Chamberlain’s launch of the tariff reform 
campaign in 1903 and his subsequent exit from the government of Arthur 
Balfour, who had succeeded his uncle Lord Salisbury as Prime Minister after 
the war’s conclusion, were particularly vital developments in this respect. Not 
only did the protectionist campaign fundamentally reshape the party political 
landscape, providing a unifying basis for the Liberal Party and shattering the 
Unionist coalition, but it was also critically an imperial political issue. 
Chamberlain’s efforts to frame tariffs as a means of binding together the 
different elements of the Empire, and free trader efforts at countering this 
narrative, formed the central component of imperial politics in this period and 
indeed, South Africa was as likely to be brought up by political speakers in 
relation to tariffs as it was as a distinct political question in its own right. 
Nonetheless, the reconstruction of South Africa was an important factor in 
British Liberal politics in the years following the war, generating a number of key 
controversies which in many respects reflected the politics of earlier iterations of 
the South African question. Some of these controversies might be characterised 
as only indirectly related to imperial matters. For example, the question of the 
Transvaal’s financial contribution to the cost of the war formed a persistent 
feature of Liberal criticisms of Unionist policy. This was at heart however 
essentially framed as a critique of the government’s fiscal competence rather 
than a question of South African matters, although Liberal speakers sometimes 
integrated this with rhetoric attacking the mine-owners on the Rand. 
Nonetheless, the politics of the reconstruction of South Africa saw two key 
imperially-focused controversies emerge in British Liberal rhetoric: the use of 
indentured Chinese labour in the Transvaal mining industry, and the methods 
and timeframe by which a form of self-government would be established in the 
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Transvaal Colony.1 The two issues were closely linked both by contemporary 
Liberal speakers, and by subsequent historians. However, as this chapter 
argues, the latter should not simply be considered the extension of the former. 
The political dynamics of the two controversies were further complicated by the 
Liberal ascent to office in December 1905. The fall of the Balfour government, 
which had been tottering for some time after the reconstruction of the ministry to 
exclude the most committed of both the Chamberlainite tariff reformers and the 
Unionist free traders, owed little directly to the South African question. 
Nonetheless, by placing the Liberals in office, it had significant consequences 
for how the party would approach South African issues: although the 1906 
election could be fought largely upon the record of the outgoing ministry, for the 
party leadership at least the challenge soon became one of defending and 
justifying their own management of South African affairs. This development also 
increased the prominence of the Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office 
in the new ministry, Winston Churchill, who had defected to the Liberal Party in 
May 1904. Critically, upon taking office the existing tensions between good 
government and self-government took on a new dynamic, as the claim that 
responsible government would serve to eliminate the system of Chinese labour 
began to unravel. 
Surveying the period from the end of the South African War through to the 
immediate aftermath of the Transvaal election in spring 1907, this chapter 
explores the rhetoric deployed by Liberals in seeking to engage with the 
debates surrounding the use of Chinese labour and the constitutional settlement 
of the Transvaal. It first examines the politics of ‘Chinese slavery’ from the 
perspective of its relationship to the British political tradition of humanitarian and 
anti-slavery agitation in imperial politics, alongside the characterisation of the 
ordinance as an assault upon white labour in the Transvaal. This chapter then 
goes on to explore the extent to which the labour controversy was framed as 
damaging to good government in South Africa and the degree to which the 
issue was framed as one which placed the Imperial government in opposition to 
colonial sentiment both within South Africa and throughout the white settler-
empire. The debates surrounding the need to establish self-government in the 
                                            
1 As discussed later in the chapter, the constitutional settlement for the ORC 
was generally side-lined in such debates.  
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Transvaal, and to a lesser degree in the Orange River Colony (ORC), are then 
examined. Critically, while the grant of self-government was regularly presented 
as the means by which the Chinese labour problem could be resolved, this 
section also considers the wider political context in which demands for full self-
government and the rejection of the Lyttelton constitution took place, particularly 
in the light of the trends identified in the previous chapter. Finally this chapter 
concludes by examining Liberal rhetoric in the period following the general 
election of 1906 through to the immediate aftermath of the Het Volk victory in 
the Transvaal election of 1907, looking not just at the official justifications 
provided by government speakers but also the increasing Radical discontent 
over the Liberal leadership’s imperial policy. In doing so, this chapter argues 
that for all the new issues raised by the politics of the reconstruction period, 
Liberal responses to the South African question continued to draw upon ideals 
of Liberal imperial rule, particularly relating the rhetoric of self-governance and 
white racial harmony. Critically, these debates would also increasingly 
demonstrate the underlying contradictions that had characterised the fin-de-
siècle Liberal approach to the politics of Empire, paving the way for renewed 
divisions within the party as Radicals increasingly sought to reframe the South 
African question. 
The Politics of Reconstruction 
For years the gold mining industry of the Rand had dominated the economy of 
the Transvaal, its requirements and interests playing a critical role at the heart 
of the political-imperial calculations that led up to the Jameson Raid and the 
outbreak of the war. By the end of the conflict, however, the industry was in 
chaos: quite apart from the general economic disruption and damage resulting 
from the conflict, an acute crisis had risen from the dispersal of the black African 
labour supply by the years of fighting.2 In response, the mining interests and 
then the imperial authorities administering the newly-conquered territory 
adopted a policy of importing what eventually amounted to over 53,000 
indentured labourers from China, who were subject to strict contractual 
                                            
2 Peter Richardson, ‘Chinese Indentured Labour in the Transvaal Gold Mining 
Industry, 1904-1910’, in Kay Saunders (ed.), Indentured Labour in the British 
Empire 1834-1920 (London: 1984), pp.262-63. 
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requirements and close regulation.3 It was in reaction to this policy, and 
particularly the alleged abuses that went along with it, that the ‘Chinese slavery’ 
controversy emerged as a major party political issue in Britain. In seeking to 
interpret the nature of the political controversy in Britain, however, it is important 
to first situate the introduction of indentured labour within the wider economic, 
political and imperial contexts of the early-twentieth century Empire. 
In terms of the significance of Chinese labour for the Rand mining industry itself, 
the work of Peter Richardson represents one of the fullest assessments of the 
policy’s economic dimensions.4 Richardson notably challenges the 
interpretation espoused by contemporary critics of the Transvaal’s mining 
interests that the problem was simply a labour shortage driven in part by an 
unnecessary drive for increased profits on the part of the mine owners. The 
industry, by contrast, was actually facing a widespread crisis of profitability 
worsened by a collapse in capital investment, putting the whole basis of gold 
mining and the Transvaal’s economic recovery at risk.5 This supports 
suggestions by Alan Jeeves that the relationship between the mine owners and 
the post-conflict Transvaal state was ‘rather one of dependence than of 
domination’, with the mining industry at points crippled by its own weaknesses.6 
Furthermore, Richardson stresses that the introduction of Chinese labour was 
not an isolated deviation in British imperial policy, instead following on from the 
practice of using Indian ‘coolie’ labour in Natal, and operated alongside efforts 
to increase the volume of black African labour recruited from Portuguese East 
Africa.7  
                                            
3 David E. Torrance, The Strange Death of the Liberal Empire: Lord Selborne in 
South Africa (Liverpool: 1996), p.42. 
4 In addition to Richardson’s essay in Saunders’ volume, see also Peter 
Richardson, ‘Coolies and randlords: the North Randfontein Chinese miners' 
“strike” of 1905’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 2:2 (1976); Peter 
Richardson, ‘The Recruiting of Chinese Indentured Labour for the South African 
Gold-mines, 1903-1908’, Journal of African History 18:1 (1977); and Peter 
Richardson, Chinese mine labour in the Transvaal (London: 1982). 
5 Richardson, ‘Chinese indentured labour’, pp.263-66. 
6 Alan Jeeves, ‘The Control of Migratory Labour on the South African Gold 
Mines in the Era of Kruger and Milner’, Journal of Southern African Studies 2:1 
(1975), 28. 
7 Richardson, pp.260-61, 66. 
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Building on such studies, Rachel Bright’s recent monograph on Chinese labour 
in South Africa stands as the most comprehensive analysis of the policy’s 
political and cultural impacts, not only in South Africa but on an imperial and 
global scale. 8 Bright contextualises the opposition to Chinese labour within the 
wider history of the ‘Asian menace’ and the empire of white settlement, 
particularly in relation to the Cape Colony, Australia and New Zealand. In 
particular, Bright identifies ideas of ‘white labourism’ as a highly important factor 
in determining reactions to the policy in the Transvaal, in Britain and throughout 
the Empire, as well as situating the moral panic surrounding the supposed 
violence and vice of the Chinese within a racial framework that emphasised the 
threat of degeneration. While Bright’s focus is not directly upon the British 
political dimension of the controversy, her work nonetheless provides an 
important basis for identifying the key influences and imperial connections 
which sustained the issue in British politics. 
In relation to British politics, the agitation against Chinese slavery has generally 
been recognised as forming a significant part of the Unionist government’s 
discomfiture in the mid-1900s and a key element in recovery of the Liberal 
Party’s fortunes. George L. Bernstein characterises the Liberal campaign as 
based upon moral condemnation and the exploitation of white labourist 
arguments, arguing that ‘the Chinese labour issue thus gave fresh impetus to 
the Liberal revival by offending both the party’s Nonconformist and its working-
class constituencies.’9 In terms of the actual arguments advanced, G.B. Pyrah 
identifies the Liberal opposition to the policy as unfolding along three key lines. 
First, the party argued, the policy was unnecessary as the Labour shortage had 
only been created by the greed of the mine-owners; second, the party 
condemned the immorality of a system which resembled slavery, a critique 
compounded by the moral panics over alleged homosexuality in the Chinese 
camps; and third, Liberals attacked the government for having introduced the 
policy against the supposed wishes of the Transvaal’s settlers.10 Liberal 
                                            
8 Rachel K. Bright, Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902-10: Race, Violence 
and Global Spectacle (Basingstoke: 2013). 
9 George L. Bernstein, Liberalism and Liberal Politics in Edwardian England 
(Boston, MA: 1986), pp.50-60. 
10 G.B. Pyrah, Imperial Policy and South Africa: 1902-10 (Oxford: 1955), 
pp.189-193. 
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agitation against Chinese labour was not therefore singularly framed, but 
covered a broad area of debate bringing in wider themes such as the influence 
of capital, the legacy of slavery and the nature of the constitutional settlement in 
South Africa. 
In seeking to assess the wider context in which the Liberal campaign was 
advanced, the work of Kevin Grant is particularly useful. Grant situates the 
Chinese labour controversy within the wider political and humanitarian reaction 
to the ‘new slaveries’ of early-twentieth century Africa. Critically, while the 
political reaction against Chinese labour adopted the abolitionist discourse of 
contemporary anti-slavery agitations such as the Congo reform campaign, 
Grant argues that it differed fundamentally in its characterisation of the Chinese, 
stating that ‘there was no latter-day equivalent of the classic abolitionist image 
of the African in chains, imploring, “Am I not a man and a brother?” By contrast, 
the Chinese were caricatured as conniving, depraved, ridiculous, and, 
occasionally, pathetic.’11 Instead, Grant argues, while the charge of slavery was 
certainly one which carried immense political weight in Edwardian politics, the 
core component of the British reaction against Chinese labour was at heart an 
expression of British class politics. Building on earlier critiques of the role of 
capital in the South African War, as well as the perception of an attack on trade 
union rights in Britain in the form of the Taff Vale judgement, Chinese labour 
was presented as a device by which the mine-owners of the Transvaal could cut 
costs and exclude unionised white labour from the Rand.12 Certainly, such 
rhetoric formed a key part of the Liberal campaign, particularly for candidates 
with links to the Trade Union movement. However, as this chapter will explore, it 
was not entirely the case that the Chinese labourer only appeared as an 
accomplice rather than a victim in Liberal rhetoric, nor indeed were appeals for 
the defence of ‘white’ South Africa constrained to discussions of the labour 
market. 
The Liberal use of the Chinese labour question has in particular been studied in 
relation to the landslide Liberal victory of 1906. Although the Liberal crusade 
against tariff reform undoubtedly represented the central issue of the election 
                                            
11 Kevin Grant, A Civilised Savagery: Britain and the New Slaveries in Africa, 
1884-1926 (New York: 2005), p.83. 
12 Ibid., pp.89-94 
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campaign, the party’s opposition to the use of Chinese labour nonetheless 
played a central role. David Torrance, for example, attributes the enormity of the 
Unionist defeat to the impact of the Chinese labour question.13 A.K. Russell, in 
his study of the contest, interprets the issue as having played a key role in 
generating working class support for the Liberals, or at least opposition to the 
Unionists, as Chinese labour came to be presented as an attack by capital on 
trade unionism and the rights of working men.14 While making no direct 
assessment as to the impact of the issue on the result, Grant likewise identifies 
the Liberal class-based rhetoric on Chinese Labour as continuing into the 
election campaign.15 Not all studies of the Liberal campaign have necessarily 
drawn this conclusion: Scott C. Spencer, for example, has characterised both 
Liberal and Unionist rhetoric on the issue as having placed stress on the ideals 
of British character, in the Liberal case ideals which centred around notions of 
liberty.16  
In any case, the nature of the Liberal assault on Chinese labour at the election 
of 1906 was highly controversial, with speakers accused of practicing deception 
and underhand tactics: Pyrah characterises the Liberal campaign as one in 
which ‘false accusations were bandied about in the most alarming and 
unscrupulous fashion; high principles were forgotten in the heat of the election 
campaign.’17 Certainly, the party’s opponents adopted the view that an unfair 
campaign had been waged against them: as Russell notes, after the question of 
free trade Chinese labour was ‘probably the most important single issue of the 
election which many Unionists later seized on as a convenient explanation of 
defeat.’18 The supposed underhandedness of Liberal electioneering also 
concerned not just the characterisation of the system as slavery, or indeed the 
willingness or ability of the Liberal government to actually bring about an 
immediate end to the system, but additionally the means by which the campaign 
                                            
13 Torrance, Strange Death of the Liberal Empire, p.40. 
14 Russell, Liberal Landslide, p.196. 
15 Grant, A Civilised Savagery, pp.98-105. 
16 Scott C. Spencer, ‘British Liberty Stained: “Chinese Slavery,” Imperial 
Rhetoric, and the 1906 
British General Election’, Madison Historical Review 7 (2010), 22. 
17 Pyrah, Imperial Policy and South Africa, p.192. 
18 A.K. Russell, Liberal Landslide: The General Election of 1906 (Newton 
Abbott: 1973), p.196. 
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was fought. As James Thompson notes, the imagery of chained Chinamen 
used in Liberal posters, and indeed in street demonstrations of mocked-up 
Chinese gangs, was particularly seized upon as a means of winning votes 
through allusions to slavery without making the explicit charge.19 Although many 
Liberal candidates did not shy away from directly deploying the term slavery, 
the controversy surrounding Liberal imagery in the contest further serves to 
stress the significance of allusion to the politics of anti-slavery in relation to 
Chinese labour.  
Given the volume of scholarship on the nature of Chinese labour as a political 
issue, it is in many ways surprising that there has been relatively little 
examination of the public politics of the question after the return of the Liberal 
government at the election. Grant briefly comments that after the election the 
Liberal ministry did not bring about an immediate end to the system, instead 
putting in place a means of voluntary repatriation and proceeding with the grant 
of full responsible self-government to the colony, but otherwise does not really 
explore the nature of these debates. While more in-depth studies such as 
Ronald Hyam’s Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office provide a detailed 
analysis of the debates Chinese labour sparked within the Liberal government 
post-election, the public political dimension of these debates is touched upon 
only briefly.20 A notable exception to this trend can however be found in Richard 
Toye’s study of Churchill’s relationship with the British Empire. Although 
naturally focused on Churchill’s own position, Toye’s account nonetheless 
provides a solid account of the public political dimension of the South African 
question up to the victory of Het Volk in 1907. Contrary to the popular notion 
that the Chinese labour controversy largely faded from the public eye, Toye 
highlights the very public political rows connected not just with the vote of 
censure against Lord Milner over the revelation over the official sanction his 
administration in South Africa had given to the flogging of the Chinese, but 
critically also the suggestion that the imperial veto could be used to regulate any 
                                            
19 James Thompson, ‘“Pictorial lies”? —Posters and Politics in Britain c. 1880–
1914’, Past & Present 197 (2007), 177-78. It is worth noting that in making 
these charges Unionists often exaggerated the prevalence of such tactics in the 
Liberal campaign: see Richard Toye, Churchill’s Empire: The World that Made 
Him and the World He Made (London: 2010), p.98. 
20 Ronald Hyam, Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office 1905 - 1908: the 
watershed of the Empire-Commonwealth (London: 1968), ch.4. 
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legislation that a future self-governing Transvaal might pass on the issue.21 
These events are also contextualised within the other South African challenges 
facing Churchill at the Colonial Office, such as the political response to the 
Bambatha Uprising of 1906 and the protests accompanying the restrictions 
imposed upon non-white imperial subjects in the Transvaal.22 
Nonetheless, the bulk of scholarship on this period has largely represented a 
more traditional imperial-administrative focus on the relationship between key 
political figures, and the calculations behind the policy adopted. Older historical 
accounts have traditionally asserted that the Liberal decision to grant 
responsible self-government was in large part brought about by through the 
lobbying of the Boer leader J. C. Smuts, who is credited with having convinced 
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and by extension the Liberal cabinet, of the 
potential to secure Boer loyalty through a magnanimous grant of full self-
government.23 Such assessments have been fundamentally challenged by the 
work of Ronald Hyam. Liberal policy in South Africa, Hyam charges, was not the 
result of genuine magnanimity but a practical calculation designed to firstly rid 
the government of the embarrassment of administering a system of Chinese 
indentured labour which it found it could not abolish, and secondly to quickly 
secure British supremacy in the Transvaal by introducing full self-government. 
Smuts’ lobbying had little influence on the policy, and the suggestion of 
magnanimity was only subsequently adopted after the surprise victory of Het 
Volk, against the wishes and expectations of the Liberal ministry.24 Certainly, 
                                            
21 Toye, Churchill’s Empire, pp.99-101. 
22 Ibid., pp.101-110. 
23 For examples of this interpretation, see Nicholas Mansergh, South Africa, 
1906-1961: The Price of Magnanimity (London: 1962), pp.15-37. Pyrah, 
Imperial Policy and South Africa, pp.164-71; Max Beloff, Imperial Sunset 
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24 Ronald Hyam, ‘The myth of the “Magnanimous Gesture”: the Liberal 
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Hyam’s thesis that the grant of responsible government was fundamentally 
linked to the question of Chinese labour is persuasive, and indeed as this 
chapter demonstrates Liberal speakers sought to make a virtue of the fact that it 
was a self-governing Transvaal which would ultimately make a decision on the 
policy. However, as examined in the previous chapter, calls for the restoration 
of full self-government to the Transvaal had for some years formed a significant 
component of the Liberal response to the South African question. 
This chapter aims to build upon the existing scholarship on the Liberal 
government’s motivations for the grant of self-government by exploring the 
political context within which the question of responsible government was 
articulated. As will be argued, Liberals advocated a swift grant of full self-
government not simply as a solution to the problem of Chinese labour but as a 
measure grounded in past imperial practice and necessary for the good 
government of South Africa. Likewise, this chapter will demonstrate that while in 
many ways Chinese labour and the grant of responsible government have 
largely been treated as two distinct controversies in the existing historiography, 
the public political dimensions of both debates were not simply connected, but 
formed part of a wider continuity of Liberal imperial politics directly following on 
from the South African war. 
Chinese Labour and Anti-slavery Rhetoric 
Given the famous characterisation of the Chinese labour ordinance as a system 
of slavery, humanitarian and abolitionist discourses played a central role in 
framing Liberal rhetoric on the controversy. Chinese labour was presented as 
an immoral aberration of imperial policy, a system fundamentally at odds with 
the history and character of the Empire. Although as Grant notes the agitation in 
Britain against Chinese labour did not simply represent the translation of 
contemporary anti-slavery politics into the field of South African policy, this 
section argues nonetheless that Liberal characterisations of the policy as a 
system of slavery were not merely a humanitarian gloss upon the surface of 
what was essentially a question of white labour. Instead, the Liberal assault 
upon Chinese labour represented the latest iteration of earlier anxieties about 
the methods of imperialism at work in the Transvaal. 
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While the main focus of the Chinese labour controversy was not to begin in 
earnest until 1904, the degree to which such themes featured in Liberal rhetoric 
on the South African question in the direct aftermath of the war is nonetheless 
striking. Sir William Harcourt, for example, gave a speech at Abertillery on 9 
October which focused heavily on the consequences of the conflict. Although 
primarily concerned with the impact of the war on the nation’s finances, in a 
surprisingly prescient section the former Liberal leader went on to discuss what 
he termed as the ‘native labour problem’. The gold mines, he noted, had 
suffered from a labour shortage prior to the war, and the mine-owners were now 
seeking to deploy various schemes to address this problem. However, stressing 
that ‘under the British flag there cannot be such a thing as forced labour’, 
Harcourt condemned the proposal to force the Black African population to work 
through punitive taxation, warning that such a policy would risk the safety of the 
region: ‘if we are going to have a Boer war followed by a native disturbance, 
that is about the most serious thing that could happen in South Africa.’ Notably, 
given the degree to which his colleagues would subsequently present Chinese 
labour as an assault on white labour, Harcourt dismissed the notion that the 
mines could be worked with white labour, on the grounds that the ‘the white 
man will not work with the black man.’ Most strikingly however, he then went on 
to condemn ‘the worst of all possible plans proposed, and that is to introduce 
Asiatic labour, by which I mean Chinese labour’, a system which he described 
as having proved elsewhere to be ‘so injurious to the population, so repugnant 
to the working white man there, that it has been universally discontinued 
throughout the whole of our colonies.’ 25 Harcourt’s rhetoric  was unusual for 
1902: nonetheless, in referencing the notion of slavery and the implications of 
Chinese labour for South Africa, Harcourt was touching upon many of the 
themes which were to become central to debate in the following years. 
While Harcourt’s direct attack on the potential for Chinese labour may have 
been exceptional for its time, the general problems arising from the labour 
shortages on the Rand were nonetheless to become regular features in Liberal 
speeches over the course of the following months. In particular, the policy of 
‘native taxation’ as a means of expanding the availability of labour came in for 
                                            
25 Sir William Harcourt, speech at Abertillery, 9 October 1902, reported in 
Manchester Guardian, 10 Oct. 1902. 
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severe criticism, with Liberal speakers adopting the language of abolitionism in 
advancing their critiques. For example, in a speech at Eccles on 23 January 
1903 Herbert Samuel, the Member of Parliament for Cleveland and a future 
leader of the Liberal Party, declared that while ‘the native of South Africa should 
pay a reasonable tax in return for the civilised government he got’, if there was 
to be ‘additional taxation in order to force him to go to the mines, that was a 
system of veiled slavery, and nothing else.’ Continuing, Samuel asserted the 
war had been supposedly fought in part ‘to improve the condition of the natives, 
who had been grossly misused by their Boer masters’, and that to introduce an 
indirect system of slavery under British rule ‘would be a gross betrayal, a grave 
political crime’.26 Samuel would emerge as one of the leading backbenchers 
behind the campaign against ‘Chinese slavery’, so it is significant that in early 
1903 he was already deploying the language of anti-slavery in relation to South 
Africa, even before the importation of indentured Chinese labour was added to 
the mix.27 
Neither was Samuel the only Liberal figure to compare the use of Black African 
labour to slavery. Speaking at Hull the Wednesday after Samuel’s speech, H.H. 
Asquith also touched upon the issue of forced African labour. While noting that 
‘only a charlatan could pretend to have in his pocket a solution of the native 
question’, he nonetheless declared to his audience that the whole of the Empire 
was ‘resolutely, uncompromisingly opposed to the establishment of the 
recognition in these territories, in any form or under any name, of open or of 
disguised slavery’.28 The use of coerced labour was similarly condemned by 
Harcourt’s son, L.V. Harcourt, a rising figure in the party who was to enter the 
House of Commons in the Rossendale by-election of 1904. Speaking at 
Failsworth on 3 March 1903, the younger Harcourt attacked the use of high 
taxation to force labourers either into the mines or into the gaol, declaring the 
policy to be ‘only slavery at one remove in which they substituted the prison for 
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the lash.’29 Notably, Liberal speakers also drew upon appeals to British 
character and the role of abolitionism in the nation’s identity in their attacks on 
the system: at a Liberal event in Rochester on 26 March 1903, the former 
Liberal minister George Leveson-Gower declared that ‘it was with a feeling of 
shame that he considered it necessary to address any body of Englishmen in 
protest against a form of slavery’, insisting that the duty of the humane man 
must be to ‘protest against his Government constituting itself a “nigger-driver” 
for mining magnates’.30 There thus existed already a significant anti-slavery 
critique within Liberal rhetoric on the reconstruction of South Africa prior to the 
advent of Chinese labour. 
The terms of the Chinese Labour ordinance, which had been lobbied for by the 
mining industry and Lord Milner before finally securing the approval of the 
Imperial government at the end of 1903, established a system by which 
labourers would be recruited from China for fixed contracted periods. While the 
labourers were waged, the restrictions imposed by the ordinance on movement 
and property rights, as well as the alleged abuses such as the buying and 
selling of labourers between mines and ill-treatment in the compounds saw the 
system condemned as slavery by its opponents in Britain.31 As discussed 
above, the explicit characterisation of Chinese labour as slavery formed by far 
the most controversial element of the Liberal campaign against the policy, at 
least in the eyes of their opponents. During the election campaign of 1906 the 
Unionist Press in particular focused their fury upon the use of the term slavery: 
the Daily Mail, for example, responded to the opening of Campbell-
Bannerman’s campaign with three consecutive editorials attacking the ‘hoax’ of 
slavery, its condemnation if anything intensified rather than mitigated by the 
Prime Minister’s relatively brief reference to the subject in his election 
address.32 Similarly, as Thompson notes, the attack on the lie of slavery 
represented a key strategy of the Unionist response in the debate on the loyal 
address, most famously leading to Churchill’s admission that the policy cannot 
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‘be classified as slavery in the extreme acceptance of the word without some 
risk of terminological inexactitude’, a formula nonetheless sufficiently vague so 
as not to entirely rule out the charge of slavery.33  
For all the contention over the use of the term slavery, it was however far from a 
universal element of the Liberal assault: while many speakers certainly attacked 
Chinese slavery, many others avoided such direct characterisations. In a 
speech at Consett on 26 February 1904 John Morley, for example, insisted that 
he would not get into a discussion as to whether the conditions for the Chinese 
‘were or were not slavery’, merely noting that Unionist arguments in the defence 
of the policy could be readily deployed in the defence of slavery.34 Similarly, 
Liberal speakers deliberately qualified their references to slavery. During the 
Rossendale by-election L.V. Harcourt charged that indentured Chinese labour 
was ‘so slightly removed from slavery as to be almost indistinguishable’.35 
Others still sought refuge in what were effectively synonyms, Charles Trevelyan 
declaring in a speech at Manchester on 25 March 1904 that if the government 
objected to the word slavery, then he would call the system ‘qualified slavery, 
bondage, serfdom – anything they pleased. But it was certainly not freedom.’36 
Such tactics, in effect, served as the rhetorical equivalent of the election posters 
of chained Chinamen, suggesting slavery to the audience while allowing for 
deniability on the part of the speaker. Ultimately, the furore around the specific 
term of slavery is best understood not so much as a dispute over the specifics 
of the scheme, but more in relation to the moral connotations of what slavery 
represented. 
For this reason, the charge that the reputation of Britain and the Empire risked 
being tarnished represented a particularly important element of Liberal rhetoric 
on Chinese labour. For example, the Radical Member of Parliament for 
Manchester North, Charles Schwann, condemned the policy in February 1904 
as a ‘stain upon the British nation’, insisting that public sentiment was opposed 
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to Chinese labour.37 Likewise, at a protest meeting in Sheffield on 30 March 
1904, Thomas Shaw declared it to be ‘defamatory and lowering to the British 
Empire to have such traffic in human life.’38 In particular, Liberal critics of the 
policy drew upon the legacy of abolitionism in Britain in seeking to portray 
Chinese labour as an immoral departure from British imperial traditions. 
Campbell-Bannerman, for example, drew upon anti-slavery rhetoric in a speech 
at Hanley on 30 June 1904. Although he was careful not to characterise the 
scheme as slavery, referring instead to ‘servile alien labour’, the Liberal leader 
nonetheless declared: 
Who would have imagined a British government advocating 
such a policy – a British government beseeching for it, 
clamouring for it, – and the Parliament of Great Britain – a 
Parliament in which Wilberforce sat and of which Fowell Buxton 
was a member – voting for it?39  
Similarly, during the election campaign of 1906 T.J. Macnamara, seeking re-
election for the seat of North Camberwell, used a meeting in his constituency to 
attack the Unionist government for having ‘debauched and prostituted the great 
name of Englishmen by writing the words “Chinese slavery” across the name of 
Wilberforce’.40 The historic force of British public sentiment was also often 
stressed: in his speech of February 1904 Schwann compared opposition to the 
government’s complicity in the scheme to past cases of public outcry when the 
Royal Navy had been ‘ordered by the Government to give up slaves who had 
taken refuge on board our vessels’, noting that ‘the order was repudiated by the 
entire English people’, forcing the government to rescind it.41 In this manner, 
Chinese labour was further characterised as a departure from and a betrayal of 
Britain’s opposition to slave labour. 
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This attack on Chinese labour as a breach of British imperial tradition was 
further emphasised through comparison of the policy with schemes adopted by 
other imperial and colonial authorities. At a protest meeting in Bolton on 25 
March 1904, the Liberal MP George Harwood argued against the introduction of 
Chinese labour, pointing out that: 
The Portuguese Government tried indentured Chinese labour in 
South America, and it was to be employed under better 
conditions than those now proposed in South Africa. After ten 
years’ trial, the scandal was found to be so great that the British 
government insisted that Portugal should drop this labour. Yet 
thirty years later we were going to do the same thing we then 
condemned.42 
Harwood’s rhetoric can be seen to have combined the idea of British imperial 
exceptionalism with notions of Britain’s past as a regulatory power correcting 
the abuses of other empires in order to frame the policy as an aberration of 
British imperial methods, despite the use of indentured labour elsewhere in the 
British Empire. Another scathing comparison was made by the trade unionist 
and Member of Parliament Charles Fenwick: speaking at the May 1904 meeting 
of the National Liberal Federation, Fenwick noted that, in Britain’s past 
treatment of the Boers of the Transvaal, there had been instrumented ‘two 
solemn Conventions […] in which our government laid it down that no slavery or 
even apprenticeship of the nature of slavery would be permitted within the state 
of the South African Republic’, describing it as a ‘cruel and bitter irony’ that the 
British themselves were introducing forced labour to the Transvaal.43 Liberal 
speakers were thus able to adapt earlier narratives attacking the moral 
character of the Boers at the time of the South African War in order to advance 
their critiques of Chinese labour.  
In relation to this continuing politics of abolitionism, it is important to consider 
carefully Grant’s assessment that the Liberal agitation against Chinese labour 
differed in relation to other anti-slavery campaigns in Africa because the 
Chinese were presented not as victims but as collaborators. Certainly it was the 
case that the Chinese were often framed by Liberal speakers as displacing 
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white labour in the Transvaal and threatening the social fabric of the colony. At 
the same time, however, Liberal speakers certainly did on occasion 
characterise the Chinese as victims of the policy, in what can be seen as a 
further continuation of anti-slavery rhetorical tropes. Appearing alongside 
Morley and Churchill at a Liberal rally in Manchester on 13 May 1904, Schwann 
attacked the Chinese labour ordinance for the high mortality rate it was likely to 
inflict upon the Chinese. Mocking Balfour’s claim in a recent speech to the 
Primrose League, that Unionists stood for imperialism and liberty, he declared: 
We knew what Tory liberty was. It was liberty to the mine-owner 
to bring over Chinese to South Africa and keep them there in 
compounds for three years and then send them back – dead or 
alive – to China; and in his opinion more would be dead than 
alive when the three years were over. We had seen how the 
mine-owners treated the Kaffirs – those patient labourers, – and 
we could only expect the sjambok and the mortality would be 
still more strongly felt by the Chinese.44 
In some respects, this was as much a moral criticism of the mine-owners as it 
was a discussion of the actual position of the Chinese. Nonetheless, the focus 
on the conditions the Chinese were to be subject to, and particular the 
suggestion that their condition would be worse than that of the Black African 
labourers in the mines, stands in contrast to the assumption that the 
characterisation of the Chinese was overwhelmingly negative. Additionally, the 
attack on ‘Tory liberty’, might also be seen as supporting Spencer’s assessment 
of the controversy as one which was used as the basis for contesting the 
language of liberty in British party politics. 
Other sympathetic characterisations of the Chinese labourer also stressed the 
denial of his rights as a worker, despite the wider narrative of competition for 
labour. In his speech at Sheffield for example, Shaw declared to his audience 
that ‘he had no brief for the Chinaman, but if he was to go in let him go in with 
the rights of a free human being’, notably also attacking the ordinance for 
dealing with ‘human chattels and not men with human rights.’45 Others attacked 
the conditions in which the Chinese were to be bound. Speaking at the 
Manchester Reform Club in April 1904, the Liberal peer Earl Beauchamp 
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attacked Chinese labour explicitly on the grounds of ‘common humanity’, 
condemning the fact ‘the Chinese labourer could not hold land, and no minimum 
rate of wages was laid down.’ Significantly, Beauchamp noted that at the time of 
the South African War, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York issued a prayer 
for ‘equal justice between man and man. What the Church of England prayed 
for then they might fairly pray for now, whether the man be white, black, or 
yellow.’46 The advocacy of equal justice of course did not mean full racial 
equality, but it was nonetheless significant that Liberal speakers also portrayed 
the Chinese as victims of economic injustice at the hands of the imperial 
authorities.  
Concerns for the treatment of the Chinese resurfaced as the fall of the Unionist 
government and the election of 1906 drew nearer, although critically these later 
characterisations were often accompanied by, and indeed in cases secondary 
to, an implied threat by the Chinese to the social and moral fabric of South 
Africa. Speaking in support of Churchill’s candidacy for Manchester North West 
in October 1905, Major John Seely, who had defected from the Conservatives 
to the Liberals in opposition to Chinese labour, identified the attacks by runaway 
labourers on the white population of the Transvaal as the inevitable result of the 
conditions in which they were forced to exist. If, he argued, ‘we treated a man 
as a social outcast he would, in return, behave like a pariah dog. If we denied a 
man the elementary rights of freedom we brutalised him’.47 Similarly, addressing 
a demonstration at Derby on 8 January 1906, John Burns, by this point 
President of the Local Government Board in Campbell-Bannerman’s 
government, attacked the South African War as a war which had been fought: 
To endow the Chinese coolies – to chain them in slavery and 
keep them in combines, to enclose them like beasts and to flog 
them like animals, and to subject them to undue abominations 
which a celibate industrial life always did and always would 
bring about.48 
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Continuing, Burns declared that the ordinance had prostituted British honour by 
‘enslaving the Chinese, the oldest and greatest people in the world.’49 In both 
cases, the rhetoric is used to support the charge that the ordinance posed a 
threat to the life of the Transvaal Colony. Nonetheless, such language can also 
be seen as having further framed the Chinese as victims, rather than willing 
abetters, in the system of Chinese indentured labour. 
Ultimately, while much of the sound and fury surrounding the Liberal attack on 
the Chinese labour ordinance might be characterised broadly as the politics of 
anti-slavery, the subsequent sections will demonstrate that this formed only part 
of the focus on the policy. Nonetheless, beyond the furore over the specific cry 
of slavery the dynamics of humanitarian politics played a significant role in 
shaping Liberal rhetoric on the subject. The controversy over Chinese labour 
did not simply emerge following the initial publicity given to the mine-owners’ 
request for the ordinance, but was directly built upon earlier debates concerning 
the coercion of the Black African labour force. Likewise, the Chinese were not 
solely presented as collaborators in the system, but were also characterised 
themselves as victims of the policy. While the Liberal campaign against Chinese 
labour in South Africa was in many ways distinct from contemporary abolitionist 
causes such as that of the Congo Reform movement, the agitation was 
nonetheless effective at adopting the rhetoric of anti-slavery because it 
ultimately dealt with many of the same anxieties about the morality of 
imperialism, all the more so since it challenged the supposed exceptionalism of 
British imperial rule. 
White Labour and Chinese Labour 
If the rhetoric of abolitionism furnished Liberals with a moral critique of the 
Chinese labour ordinance, it was the focus on the position of white labour in 
South Africa which gave the Liberal campaign much of its political force. 
Chinese labour, the scheme’s opponents charged, demonstrated the true extent 
of underhand capitalist efforts to diminish the position of the working classes 
and represented a betrayal of the cause for which the Empire had fought during 
the war. Given the degree to which this argument was advanced against a 
backdrop of increased labour agitation in Britain, it is tempting to regard the 
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campaign against Chinese labour as a reversal of earlier dynamics in the 
politics of the South African question: rather than positions on South Africa 
being articulated in relation to domestic political concerns and past 
controversies, here was a case in which an ostensibly imperial issue was used 
to advance wider concerns about the position of labour in Britain. However, 
while the extent to which the politics of Chinese labour resonated with working 
class concerns in Britain should not be understated, the essentially imperial 
dynamics of the controversy should not be ignored. As such, this chapter 
argues that the labour critique of the ordinance not only recalled earlier 
narratives framing capitalist interests as sectional and harmful to the wellbeing 
of the Empire, but was also used by Radical speakers to articulate wider 
anxieties over democracy and trade unionism within the Empire. 
In many respects, it is unsurprising that attacks on the role of capital should 
have formed a key element of the most prominent post-war iteration of the 
South African question. As previously examined, in the actual debates on the 
causes of the war at time of the Transvaal crisis the focus was primarily upon 
the consequences of action or inaction for the governance of South Africa and 
the security of Britain’s imperial position. Although it that had always been 
something of a running undercurrent in Liberal rhetoric following the aftermath 
of the Jameson Raid, the actions of the mine-owning capitalists on the Rand 
had generally been a secondary issue. Yet throughout the course of the war 
and after, Liberal figures who had opposed the justice of the conflict 
increasingly characterised the war as one fought on behalf of the mine-owners. 
Additionally, the dawn of the twentieth century had seen the rise of J.A. 
Hobson’s theories of imperialism as a capital-driven enterprise.50 The capital-
focused critique of Chinese labour did not however simply reflect a translation of 
Hobson’s analysis of imperialism into the rhetoric of Liberal politics: although 
many of the same tropes are recognisable, by and large Liberal speakers did 
not use the question of Chinese labour to advance Hobson’s wider thesis. 
Instead, as with the arguments deployed following the Jameson Raid, the focus 
of Liberal attacks on mine-owning interests were often articulated as critiques of 
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character and the influence of sectional interests, as opposed to imperial 
interests. 
Liberal attacks on the character and background of the mine-owners on the 
Rand primarily served to frame their interests as contrary to those of the Empire 
at large. Given that the Unionist government sought to justify the Chinese 
labour ordinance as necessary for the economic reconstruction of the 
Transvaal, there was thus an important rhetorical advantage in seeking to frame 
the mining interest as sectional in nature, even antagonistic and menacing, by 
characterising the mine-owners as a primarily foreign element. For example, in 
an address to his prospective constituents on 22 March 1904 the Liberal 
candidate for Manchester South, Arthur Haworth, attacked the exclusion of 
white labour from the mining industry, as he put it, by the ‘gentlemen with the 
foreign names’.51 Echoing Hobson, anti-Semitic rhetoric was similarly deployed 
to frame the ordinance as favouring alien interests over British interests. In the 
famous Hyde Park rally against the ordinance, Burns attacked the Unionist-
dominated Parliament as the ‘handmaid of the Jewish plutocracy’ which was 
seeking to ‘starve “Britishers” out of existence altogether’.52 Likewise, appearing 
on the platform alongside Shaw at Sheffield the following week, the Liberal 
candidate John Tudor Walters declared that ‘this country was not prepared to 
allow South Africa to be handed over to a company of German Jews’.53  
Similar language resurfaced in the run up to the general election. For example, 
R.L. Outhwaite, the Liberal candidate standing in opposition to Chamberlain, 
used a speech in Manchester on 14 November 1905 to charge that ‘the 
monopoly control of wealth in South Africa is very close, and entirely in hands of 
a group of cosmopolitan financiers’, although intriguingly he went on to place 
the blame for Chinese labour not on the mine-owners themselves but on the 
imperial authorities whom had allowed themselves to be controlled by the 
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mining interests.54 The force of anti-Semitic appeals in and of themselves 
should not be discounted in Edwardian political culture. Nonetheless, the 
explicit characterisation of the mine-owners as an alien interest served to 
undermine Unionist claims that Chinese labour was for the good of South Africa 
and for the good of the Empire, by presenting its key backers as an alien 
element with no wider interest in imperial affairs.  
The imperial basis for the Chinese labour ordinance was further undermined by 
suggestions that the mining industry did not actually require assistance, or at 
least did not deserve it. Liberal speakers insisted that there was no necessity for 
the introduction of Chinese labour, a line of argument that served both to 
highlight the greed of the mine-owners and to link the issue firmly with wage-
politics. The labour shortage in the mines, many Liberals responded, was 
primarily down to the mine-owners’ refusal to pay the Black African labour force 
a reasonable wage, and was often explicitly linked to the earlier scheme of 
coerced labour in the Transvaal. In his speech to the National Liberal 
Federation on the subject, Fenwick attributed the labour shortage to a 
combination of low wages and the after-effects of the war, insisting that ‘if 
wages were low and treatment bad […] then we must not be surprised if labour 
did not gravitate to that particular industry.’ It was not, he declared, ‘the duty of 
the government to provide cheap labour for employers’.55 This claim was 
repeated by no less than Campbell-Bannerman himself, who in an election 
speech at Chester on 10 January 1906 declared that: 
There is plenty of labour in this country and there is plenty in 
South Africa at a price. The whole thing is a question of price. I 
have never been satisfied that black labour cannot be obtained 
in South Africa, and I have never been satisfied that white 
labour cannot be employed much more largely than it is.56 
Again, the emphasis on the price of labour is used to explain away the shortfall 
in the workforce, characterising the situation as that of the mine-owners’ own 
making. However, Campbell-Bannerman’s statement also advanced this 
critique alongside what was to become the key charge of the Liberal campaign 
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against the ordinance: the argument that Chinese labour was closing down 
opportunities for, and indeed actively displacing, British workers. 
Liberal speakers characterised the employment of Chinese labour as opposed 
to British labour as a betrayal of expectations for the reconstruction of South 
Africa. Speaking at Glasgow in January 1904, Campbell-Bannerman attacked 
the government for ‘slamming the door in the face of British emigrants’ by 
proposing to bring in Chinese labour.57 Similarly Asquith, speaking the following 
month at Harrogate, condemned what he described as ‘the importation into a 
colony of white men of this alien element’, given that the British people had 
been led to expect the colony ‘would become a widening field for the energy 
and enterprise of the subjects of his majesty’.58  
In many cases, Liberal speakers framed the failure to deliver opportunities for 
the employment of British settlers as an explicit breach of the justifications given 
for the South African War. In his speech at Consett, Morley drew attention to the 
claims made in the early stages of the conflict that the opening up of South 
Africa would represent ‘a grand field for our surplus population’. ‘The surplus 
population’, he continued, ‘went out and found itself more surplus there than it 
was at home.’59 This was a somewhat disingenuous argument from Morley: 
although it was the case that defenders of the conflict had advanced the claim 
that the Transvaal would be opened up as field of migration, this had never 
been a main focus of the debates on the war, which after all had been justified 
in its early stages as explicitly not a war for territorial gain and economic 
advantage. Indeed, to the extent it had ever been a miners’ war, it was in 
relation to the Uitlanders rather than potential miners from Britain or elsewhere 
in the Empire, and even then concerned more with political status rather than 
questions of employment. Nonetheless, the suggestion that one of the primary 
causes of the war had been betrayed by the sectional interests of the Unionist 
government represented a powerful rhetorical line, adding further force to the 
Liberal assault upon the Chinese labour ordinance. 
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Beyond the utilisation of the Chinese labour issue as a means of attacking the 
premise of the conflict, the particular notion that Chinese labour had been 
adopted as an alternative to British labour, or more generally white labour, 
represented a specific focus on wage-politics. Although the mine-owners’ desire 
to avoid paying high labour costs had already been blamed for causing the 
labour shortage in the first place, Liberal speakers nonetheless also presented 
the desire to drive down the wages of white labourers, so as to effectively 
exclude them from the industry, as not just the consequence of but the specific 
aim of the ordinance. In his speech at Sheffield, Tudor Walters asked what had 
become of ‘the Cornish miners who left South Africa before the war began? 
They were waiting to return, but not at a rate of 6s. 3d. per week. They desired 
a fair return for their labour.’60   
A similar point was advanced by Beauchamp, who drew upon his experience as 
Governor of New South Wales in order to advance his argument: in the gold 
mines of Victoria, he declared, ‘white men were employed at the trade union 
rate of wages. If white men could be employed in Victoria in the mines why 
should they not be so employed on the Rand?’61 Significantly, as Beauchamp’s 
rhetoric suggests, this critique of Chinese labour not only argued that white 
labour was to be excluded for reasons of cutting cost, but also presented the 
ordinance as a deliberate attempt on the part of the mine-owners to exclude 
trade unionism from South Africa. In a speech at Bolton on 19 December 1905, 
Harwood recounted to his audience the meetings he had with the mine-owners 
during his visit to South Africa following the end of the war. Remarking that he 
had suggested to them at the time that there was no reason why the mines 
could not be worked with white labour, Harwood declared that their response 
had been ‘we don’t want any of your trade unionism over here’.62 Chinese 
labour in this fashion was then characterised not just as a means of robbing the 
white working class of opportunities for employment, but as a device used to 
permanently stall the expansion of organised labour into South Africa. 
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Strikingly, Liberal speakers explicitly linked this language of labour politics with 
the franchise questions which had dominated debate during the crisis of 1899. 
White labourers were unwanted in the Transvaal, the argument went, because 
white working men would demand the vote, which in turn risked capitalist 
profits. For example, Thomas Horridge, who was to successfully unseat Balfour 
in Manchester East during the general election, used a speech in April 1904 to 
declare that ‘if the British workman were allowed to go out there with decent 
wages he would want, what, indeed, the South African war was said to be for, a 
vote – and there was not a vote in South Africa now.’63 Similar language was 
deployed by Shaw, who in a speech at Manchester on 9 December 1904 
asserted that ‘not only did the mining magnates want cheap labour by force; 
they wanted no political opinion which would conflict with the capitalist interest. 
At the back of the introduction of Chinese labour was the desire to have human 
chattels who would be under conditions of non-citizenship.’64 Similarly 
Outhwaite identified the Chinese labour policy as having emerged from ‘the 
mine magnates’ dread and hatred of white democracy’, noting that the mining 
Press in Johannesburg had insisted that there should be no emergence of a 
Labour party on the back of poor white migration, as there had been in 
Australia.65  
Although naturally such arguments might be expected to occur more commonly 
among speakers on the Radical wing of British Liberal politics, they were by no 
means exclusive to those with established labour connections: in a speech at 
Dalkeith on 29 March 1906, Sir Edward Grey deployed the very same line of 
argument, declaring that ‘the mineowners were afraid that South Africa might 
become like Australia – with the Labour vote in a majority – or, for that matter, 
like what they had at home.’66 It is necessary to consider some of the more 
alarmist warnings about Chinese labour with such critiques in mind. Lloyd 
George famously warned, in a speech at Pwllheli on 16 January 1906, that if 
Chinese labour could be introduced in South Africa on grounds of cost then it 
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could also lead to ‘slavery on the hills of Wales’.67 Such a line of attack was 
effective not so much because of any realistic anxiety about such a scenario, 
but, as Grant suggests, because of the wider anxieties about the perceived 
efforts to thwart the advance of working class politics in Britain in this period. 
Indeed, in this sense such rhetoric can be seen almost as a classed-based 
adaptation of the pejorative mid-Victorian understandings of imperialism, with 
the abuses of liberty in the colonial Empire at risk of corrupting society at the 
metropole. 
The economic-labour dimension of the Chinese labour controversy thus played 
a vital role in not just shaping Liberal rhetoric on the issue itself, but in 
articulating a wider critique of the form of imperialism which it represented. 
Attacks on the background, character and motivations of the mine-owners 
served to contest the idea that Chinese labour was for the good of South Africa, 
instead presenting the Unionist government’s policies as serving sectional 
rather than imperial interests. Furthermore, while Chinese labour was presented 
as an attack on the employment of white British labourers, it was not just the 
material displacement of British workers which was condemned, but what such 
actions came to symbolise: namely, the shutting out of trade unionism and 
labour democracy from a part of the Empire of white settlement. While this 
undoubtedly reflected home concerns, it also struck at the core of the liberal 
ideal of the self-governing Empire run in the interests of the many, rather than 
for the benefit of elite sections. Yet if this critique of Chinese labour is to be 
considered evidence of the spread of white labourism in Britain, its limitations 
also have to be acknowledged: unlike with the rhetoric which was to accompany 
imperial labour disputes later on in the Edwardian period, such as in relation to 
the 1914 deportations of white labour leaders from South Africa, there was little 
effort on the part of Liberal speakers to frame Chinese labour as an attack upon 
an imperial working class, rather than upon British workers directly.68 In respect 
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to the Chinese labour controversy at least, the Liberal vision appeared largely 
fixated on the circumstances in Britain and in South Africa. 
Race, Moral Panic, and Imperial Sentiment 
So far this chapter has examined the degree to which Liberal rhetoric on the 
Chinese labour controversy represented the re-emergence of earlier 
humanitarian and anti-slavery narratives, and the application of wider class-
based political dynamics to the situation in South Africa. Both primarily dealt 
with the immediate unacceptability of the Chinese labour ordinance, attacking it 
either for replicating the immorality of slavery or for undermining the position of 
the white labourer in South Africa. Critically, the debates surrounding the 
ordinance also drew upon many of the longer-running themes of Liberal rhetoric 
on the South African question: in particular, Liberals presented Chinese labour 
not simply as a bad policy, but as a dangerous policy which threatened to 
undermine the basis of British rule in South Africa. This section examines how 
ideas of race and colonial sentiment were used to frame the policy as 
essentially one of imperial mismanagement which, if unchecked, threatened to 
undermine the whole basis for the future government of South Africa. 
Furthermore, it explores how Liberals framed the policy as one harmful to 
imperial sentiment, stressing settler opposition to Chinese labour both within 
South Africa and throughout the wider Empire. 
Liberal speakers framed indentured Chinese labour as a policy which would 
further upset the racial balance within South Africa. Notwithstanding the 
Unionist government’s insistence that the Chinese labour ordinance would only 
be a temporary measure, many Liberal speakers characterised the move as 
one which would establish a permanent Chinese population in the territory. At 
Dalkeith, Grey charged the government with ‘laying it down that South Africa 
was not to be a white man’s country’. Rather than being a ‘temporary 
expedient’, Grey insisted that ‘once they got the Chinese into South Africa the 
difficulty of getting them out would be much greater than the difficulty of getting 
them in’.69 Likewise at Consett a month previously Morley had mocked official 
claims that the need for the ordinance was only temporary, declaring to cheers 
that this claim was made by ‘the same man who told them the war would cost 
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ten millions and be over in ten minutes’.70 Such efforts deliberately framed the 
introduction of Chinese labour as likely to become a permanent feature of South 
Africa’s racial makeup, which in turn enabled Liberal speakers to present the 
Chinese as a threat to the future stability and good governance of the 
Transvaal. 
As seen in previous chapters, the South African question was regularly framed 
as one caused by the racial divisions within South Africa, articulated as either 
between the British and the Dutch or also additionally in relation to the Black 
African population. In a speech at Forfar on 20 October 1905, Morley 
characterised South Africa as already having had a problem of the three races, 
continuing by asking ‘Do you think the Chinese will all go? They will not go, and 
therefore you will have four races.’71 Along these lines, Liberals presented the 
introduction of the Chinese as the addition of yet another difficulty to an already 
precarious situation. This formed the heart of Campbell-Bannerman’s argument 
in a speech at Dundee on 17 November 1904. The mine-owners’ policy, he 
declared, 
was the end of the hope of making South Africa a white man’s 
country. What would it be? A country of mixed races, of mixed, 
antagonistic, jealous, and rival races, adding to the confusion 
already existing. Out of such a witches’ cauldron as this what 
hope was there of reconstructing the colony in a way which the 
consciences of this country would sanction, and what hope of 
self-government, what hope of real government, and what hope 
of South African federation?72 
The Liberal leader’s message at Dundee was in essence premised on the same 
assumptions which had characterised his rhetoric on South Africa since 1899: it 
was the history of racial antagonism in South Africa which had consistently 
thrown up barriers to good imperial governance in the region, and any policy 
which further exacerbated or complicated the race situation would only serve to 
make the idealised vision of South African policy, a self-governing federation, all 
the more unlikely.  
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Shaw adopted similar language in his speech at Manchester the following 
month. ‘Did not shame cover us’, Shaw asked his audience,  
was not confusion upon our face as a nation, that we who went 
to war for the sake of ‘equal rights for all white men’ should 
have been the powerful instruments of introducing a new racial 
antagonism in that country?73 
Likewise, in an address at the Manchester Free Trade Hall on 13 October 1905, 
Grey criticised the government for having further complicated the racial 
dynamic. While criticising the restrictive conditions which the Chinese were 
subject to, Grey stressed that he did not advocate their immediate lifting and 
allowing the Chinese rights of settlement on the grounds that ‘race problems in 
South Africa are complicated enough already. The native problem is an 
exceedingly difficult problem […] I would not make that problem still more 
difficult by importing the Chinese race in South Africa at all.’74 Many of these 
interventions did not simply revive the earlier discourse of racial antagonism but 
explicitly framed the problem as one in which the ‘white man’s country’ of South 
Africa was increasingly jeopardised.75 Although the focus was unsurprisingly on 
the position of the Chinese, this rhetoric might also be seen in part as a return 
to earlier conceptions of the South African question which characterised the 
Black African population as a primary difficulty and concern of imperial policy, 
rather that the narrower Anglo-Boer focus of much of the previous decade. 
The introduction of the Chinese into South Africa was not simply presented as a 
further complication however, but also as directly harmful to the social fabric of 
South Africa. In particular, Liberal speakers characterised the introduction of 
Chinese labour as a moral contamination. Notably, this was a narrative that 
preceded the moral panics of 1905: in his by-election speech at Stacksteads, 
L.V. Harcourt warned that the ‘invasion’ of the Chinese would constitute ‘a 
danger to the health and morals of the people’, while similarly Robert Reid, in a 
speech at Newton Stewart on 5 April 1904, characterised the presence of the 
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Chinese as ‘a danger to morals and to sanitation’.76 Neither Harcourt nor Reid 
actually went into detail as to what these risks might be, their audiences 
presumably able to infer from other sources the implications of their rhetoric. As 
the ordinance was put in place and the controversy developed, phrases such as 
‘danger to morals’, and particularly references to the ‘demoralising effects’ of 
the compounds, became shorthand for allegations that the system established 
by the ordinance fostered homosexuality among the Chinese. In a letter 
published in The Times on 13 January 1905, Macnamara attacked the ‘moral 
contamination’ Chinese labour represented, quoting a letter from the Bishop of 
Winchester, who had referred in his own circumlocutory fashion to 
‘demoralization of a sort which I do not care to characterise more exactly’.77 
Similarly, Burns’ attack at Derby in the 1906 election campaign on the ‘undue 
abominations which a celibate industrial life always did and always would bring 
about’ drew upon the moral panic over Chinese sexuality and advanced a 
narrative of contamination, albeit one in which Burns’ also characterised the 
Chinese labourers as victims of the system to which they were subjected. 
Despite the indirect and constrained means by which Liberal speakers engaged 
with the moral panic around the sexuality of the Chinese labourers, it is 
nonetheless worthwhile considering the purpose such allusions served to the 
wider Liberal critique of the system. Beyond simply serving to further underline 
the immorality of the scheme, Liberal speakers’ references to alleged 
homosexual practices within the compounds advanced a wider narrative of 
moral threat to South Africa. As Bright identifies, in the Transvaal itself and 
within imperial governing circles, anxieties over homosexuality among the 
Chinese labour force were accompanied by moral panics over the implication of 
the system producing a demand for Black African prostitution, which was seen 
as likely to cause further long-term social disruption in the Transvaal, and the 
suggestion that the system was facilitating sexual relations between white 
women and the Chinese.78 Liberal speakers’ references to ‘unnatural vice’ in the 
compounds were possibly able to act as a proxies for some of these wider 
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anxieties, which did on occasion find explicit mention in British political 
discourse: in a House of Commons debate on a Liberal motion condemning the 
policy on 21 March 1904, James Bryce warned of the dangers that would be 
posed by ‘a race of mingled Chinese and Kaffirs’ arising in South Africa.79 
Underlying fears that the Chinese labour ordinance would only further 
jeopardise the future of ‘white’ South Africa certainly seem likely to have played 
a further role in reinforcing political anxieties in Britain. 
If the moral panic surrounding Chinese sexual behaviour proved a somewhat 
tricky subject for Liberal politicians, the stories of acts of violence committed by 
the Chinese which emerged throughout the course of 1905 made easier 
material for speeches. Liberal speakers presented Chinese violence against the 
white population of the Transvaal as further demonstrating the danger posed by 
the policy of indentured labour. Speaking at Warrington on 19 September 1905, 
Outhwaite attacked the capitalists of the Rand for having ‘introduced Chinese 
wastrels to burn, murder, ravish, and work at a shilling a day’, simultaneously 
presenting the policy as not only a threat to white labour but a threat to the 
settler population as a whole. Similar language was deployed by Churchill who, 
speaking at Manchester the following month, spoke of Chinese deserters from 
the mines as: 
roaming about over those vast plains, crouching among the 
rocks, hunted like wild beasts, shot at sight, living by murder 
and rapine, the terror of the world, half the world between them 
and their own sunny China. Surely the grimmest spectacle of 
moral havoc for which this Christian and civilised nation has 
been made responsible within the lifetime of living men!80 
In his characterisation of the Chinese as pitiable but also animal-like, Churchill 
can be seen as reinforcing the characterisation of the ordinance as 
fundamentally immoral in reducing the Chinese to such a position, while at the 
same time presenting the situation as one which threatened the settler 
population of South Africa. Additionally, his attack on the fact that Britain had 
been made responsible for the situation served as a further indictment on the 
policy of the Unionist government, drawing upon traditional imperial political 
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tropes which stressed an aversion to the nation becoming involved in an 
undesirable extension of imperial responsibilities. 
If the fear of exacerbated racial tensions and the moral panics prompted by 
Chinese labour represented some of the key threats to the future of imperial 
South Africa, the most serious threat from the Liberal perspective came from 
the potential alienation of settler opinion, both within South Africa and 
throughout the Empire as a whole. The charge that the policy had been 
introduced against the will of the colony’s settler population represented one of 
the persistent Liberal attacks against the measure. In his speech at Newton 
Stewart, Reid argued that it should be for the white population of the Transvaal 
to decide on whether to import Chinese labour, arguing that ‘if they wished the 
thing done we could not prevent them’, but that the government ‘had no right to 
force it upon them’.81 Likewise in his Dundee speech, Campbell-Bannerman 
criticised the government for having ‘forced’ Chinese labour upon the Transvaal, 
asking:  
If the importation of the Chinaman was undertaken for the good 
of the colony, why were not the people of the colony consulted? 
Why were the protests of the Boers, who, after all, knew a good 
deal about the country, and were our fellow-citizens in the 
country, flouted with contempt?’82    
In a published statement of his views on South Africa in August 1905, Shaw 
similarly stressed that the policy was opposed by both white races in the 
Transvaal: the Dutch, he argued, ‘resent the introduction of the Chinese, not 
only on industrial grounds, but because it is part of British policy notably 
antagonistic to that followed by President Kruger. The English population resist 
it both on industrial and political grounds.’83 Given the persistent emphasis in 
Liberal rhetoric on the need to govern South Africa with the assent and 
cooperation of both white races, such opposition to the policy provided a 
powerful basis from which to condemn Chinese labour. 
Critically, many Liberal speakers directly asserted that the Unionist 
government’s failure to demonstrate the support of the Transvaal settler 
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population over Chinese labour demonstrated their unfitness for imperial rule, 
and indeed warned that the Empire would be damaged as a result. In his 
speech in Manchester on 25 March 1904, Trevelyan attacked the Unionist 
government for having made no attempt to seek approval for the measure from 
the population of the Transvaal, claiming that in doing so they had 
demonstrated that ‘they did not understand the very fundamental principles 
which should and must underlie the Government of the Empire’.84 Burns 
likewise attacked the Unionist government and the imperial authorities for 
ignoring settler opinion in his speech at the Hyde Park demonstration: branding 
Milner a twentieth-century Lord North, Burns declared that Chinese labour 
would lose South Africa for the Empire just as America had been lost, adding for 
good measure that ‘if the Chinese ordinance were not torn from the Statute-
book it would be the beginning of the end of the British Empire’.85 Just as in 
earlier iterations of the South African question, British imperial rule in South 
Africa was presented as vulnerable and dependent on the continued good will 
of both the British settler populations in the region and the support of its now 
greatly-expanded Dutch-speaking imperial subjects. By pursuing a course of 
action and overriding local opinion, Liberals argued, the Unionist government 
was actively mismanaging and indeed jeopardising the future of imperial rule in 
South Africa. 
Most significantly however, Liberals did not just present the Chinese labour 
ordinance as alienating sentiment within the Transvaal, but throughout South 
Africa and the Empire at large. As Bright has ably demonstrated, the storm over 
Chinese labour was not confined to debates within South Africa, or indeed 
within Britain, but represented a controversy of global dimensions, as political 
elites and public opinion throughout the empire of white settlement mobilised in 
opposition to the policy.86 In particular, the introduction of Chinese labour to 
South Africa triggered strong objections from Australia and New Zealand. 
Operating within a political climate heavily influenced by the doctrine of white 
labourism, the governments of Richard Seddon and Alfred Deakin actively 
cooperated not only to lobby the imperial authorities against the introduction of 
                                            
84 Manchester Guardian, 26 Mar. 1904. 
85 The Times, 28 Mar. 1904. 
86 Bright, Chinese Labour in South Africa, pp.4-5. 
-253- 
 
the policy, but also to coordinate public demonstrations and displays of imperial 
sentiment in order to impress upon British political opinion the strength of 
popular colonial views on the matter.87 Notably, Deakin’s position depended 
upon the support of the Australian Labor Party, which indeed would displace his 
ministry entirely in April 1904, particularly significant in context given the degree 
to which Liberal speakers in Britain characterised the Chinese labour ordinance 
as a capitalist effort to pre-empt the rise of labour politics in the Transvaal.88 
Critically, antipodean objections were not simply against the principle of 
Chinese labour, but sprang from direct economic interests: as Hyslop notes, by 
1904 there were over 5000 Australian settlers in Johannesburg based within the 
mining and related industries, forming a core element of the trade union 
movement on the Rand, whose livelihoods were perceived to be directly 
threatened by the ordinance.89 Given the circumstances, it might therefore have 
been expected that Liberal speakers in Britain would utilise the labour-
orientated protests of colonial governments, and the position of the Australian 
miners in particular, in seeking to condemn the ordinance, and indeed such 
tactics were certainly not unknown. In November 1905 Outhwaite characterised 
the policy as one which saw Australians ‘starving in the streets of 
Johannesburg’.90 Strikingly, Liberal speakers as a whole generally did not 
connect colonial protests against Chinese labour with white labourist 
arguments, but instead revived earlier tropes of imperial sentiment and the 
delicate nature of the relationship between Britain and its colonies. 
Liberals characterised Chinese labour as fundamentally opposed by imperial 
sentiment. In his Harrogate speech, Asquith urged his audience to ‘look at 
Australia, at Canada, at New Zealand – were they going to dismiss the 
sentiments which these communities felt and which they pressed in no doubtful 
language?’ The proposal to import Chinese labour, Asquith declared, ‘deserved 
what it was receiving – the condemnation of the whole Empire.’91 His former 
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mentor Lord Rosebery, in one of his occasional forays back into active politics, 
similarly used a speech at Newcastle on 12 March 1904 to attack the 
government for introducing Chinese labour to South Africa ‘against the protest 
of every self-governing part of the Empire’.92 Likewise, at the Manchester 
meeting of 13 May, Morley drew his audience’s attention to the opposition 
expressed by colonial governments, noting that the parliaments of both the 
Cape Colony and of Australia had passed resolutions opposing the policy. 
Indeed, Morley declared, such was the level of opposition in Australia that ‘the 
phrase, which some of us are not entirely unacquainted with of “pro-Boer” is 
now taken by the hostile phrase of “pro-Chow”’.93 As well as emphasising the 
opposition of imperial sentiment to the scheme, the focus on the opposition as 
expressed through the Empire’s self-governing institutions can be seen as 
placing further stress upon the absence of self-government in the Transvaal. 
In addition to insisting that the policy was opposed throughout the Empire, 
Liberals also characterised the ordinance as a betrayal of the sacrifice shown 
by the self-governing colonies of the Empire in having supported Britain during 
the war. In his Dundee speech, Campbell-Bannerman implicitly accused the 
government of ignoring the sacrifice of Britain’s colonies, demanding to know 
‘why the opinion of Australia and New Zealand, who had sent their sons to shed 
their blood in the war for the purpose of acquiring the colony’ had not been 
considered by the government commission on the ordinance.94 Likewise, in a 
speech at Arbroath during the election campaign, Morley quoted Deakin as 
having stated that: 
Australia had been told that the war was a miners’ war, and not 
for Chinese miners; a war for the franchise, but not for Chinese 
franchise. The truth, if it had been told, would have presented a 
very different aspect and would have made a very different 
appeal to Australia.95 
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Critically, Morley used Deakin’s remarks to challenge Unionist claims to speak 
for the Empire: attacking the South African War as a war which had been not for 
the improvement of civilisation but for the introduction of Chinese labour, Morley 
declared to an audience of his constituents that ‘it is not only we whom they [the 
previous ministry] insolently and falsely called Little Englanders who say that, 
but our Colonial kinsmen, whose sentiments they so consistently charge us with 
rejecting.’96  
In similar fashion, Liberal speakers sought to use the Chinese labour question 
to present their own positions as more in line with imperial sentiment. Speaking 
in January 1906 after the early results from the election campaign were already 
clear, the Liberal candidate for Eccles, George Pollard, demanded to know: 
what right Mr. Balfour had to speak in the name of the real heart 
and soul of the Empire. He might better have claimed to speak 
in the name of the material system. Colonials would rejoice that 
the British people were condemning Chinese slavery as 
emphatically as they had condemned it in New Zealand and 
elsewhere.97 
In highlighting imperial opposition to the policy, Liberal speakers were therefore 
able to contest Unionist claims to speak for imperial sentiment, which had been 
so effectively deployed against the Liberal party during the politics of the South 
African War. 
Although ultimately less distinct than the more prominent narratives of anti-
slavery politics and the focus on the position of white labour, anxieties about the 
future position of South African society, and particularly Britain’s prospects for 
successfully governing the region, lay at the heart of the Liberal Party’s assault 
upon Chinese labour. The issue was one which allowed them to revive earlier 
rhetoric characterising the South African question as one ultimately dependent 
on the successful management of race relations in the region, while also 
allowing them to exploit concerns over the fragility of the imperial position in 
South Africa. Furthermore, through emphasising imperial sentiment in their 
rhetoric on Chinese labour, Liberal speakers were able to stress the imperial 
ideal of self-government, while also presenting the Liberal Party’s position as 
                                            
96 Ibid. 
97 George Pollard, speech at Irlam, 18 Jan. 1906, reported in Manchester 
Guardian, 19 Jan. 1906. 
-256- 
 
one representative of the Empire of white settlement, contesting Unionists’ 
previous dominance of the issue. In this fashion, Liberal rhetoric on the Chinese 
labour controversy, although incorporating new elements, was able to adapt to 
great effect the party’s earlier narratives on the South African War to a new, 
more politically advantageous context. 
Representative and Responsible Government 
Following on from the debates during the South African War, Liberal speakers 
consistently stressed the need for a speedy and full return to self-government in 
the newly-established colonies. As examined above, questions over the 
governance of the Transvaal in particular were closely linked with the 
controversies of Chinese labour: quite apart from the suggestion that Chinese 
labour represented a deliberate attempt by the mine-owners to pre-empt the 
establishment of a labour democracy in the Transvaal, and indeed that the 
further complication of the race dynamics of South Africa would only further 
harm the cause of self-government and eventual federation, demands for the 
grant of full self-government served Liberals as both an argument for delaying 
the introduction of the ordinance, and subsequently as a way for the long-term 
future of the system to be decided. Critically, the constitutional settlement of 
South Africa was not simply subordinate to the controversy over Chinese 
labour, but was in and of itself a key feature of Liberal rhetoric on the South 
African question throughout this period. This section therefore explores Liberal 
critiques of the Crown colony administration established in the Transvaal and 
the debates surrounding the party’s opposition to the Lyttelton constitution, as 
well as the elements directly concerning the resolution of Chinese labour and 
the party’s own support for full responsible government. 
Although the issue was now decoupled from the debates on ending the war and 
the controversy over ‘unconditional surrender’, after the conclusion of the 
conflict the question of Transvaal self-government nonetheless continued to 
remain a feature of Liberal speeches on South Africa. In his Glasgow speech 
Campbell-Bannerman declared to his audience that it was humiliating to think 
that the two colonies were not only to be developed through indentured labour, 
but also that they were ‘apparently without self-government’.98 Similarly at 
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Hanley the Liberal leader expressly attacked the government for failing to 
establish democratic government in the Transvaal, arguing that ‘the helots we 
heard of, for whom the war was undertaken, are not yet enfranchised. The 
Government will not even submit to the judgement of the people of the country 
the question of introducing some real helots from China.’99  
However, Liberal speakers did not simply criticise the failure to introduce self-
government on the grounds that it prevented the colony’s population from 
passing judgement on the ordinance, but also drew upon earlier narratives 
stressing self-government as a fundamental principle of British imperial rule. 
Speaking at Failsworth, L.V. Harcourt attacked the suggestion from government 
circles that self-government could only be granted once the Transvaal had 
demonstrated its loyalty to the Empire. Drawing comparisons with the history of 
Canada, Harcourt declared that ‘Home Rule was given to Canada almost in the 
midst of the rebellion, and it brought peace in its train’. Self-government, he 
continued, ‘should not be regarded as the reward of loyalty; it was itself the 
producer of loyalty.’100 Such arguments represent a direct echo of the rhetoric 
deployed by Liberals during the settlement of the South African War, 
representing an essential continuity of emphasis in Liberal approaches to the 
South African question in the reconstruction period. 
Significantly, criticisms of the failure to introduce self-government to the new 
colonies in South Africa were also accompanied by critiques of British misrule 
under Crown Colony government. In his speech at Failsworth, L.V. Harcourt 
criticised the illiberal nature of the British authorities in the Transvaal: attacking 
the draconian powers Milner’s administration retained, allowing the 
imprisonment of Boers without trial and a clamping down on dissent, Harcourt 
described the state of affairs in the colony as ‘the negation of all individual 
rights’ and the ‘destruction of all liberty of the subject’. Given this situation, he 
asked his audience, ‘Could they wonder that the Boers wanted “a little less 
Crown, and a little more colony?”’101 Likewise, in a speech at Littleborough on 
16 April 1904, Philip Stanhope criticised the lack of good government in South 
Africa, warning that it risked alienating the population of the region. There were, 
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he declared, ‘elements of dissatisfaction among both whites and blacks which 
might any day result in an explosion, due not to the bad government of the 
Boers, but to the bad government of Great Britain.’102 Harcourt’s and 
Stanhope’s comments can be seen as a revival of earlier narratives which 
emphasised the dangers of disaffection arising from imperial misrule. 
Significantly, this tactic included directly comparing Boer misrule under Kruger 
with British misrule under Milner. In his speech at Consett, Morley pointed out 
that the war had been supposedly waged against a ‘corrupt and despotic 
oligarchy. Was there no oligarchy now in the Transvaal?’ Even if were not 
corrupt, Morley continued, ‘it looked as if it were rather despotic.’103 Given the 
degree to which narratives of misgovernment had characterised earlier Liberal 
rhetoric on the operations of the British South Africa Company and the 
government of the SAR under Kruger, such charges carried particular weight 
when levied against Britain’s own post-war administration. 
Alongside the arguments directly concerning Chinese labour, Liberal 
dissatisfaction with the failure to establish full self-government in the new 
colonies directly influenced the party’s response to the Unionist government’s 
proposals to establish a scheme of ‘representative government’ in the 
Transvaal, in what would become known as the Lyttelton constitution. The 
Lyttelton proposals, outlined briefly, would have seen the existing, appointed 
legislative council replaced by an elected assembly, but would not have 
constituted a system of ‘responsible government’, as the executive would have 
remained answerable to the governor rather than to elected representatives. 
Because of this provision, the scheme was criticised as one which would not 
actually represent a true system of self-government for the Transvaal at all, a 
charge compounded after it was revealed that the franchise proposed for 
electing the new assembly would likely exclude many Boers from the electoral 
roll, but would allow members of the British garrison to vote. With the exception 
of the Progressive Party in the Transvaal, the proposal received little support 
from the colony’s political organisations, and when the Liberal government 
came to power in 1905 the constitution was abandoned entirely without ever 
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having been implemented.104 Despite never having coming into force, however, 
the political debates it prompted in Britain, and particularly the Liberal Party’s 
stated reasons for rejecting the constitution, are highly illustrative of the wider 
assumptions of imperial governance at the heart of Liberal rhetoric on the 
reconstruction of South Africa. 
Even before the full details of the constitution were announced in March 1905, 
Liberal speakers attacked the proposed limited grant of representative 
institutions on the grounds that it was designed to artificially produce a majority 
in favour of the mining interest, and by extension in favour of continuing 
Chinese labour. In a speech at Margate on 24 September 1904, Macnamara 
warned his audience that: 
the real danger in the situation in South Africa lay in the fact 
that to get a bogus vote in favour of the Ordinance for the 
purposes of the home general election the present government 
would put together a gerrymandered scheme of representation. 
That would at once set the Transvaal by the ears.105 
The Unionist government, by this account, risked further alienating popular 
sentiment in the Transvaal by putting forward a rigged or incomplete system of 
representative government.  
While not all Liberal speakers went as far as Macnamara in accusing the 
government of pursuing this strategy deliberately for electoral gain in Britain, the 
suggestion that Unionist policy was trying to artificially create a pro-Chinese 
labour majority in the Transvaal became a recurring feature of Liberal rhetoric 
on the subject. In his Dundee speech that November, Campbell-Bannerman 
protested that Parliament had been given no details of the planned scheme for 
representation in the Transvaal, and speculated that ‘it would probably be only 
just enough of self-government and of representation to confirm the mine-
owners in the freehold of the Chinese compound.’106 Likewise, in his speech at 
Manchester the following month, Shaw characterised the grant of limited self-
government as ‘a proposal to load the dice in order to give those engaged in the 
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gold industry larger representation and fuller control of the government.’107 In 
this manner, Liberal speakers were able to present the Unionist government’s 
plans not as steps towards representation, but as a deliberate means of 
sabotaging real self-government in the interests of capital and the perpetuation 
of Chinese labour.  
Critically, Liberals did not simply attack the prospect of an unrepresentative 
assembly on the grounds that it would likely endorse Chinese labour, but also 
criticised it for denying the citizens of the Transvaal, particularly the Boer 
citizens, a fair share in government. In his Manchester speech, Shaw pointed 
out to his audience that: 
one of our objections to the Kruger régime was that Mr. Kruger 
was ‘loading the dice’ in a similar fashion, and so preventing – 
what we were now also going to prevent – a fair representation 
of all the whites in the country.108 
By contrast, he declared, out of the ruins of South Africa it would be ‘the good 
fortune of the Liberal Party to construct a great and a fair fabric of self-
government, and to make that fabric so solid that it should rest on the goodwill 
of the peoples who were governed.’109 The direct comparison between the 
Unionist model of representative government and the dysfunctional 
representative institutions of the South African Republic again demonstrates the 
ways in which Liberal speakers were able to draw upon the rhetorical legacy of 
the South African War in critiquing the government’s proposals. Along similar 
lines, in a detailed speech on the subject to his constituents at Oldham on 26 
April 1905 Alfred Emmott charged that no scheme to grant representative 
government had been offered to the ORC precisely because that territory had a 
Boer majority. Indeed, he argued, this motive was proved by the Lyttelton 
constitution’s franchise provisions for the Transvaal, ‘framed in such a way that 
almost every man, however bad, in the towns would have a vote, whilst in the 
country the grown-up son of the Boer farmer would have […] great difficulty in 
getting a vote.’110 Far from bringing the Boers into the administration of their 
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territory, Liberals charged that the Unionist government was deliberately 
seeking to marginalise them, undermining the pluralistic basis of the Empire of 
white settlement. 
At a more fundamental level, Liberal speakers attacked the Lyttelton 
constitution as liable to frustrate the good governance of the Transvaal by 
fostering political tensions. Speaking in London on 20 March 1905, Morley 
warned that any attempt to introduce a scheme short of full responsible 
government would be an error, as it was bound to ‘cause a large amount of 
friction and irritation, which would be used as an argument against its further 
extension into a complete scheme of self-government’.111 In his speech at 
Oldham Emmott similarly characterised the constitution as one which ‘bore the 
form of a democratic constitution without the reality and created a desire for 
freedom which was denied. It was almost sure to generate friction between the 
elected and official members of the Legislative assembly.’112 Significantly, this 
friction was presented not simply as causing problems within the Transvaal, but 
as having the potential to cause long-term harm to the relationship between the 
colony and the imperial government. This argument was deployed by Grey who, 
in a speech to the Eighty Club on 31 May 1905, predicted that: 
the present hybrid situation would generate friction between our 
fellow-subjects in South Africa and the Imperial Government 
home, and that when responsible government came it would 
appear to come grudgingly as the result of that friction extorted 
                                                                                                                                
office, Emmott’s attack on the failure to grant representative institutions to the 
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from us instead of being given willingly, as it might have been at 
the present time.113 
A key element of the Liberal Party’s faith in imperial self-government was the 
belief that only through such methods could imperial governance be effective. 
The Lyttelton constitution stood doubly damned in Liberal rhetoric not simply 
because it would fail to meet up to the Liberal ideal of true self-government, but 
because it would not represent an effective basis for governing the Transvaal 
either, instead serving only to exacerbate the challenges of imperial governance 
in South Africa. 
Additionally, Liberal speakers drew upon past precedents in British imperial 
policy in order to further frame the offer of representative government as 
misguided. In his speech at Oldham, Emmott challenged the idea that it was 
normal for white settler colonies to pass through an intermediate phase before 
being granted full self-government. Echoing L.V. Harcourt’s rhetoric at 
Failsworth, Emmott declared that far from Canada having passed peacefully 
through such a phase, the attempt to govern Canada through a representative 
but non-responsible system had pushed the country into open revolt. ‘It was 
because the conditions of this form of government were so bad’, he argued, 
‘that the friction occurred in Canada which led to the alteration of its 
constitution.’114 Shaw likewise drew upon the Canadian parallel in his August 
statement of South African policy. The result of Lord Durham’s policy, he 
argued, had been successful in so far as he had placed ‘absolute trust in the 
people of both races to work out on constitution lines […] their common destiny’; 
by contrast, he argued, it was Durham’s efforts to produce an artificial British 
majority that led to decades of unrest, only resolved by a full grant of self-
government to the provinces.115  
Along such lines, Liberals drew upon past precedent to frame responsible self-
government as an established imperial principle: speaking in October 1905, 
Grey mocked the suggestion that responsible government for the Transvaal 
would damage the Empire, declaring instead that ‘every large white community 
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at a distance from the mother country can only in the long run be kept loyal to 
the Empire by responsible self-government.’116 Such rhetoric not only served to 
further emphasise the ideals of a decentralised Empire held together by 
common settler sentiment, themes which Liberal Imperialist speakers had often 
stressed in order to accentuate the acceptability of the British imperial model to 
Liberal audiences, but constituted a direct echo of Liberal anti-war arguments 
against the use of martial law and the policy of ‘extermination’. In this sense, 
Grey’s language might be said to indicate an evolving unity among Liberals on 
the politics of South African governance, although questions over the 
continuation of the ordinance by a responsible government in the Transvaal 
were to complicate this self-governing narrative. 
Liberals explicitly framed their South African policy as one which would place 
the Transvaal on the same footing as the self-governing settler colonies, 
continuing a narrative that had been consistently deployed throughout the war 
itself. Shaw insisted in his statement on South African policy that ‘the right 
which had been given to the populations of Australia and New Zealand cannot 
be long denied to these colonies’, although he also noted that once granted 
responsible government it would ultimately be up to the settlers themselves to 
make a decision over Chinese labour.117 This argument was repeated going into 
the election campaign of 1906: campaigning in Manchester, Churchill insisted 
that there was ‘no reason why the Home Government should expect to exert a 
more intimate control over the purely domestic affairs of South Africa than they 
do and have over self-governing colonies like Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand’, adding that it would be Liberal policy to swiftly establish a Transvaal 
assembly under ‘truly democratic conditions and operating by recognised 
colonial methods’.118 Likewise in his election address, Grey emphasised that the 
ultimate solution to Chinese labour ‘can only be reached when the Transvaal 
and the Orange Colony are put on the same footing as all self-governing 
colonies.’119 Such comparisons did not simply serve as useful shorthand for the 
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nature of responsible government that the Liberal ministry wished to introduce 
but also emphasised that the policy being pursued was one of established 
imperial practice, as well as serving to normalise the position of South Africa 
within the framework of Empire. 
In considering the links between the campaign for full responsible government 
and the Chinese labour controversy, a significant caveat emerged in the rhetoric 
of the Liberal leadership during the 1906 election. As noted above, by the time 
of the election Liberal policy had been recalibrated as an opposition to the 
issuing of any new licenses for Chinese labourers, but no immediate end to the 
importation of Chinese labour, let alone the abolition of the system outright. 
However, the charge of slavery, whether explicitly levied or simply implied, not 
only proved a source of Unionist outrage but also created difficulties for the 
Liberal government: if the system was after all akin to slavery, then there was 
surely a necessity to insist on it being ended, rather than leaving the issue to 
the judgement of a responsible government in the Transvaal. As Grant notes, 
the Liberal government attempted to act against such criticisms by introducing a 
scheme of voluntary repatriation.120 While this may have been successful to 
some degree, Campbell-Bannerman was nonetheless compelled to clarify that 
there would be limits on the Transvaal’s ability to determine the future of the 
policy.  
In a meeting at Inverkeithing on 12 January 1906, Campbell-Bannerman was 
challenged by a questioner to set out the government’s policy in the event of the 
Transvaal voting to retain the scheme. Replying, the Prime Minister stressed 
that while the system should ‘be submitted to the people of the colony so soon 
as they had a completely representative and responsible constitution’, he added 
the further proviso that ‘if the rules and conditions under which the Chinese 
worked in the Transvaal were such as to be contain any seeds or signs of 
slavery or of servile labour’, he would consider it be inconsistent with British 
imperial doctrine and would insist that it must be changed.121 A week later at 
Inverness, Campbell-Bannerman was again compelled to stress that while the 
question of Chinese labour should be referred to the people of the Transvaal, ‘if 
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the conditions under which they lived were found to be inconsistent with real 
liberty, then these must not be allowed to continue within the dominions of the 
Crown.’122 This tension between a commitment to ending Chinese labour and 
the expressed determination to grant full responsible government would pose a 
serious dilemma for the government following the election. 
While there was therefore a close connection between the Liberal Party’s 
campaign against Chinese labour and their demands for a swift grant of 
responsible government for the Transvaal, the question was also one that made 
extensive use of existing Liberal rhetorical tropes on Empire, and of imperial 
ideals which had been stressed in relation to previous iterations of the South 
African question. The system of representative government embodied in the 
Lyttelton constitution was not simply attacked as gerrymandered in the mine-
owners’ interests or incapable of delivering good government, but in effect as a 
dangerous innovation in British imperial policy, departing from established 
systems of administering the empire of white settlement.  
In considering this continued focus on self-government as an aspect of Liberal 
imperial politics following the South African War, it is worth noting two further 
points. First, for all the debates on the nature of the franchise under either the 
Lyttelton constitution or the Liberals’ proposed alternative, the focus was 
exclusively on the position of the white population. Although in South Africa 
itself the debates of the reconstruction era did involve questions about the 
potential for a limited franchise for non-whites in the two new colonies, these 
questions were generally not reflected in the rhetoric of British Liberals.123 
Indeed, this might again be attributed in part to the language of the protests 
against Chinese labour: attacks on a war for the Chinese franchise might well 
have crystallised the question of self-government as one ultimately relating to 
the rights of white men.   
Second, in light of the historiographical debate surrounding the magnanimous 
gesture it is striking the degree to which many Liberal speakers in this period 
continued to link the grant of self-government specifically with the attitude of the 
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Boers and the need to secure the loyalty of the former republics to the Empire. 
Naturally, just because Liberals presented their critique of representative 
government in this fashion does not mean that it was primarily designed with 
the goal of pacifying the Boers in mind, nor indeed did calls for the inclusion of 
the Boers in government necessarily mean Boer leadership. Nonetheless, as 
the Liberal government assumed control of imperial policy at the end of 1905, it 
did so against a backdrop in which it had consistently presented a vision of 
South Africa framed not simply in relation to idealised forms of good 
government and self-government, but a vision fundamentally inclusive of the 
Boer population. 
After the Election: Defending Liberal Rule 
The British general election of 1906 resulted in a landslide victory for Campbell-
Bannerman’s nascent ministry, the Liberal Party and its allies gaining a 
combined majority of 356 seats over the Unionists, seemingly securing the 
government in office for some time to come.124 The immediate consequence of 
this result for the South African question in British politics was that the Liberals 
were now firmly in control of imperial policy. The rhetoric examined in this final 
section, which covers the period following the election through to the immediate 
aftermath of the Het Volk victory in the Transvaal election of 1907, is therefore 
of a different order to the rhetoric examined so far in this thesis, in that rather 
than being fundamentally reactive in nature, Liberal speakers, or at least those 
supportive of the government, were instead having to justify their own 
management of imperial affairs. If it had sufficed in opposition to critique the 
Unionist government for failing to act in accordance with the idealised Liberal 
principles of imperial rule, in power the party had to present its actions as 
working to create the well-governed, self-governed South Africa that they had 
for so long insisted upon: a challenge that proved far more difficult. 
Following the election, Liberal speakers continued to present full responsible 
government for the Transvaal as the solution to Chinese labour. For example, 
the Liberal member of Parliament for Reading, Rufus Isaacs, used a speech at 
Cambridge on 10 March 1906 to express his full confidence that the new 
constitution for the Transvaal would resolve the Chinese labour question, as 
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once responsible government had been granted he was ‘perfectly certain that 
there would be no such condition of the ordinances permitted as had been 
permitted to the present day’.125 A similar argument had been made by Harry 
Nuttall, the newly-elected member for Stretford, a week previously, although 
notably Nuttall had less optimism in the likely judgement of the new Transvaal 
assembly. While a responsible government would not, in his opinion, ‘express 
any wish favourable to the retention of the Chinese on the Rand’, he went on to 
reassure his audience that ‘if they favoured anything approaching semi-slavery 
– the British Government would not allow it.’126  
William Byles, who would become something of a Radical thorn in the side of 
the new Liberal administration over South African questions, likewise impressed 
upon his constituents that the Colonial Office veto would be imposed if 
necessary: while the decision would fall to the new government of the 
Transvaal, he argued, ‘the Imperial government would not sanction servile or 
slavish conditions of labour’.127 In each of these cases the grant of responsible 
government was not framed as an end in and of itself, but primarily as a means 
of abolishing Chinese labour; indeed, if the speeches of Nuttall and Byles are 
any indication, there seemed little faith, among Liberal audiences at least, that 
the newly enfranchised population of the Transvaal could be relied on to reject 
the ordinance, even if among the Liberal leadership the emphasis on self-
government remained at the centre of the government’s South African policy. 
The prospect of Chinese labour being ended by Colonial Office veto was itself 
controversial, despite the issue having been brought up during the election 
campaign. A particular controversy erupted following ill-advised comments 
made by Churchill in a fractious parliamentary debate on 14 March. Following 
an intervention from Chamberlain challenging the government over whether a 
responsible government in the Transvaal would consult with the imperial 
government before introducing a measure on Chinese labour, Churchill, who 
was already in the middle of responding to a challenge from Seely over whether 
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the government was really acting to halt Chinese labour, replied with the 
assertion that: 
the Government will be prepared to use the veto of the Crown 
without shrinking if the conditions of any proposal that may 
reach us from the Transvaal, no matter by how great a majority 
it may be supported, are really derogatory to the fundamental 
and elementary principles of liberty, and, I may say, of decency 
also.128 
As Toye has documented, the suggestion of a general right of interference in 
the affairs of a self-governing colony was readily exploited by the Unionist 
opposition, and provoked a hostile Press reaction in Britain, South Africa and 
throughout the Empire.129  
Much of the criticism of Churchill’s language was unfair, as immediately 
following his remarks Churchill had stressed that such a course would represent 
‘a very serious event in British colonial history’ which he was hopeful could be 
avoided.130 Nonetheless, neither was the controversy entirely manufactured by 
Churchill’s Unionist opponents, the subsequent debate illustrating the problems 
the issue raised within the Liberal party. Aurelian Ridsdale, the Liberal Member 
of Parliament for Brighton, warned of the danger inherent in any use of the veto, 
urging the government ‘to treat this matter as one to be left to the Transvaal and 
to the Transvaal alone’, while his colleague Arthur Markham, the Member of 
Parliament for Mansfield, declared that the government must either trust the 
people of the Transvaal or postpone self-government: ‘they could not have it 
both ways.’131 Ultimately, the Colonial Office veto remained hypothetical: 
following Het Volk’s victory in 1907, new ordinances were passed so as to 
retain existing Chinese labour on a temporary basis, the Liberal government 
opting to avoid confrontation with the new government in the Transvaal.132 The 
episode nonetheless illustrated the difficulties facing the Liberal leadership in 
this period, demonstrating the degree to which, having emphasised a moral 
ideal of imperialism alongside the ideal of a self-governing Empire, the 
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government found itself vulnerable to criticism from Liberal quarters on both 
counts.  
One further aspect of the politics of Chinese labour controversy was the 
controversy that erupted when it emerged that Milner, during his time as the 
High Commissioner in South Africa, had allowed for the flogging of Chinese 
labourers, in breach of both the law and the agreements which had been struck 
with the Chinese government. This revelation saw the Liberal government 
brought into direct confrontation with its Radical backbenchers after Byles 
brought forward a motion of censure in Milner’s conduct on 21 March 1906. In a 
result that managed to alienate both Milner’s supporters and his opponents, the 
government brought forward an amendment which stressed its condemnation of 
illegal flogging but refrained from making any personal censure. Although the 
government won the vote on the question, Churchill’s speech on the occasion 
was seen as mocking Milner’s fall from grace, alienating the very elements of 
South African opinion that the government had been keen to placate.133 Byles, 
for his part, did not quietly accept defeat on this issue: addressing his 
constituents later that month, he attacked the government for having not 
censured Milner, declaring it to be ‘a very queer net […] which lets the big fishes 
through and catches all the little ones’, adding his fear that similar abuses might 
now be encouraged following Parliament’s failure to rebuke Milner.134 Byles 
defence of his actions in this way is significant, because it demonstrates that the 
question was not, in Radical eyes, simply about Milner’s personal conduct, but 
the form of imperialism it represented. 
Indeed, what is most striking about the whole episode is the way in which 
Milner’s critics framed the question as one relating to good imperial governance. 
Moving the motion of censure, Byles stressed that he disclaimed ‘all personal 
hostility to Lord Milner’, but instead was acting because ‘if illegality was 
condoned, if high officials were screened, and if injustice and cruelty were 
allowed to go unreproved, then in his judgment the highest interests of this 
country were in danger.’135 If the rule of law was not enforced, he continued, 
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then it would jeopardise the whole basis of the settlement in South Africa: the 
Boers, he declared, 
were reputed to be a suspicious people. What would become of 
their confidence in us when they found breaches of the law 
sanctioned by the highest executive officer of the State, and 
sanctioned moreover in the interests of the very men whom 
they regarded as responsible for all the evils of the war, and for 
the wreckage of their country?136 
If Britain was to retain the trust of its non-British imperial subjects, he cautioned, 
it could not condone such illegality. 
Seconding the motion, Frederick Mackarness, the Liberal Member of Parliament 
for Newbury, took this analysis a step further by directly linking the question of 
imperial misrule with the moral panic over violence by the Chinese. Because 
flogging had been sanctioned, he declared, 
The Chinamen were driven into a state of desperation by the 
treatment they received; they deserted from the mines, and, 
being forbidden by law from obtaining an honest livelihood, they 
were driven to commit crimes, and so the unfortunate people of 
the Transvaal, who had only just recovered from a devastating 
war, had inflicted upon them the calamity of having their houses 
broken into, their property taken, and often murders committed 
by the Chinese.137 
The imperial authorities, by this assessment, had not only facilitated the 
outrages by introducing Chinese labour in the first place, but had actively 
encouraged them by abandoning the rule of law. Ultimately the flogging 
controversy was relatively short-lived, in the public eye at least. Nonetheless, it 
serves as a useful demonstration of how the Liberal government stood 
vulnerable to the very narratives of imperial misgovernment which had proved 
so effective for the Liberal party in opposition. 
Further pressures on Liberal imperial policy emerged as relations with the Black 
African population of South Africa moved increasingly to the forefront of imperial 
politics following the Bambatha Uprising in Natal. The subsequent disturbances 
in many ways represented a perfect storm for imperial policy in South Africa: the 
Liberal government considered the Natal government’s actions heavy-handed 
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and counter-productive, while the Natal government reacted strongly to imperial 
interference in its affairs, threatening outright resignation at one point.138 For 
reasons of brevity, the full debates surrounding these disturbances are not 
examined in this thesis; for our present purposes it suffices to note that the 
issue once again highlighted the tensions between the ideal of imperial self-
government and the values the Empire was supposedly meant to embody. 
Speaking at West Hartlepool on 12 May 1906, Churchill was forced to negotiate 
between the two increasingly contradictory goals in addressing the subject, 
commenting that while the imperial government ‘could not be indifferent to the 
welfare and interests of the great multitude of natives who were, after all, 
subject of the King’, he stressed that he did not intend ‘in any degree to impair 
the general principle of Liberal colonial policy, which was the principle of self-
government’.139 As Andrew Thompson has noted, this was a period in which 
Radical influences within British politics increasingly sought to advocate a vision 
of imperialism which emphasised ideas of trusteeship and the welfare of the 
Empire’s non-white subjects, and in many respects the attitude of the Liberal 
government towards the Bambatha Uprising can be seen as representing this 
shift in opinion.140 However, the co-existence of this vision of imperialism 
alongside the traditional Liberal emphasis on self-government inevitably 
generated serious difficulties for the Liberal government in relation to the 
constitutional settlement for the former Boer republics. 
Early on in the life of the new Parliament, Liberal backbenchers had begun to 
raise the question of how the non-white population of South Africa would be 
affected by the new Transvaal constitution: opening a debate on the subject on 
28 February 1906, Byles declared that ‘while he was in favour of granting self-
government to the Colonies he would not grant to the Colonies the freedom to 
deprive others of their freedom.’ Past British practice in Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand, he asserted, had always been to maintain imperial oversight over 
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the position of the non-white population, and this was a principle that should not 
be abandoned in South Africa.141  
Likewise, when the actual constitutions came before Parliament for approval in 
December, they were attacked in Radical quarters on similar grounds, 
particularly over the question of the franchise. Rising to speak in the House of 
Commons, Charles Dilke protested that so far the debate had entirely failed to 
consider that the proposed constitutions represented a major departure from 
existing British imperial policy: ‘it might be inevitable, it might be impossible to 
resist it, but we were for the first time establishing a colour bar in the British 
Empire by the action of the Imperial Parliament.’142 The introduction of an 
absolute colour bar, he continued, was contrary not only to British practices at 
the Cape, but indeed: 
was contrary to the usage of great self-governing Colonies 
within the Empire; there was no such colour bar against the 
Maoris in New Zealand, or the Red Indians in Canada, the 
descendants of whom were among the most valued members 
of society… 143 
Churchill, in reply, could only state that ‘nothing was more clearly stipulated in 
the Treaty of Vereeniging than that an extension of the franchise to the native 
population was not to take place before the grant of responsible government’, 
although he expressed the belief that throughout South Africa the tendency 
would be for a move towards the Cape system.144  
It is important not to exaggerate the political significance of these debates: 
although certainly the period 1906-07, and indeed beyond, would see extensive 
efforts by political actors in Britain and South Africa to secure political and civil 
rights for the non-white populations, particularly the substantial Indian 
population in South Africa, this was rarely a political issue which developed a 
wider salience in the imperial politics of the country at large. Nonetheless, two 
important elements might be identified in the Radical rhetoric deployed in 
relation to the constitutional settlement for the two former colonies. First, even if 
the arguments deployed can be seen as representing the emerging Radical 
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vision of Empire in British politics in this period, it is striking the degree to which 
its advocates presented their positions not as new departures in imperial policy, 
but instead as defending the principles by which the Empire had supposedly 
been previously run. Just as the Liberal opposition sought to delegitimise the 
Lyttelton constitution by presenting it as a break with established wisdom and a 
departure from past policy, so too did Radical defenders of the non-white 
population seek to challenge the grant of responsible government without 
specific limitations. Second, it might be reflected that if this represented an 
extension of earlier critiques of the treatment of the non-white population in 
South Africa, it was not one which attributed mistreatment either to the specific 
character of the Boers or the mine-owners, but to the settler population of the 
territories as a whole. 
Despite the cross-currents increasingly emerging from Radical quarters, 
however, the Liberal leadership and their moderate supporters in the party 
resolutely stuck to their earlier narrative of responsible government as the 
measure which would finally resolve Anglo-Boer tensions in South Africa. 
Speaking at Morley on 2 February 1906, Asquith for example stated that 
following the election, the Liberal ministry would now grant responsible 
government to the Transvaal as soon as possible, 
in the confident belief and hope that in South Africa, as in 
Canada, it would result in the gradual effacing of racial 
distinctions, and in the combination and concentration of the 
common interests of a community to which both Boer and 
Briton belonged.145 
Likewise, in his Cockermouth speech Churchill characterised the grant of 
responsible government as representing their intention ‘to make the Boers 
practically partners in the British Empire’, expressing his hope that ‘this new 
Parliament will also be the signal for some cessation of that struggle, which has 
been so long protracted, between the Dutch and the British’.146 Even if in other 
respects the South African question had increasingly been framed in terms of 
the relationship between the white population and the non-white populations, 
whether Chinese or African, the core justification for responsible government 
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remained premised upon the idea of Anglo-Boer harmony as the key to 
successful governance of the region. Indeed, the persistence of this idea was 
further demonstrated by the continued characterisation of responsible 
government as the means by which the Transvaal would be rendered loyal to 
the Empire. Speaking at Wimborne on 6 August 1906, Churchill attacked 
Balfour as ‘unpatriotic and unworthy’ for having suggested that responsible 
government might be used by the Boers to launch a rebellion against British 
rule and seek a reversal of the war’s outcome.147 Having presented the Boers 
as co-participants in the British Empire, Liberals were now able to frame 
responsible government not simply as desirable, but as the only true patriotic 
and imperial outcome for South Africa. 
Ultimately, when the results of the new constitution delivered a victory for Het 
Volk and installed General Louis Botha as the premier of the Transvaal, Liberals 
presented this as the ultimate proof that their strategy, of loyalty following true 
self-government, had been the correct one. At the April 1907 Liberal banquet for 
the Colonial Premiers, hosted at the very restaurant where Campbell-
Bannerman had denounced Britain’s ‘methods of barbarism’ in South Africa, it 
fell upon R.B. Haldane to propose the toast to the party’s guests, including 
Botha himself. The former Liberal Imperialist, now installed as Secretary of 
State for War, referred to the Transvaal premier as: 
the head of a new Government and a Government he believed 
would become a great Government, and that had come about 
suddenly and unexpectedly to those who observed only the 
surface movement of things, but in the nature of events to those 
who appreciated and understood that great unwritten, ever-
changing, developing British constitution, which was the 
foundation of their liberties at home and across the seas, which 
held them together.148 
Rising in reply, Botha declared that ‘the Transvaal had received with gladness 
and gratitude the Constitution which had conferred upon them the inestimable 
privileges and rights of self-government.’ Noting that in the election ‘Englishmen 
voted for Boers and Boers for Englishmen’, Botha stated that his government 
                                            
147 Winston Churchill, speech at Wimborne, 6 Aug. 1906, reported in The 
Times, 7 Aug. 1906. 
148 R.B. Haldane, speech at Holborn Restaurant, London, 16 Apr. 1907, 
reported in The Times, 17 Apr. 1907. 
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‘owed its existence in no small measure to the vote of the British community’. 
His only request, he declared to loud cheering, was for the imperial government 
‘to help them to establish a united federated South African nation under the 
protection of the British flag.’149 If the Liberal government had not intended to 
grant self-government as a magnanimous gesture to the Boers, the long history 
of the party’s rhetoric on the South African question nonetheless gave its 
leaders, and indeed Botha, the language through which to explain and justify 
the move. 
The Liberal Party’s transition from opposition to government is ultimately 
remarkable not so much for how the party’s rhetoric on the South African 
question changed as a result, but also for how much it remained the same. The 
transformative effect of the grant of responsible government, the 
characterisation of Anglo-Boer relations as the key to resolving the South 
African question, and the need to avoid direct intervention in colonial affairs 
remained the key elements of the Liberal leadership’s rhetoric in this period. 
Likewise, the government’s growing base of Radical critics drew upon existing 
rhetorical strategies emphasising the primacy of established imperial practice 
and the insistence upon the good governance of Empire, even as they 
advanced new critiques emphasising protections and political rights for the 
Empire’s non-white subjects. Once again, in addressing the South African 
question, Liberals from across the party drew upon earlier rhetorical techniques 
in order to articulate their positions on new controversies and present them as 
logical extensions of existing Liberal policy. However, the party’s first year in 
charge of British South African policy nonetheless served to highlight the key 
tensions which had long existed at the heart of its imperial rhetoric. 
Conclusion: the End of the South African Question? 
The Liberal Party’s response to the politics of South African reconstruction 
followed naturally on from the party’s rhetoric at the time of the South African 
War. Although the central divisions within British Liberal politics over that 
conflict had by the time that the party entered government largely faded from 
public view, or had at the very least been transferred into other arenas of Liberal 
policy, the idealised narratives of imperial governance which had dominated 
                                            
149 Louis Botha, speech at Holborn Restaurant, London, 16 Apr. 1907, reported 
in The Times, 17 Apr. 1907. 
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Liberal rhetoric on South Africa continued to form the basis by which Liberals 
constructed and articulated their positions on the South African question. The 
push for full responsible government for the Transvaal, although certainly 
energised by the controversy over Chinese labour, represented a direct 
continuation of Liberal rhetoric from the time of the South African War, and 
indeed earlier debates. The idealised vision of an Empire of white settlement 
run on a self-governing, pluralistic basis remained at the very heart of the 
Liberal Party’s approach to South Africa, a principle the party leadership clung 
to all the more in government as obstacles and objections mounted in other 
areas. Even as the controversy over Chinese labour shifted the focus of the 
South African question into new fields, particularly in relation to the rise of white 
labourism, Liberal speakers nonetheless drew upon established rhetorical 
trends emphasising British exceptionalism, suspicions of sectional interests, 
and a fundamental link between the idea of racial harmony and the successful 
good governance of South Africa. Although the pressure to directly compete 
with rival visions of Liberal imperial politics had faded, the legacy of the party’s 
earlier battles over imperialism and the war continued to provide the rhetorical 
basis for Liberal rhetoric on South Africa, event after the party entered 
government. 
With the grant of responsible government to the Transvaal, the period of this 
thesis’ main focus of inquiry comes to something of a natural close. Although 
the colony’s return to self-government did not, of course, represent the end of 
South African concerns within British Liberal politics, the politics of the South 
African question as had broadly existed since the time of the Raid largely came 
to a conclusion. While certain aspects of South African affairs did continue to 
attract attention, such as during the parliamentary consideration of the South 
Africa Act in 1909, the question was never to emerge again in the Edwardian 
era as such a dominant political issue. This was in part because the 
circumstances of the Liberal Party had changed: Liberal rhetoric on the South 
African question had been forged in opposition, driven by a need both to 
respond to the claims of Unionist imperial policy and the escalation of events in 
South Africa, while at the same time also serving as the key battleground in the 
struggles over the leadership and direction of the Liberal Party. It was a rhetoric 
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driven by a need to advance a specifically Liberal politics of Empire, yet by 1907 
the political necessities which had driven this need had largely evaporated. 
More than this however, the grant of responsible government represented the 
end of the South African question in British Liberal politics as it had been 
conceptualised since the events of December 1895. The focus of the politics of 
the Raid and the Transvaal Crisis of 1899 on the position of the Uitlanders 
brought about a situation in which the problems of South Africa were framed as 
the challenge of managing relations between the British and the Dutch 
populations, effectively constructing the South African question as a ‘white’ 
question, with issues relating to the non-white majority in the region largely 
marginalised in Liberal rhetoric. Likewise, the focus on the forms of 
misgovernment perpetuated by the British South Africa Company and the 
government of the South African Republic served to place further emphasis 
upon the ideal of British imperial rule as embodying the principle of good 
governance through a decentralised, self-governing model of settler 
imperialism, even if Liberal arguments differed substantially on how such an 
outcome could be achieved. Critically, these two factors in combination meant 
that Liberal rhetoric on the South African question ultimately advanced a vision 
of South Africa in which free self-governing institutions for the settler 
populations would serve both as guarantors of the good governance of the 
region and facilitate the reconciliation of the two white races, transforming the 
Boers into loyal imperial subjects.  
The continuation of this rhetorical framework into the debates in the years 
following the war should not therefore simply be seen as an extension of Liberal 
rhetoric on the conduct of the war, but the natural result of how Liberals had 
conceptualised the nature of the South African question. Having identified 
Chinese Labour as continuing to exacerbate the same old problems of South 
Africa, responsible government was presented as the only obvious means by 
which the idealised Liberal vision of South Africa could be achieved. The grant 
of responsible government thus ultimately served to resolve the South African 
question as it had been understood. For the Radical opponents of this 
settlement, the continuation of Chinese Labour and the creation of the colour 
bar proved unacceptable to notions of good imperial governance, yet opposing 
such measures ultimately meant opposing the very settler self-government 
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which was supposed to remedy the problems of South Africa. As will be 
explored briefly in the conclusion, this new agitation would adopt many of the 
same rhetorical techniques which had characterised the Liberals’ earlier battles 
over South Africa and Empire, but it was ultimately a very different sort of South 
African question upon which the Radicals subsequently campaigned. 
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CONCLUSION: RHETORIC AND THE POLITICS OF EMPIRE 
From the Jameson Raid and the crisis of 1899, through the course of the South 
African War and into the reconstruction era, the spectre of a federal South 
Africa under the British flag had consistently loomed large in British debates on 
the South African question. It is something of an irony of history, therefore, that, 
when proposals to create a Union of South Africa were formally placed before 
Parliament in the summer of 1909, the debates over the plan were a mere echo 
of the heated Liberal controversies over South Africa which had gone before.1 
The proposals for federation, which had emerged from the National Convention 
at Durban the previous year and had been subsequently approved by the four 
colonial governments, envisaged a unitary structure for the new state with the 
aim of producing a strong centralised government. Critically, however, they also 
established an absolute colour bar for the new Union institutions while 
simultaneously establishing a constitutional mechanism by which the existing 
limited franchise for non-white imperial subjects in the Cape might be revoked.2  
It was with respect to the latter elements in particular that the passage of the 
South Africa Act has earned the condemnation of history. As Martin Meredith 
notes, a wave of oppressive legislation against the Black African population 
followed on swiftly from unification, while the structures of the new state 
facilitated the eventual rise of the National Party, setting South Africa on the 
road to apartheid.3 In reacting to the proposals for federation, the elements of 
the Liberal Party which had previously objected to the exclusive franchise in the 
Transvaal Colony again sought to make their concerns known. Sir Charles 
Dilke, among others, attempted to lobby the Colonial Office with the support of 
                                            
1 However, much of the parliamentary opposition on the issue came from the 
Labour benches, with Keir Hardie and Ramsay MacDonald particularly active 
across the two days of debate. 
2 The impetus for federation owed much to the activities of Lord Selborne as 
high commissioner; likewise, through Selborne the Colonial Office was closely 
involved in the proceedings at Durban, although it generally suited the Liberal 
government to portray the cause of federation as an organic one arising from 
the settler populations themselves. For details, see David E. Torrance, The 
Strange Death of the Liberal Empire: Lord Selborne in South Africa (Liverpool: 
1996), ch.9; Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok: 
Britain and South Africa since the Boer War (Cambridge: 2003), ch.4. 
3 Martin Meredith, Diamonds, Gold and War: The Making of South Africa 
(London: 2007), pp.521-522. 
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several colonial delegations opposed to the measures.4 In terms of the public 
debate, however, this dispute over the terms of federation only generated 
significant interest when the South Africa Bill came before the House of 
Commons. 
Leading the Liberal rebellion in the Commons, Dilke sought to undermine the 
government’s stance by challenging the right of the colonial settler governments 
to speak for South Africa, attacking the bill for ‘making the four Colonies 
masters, to a certain extent, of two-thirds of South Africa outside those four 
Colonies’.5 Yet, even in seeking to disrupt the certainties which had 
underpinned Liberal rhetoric on South Africa, as in 1906 Dilke nonetheless also 
drew upon notions of a pre-existing idealised model of Empire, against which 
Union could be characterised as a dangerous departure. The South Africa Bill, 
he charged, would end the struggle of ‘the old British principle as against the 
Boer principle - the principle of equality of rights’, noting that the South African 
War had in part been justified as an assertion of the Cape system.6 His 
colleague Ellis Griffith likewise adapted earlier narratives on the importance of 
race harmony for British governance, declaring that ‘the security of white rule in 
South Africa, the security of Imperial supremacy in South Africa, depends to a 
large extent upon the willing and active loyalty of the subject races’, loyalty 
which he argued Union would diminish.7 In this manner, both Dilke and Griffith 
were falling back on established Liberal rhetorical tactics, even as they sought 
to reframe the South African question as one not of Anglo-Boer relations, but 
instead concerning the subject populations of the Empire. Their Liberal 
colleagues, however, responded by continuing to stress Anglo-Boer 
reconciliation and the need to obtain the support of settler opinion. A.C. Beck, 
the Liberal member for Wisbech, warned that it was imperial interference in 
native affairs which had estranged the Boers and triggered the Great Trek, 
insisting instead that the new government of South Africa would simply have to 
be trusted to adopt a statesmanlike position on the non-white races.8 Bringing 
the debates on the bill to a close, Asquith acknowledged that all sides of the 
                                            
4 Hyam and Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok, pp.82-83. 
5 HC Deb. 16 Aug. 1909, fifth series, Vol.9 c.975. 
6 Ibid. 
7 HC Deb. 16 Aug. 1909, fifth series, Vol.9 cc.999-1000. 
8 HC Deb. 16 Aug. 1909, fifth series, Vol.9 cc.1023-1027. 
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House of Commons had reservations about the implementation of the colour 
bar, but declared nonetheless that it would be far better for any extension of the 
franchise ‘be carried out spontaneously, and on the initiative of the South 
African Parliament, rather than they should appear to be forced upon them by 
the Imperial Parliament here.’9 A backbench effort to disrupt the third reading 
failed, and the South Africa Bill passed the House of Commons entirely 
unamended.   
Whatever anxiety Liberals felt over the consequences of union for the Black 
African and Asian populations of South Africa, it did not prevent the party from 
championing the measure as a triumph for Liberal imperial policy. In a speech 
at Branksome on 31 July 1909, Winston Churchill, by now elevated to the 
Cabinet as President of the Board of Trade, hailed the ‘miracle of South Africa’ 
as a ‘living testimony to the truth and power and solvent forces of Liberal 
principles when they were boldly applied’. Where before in South Africa there 
had been bitterness and hatred, he continued, ‘there was now union and 
reconciliation and prosperity’.10 Churchill’s rhetoric was echoed by Lord Crewe, 
the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, who at a speech in Glasgow the 
following month declared that:  
the South African Union has been brought about with the most 
amazing rapidity owing to the great quality of the statesmen of 
both races in South Africa, and to the happy fusion for the 
purpose of those two races, as they hoped to attain a new era 
in the country.11 
The language invoked by Churchill and Crewe hailed back to earlier Liberal 
narratives: the South African question invoked by the speakers remained that of 
Anglo-Boer relations and the legacy of the war, a problem which the Liberals’ 
trust in the two settler populations’ character and capacity for self-government 
had resolved, vindicating the Liberal basis on which the Empire was to be 
governed. An imperial question which had from the beginning been debated in 
the rhetoric of an idealised Liberal Empire was now declared to have been 
resolved by the very same Liberal ideals. 
                                            
9 HC Deb, 19 Aug. 1909, fifth series, Vol.9 c.1657. 
10 Winston Churchill, speech at Branksome, 31 Jul. 1909, reported in Aberdeen 
Daily Journal, 2 Aug. 1909. 
11 Lord Crewe, speech at Glasgow, 20 Aug. 1909, reported in Aberdeen Daily 
Journal, 21 Aug. 1909. 
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How then is the Liberal Party’s rhetoric on the South African question to be 
understood? Clearly, there did not exist a singular definitive vision of Empire for 
Liberal speakers, let alone a technical blueprint for imperial rule. Liberal rhetoric 
was instead framed on a series of collective assumptions about the ideals of 
British imperial rule, which were presumed to exist throughout the Empire of 
white settlement. Fundamentally, it was these assumptions which determined 
how Liberals characterised the problem of South Africa, framing each of the four 
episodes examined here as difficulties arising out of, and threatening to further 
exacerbate, race disharmony and misgovernment. Fuelled by failings of 
character and the corrupting influence of sectional interests, Liberals presented 
such problems as threats not just Britain’s long-term position in the region but 
also to the character of the Empire as a whole. These same assumptions also 
shaped Liberal remedies for the problems of South Africa, fuelling the conviction 
that localised self-government would bring about a union of the settler 
populations and ensure good governance or was at least a precondition for 
such developments.  
Yet, if it was the ideals of Liberal Empire which framed Liberal responses to the 
South African question, it was nonetheless a set of ideals which inevitably 
fractured when applied to the reality both of the situation in South Africa and of 
the political contexts in Britain, the fundamental tensions between self-
government and good governance providing time after time a basis for division 
within the Liberal ranks. Indeed, Liberal responses were further complicated by 
the intrusion of what might be termed the ideals of the dependent Empire into a 
sphere which Liberal speakers consistently sought to frame in the ideals of the 
settler Empire. The impossibility of translating an idealised vision of British 
imperial rule into a practical imperial policy for South Africa nonetheless goes 
some way towards explaining why, when Liberal rhetoric embodied an 
essentially common approach to Empire, the issue nonetheless proved such 
fertile ground for Liberal divisions. 
It is also worthwhile reflecting on why such language constituted a specifically 
Liberal rhetoric of Empire, as opposed to a body of rhetoric which Liberal 
speakers simply happened to use. Although it would be wrong to imply that the 
core elements of this rhetoric were somehow exclusively Liberal, existing in 
isolation from the wider political culture in which it was found, this rhetoric might 
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nonetheless be described as fundamentally Liberal because Liberal speakers 
themselves sought to claim it as such. From Sir Edward Grey’s boast that 
Britain possessed a truly ‘Liberal’ Empire to John Morley’s characterisation of 
his opposition to Unionist policy as essentially Gladstonian in nature, and most 
significantly of all in the Roseberyite campaign for Liberal Imperialism, Liberal 
speakers consistently sought to present their position on South African and 
imperial questions as explicitly Liberal in nature. The fractious divisions within 
the party during the South African War served to create a political climate in 
which speakers needed to defend their claims to speak for Liberal opinion in 
responding to events in South Africa, a position which necessitated a form of 
imperial rhetoric which could be claimed to be distinctly Liberal. Furthermore, 
this rhetoric was essentially Liberal in relation to why it existed as a 
phenomenon at all. For all the diverse purposes to which it was put, Liberal 
rhetoric on the South African question fundamentally served to justify a version 
of imperial rule differentiated both from that of the party’s political opponents 
and from the traditional Caesarist notions of imperialism which remained a part 
of the political discourse. In this sense, this was a Liberal rhetoric not simply 
because it was used by Liberal speakers, but ultimately because of the political 
contexts in which it was articulated and the political purposes it served. 
The focus of this thesis has been on the specific phenomenon of British Liberal 
politics, rather than on the presence in imperial debates of liberalism more 
widely. Yet while Liberal politics cannot be seen simply as the manifestation of 
liberalism within the British parliamentary system, it is nonetheless worth 
considering the extent to which this also represented a liberal rhetoric of 
Empire. Certainly, a suspicion of government power and military power in 
particular, as seen both in Liberal Imperialist characterisations of the Kruger 
government at the time of the war’s outbreak and in Campbell-Bannerman’s 
denunciations of martial law in the Cape Colony, can be seen as suggestive of 
the wider influence of liberalism (however it might be defined) upon the Liberal 
Party’s imperial outlook. Indeed, these debates can be said to demonstrate 
Miles Taylor’s assessment that the debates over Empire in the period after 1895 
reflected mid-century concerns over imperialism as representing conquest-
driven despotism: the characterisation of Chartered Company, Boer and British 
administrations in South Africa as examples of autocratic misrule served as 
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both as a criticism of despotic imperialism and a defence of the supposedly 
liberal values of traditional British rule.12 Likewise, the emphasis placed upon 
the rule of law, whether applied at the regional level or within the republics and 
colonies, and particularly the Liberal focus on governing structures can be seen 
as reflecting the emphasis on constitutionalism identified by Mira Matikkala, 
forming part of a wider liberal conceptualisation of the issues surrounding 
Empire as a whole.13 Furthermore, the Liberal Party’s rhetoric on the South 
African question broadly supports Uday Singh Mehta’s assessments of the 
paternalistic impulses of liberalism in the imperial sphere: as demonstrated in 
the debates over the Boer treatment of the Black African population, the 
positions taken by Liberals often illustrated tensions between a liberal optimism 
in the potential of the civilising mission and a liberal pessimism necessitating 
less idealistic modes of imperial rule in the name of good government.14  
Yet, in spite of all this, the most striking element that emerges from this study of 
Liberal rhetoric is the extent to which it represented not so much a liberal 
politics of Empire as it did a conservative one. Liberal speakers consistently 
spoke of the idealised Empire as pre-existing, the tensions in South Africa the 
result of deviations, whether British or Boer, from the traditional practices of 
British imperial rule, and active intervention in South Africa was justified as 
either pre-empting further decay or restoring a previous state of affairs. Even 
the more obviously innovative imperial visions that emerged in Liberal politics in 
this period, from Lord Rosebery’s Liberal Imperialism to the emergence of 
Radical ideas on trusteeship, were generally framed within the narratives of the 
British imperial tradition and the organic development of Empire. 
Considering questions of British political culture more generally, rhetoric played 
a critical role in shaping the meaning of imperial questions within British politics, 
serving to situate such issues within the wider dynamics of party political 
contest and national debate. More than simply imbuing imperial questions with 
                                            
12 Miles Taylor, ‘Imperium et Libertas? Rethinking the radical critique of 
imperialism during the nineteenth century’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 19:1 (1991). 
13 Mira Matikkala, Empire and Imperial Ambition: Liberty, Englishness and Anti-
Imperialism in Late Victorian Britain (London: 2011). 
14 Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century 
British Liberal Thought (Chicago: 1999). 
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their political meaning, it was through the public medium of rhetoric which the 
very ideals of Empire were contested within British political culture. The 
rhetorical dimensions of the South African question enabled Liberal speakers of 
all persuasions to elevate specific aspects of imperial policy into matters of 
principle, contesting both Unionist accounts of the nature of the South African 
question and those of their rivals within the Liberal Party. Indeed, the very 
flexibility of this imperial rhetoric allowed the South African question to become 
both a key driver of the split within the Liberal Party and its most visible 
reflection. Yet while this rhetoric of Empire was indeed sufficiently flexible to 
allow for Liberal speakers to advance their own positions on South Africa, it was 
not infinitely malleable or exclusively a means of opening up rhetorical space for 
speakers. In shaping understandings of Empire and ascribing political meaning 
to events in South Africa, speakers did not simply open up new rhetorical 
spaces for themselves, but also closed off or otherwise adjusted the scope of 
political action for subsequent speakers.15  
This was true not just in relation to the Liberal Party’s internal divisions, but 
across British politics as a whole. For example, during the crisis of 1899 even 
Liberals strongly opposed to a confrontationist policy nonetheless had to frame 
their responses with reference to the Unionist characterisation of the Uitlanders 
as British subjects and the idea of British paramountcy. Likewise, Liberal 
rhetoric in Opposition on the importance of Boer self-government following the 
cessation of hostilities restricted the incoming Liberal government’s scope for 
action after 1905: having characterised the continuing problems of 
reconstruction-era South Africa as caused by the failure to implement true self-
government, Campbell-Bannerman’s ministry could not have easily adopted an 
alternative course in office.16  
                                            
15 In this sense, this Liberal rhetoric of Empire can be understood as conforming 
to the framework advanced by Richard Toye in relation to post-war British 
political rhetoric on the Commonwealth, in which ‘each player in turn shifted the 
ground on which those who followed were forced to debate’. See Richard Toye, 
‘’Words of Change: the Rhetoric of Commonwealth, Common Market and Cold 
War, 1961–3’, in Larry Butler and Sarah Stockwell (eds), The Wind of Change: 
Howard Macmillan and British Decolonization (Basingstoke: 2013), p.154. 
16 Indeed, the flak that the Campbell-Bannerman government received from 
Unionist opponents and from its own radical supporters over the failure to 
secure the immediate removal of Chinese labour from the Rand demonstrates 
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Considerations over the role rhetoric played in shaping the wider direction of 
British politics also invite us to ask further questions about the role of 
newspapers in facilitating these developments, particularly the function of the 
detailed speech report. Although this thesis has concentrated in the main on the 
rhetoric of Liberal politicians, and indeed primarily on the rhetoric deployed in 
extra-parliamentary speeches, the role of the Press has been central to the 
rhetoric examined in this study. Not only is it newspaper reports which serve to 
provide the present-day historian with a mediated record of the rhetoric 
deployed by Liberal speakers, but it was also newspaper reports of speeches, 
including parliamentary speeches, which served as the primary medium by 
which contemporary audiences consumed the rhetoric of leading political 
figures. Yet the Press did not simply act as a means of political communication, 
but also directly participated in the processes of shaping rhetoric, contesting 
political meaning and, significantly, framing ideas as to what represented public 
or party opinion. Indeed, one might make the point that it was this very function 
of the Press with its practices of printing detailed reports of political speeches 
which enabled both the contest over what it meant to be a Liberal on questions 
of Empire, and indeed the wider contest for who could claim to speak for British 
Liberal opinion, to take place in the country at large at all.  
Additionally, the rhetoric examined in this thesis also offers insights into wider 
imperial attitudes within fin-de-siècle British politics. At the heart of both 
imperialist and anti-imperialist narratives lay an insistence of British 
exceptionalism, the conviction that the Empire was both morally and materially 
superior to the empires of other nations, or at very least that the Empire was 
supposed to be superior. Rosebery’s boast that Britain was the only Empire 
which would happily fix all borders, Campbell-Bannerman’s allusions to Spanish 
imperial practices in condemning British war tactics, and the anti-slavery 
legacies invoked in the Chinese labour controversy all reflected this 
exceptionalist tendency. Critically, this exceptionalism does not appear to have 
simply been an expression of confidence in British imperial methods, but 
fundamentally constituted a belief in the exceptionalism of the British character: 
P.J. Cain’s emphasis upon the role of character as key to late-Victorian 
                                                                                                                                
the degree to which a previously useful line of rhetoric could subsequently 
create political liabilities further down the line. 
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justifications of imperial rule would certainly appear to be borne out by this 
study.17   
Yet the rhetoric of the South African question also suggests an anxiety at the 
heart of the metropole’s imperial outlook. Surveying the spectre of imperial 
decline in twentieth-century politics, John Darwin has argued that, despite the 
‘fear of falling’, explicitly imperial declinist movements made relatively little 
headway in British politics, with party elites from across the political spectrum 
cooperating in the downplaying of imperial questions and the cushioning of the 
British public from imperial decay.18 However applicable Darwin’s analysis may 
or may not be for the bulk of the period he examines, what is striking is the 
degree to which the ‘fear of falling’ he describes can be seen as reflected 
throughout the politics of the South African question, with the Empire 
consistently framed as at risk from not just military but existential threats. 
Indeed, this existential fragility of Empire can be seen as sufficiently pervasive 
that Liberal speakers characterised their ideals of Empire as not simply moral 
and effective modes of imperial governance, but critically the only methods by 
which imperial degradation could be staved off. Articulated in an environment in 
which Unionists too were warning of the threats to Empire, not least the threat 
posed by a Liberal government, the rhetoric of Empire within British politics at 
the end of the Victorian era was, fundamentally, a rhetoric of insecurity. 
The rhetoric of Empire explored in this thesis additionally serves to demonstrate 
the wider significance of imperial politics within late-Victorian and Edwardian 
Britain, posing challenges to the minimalist account of Britain’s imperial past. 
Andrew Porter’s characterisation of the South African question, as one shunned 
as far as possible by Liberals keen to return to domestic questions, fails to 
account for the ideals of imperial rule which lay at the heart of the Liberals’ 
rhetorical responses, or indeed for the degree to which the debates over 
imperial policy represented a wider struggle over the future of Liberal politics.19 
                                            
17 P.J. Cain, ‘Character, ‘Ordered Liberty’, and the Mission to Civilise: British 
Moral Justification of Empire, 1870–1914’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 40:4 (2012). 
18 John Darwin, ‘The Fear of Falling: British Politics and Imperial Decline Since 
1900’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 36 (1986). 
19 Andrew Porter, ‘The South African War and Imperial Britain: A Question of 
Significance?’ in Greg Cuthbertson, Albert Grundlingh and Mary-Lynn Suttie 
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Neither does the complex and dynamic nature of Liberal imperial rhetoric 
explored in this thesis fit in easily with traditional interpretations of imperial 
politics as an elite proselytising exercise inflicted upon an uninterested 
population. While undoubtedly an element of propaganda existed in these 
debates, Liberal speakers from across the spectrum of opinion in the party did 
not broadcast their ideas in a vacuum: it was an awareness of the need to win 
over sections of Liberal and public opinion to their own positions on South Africa 
that compelled Liberal speakers to adopt and adapt the language of Empire. 
Imperial rhetoric served as the means of political communication, rather than 
just the product of it.  
Finally, this thesis challenges the idea that the period of the South African War 
represented a brief imperial aberration in a British political culture otherwise 
untroubled by Empire. The persistent minimalist portrayal of the South African 
War as a short-lived ‘climax’ of the new imperialism followed by a swift return to 
apathy and scepticism, a characterisation notably advanced in Bernard Porter’s 
most recent work on the British Empire, ultimately presents only a part of the 
wider political picture.20 While the war represented a specific period of high 
salience, it did not call into being a hastily constructed and temporary rhetoric of 
Empire. Instead, as this thesis has demonstrated the rhetorical framework in 
which imperial questions were debated was already evident in the political 
responses to the Jameson Raid and would remain dominant throughout the 
subsequent politics of South African reconstruction. This rhetoric in turn did not 
exist in isolation, as much as it was a product of political and imperial turmoil of 
the fin de siècle: rather, Liberals had continuously framed and reframed this 
rhetoric in relation to other imperial debates. The South African question was 
not therefore a superficial issue or an imperial ‘moment of madness’ at the 
dawn of the twentieth century, but instead must be understood as the product of 
a political culture in which, fundamentally, imperial questions mattered. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
(eds), Writing a Wider War: Rethinking Gender, Race and Identity in the South 
African War, 1899-1902 (Athens, OH: 2002). 
20 Bernard Porter, British Imperial: What the Empire Wasn’t (London: 2016), 
pp.101-03. 
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